PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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Amanullah Memon

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FOREWORD

The Allama Iqbal Open University since its inception in 1974 has rendered valuable contribution in dissemination of learning in a wide range of studies through its framework of Distance Learning System.

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I would put on record my appreciation for efforts of STEPS Committee which made the dream of Short-Term Educational Programmes come true.

(Prof. Javaid Iqbal Syed)
Vice-Chancellor
COURSE DESCRIPTION

PAKISTAN RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

By

Aman Ullah Memon

Pakistan came into being as the result of historical struggle of Indian Muslims. The objectives of creation of a new state were to achieve the two prong goals: 1. of securing "territory where Islamic ideology could be practiced" and 2. "to make Muslim brotherhood a reality - promote fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries".

Soon after independence Pakistan was pushed into severe security and economic threats. In order to meet these menaces Pakistan looked at the Muslim world for help and assistance. During the first phase (1947-54), Pakistan's external behaviour, it was geared towards establishing cordial relations with the Muslim countries. According to S. M. Burke, since at that time "Islam was not an issue in the politics of other Muslim Lands so Pakistan's efforts could not bear fruit." Hence, Pakistan decided to join Western Pacts. Pakistan's decision to join Western Pacts further proved detrimented to its relations with some of the Muslim Countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. After disenchantment from the Western allies, Pakistan adopted the policy of bilateralism. During 1972-77 once again conscious efforts were made to improve relations with the Third World and Muslim Countries. According to Shirin Tahir Kheli, Pakistan's foreign policy portrayed a national commitment towards Islamic Solidarity are established cordial relations with the oil rich Muslim states of Middle East. By during that, infact Pakistan played vital role in bringing these muslim states into the fold of the Third World countries and gave them a collective strength.

Pakistan not only made conscious efforts to improve its bilateral relations with Muslim countries but also played a leading role in providing a collective platform to the Muslim states. In this connection one can quote Pakistan's active participation in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as well as in its sub-organizations like Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF), Islamic Economic and Scientific Cooperation (IESCO). According to Devlet Khalid all these projects were "more or less Saudi Arabian/Pakistan joint ventures".

In 1948, Pakistan sincerely supported Indonesian Muslims' struggle at government as well as at public level against the Dutch colonialisms. The people of Pakistan organized protest rallies and Pakistan government suspended the
license of the Dutch airline, KLM. When the Indonesians achieved independence, Pakistan celebrated that event as a public holiday. In the Arab Israel Wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 Pakistan supported Arabs against Israel, morally and materially. In UNO and outside, Pakistan strongly condemned Israel's aggression and expansionist acts. During the 1973 war, Pakistan boldly supported Syrians by sending a number of fighters Pilots to strengthen its defence against Israeli aggression. Pakistan stood by the Afghan struggle against Russian invasion. In the Recent past Pakistan has strongly advocated the cause of Bosnian Muslims at all available forums. During the Gulf war, when Iraq was attacked by 28 world powers under the US leadership, the people of Pakistan raised their voice for Iraqi people and the storm of protests was witnessed in the cities and towns of Pakistan. All these facts adequately reveal Pakistan's commitment at both government and mass levels in support of Muslim brotherhood.

Pakistan's struggle against the British Colonialism and Hindu domination brought Pakistan into the camp of anti-colonial countries who believed in the right of self-determination. This was the main determinant which forced Pakistan to support the struggle of Indonesian people against the Dutch colonial designs. Pakistan also stood with the African people in their struggle against Italian and French colonialism. In this regard one can quote the precedent of Pakistan's support for the people of Ethiopia, Libya, Eritaria, Somalia, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. Pakistan also supported the South African's struggle against the apartheid on world forums. In fact, in this way, Pakistan supported the cause of Third world countries for their struggle against colonialism, imperialism and racism.

On the issue of North South conflict, Pakistan also pleaded the cause of South against the economic exploitation of the North. Criticizing the economic policies of North (rich or developed nations).

"A former Prime Minister of Pakistan Z. A. Bhutto maintained, "there is an urgent need to provide the poorer countries an insurance against disasters. The future of the less privilege cannot be allowed to depend upon growing inequality. Ways have to be found to improve the terms of trade of the Third world to remove the inequality of quotas and trade restrictions in the affluent countries and to reduce the paralyzing burden of external debt which is largely a result of unequal trade and exchange between the poor and the rich."

These facts reflect Pakistan's clear commitment to the cause of the poor nations of the Asia, Africa and Latin America which are also known as the Third world countries. Since Muslim countries are the part of third world so by advocating the cause of the third world countries, Pakistan also pleads the case of the Muslim world. So it would be appropriate to say that Pakistan played a vital role to weld the struggle of the Muslim countries with the struggle of third world countries. It is hoped that after going through this course students will be able to analyse the thesis that, instead of dealing with issues related to the Muslim world in isolation it seems appropriate to link them with the world issues.
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READING 1

IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY: ISLAM AND PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

By Shirin Tahir Kheli

One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslim. As critical moments in their history, it is Islam that has saved the Muslims and not vice-versa. (Iqbal)

This view is certainly corroborated by Pakistan’s history since 1971. After nearly a quarter century of frustration, Islamic renaissance has finally touched “official” Pakistan. This chapter examines a particular facet of this contact: that is, has Islam motivated any aspects of Pakistani foreign policy? If so, what has been the impact of Pakistani foreign policy on the Islamic world? And, finally, how has the Islamic world impinged on Pakistan?

The Background

External relations have always been of major importance to Pakistan. The trauma of partition and the unfortunate history of subsequent Indo-Pakistani relations ensured almost an obsession with threats to national security. In search of ways to supplement military capability, the Pakistani elite looked toward the only major source of assistance available at the time – the United States. Even as Pakistan entered into alliance relationships with the West, it regularly expressed a desire to cultivate its Islamic ties, reminding the Muslim world that Pakistan was the only modern state created exclusively in the name of Islam.

These exhortations were more than mere lip service, but they were less than a definite commitment to the evolution of a purely Islamic state. Given the feeling that the first requirement was “security” above all else, in the perception of the elite the Muslim world looked weak and incapable in the 1950s of supplying the wherewithal required for Pakistani defence. Thus, Suhrawardy’s comment as prime minister in 1956 that Pakistani cultivation of ties with Islamic countries was difficult because zero plus zero still equals zero has to be taken in the perspective of overall defence needs.

The development of the Western connection did not simply occur by default. Deliberate options were pursued by the Pakistani elite, which was primarily Western in its orientation. Years of exposure to the West was a direct consequent of the British Raj, and the resultant Western socialization of the elite led it to look to the West. Throughout the formative year, Pakistan’s political, military and bureaucratic elite, who constituted the policy-making group, moved the nation in directions that were contrary to the fundamental Islamic ideology that was officially espoused by the state. A two-tier system evolved: a mass culture which was steeped in ethnic and religious traditions; and an elite culture which mimicked the West, at least in its outer trappings.
The exclusively Eastern orientation of Pakistani foreign policy in the 1950-62 period was promoted to the people as a necessity occasioned not only by threats from Hindu India, but as a means of securing Pakistan from the "Godless communists". Thus was Pakistan's identification with anti-Soviet and (to a lesser degree) anti-Chinese alliances projected. This identification was not simply a figment of the elite's imagination. Given their pro-Western proclivities, Pakistani leaders shared prevailing Western antipathy toward communism. During these years, Islam was routinely used by the elite to justify a foreign policy chosen for other reasons.

Disenchantment with the West, particularly the US set in firmly after the later's shipment of arms to India in 1962. Ayub Khan, who had been particularly instrumental in foreign ties with the US was deeply stung by the extent of the American support for India following the Sino-Indian clash. At that time, finally, the elite admitted the raison d'etre of the alliance relationship. In the first real public debate on foreign policy, Foreign Minister, Bogra, who had served as Prime Minister in 1954 when Pakistan signed the defence agreement with the US, said:

*When we entered into these pacts ...... we did so purely for defensive purpose ... We were in desperate need of arms and equipment and while we are interested in the defence of our region, we were no less interested in boosting the moral of our people. Now with a change in military strategy, the military importance of these pacts has necessarily diminished ...... Friends that let us down will no longer be considered our friends.*

The balance brought into Pakistani foreign policy after 1962 led to the normalization of relations with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. Close relations with Islamic countries remained a desired but distant goal. US-Pakistani relations dipped to a low after the imposition of the American arms embargo following the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. Not until after the election of Richard Nixon to the US presidency and the subsequent Pakistani role in arranging Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing did Islamabad re-focus on the American connection.

The rise of Bengali nationalism and its culmination in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 was taken by many outside Pakistan to mean that the experiment in Muslim nationalism, epitomized in the idea of Pakistan and the subsequent partitioning of India, had failed. To observers who felt that Jinnah's "two nation" theory was based on a false premise, the disintegration of Pakistan of 1947 was eminent proof of the fact that twentieth-century nationalism needed more than religion to glue together a nation

Quite unexpectedly, the loss of East Pakistan did not result in Pakistan embracing a secular philosophy. Rather, a process of closer and ever more deliberate identification with Islam began to take place. This development was in part a consequence of internal Pakistani dynamics. A major impetus, however, came from external events over which Pakistan had little or no control.
Shift in Focus

The 'loss' of East Pakistan was traumatic enough an event, but the manner in which the eastern wing separated was of major consequence to the policy-makers of Pakistan. The adverse reaction in the Western world to the army’s crackdown on East Pakistan left the image of a Pakistan in shambles. In 1972 began a painful process of international rehabilitation. In the face of isolation from the rest of the 'civilized' world, the Pakistani psyche turned inward.

The mind of [the] Pakistani intellectual has often been agitated by a consideration of the question of our national identity ... But since the traumatic events necessity ... What are the links that bind the people of Pakistan? What is the soul and personality of Pakistan? What is our national identity and our peculiar oneness which makes us a nation apart from other nations?

Zulifkar Ali Bhutto, the new leader of a beaten and truncated Pakistan, understood the new reality of a changed position. It was obvious that Pakistan's interest in South East Asian affairs had vanished with the formation of Bangladesh. Furthermore, India's powerful position after 1971 substantially raised the costs of any future conflict. While Pakistan could not ignore the Indian 'threat'; it had to look elsewhere for a new focus with which to revitalize the country's foreign policy. As summed up by Bhutto:

The severance of our eastern wing by force has significantly altered our geographic focus. This will naturally affect our geo-political perspective ... at the moment, as we stand, it is within the ambit of South and Western Asia. It is here that our primary concern must henceforth lie.

The change in focus to South-west Asia meshed neatly with the resurgence of Islam in the wake of the reassessment of national identity. The rediscovery of Islamic roots offered the Pakistani elite a chance of moving nearer a public that had always remained closer to Islam than had the leadership. Furthermore, the move offered a way out of public outcry against the debacle of 1971.

Pakistani foreign policy in 1972 emphasized the country's links to the Islamic world. The political leadership and the Foreign office actively sought an identification of the Pakistani position on the non-recognition of Bangladesh (because of the use of Indian military force and the incarceration of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in India) with that of other Islamic countries. Regular consultations particularly with the conservative Arab regimes, became part of a new pattern of diplomacy. Disappointment with Western alliances was accompanied with a great deal of frustration at the inability of the PRC to move forcefully in support of Pakistan in the 1971 war.

Much of the distress with post directions of Pakistani foreign policy was the consequence of the fact that, because of its perceptions of particular vulnerability, the Pakistani elite felt the need for dependency beyond the realm of ordinary alliance. Instead, what was desired was a linkage which would 'transcend immediate self-interest because it [was] based not upon a calculation of gain and loss, but a commitment involving deeper moral obligations between the two parties'. Thus, after 1971, the Islamic world offered Pakistan a chance to seek out the 'deeper moral obligations'.

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The Islamic Connection

The development of a new and vigorous Islamic consciousness after 1973 took place in all countries with substantial Muslim populations, albeit to varying degrees. For Pakistan, Islam offered new opportunities as much as it satisfied old desires. There were a number of ways in which the formulation and execution of Pakistani foreign policy was touched by Islamic resurgence.

In the first place, Islam reinforced the national interest. If the first and most fundamental Pakistani concern remained survival as a nation state, the renewed interest in Islam worldwide made the national commitment toward Islamic values sound insurance. Henceforth, any attack on Pakistan became not simply a clash of rival states, but rather an attack threatening the destruction of the Islamic state, thus drawing in other Islamic powers. Secondly, Islam bestowed an instant ideology on Pakistan. It helped rationalize years of vacillating foreign policy orientations by finding a suitable niche for Pakistan in the world's competing ideologies.

Thirdly, Pakistani foreign policy capitalized on the economic assets of the oil-rich Muslim states by linking these counties to the rest of the Third World, of which Pakistan was a part; a process which "world complement their individual resources and given them collective strength." Thus, Pakistan could be useful in adding to the overall strength of the Muslim block in return for assistance to shore up its economic and diplomatic position. The Pakistani leadership successfully sold this argument and hammered away at the opportunities which had been opened up because the 'Muslim countries are now so placed as to be able to play a most constructive and rewarding role for cooperation among themselves and with other countries of the Third World."

Pakistan did not have to compete with India within the Islamic block, whereas in the Third World movement, India remained a formidable force, one which Pakistani foreign policy endeavored to displace. Thus, by clever public relations tactics, Pakistan set out to destroy the myth of Indian non-alignment by citing the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 as proof of what Pakistan considered to be near total alignment of India with the Soviet Union. In this venture, Islamabad was greatly assisted by the PRC which had itself worked hard to gain access to the Third World movement, and whose goals in decrying the Indo-Soviet axis paralleled those of Pakistan.

As Pakistani diplomats worked to reduce India's prestige in the Third World movement, the embarked simultaneously on an active campaign to focus movement's attention on its connections with the Islamic world. Islam's lared principles of concern for the less fortunate, absence of caste system, condemnation of racial bias, and its outward-looking philosophy to entate in auggle for a more equitable world order were cited. Thus, Pakistan diplomats constantly tried to project their country as a champion of Islamic and Third World causes, and saw Pakistan's political and economic destiny linked to this block.

Throughout the 1970s Pakistan achieved considerable success in these endeavors, whereby it used the Islamic links to help gain access to the Third World movement, and the latter to further cement Pakistan's ties to the Islamic
world. These ties, along with the Third World connections, were extremely beneficial to Pakistan. For example, they enabled Islamabad successfully to resist Washington’s pressure on limiting Pakistan’s nuclear programme. It also made it enormously more difficult for the French to reneg on their contractual agreement to supply a nuclear reprocessing plant. The French came under heavy US pressure to cancel the deal, but given France’s very considerable dependence on Middle East oil and its lucrative commercial interests in the Arab world, the existence of the Pakistani connection with these nations checkmated US pressure for a number of years.

Fourthly, Pakistani diplomacy brought the earlier experience with Pakistan’s ‘bilateral tri-lateralism’, namely good relations bilaterally with each of the three superpowers, to bear on the cultivation of friendly ties with three important Muslim countries: Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya. As Islamabad paid homage to Saudi Arabia for being the centre of the Islamic world, and King Faysal as the Keeper of the Faith, the Shah was cultivated as an enlightened monarch and an old friend of Pakistan, while Libya’s Colonel Qadhafi was welcomed with a great deal of pomp and ceremony.

Finally, an Islamic summit, the second ever, was called for February 1974 in Lahore, Pakistan, and attended by 37 countries. The meeting was sponsored jointly by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Though its immediate goal was the liberation of Jerusalem and Arab lands held by Israel, the agenda was more broadly based and encompassed the role of the Muslim states in global perspective. The Islamic Conference institutionalized Pakistan’s role as a key Muslim state. The fact that a Pakistani leader was elected Chairman of the Conference reflected the new-found identity which enabled Islamabad to play a more dynamic role in Islamic affairs than warranted by virtue of its size and economic resources.

The Economic Dimension

The economic costs of political agitation in 1971 were high. In May Pakistan was forced to request an extraordinary moratorium on its aid repayments. Then came the war which cost some $200 million in lost military equipment. To make up for these losses, Pakistan spent $115 million on military purchases in 1972, and defence expenditures rose to the highest percentage of the annual GNP – i.e. 6.7 percent. Pakistan desperately needed to increase its exports in order to underwrite economic reconstruction and military improvement.

In a variety of ways, the Islamic countries of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula were particularly helpful after 1971. First, they quickly replaced Bangladesh as a market for Pakistani exports. Secondly, after the oil-price increase of 1973, the oil-rich states began to underwrite the cost of economic programmes in Pakistan as they augmented the more traditional sources of assistance. While, in general, the aid was erratic and personal in nature, certain countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran did give project assistance, enter into joint ventures (e.g. in fertilizers, polyester, textiles and cement and make substantial personal donations to offset dwindling foreign exchange reserves and, occasionally, to help defray oil-price increases. Thirdly, Libya and countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula became markets for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled Pakistani labour. In the mid and late seventies, around 1.2
million Pakistanis in the gulf and middle east returned more than $2 billion in annual remittances to Pakistan. This critical sum met the foreign exchange requirements of the country and also helped the government by creating pockets of 'prosperity' in areas which otherwise might have been ripe for political discontent. Fourthly, the Gulf countries became important outlets for Pakistani entrepreneurs whose unhappiness with the early nationalization policies of the Bhutto regime first led them into overseas investment.

Pakistan also actively attempted to create institutional channels for development aid from the Muslim block. The establishment of the Islamic Development Bank, whose main function is to participate in providing equity capital in enterprises in Muslim countries, is one such example. In addition, a number of joint-venture financial institutions provide foreign exchange loans or equity for large industrial projects, e.g. the Pak-Kuwait Investment Company, Pak-Libya Holding Company and Pak-Saudi Investment Company.

Islamic Revival and Impact on Foreign Policy

The vision of 'socialist' Bhutto playing a role in Islamic forums clashed with the absence of any real programmes to transform Pakistani society into an Islamic state. While the Pakistan People' Party (PPP) had coined the catchy label of 'Islamic socialism' as a means of getting around this dilemma, it was no secret that such PPP stalwarts as Mubashir Hasan, J. R. Rahim and Khurshid Hasan Meer wished to move the country in directions which had little to do with Islam. In 1974, when Pakistan's relations with the Islamic countries were on a firm footing, Bhutto decided to sacrifice the left in his party. While the ostensible reason given was the unhappiness of conservative Arab leaders, such as King Faysal, with the socialist wing of the PPP, Bhutto, at the time, was also trying to get the Americans to lift the arms embargo, and here too the left was a liability. In addition, Bhutto resented the implications that he owed his 1971 victory to the efforts of the aforementioned individuals in organizing the PPP, and managing the election programme.

Recognizing that the shift in national focus from the West and the East, manifested respectively by the US and PRC, to the Islamic block had greatly aided the credibility and prestige of the right-wing political parties (since they had always espoused what Bhutto discovered only in 1971 i.e. that Pakistan's future lay in its Islamic connection) Bhutto moved to steal the march on his opposition. The 1977 election manifesto, written primarily by Yousef Buch, focused on Islamic egalitarianism and some highly publicized changes were promised, for example changing the weekly holiday to Friday instead of Sunday. When election returns resulted in a massive anti-Bhutto movement led by the right the beleaguered prime minister sought to correct his image by prohibiting the use of alcohol and banning nightclubs and gambling, which led one Pakistani leader to remark; 'Now he's lost middle and upper class support!'

Bhutto kept his fences with the Islamic block carefully mended. He even accepted Saudi mediation in attempting the resolution of his difficulties with the opposition. It was indeed ironic that Bhutto, who carefully cultivated an image of a Muslim leader and had used his connections with Saudi Arabia and Iran in pressing the Pakistani case for arms in Washington, never managed to identify himself within Pakistan as anything except a 'Muslim of convenience'. His
departure, therefore, was followed by even more serious attempts at Islamicization.

Apart from differences in personality and style, there were substantial differences in the Zia regime’s emphasis on Islam. Soon after his take-over, Zia admitted that Pakistan was ‘created in the name of Islam’ and would ‘survive only if it sticks to Islam’. The prevailing feeling was that in its pursuit of an Islamic system, the country must develop political, economic and social institutions which reflected the sharia. A genuine shift in these directions was expected to help resolve Pakistan’s difficulties by strengthening the system from within and ensuring closeness with the rest of the Islamic world, which, as stated by General Zia in an interview with this author, constituted ‘a firm pillar’ of Pakistani foreign policy.

**Impact of the Iranian Revolution**

The fall of the Shah had important consequences for Pakistan, not only because of the Iranian monarch’s role in guaranteeing Pakistan’s economic and military security but also because a militantly Shi’i regime in Tehran could create mischief within Pakistan. Officially, remarkably little was made by Islamabad of the change in Iran as the government continued to stress the historical ties and good relations traditionally existing between Pakistan and Iran. The Pakistani foreign minister journeyed to Iran and received several audiences with the Ayatollah. Pakistan and Iran jointly announced their withdrawal from CENTO in March 1979, an act which symbolized for Iran a deep displeasure with the ‘Great Satan’, and for Pakistan a clear recognition that for all practical purposes the alliance was dead anyway.

However, no amount of studied diplomatic niceties could cover the difficulty for Pakistan. Both Islamic right and the Mujaheddin left in Iran identified Pakistan with the Shah. Consequently, a great deal of verbal abuse was hurled at the country. Khumayni called upon the people of all neighbouring countries to rise up and overthrow their ‘tyrannical’ regimes and on occasion the Zia government was specifically mentioned by Tehran radio. Protests from Islamabad elicited the response that no one was clearly in charge in Tehran and the government could thus not accept responsibility. The potential for trouble was amply demonstrated when Pakistani crowds, reacting to broadcasts from Tehran citing American CIA collusion in the capture of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979, burned down the US embassy in Islamabad. Rumor, fed by mischief-making from both the Pakistani left and the right, created an explosive situation for the Zia regime within the country and in the United States.

President Zia has generally been helped domestically by the fact that his own proposals for fulfilling the Islamic aspirations of Pakistan preceded Khumayni’s revolution. Yet, the split caused by the divisions between Khumaynism and the conservative Arab regimes, with whom predominantly ‘Sunni Pakistan identified more closely, mean walking a fine line and offending neither side by endeavoring to focus on the larger issues in Islam that cut across secular lines. However, Khumayni’s influence with the substantial Shi’i population in Pakistan carries the potential of creating difficulties for Pakistani proposals to incorporate Islamic principles into the political, economic and social
life of the country. For example, when the government proposed the imposition of a mandatory Zakat tax in 1980, the Shi'is rebelled. Perhaps fed by a new sense of identity with others across the Iranian border, large-scale Shi'i agitation began in Islamabad in July 1980. The capital as carefully chosen not only to magnify Shi'i defiance of the government by demonstrating in a city with controlled access, but also to ensure that the difficulties faced by the regime were recognized by the diplomatic community residing in Islamabad. The tactic worked; the government relented and the Shi'i community was exempted from governmental measures.

Potential for further trouble in Pakistani-Iranian relations appeared in 1980 when a report from Moscow claimed that the aircraft used in the abortive US rescue mission to get out American hostages took off from Pakistan. Vehement denials by the government and the later identification of Oman as the take-off point finally defused the crisis, and Pakistan rode out the storm through continued moderation in its policy toward Iran.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The dovetailing of Pakistani security concerns with those of the Islamic countries and the US occurred in December 1979 as the 80,000 Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan. While the rationale for Soviet actions is not to be dwelt on here, it is important to note that Moscow's attempts to move decisively in support of the communist regime in Kabul exacerbated Pakistan's security concerns just as it alarmed the conservative Arab regimes and the United States. The common vision was one of regional security crumbling as a result of attacks by the Khumaynist right in Iran and Soviet-supported communist left in Afghanistan, not to mention direct Soviet involvement. In this way, external fears helped internationalize the crisis.

Pakistan thus became a front-line state against future Soviet encroachment. There was little the country could actually do along diplomatically or militarily to ensure that no such action by the Soviet Union took place. However, by aligning itself closely with the Islamic Conference and once again identifying the Pakistani predicament with the fate of Muslim everywhere, Pakistan could raise the stakes for Moscow. This line of reasoning proved successful. Not only was the Soviet invasion soundly condemned by a vote of 104 to 18 (with 30 abstentions) at the United Nations in January 1980, it was also dealt with firmly by the Islamic block. Meeting in Islamabad in January, 1980, the Conference voted unanimously to condemn the invasion, withhold recognition from the Babak Karmal regime until all Soviet troops were withdrawn, sever diplomatic relations, and urge all Muslim states to support Islamic countries neighboring Afghanistan. Thus, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought Pakistan closer to the Islamic Conference and institutionalized General Zia's role as spokesman for the group, as was evident when he came to address the United Nations General Assembly in September 1980. In his capacity as spokesman of the Islamic Conference, Zia also made several, generally unsuccessful attempts at ending the Iran-Iraq war.

The Military Strategic Dimension

Increased Pakistani military cooperation with key Muslim countries is a corollary of enhanced identification with the Islamic block. While Pakistani
military advisers have been serving in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf since 1965, the rapid increase in their numbers and their role has taken place since oil wealth made these countries more vulnerable. Also, the desire for enhanced security resulted in huge expenditures on defence unmatched by an adequately trained manpower base. This development coincided with Pakistan's search for expanded interaction with the Islamic block. Furthermore developing a military dimension was, for Bhutto (under whom the cooperation accelerated), also a way of ingratiating himself with the Pakistani military establishment. In addition, cooperation with Islamic nations helped develop a second strategic front, thus shifting the focus of the Pakistan military away from India to the West.

Over the years, the number of Pakistani advisers serving in the Middle East has grown. The Pakistani government predicates its advisory and manning programme overseas on non-involvement in Arab affairs, but there has been at least one instance where this policy has run into difficulty. The fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have led to closer collaboration with key Islamic countries. The evolving military relationship with Saudi Arabia is a case in point. The notion of joint interests between the two countries was discussed during the visit of Crown Prince Fahd's visit to Pakistan in December 1980. The Prince openly declared that Saudi Arabia envisions its security tied to that of Pakistan and that 'Any interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan would be considered interference or injury to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'. Saudi leaders remain well aware that their own perceptions of increased vulnerability, coupled with a sense of threat, mesh with Pakistan's insecurity in the face of the Soviet move into Afghanistan which for the first time in Pakistan's history opens up the possibility of a two-front war. Pakistan has the necessary trained manpower, but its general military preparedness is adversely affected by obsolete arms and an empty treasury. As a scholar of South Asian strategic affairs notes: The South Asian security system is an insecurity system, and the trade-offs for each regional government involve minimizing insecurity, not maximizing security'. Developing a military relationship with Pakistan offers Saudi Arabia an intermediate option between relying on its own limited manpower and the full force of a US response.

The presence of common sources of threat moved the Saudi-Pakistani military relationship forward, propelled by positive perceptions of each other. In particular, the Saudis (especially King Fahd) sought to bring Pakistani soldiers into Saudi Arabia despite Saudi sensitivity to the presence of foreign workers amidst their own populace. Yet, clearly, at a first choice, the Saudis would definitely prefer to be self-reliant. But given the fact that they face tremendous shortages in trained manpower, they have no option but to rely on external sources. While the Saudis have enough funds to pay for Western manpower for training far beyond present usage, Western and particularly American trainers or advisers (since much of the Saudi equipment is from the US) are a political liability. Saudi rules must walk a tightrope between their need for US support and military sales, and their fear of creating family is indeed propped up by the 'Great Satan', to use a favorite phrase of Iran's Ayatollah Khumayni.

Thus, given their inability to be self-reliant or to bring in a direct US presence, the Saudi leadership looks for more palatable alternatives. From this perspective, for a variety of reasons, Pakistan appears as the most viable option.
providing for the augmentation of Saudi capability. First, it has a large military establishment which has been tested in wars. The discipline and organization of the Pakistani military makes it one of the few effective fighting forces in the area. Second, the Pakistanis are Muslims. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia is considered to be a special place by all Muslims. This feeling is especially strong in Pakistan where Muslim nationalism is totally meshed with religion as the raison detre of the state. The commitment to Saudi stability then is part and parcel for Pakistan's concern for religion. While outsiders may ponder the difference between Pakistan's commitment to Saudi Arabia and concern for The Saudi ruling family, there is little indication thus far that a distinction is drawn in Pakistan itself between the two. The present Iranian instability which has engendered real fears of the break-up of Iran or its absorption into the Soviet orbit convinces the Pakistan's that any change in the status quo in Saudi Arabia could have similar repercussions there with a possibility of denial of future access to Islam's holiest place. Third, while Pakistanis are indeed Muslims, they are not Arabs. As such, they do not speak Arabic, even through they read the Quran in Arabic, and they are unable to interact with the Arab work force employed in Saudi Arabia. Nor are the Pakistanis able to communicate with the Saudi Population. Thus, unlike soldiers brought in from other Arab countries, the Pakistanis are basically isolated from local elements, dissident or otherwise. This fact, coupled with their separation in military cantonments, keeps them from becoming involved in local politics.

From the perspective of the Pakistani officers and soldiers, a tour of duty in Saudi Arabia is a lucrative proposition. Because the remunerative rewards of their service are considerably higher than any that is available at home, the incentive to go to Saudi Arabia is strong. In addition, the Pakistanis are quite aware that continued service depends on their non-involvement in Saudi affairs. The above should not be identified with the notion that the Pakistani are merely 'mercenaries' because it is the religious links that form the real basis of the relationship and thus far outweigh even the rather substantial economic rewards available. The Saudi-Pakistani military relationship provides and opportunity to enlist Saudi assistance for Pakistani modernization, and also to train on the more advanced American weapons that are available in Saudi Arabia but not in Pakistan.

Finally, the military relationship with Saudi Arabia offers Pakistan a more dynamic role beyond the borders of South Asia and the traditional preoccupation with India. It is in this spirit that the Pakistani military serve as 'the soldiers of Islam', a role that evokes much pride in Islamabad. This is psychologically important for a country that was allowed relatively late entry into the inner sanctums of the Islamic movement.

Islam and Pakistani Foreign Policy: an Assessment

Pakistani leaders have deliberately been aggressive in their use of Islam as a major factor in the nations' foreign policy after 1971. Islam is the symbol of the nation’s return to its original mission; the personification of the states' justification. Careful use of Islam can indeed mobilize not only the population of Pakistan, but also the Islamic world within which the Pakistani role is increasingly dynamic. Hence, recent regimes in Islamabad have laid great
emphasis on maintaining strong ties with Muslim countries, and recognized that self-interest dictates that Pakistan should ensure that their relations are not jeopardize.

However, the emphasis on Pakistan's relations with the Islamic block and an officially propagated Islamic revival within the country is not free of cost. Domestically, the elite cannot indefinitely use Islam as a mobilizing and legitimizing force without at some point facing the consequences of raised expectations. A polity which largely practices Islamic values may begin to demand harsher compliance from its leaders. In other words, Pakistan may not be able to sustain the varying strands of culture as it has in the past. Additionally, the higher standard of education, which is a consequence of its Western colonial history and not of its Islamic roots, and which so far has enabled Pakistan to play a leading role in the Islamic world, may not survive attempts to create a uniformly egalitarian system. Measured against a purely Islamic yard-stick, Pakistan cannot aspire to the leadership it seeks.

Secondly, persistent emphasis on Islam within the country and in its foreign policy cannot logically continue without affecting the Kashmir issue because it involves the rights of a Muslim populace to self-determination. If Kashmir is made an Islamic issue, Pakistan cannot really hope to have sustained improved relations with India.

Thirdly, the leading role that Pakistan played within the Islamic Congress in condemning Soviet invasion of Afghanistan means that Pakistan cannot reach a separate understanding with Moscow on the Afghan issue. The Islamic block, which helped raise the diplomatic costs of the invasion for Moscow in 1980, may constrain Pakistani search for fresh options if the burden of three million Afghan refugees becomes a heavy one. Despite the fact that Pakistan is the most directly affected nation, its policy on the Afghan issue is forced to operate in tandem with the rest of the Islamic world.

Fourthly, after 1971, the emergence of South-west Asia as an arena for involvement offered psychological and material rewards for Pakistan. It provided a much welcomed opportunity to sidestep the quarrels of South Asia where Pakistan remained vulnerable because India continued to dominate. Since 1979, the fall of the Shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to which the Islamic block could not fashion any coordinated response have all become poignant reminders of the smoldering problems which beset the area. In the changing security picture confronting the countries to its west, Pakistan may learn the hard ways that its entanglements can be costly, particularly as Israeli leaders begin to point out that Pakistan cannot escape Israeli wrath for its Middle East involvement.

Finally, thus far Pakistan has managed to stay largely free of involvement in the partisan tendencies that often exist in the Islamic world. As the polarization continues between the vision of Ayatollah Khumayni's Islam and that of the conservative kingdoms befriended by Pakistan, Islamabad will have to demonstrate a more sophisticated, multi-dimensional approach to the use of Islam in the conduct of its foreign policy. Failure to do so may indeed affect Pakistan's ability to deal with instability spilling over from the Muslim countries that sit astride its borders.
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18 In 1979 Qadhafi wished to involve Pakistani pilots serving in Libya more closely, threatening to retaliate for non-compliance with expulsion of all Pakistanis from Libya. The crisis was averted after intense high level consultation and Qadhafi demurred. The government of Pakistan was quite aware of the economic and political consequences of the expulsion and dislocation of 80,000 well-paid Pakistani.
The poet Muhammad Iqbal said that the ultimate purpose of the prophetic mission of Muhammad was to create a form of society which followed that divine law which the Prophet Muhammad received from God. In other words the object was to purify the nations of the world of the abuses which go by the name of time, place, land, nation, race, genealogy, country, etc. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other. If one begins with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus has been displaced by national systems of ethics and polity. But the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. Iqbal thought there was an historical reason for the separation of the Church from the State in European political thought. Primitive Christianity, he argued, was founded not as a political or a civil unit, but as a monastic order in a profane world, having nothing to do with civil affairs, and obeying the Roman authority in all practical matters. The result of this was that, when the State became Christian, State and Church confronted each other as distinct powers with interminable boundary disputes between them. Such a thing could never happen in Islam, for Islam was from the very beginning a civil society, having received from the Quran a set of simple legal principles which, like the twelve tables of the Romans, carried great potentialities of expansion and development by interpretation. The nationalists theory of State, therefore, is misleading inasmuch as it suggests a dualism which does not exist in Islam. These views led Iqbal to say in one of his poems, ‘Muslim hein hum wattan hai sara jehan hamara’ (We are Muslims, our motherland is the entire universe). After independence, a Pakistani writer, summing up the Pakistani conception of Islam, stated that Islam itself is a nationality.

Until 1924 the symbol of universal Islamic unity for the Indian Muslims was the Sultan of Turkey in his capacity as the Khalifa of Islam, and the fate of Turkey, therefore, deeply stirred their emotions. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1897 religious services were held in the mosques in Calcutta and subscriptions were collected for the Turkish wounded. All subsequent Turkish causes similarly evoked Muslim sympathy in India. Notable amongst these were the wars against Greece (1877), Italy (1911), and the Balkan League (1912). During the Balkan War the Muslims of India sent a medical mission to Turkey, under Dr. M. A. Ansari. When the Bulgarians approached Constantinople, Maulana Mohammad Ali was so overcome with grief that he seriously contemplated suicide.

After the First World War, in which Turkey had been on the losing side, the Muslims of India tried their utmost to ensure that the territorial and spiritual status of the Sultan should remain intact. 'About the middle of 1920,' noted Subhas Bose, 'anti-British feeling
was stronger among the Moslems than among the rest of the Indian population. A Khalifat movement was inaugurated in India, and two delegations, one led by Maulana Muhammad Ali and the other by the Aga Khan, journeyed to London to plead on behalf of the Sultan.

It so happened that at that very time the Congress Party, hitherto a loyal organization, was also contemplating rebellion against the British because, instead of rewarding Indians with greater freedom for their co-operation in the war effort, the British Government passed the notorious Rowlatt Bills, which authorized the continuation in peace time of certain special powers the Government of India had assumed during the First World War. The most serious incident during the agitation was the horrible massacre of Jalianwala Bagh in Amritsar (Punjab), in April 1919, when General Dyer ordered his troops to fire at a meeting of over 20,000 men, women, and children, in an almost enclosed space, killing 379 and wounding 1,500 others. Martial law was imposed in all the important towns in the Punjab and the movement was brutally suppressed.

Realizing that such an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Muslims ‘will not occur for another hundred years,’ Gandhi placed himself in the forefront of the Khilafat movement as well as the agitation for the repeal of the Rowlatt Act and the redress of the Punjab atrocities, and he launched the first of his famous non-cooperation movements.

The raison d’être for Hindu–Muslim unity, however, ceased to exist in March 1924, when the Turks themselves abolished the institution of the Khilafat. Instead of bringing the Muslims closer to the Hindus, the Khilafat. Instead of bringing the Muslim closer to the Hindus, the Khilafat movement, by inciting the pan-Islamic feeling of the Muslims, in the long run served to widen the gulf between them. The fanatical feelings roused by the Khilafat movement, in fact, led to the ugly Moplah Rebellion in 1921, at the very time when Hindu–Muslim unity was supposed to be at its zenith. The Moplahs, who are Muslims and mostly peasants and fishermen by vocation, started with the aim of replacing British rule by a Khilafat kingdom, but they soon fell upon the Hindus, who were near at hand and represented the more prosperous landowner and moneylending classes. ‘By the middle of 1923,’ observed the Simon Commission, ‘communal riots, marked by murder, arson and looting, were almost monthly occurrences. In 1924 fierce outbursts occurred in many of the greater cities of the North.’

The abolition of the Khilafat by Turkey formed a watershed in the evolution of Muslim politics in India. Muslim hopes, having lost their outside focal point, turned inward. In his famous presidential address to the Muslim League at Allahabad, in 1930, Iqbal stressed that seventy million Muslims in India constituted ‘a far more valuable asset to Islam than all the countries of Muslim Asia put together.’ A few years later he wrote to Jinnah that ‘the whole future of Islam as a moral and political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete organization of Indian Muslims.’

The unification of a part only of the Muslims of the world under the flag of Pakistan was thus not viewed by the founding fathers of Pakistan as the culmination of their efforts but merely as a necessary milestone on the journey towards the ultimate goal of universal Muslim solidarity. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan eloquently expressed the true aspirations of all Pakistanis when he stated that Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge of the Muslims of the subcontinent to secure territory where Islamic ideology could be practised and demonstrated to the world and, since a cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a reality, it was a part of her mission to be everything in her power to promote fellowship and co-operation between Muslim countries.
However, the issue facing Muslims in the predominantly Muslim countries of the world were different from those confronting the Indian Muslims. The latter were surrounded by a non-Muslim majority which subscribed to a highly receptive faith, and Islam was their only defence against the threatened loss of identity. In Iqbal’s words, Islam furnished them with ‘those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well-defined people...India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people-building force, has worked at its best.’

But Islam was not an issue in the politics of other Muslim lands. As the age of imperialism approached its end, nationalism in those countries took the familiar form of territorial, racial, and linguistic nationalism, for the problem there simply was how to get rid of European domination. The task before the Indian Muslims, however, was uniquely complex. Like all other peoples who were struggling to be free, they wished to get rid of the foreigner. But how were they, at the same time, to escape the yoke of the more numerous Hindus, whose claim to the same homeland was even more ancient than their own, except by claiming a separate share of the territory on the basis of Islam? Luckily for them, although the Hindus commanded the majority on an all-India basis, the Muslims predominated in the western and eastern parts of the country. They therefore pressed that these wings be separated from the rest of the subcontinent and constituted into the Islamic State of Pakistan.

While the device of dividing the country provided the only means of real freedom to the Indian Muslims, the very world partition was anathema to Muslims elsewhere. For the latter it conjured up the example of Ireland, the spectres of the proposed partition of Palestine, and the separation of the Sudan from Egypt; and they viewed the partition of India as yet another manifestation of the same imperialistic strategy of divide and rule. Finding direct control of the subcontinent no longer feasible, Britain, they thought, was now resorting to the trick of divide and quit so that the new nations of India and Pakistan would remain weak and at loggerheads with each other, enabling the erstwhile ruling power to continue its overall domination. It seemed to them that the Muslim League, by demanding a division of the motherland, was playing into the hands of British imperialism, while the Congress Party was putting up a genuine fight for freedom, just as they themselves were doing.

Though the approach of the Pakistani Muslims to the task of achieving the solidarity of Islam is now less naive than it was in the early years of Pakistan, and they have increasingly begun to realize that there are important differences of outlook between themselves and fellow-Muslims of other lands, their desire to serve the cause of Islam is as ardent as ever. Muslims of other countries, for their part, have also learned, with the passage of time, to view the Indo-Pakistani problem with greater understanding, and Pakistan’s genuine concern for their welfare with increasing appreciation. Pakistan’s relations with Muslim countries, in fact, have passed through three distinct phases.

The earliest period (1947–54) was marked by Pakistan’s efforts, to forge closer links between Muslim countries by playing host at various conferences. In retrospect these moves seem to have been over-optimistic and amateurish but those were the heady days of newly won independence and it needed time and experience to develop the capacity to view matters in perspective. There were references then to Pakistan being the largest Muslim state and the fifth largest country in the world. Such talk from a country the rationale of whose creation was little understood at the time, and whose capacity to survive bore a large question mark, naturally was not well received by other countries, proud of their own heritage. If the matter had rested with the various conferences staged by Pakistan, she would have earned little respect for her endeavours to build up the solidarity of Islam. What, however, did win
Pakistan a measure of esteem was her consistent and effective advocacy of Muslim causes, many of which happened to come before the United Nations during her early years. But just as Pakistan was beginning to gain ground in the Muslim world she joined the Baghdad Pact, and with it began the second phase (1955-7) during which her relations with the Arab countries, the heart of the Muslim world, reached their lowest ebb. The third phase began in 1958 when Pakistan became emotionally estranged from her most powerful ally, the USA, and, on the rebound, once more began to look towards her first and greatest love, the Muslim countries. Both Pakistan and the other Muslim nations now looked at each other with better understanding and their relations registered a growing improvement.

With two important Muslim countries, Egypt and Indonesia, Pakistan’s relations in the early years were less than satisfactory. In November 1951 the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Salah el Din Pasha, told an Indian correspondent in Cairo that Egypt looked to India for moral support in her struggle for national liberation. King Farouq was reported to have ridiculed Pakistan’s overzealous devotion to Islamic causes by saying to his courtiers, ‘Don’t you know that Islam was born on 14 August 1947?’

When the Dutch took police action against Indonesia in December 1948, Pakistanis demonstrated their genuine concern in various ways. In Parliament Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan called it ‘an affront to the soul of Asia’ and Pakistan immediately suspended the licence of the Dutch airline, KLM, whose aircraft were being used to aid Dutch military action. When Indonesian independence was recognized Pakistan celebrated the event by declaring a public holiday. Indonesia, however, at this time felt much closer to India because, like the latter, she had made secularism, non-alignment, and socialism the main pillars of her policy. During Nehru’s visit to Indonesia in December 1950, President Soekarno publicly said Nehru politically was his ‘father.’

Pakistan’s relations with Turkey and Iran, however, were cordial from the first day, foreshadowing the formal co-operation between the three countries first in the Baghdad Pact and later in the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD). The deep agony with which Indian Muslims had viewed the decline of the Ottoman empire and the demise of the Khilafat was transformed into admiration for the way the new Republic of Turkey emerged as a vigorous, modern state from the ashes of the Sultanate. Pakistan’s abiding love for Iran arises from the fact that not only is Iran an immediate neighbour but also the mother of Pakistani culture.

I. Relations with Afghanistan

One of the most painful experiences of Pakistan has been the almost continuous hostility of the neighbouring Muslim State of Afghanistan. With the threat of India perpetually looming from the east and north-east of West Pakistan, Afghan pressure on the western flank greatly added to Pakistan’s already heavy burden of anxieties. As Ian Stephens has pointed out, if, on Pakistan’s birth, ‘coordinated movements opposed to her could be produced in Kashmir and Afghanistan, both of them predominantly Muslim territories near to one another, the new State [of Pakistan] might be still-born, crushed by a sort of pincer movement.’

Pakistan’s problem with Afghanistan has resulted from Afghan ambitions in respect of certain areas in the north-west and west of West Pakistan which, for a brief period, formed a part of the territories conquered by Ahmad Shah, the first native-born king of Afghanistan who reigned from 1747 to 1773. Ahmad Shah’s successors, including the present king of
Afghanistan, all Durrans like Ahmad Shah, have considered themselves natural heirs to the
transitory empire of their illustrious kinsman and have fondly cherished the dream of recovering its lost parts.

Towards the middle of the nineteen-forties, when it began to appear that Britain
would soon have to relinquish her Indian empire, the Government of Afghanistan represented to Britain that the people of the frontier lands be given the choice of becoming independent or reuniting with their 'motherland' (Afghanistan). But this move failed to create any enthusiasm among the people of the area for joining Afghanistan? Thereupon Afghanistan, at least outwardly and for the time being, gave up her irredentist claims and began to devote her energy to playing the seemingly more altruistic role of champion of the cause of independence for the Pakhtuns, with a state of their own to be called 'Pakhtunistan.' This state would come into being by detaching the following parts from West Pakistan: the frontier states of Dir, Swat, Chitral, and Amb; Baluchistan and the Baluchistan states of Kalat, Kharan, Makran, and Las Bela. It will be helpful at the outset to recall how the various lands just named became a part of Pakistan in the first instance.

On the eve of partition 'a bastard situation' prevailed in the North-West Frontier Province. A Congress Ministry under Khan Sahib was still holding office in that 92 per cent Muslim province though the majority of the people had gone over to the League, now that a Muslim homeland was definitely within sight. The difficulty was resolved by inserting a provision in the partition plan that the question whether the Frontier Province should belong to India or Pakistan would be decided by the electors of the Provincial Legislative Assembly in a referendum.

Realizing that the proposed referendum in the changed atmosphere of the Frontier
would result in a victory for Pakistan 'Congress tried a little sleight of hand...by suggesting that the referendum which was to take place under the terms of the plan should not be simply to decide whether the population should choose Pakistan or Hindustan, but also whether it should become an independent State.' But the proposed independence was simply a stratagem to tide over the immediate problem of preventing the Frontier from joining Pakistan. In his report to London Mountbatten stated, 'Nehru quite openly admitted that the NWFP could not possibly stand by itself, and it became clear to me that this was a device to free Khan Sahib's party from the odium (in a largely Muslim province) of being connected with Congress during the referendum period, since Nehru spoke about Khan Sahib wishing to join the Union of India at a subsequent stage.' Failing to have the option of independence included in the questionnaire of the referendum, the Khan brothers called upon their followers to boycott the poll. Nevertheless, the referendum in the North-West Frontier Province (the five settled districts) was duly held from 6 to 17 July 1947. To meet the Congress objection, that the Governor and his senior officers were siding with the Muslim League, it was arranged by Mountbatten that the Governor, Sir Olaf Caroe, should proceed on leave and the poll be conducted by a specially appointed military regime with Lieut.-General Sir Rob Lockhart as acting Governor and Brigadier J. B. Booth as the Referendum Commissioner.

Out of a total electorate of 572,798, just over 50 per cent took part. Pakistan received 289,244 votes and India 2,874. Pakistan thus secured an absolute majority of the total number of votes cast.

But a plebiscite such as the one held in the Frontier Province could not possibly be arranged for ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants of the Tribal Agencies for the simple reason that the latter had no legislature and, therefore, no electoral roll. The representative
The rulers of the four frontier states of Dir, Swat, Chitral, and Amb also led their subjects into Pakistan by executing Instruments of Accession in favour of that Dominion.

Baluchistan's constitutional position was similar to that of the Tribal Areas of the north-west. The ties with the ruling power there, too, consisted of agreements with the tribes. In the 3 June official pronouncement it was stipulated that the province would be given an opportunity to choose between Pakistan and India and it was stated that the Governor-General was 'examining how this can most appropriately be done.' Ultimately it was decided by the British Government to entrust the responsibility for the decision to the Shahi Jirga and the non-official members of the Quetta municipality who unanimously opted for Pakistan. This was followed by accession to Pakistan by the Baluchistan States of Kharan, Makram, and Las Bela. The Khan of Kalat harboured the idea of independence for some time but in the end he, too, declared for Pakistan.

Afghanistan's earliest formal move was made in November 1944 when it had become fairly obvious that Britain could not long deny independence to India. The Afghan authorities approached London for an assurance that, in the event of India becoming independent, the people of those frontier areas which had been annexed by Britain during the previous century would be given the choice of becoming independent or reuniting with their 'motherland'. A representation was simultaneously made the Afghanistan be given a corridor to the sea through Baluchistan in order to improve her economic position.

After the announcement of the partition plan on 3 June 1947, Afghanistan mounted a vigorous public and diplomatic campaign that all tribes living between the Indo-Afghan Frontier, called the Durand Line, and the river Indus be allowed to say whether they wished to become completely independent or revert to Afghanistan. His Majesty's Government in London took up the position that the territories claimed by Afghanistan were an integral part of India, having been recognized as such by the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, and that Afghanistan, therefore, had no locus standi to interfere in the arrangements concerning their future. The British Government could deal with the situation only as it existed at the time of transfer of power. An historical investigation of the Afghan claim, they pointed out, could
very well end up with India claiming the whole of Afghanistan instead of Afghanistan claiming a part of India.

Afghanistan soon realized, also, that there was no desire among the Pathans on the Indian side of the Durand Line to join Afghanistan. Even the Khan brothers, who represented the extreme opposition to Pakistan, did not entertain union with Afghanistan as one of the acceptable alternatives. When they realized that there was no chance whatever of the referendum going in favour of India, their organization resolved that the issues should be amended on the basis of Pakistan and free Pathan State. There was no mention in the resolution of joining Afghanistan. On 2 July 1947 Dr. Khan Sahib wrote to Pandit Nehru, 

'We assure you that we have never thought of joining Afghanistan. We have also learnt for the first time that the Afghan Government have officially approached the Government of India. We having been placed in an unenviable position, naturally, the Afghan Government are taking advantage of it and exploiting the situation.'

After the referendum had gone in favour of Pakistan, Ghaffar Khan further adjusted his position in the light of the new reality. He declared, at a meeting of his followers, that all they demanded was 'full freedom for the Pathans to manage their internal affairs as a unit within Pakistan State.' One of the resolutions adopted at the meeting ran: 'This new State will comprise the present six settled districts of the NWFP and all such other contiguous areas inhabited by the Pathans which may wish to join the new State of their own free will. This State will enter into agreement on defence, external affairs, and communications with the Dominion of Pakistan.'

Unable to find any supporters for union with Afghanistan, the Afghan authorities thought it wiser not to press irredentist claims directly but to concentrate upon the apparently selfless issue of independence.

Afghan pressure on Pakistan has been almost continuous and at times has resulted in a state of high tension between the two neighbours. When Pakistan's application for admission to the United Nations came up in the General Assembly on 30 September 1947 the Afghan representative, Hosayn Aziz, cast the only opposing vote, because we cannot recognize the North-West Frontier Province as part of Pakistan so long as the people of the North-West Frontier have not been given an opportunity free from any kind of influence to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become a part of Pakistan.' On 20 October, however, Aziz withdrew the negative vote and expressed the hope that agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan would be reached as a result of the discussions then taking place through diplomatic channels.

In November 1947 Sardar Najibullah Khan came to Karachi as special envoy of His Majesty King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, and held talks with Pakistani officials. On his return home Najibullah said in a broadcast that Afghanistan had made three demands on Pakistan: first, the tribal areas inhabited by Pathans and Afghans must be constituted into a free, sovereign province; secondly, Pakistan must give Afghanistan access to the sea either by the creation of an Afghan corridor in West Baluchistan or by allotting a free Afghan Zone in Karachi; and thirdly, Afghanistan and Pakistan should enter into a treaty which should permit one party to remain neutral if the other was attacked.

A brief description of some of the developments will illustrate the trend of Pakistani-Afghan relations during the years immediately following.

On 12 July 1949 a Pakistani Air Force plane bombed an Afghan village near the
border but, a joint commission of the representatives of both countries having found that the bombing was accidental, the matter was peacefully settled upon payment of damages by Pakistan. But the amicable end of the plane incident did not cure the root of the trouble. King Zahir Shah chose the inauguration of the seventh session of the Afghan National Assembly on 30 June 1949 as the occasion for making an anti-Pakistani speech, and the Assembly itself proceeded to pass a resolution repudiating all treaties, conventions, and agreements signed between the Afghan and British Governments before the birth of Pakistan and rejecting the Durand Line as the international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The resolution also referred to the alleged repression of the 'Afghan' provinces and states from Chitral to Baluchistan and promised support to the Afghan Government in its efforts to achieve freedom for the inhabitants of those places. Afghan radio and press propaganda against Pakistan continued unabated and there were also reports of Afghan raids into Pakistan.

Afghan sources asserted that, in August 1949, a number of Afridi tribesmen met at Tirah and inaugurated the 'National Assembly of Pakhtunistan.' Another jirga was stated to have met at Razmak and elected the Faqir of Ipi as the President of southern 'Pakhtunistan.' In an exclusive interview published in the Indian News Chronicle on 4 March 1950 Sardar Najibullah Khan, Afghan Ambassador to India, said that tribesmen were electing regional assemblies preparatory to electing a Central Assembly to set up a Central Government for 'Pakhtunistan.'

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan said in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 9 January 1950 that these 'national assemblies have not been formed by the people of the areas concerned but they have been set up on paper in Kabul.'

As could well be expected, India did not fail to encourage Afghanistan's efforts to harass Pakistan. A number of 'Pakhtunistan' days were celebrated in Indian cities and Indian orators editors upheld Afghan claims.

On the credit side, the Government of Pakistan, in December 1947, ordered the withdrawal of troops from the frontier areas. This was a sensible move, because if the sense of freedom and belonging to Pakistan was to be brought home to the tribesmen, it was essential that there no longer be an army of occupation in their homeland to gall their sense of self-respect. The Pakistani authorities also, despite innumerable demands on their slender resources, earnestly set about improving the economic and social conditions in the tract. The Times noted, on 29 June 1949, that the tribesmen continued to draw from the Pakistani exchequer some 50 million rupees a year in subsidies, just as they did in British days, and pointed out that this sum exceeded the total budget of Afghanistan. The Government was also embarked on large-scale hydroelectric and irrigation schemes to bring greater prosperity to the tribesmen.

A natural result of the tension between the two countries was the virtual stoppage of trade between them and the interruption of transit facilities which landlocked Afghanistan had traditionally enjoyed through Pakistani ports and territory. To reduce her dependence on Pakistan, Afghanistan, in July 1950, signed a trade and transit agreement with the Soviet Union, who had been eagerly waiting for just such a chance to come her way. The Soviets agreed to export petroleum products, cotton cloth, sugar, and other commodities in return for Afghan wool and raw cotton. They also agreed to permit free transit of Afghan goods through Soviet territory, and to build petrol storage tanks within Afghanistan. The Soviets continued skilfully to press their advantage and by 1952 trade between the USSR and Afghanistan had doubled, and some Soviet technicians had arrived in Afghanistan. In 1954 the Soviet Union granted a loan of approximately dollars 18 million for the construction of more storage tanks, wheat silos, a flour mill and a bakery, and for the paving of streets in Kabul.
II. An Examination of the Afghan Case

One of the more substantial statements of the Afghan case has been made in the form of a 153-page book called *Pakhtunistan* by Rahman Pazhwak, an Afghan career diplomat. Without mentioning any time in history when a unit comprising the areas now claimed for ‘Pakhtunistan’ ever stood by itself politically, the Afghan protagonist avers that the most important districts and passes which form the ‘Pakhtunistan’ of ‘today’ are Chitral, Hazara, Kohistan, Swat, Dir, Buner, Peshawar, Tirah, Bajaur, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Waziristan, Khyber, Pezu, Gomal, Bolan, and Malakand. He then gives a description of these districts and their natural resources and concludes that the existing and potential wealth of the area is such that ‘the Pakhtuns have realized that once the preservation of their freedom and independence is assured, to which all their energies have inescapably been bent in the past, they can proceed to build a prosperous life for themselves in their homeland. A factor of great importance, according to the Afghan author, is that ‘Pakhtunistan’ has the advantage of access to the sea in Baluchistan. Then follows a list of ‘clans’ which inhabit ‘Pakhtunistan’ and it is noteworthy that the total runs to no less than twenty-three separate clans.

In a society where the social and administrative unit throughout history has been the tribe, and where the first loyalty has traditionally been given to that unit, there is obviously little chance of a feeling of national unity being born, still less of its getting firmly established. There would be resentment against outside interference and foreign domination no doubt, and the various tribes on the north-west frontier of the Indian subcontinent, after the manner of mountainous people elsewhere, have managed to preserve their own peculiar way of life. But it hardly follows from this that collectively they have ever formed a nation. It is, therefore, not surprising that the only time in history when they are stated by Pazhwak to have converted the dream of nationhood into reality is ‘today’. After mentioning the poet Khushhal Khatak’s fight for independence against the Emperor Aurengzeb, the adds: ‘The poet’s wish has today been fulfilled by the hoisting of the flag of independent Pakhtunistan.’

What the Afghans call ‘Pakhtunistan’ is located on the traditional invasion route to the subcontinent of India and has been the pathway of countless immigrants, conquerors, and raiders, of which the first recorded in history were the Aryans who entered India in about 1500 B.C. Consequently, the frontier tracts of India, like the Balkans which are the gateway to Europe, have had a kaleidoscopic history, and to pick out any single period in the past as a guide to the present is a futile exercise. If we take the comparatively stable eras of Indian history as our guide—and this seems to most rational thing to do—it will be found that ‘Pakhtunistan,’ wholly or in part, has formed a portion of empires whose centre of power lay in the rich and more densely populated plains of India. None of substantial empires—the Mauryan, the Khushan, the Moghul, and the British—ever ruled India from Afghanistan. Mahmud of Ghazni, Timur, Nadir Shah, and Ahmad Shah Durrani were raiders who swooped down upon the fertile plains of northern India primarily to plunder the wealth of the prosperous cities there, and only Ahmad Shah Durrani was an Afghan. The ‘Afghan’ or ‘Pathan’ kings who ruled India adopted that country as their homeland and became Indians in the same way as the Moghuls did after them.

Even Afghanistan herself as a united and independent country is a comparative newcomer to the family of nations. ‘At a time when a stream of cultures from east and west was meeting in the great centres of literature and science in Samargand and Herat, or at a later period when India was developing the culture and art which flourished under the Moghul Empire, the Afghans were an obscure and troublesome tribe of shepherds and highwaymen....The true Afghans had never been looked on as other than savage wild men of the
hills by their neighbours until they suddenly emerged 200 years ago as sovereigns of a vast
dominion.\textsuperscript{45} The author of this empire was one Ahmad Khan, a captain in the armed hordes of
Nadir Shah of Persia and a prince of the Abdali tribe of Afghanistan. At this time the
Moghul empire, in decay since the death of Aurengzeb, was still reeling under the impact of
Nadir's ferocious sack of Delhi in 1739. When Nadir was murdered in 1747 Ahmad Khan got
his chance to liberate Afghanistan from the yoke of Persia and to build an empire of his own.
He marched to Kandahar and, upon being elected by some tribes as the first King of Af-
ghanistan, became 'Ahmad Shah'. ‘This is the year,’ writes Amir Abdur Rahman in his au-
tobiography, 'in which the history of Afghanistan made a start in having an elected king and
constitutional government to govern the country.'\textsuperscript{46} Ahmad Shah assumed the title of Durr-
i-Durran (Pearl of Pearls), reputedly because he liked to wear a pearl earring, and from then
on the Abdalis began to be called the Durranis. Before his death in 1773, Ahmad Shah 'swept
eight times across the Indus, and ravaged the Punjab as far as Delhi.'\textsuperscript{47} It was in the course of
one of these incursions that he routed the Mahrattas at Panipat in 1761. Next year he de-
feated the Sikhs near Lahore and with the annexation of Kashmir his empire reached its high
watermark, stretching from the Atrek River to Delhi and from the borders of Tibet to the In-
dian Ocean.\textsuperscript{48} It is this Afghan empire of Ahmad Shah that his successors have hankered
after ever since, and which, therefore, is the real source of the problem of 'Pakhtunistan'
today.

But Ahmad Shah's effort was a mere flash in the pan of history. The empire he had so
suddenly acquired quickly began to decay. The task of founding an enduring dynasty ‘was
too great for a people who were still largely tribal...possessing no true national cohe-
sion....Already in Ahmad Shah's lifetime signs were apparent that it was not possible to re-
tain hold of northern India from a base in Kandahar. In an attempt to arrange a settlement of
the Punjab, Ahmad Shah recognized in 1761 the Moghul Prince Shah Alam II as Emperor at
Delhi, while in 1767 he gave up the central Panjab to the Sikhs, retaining under his own con-

trol Peshawar and the northern Panjab.'\textsuperscript{49}

Ahmad Shah was succeeded by his son Timur Shah, 'whose character was marked
by indolence...[which] rendered him incapable of keeping together the tribes which had
been conquered by his father, and the kingdom began to decline... [and] upon his death in
1793, which occurred at Kabul, a struggle for the monarchy ensued between his numerous
sons...from 1793, after Timur Shah's death, the fightings, the misfortunes, and the violent
deaths of the kings and chiefs were innumerable. The breakdown of the Constitutional Gov-
ernment...was brought about by the kings' habits of self-indulgence and intoxication, and
their partiality for one person or one clan to the exclusion of the others. These characteristies
of the Suddozai kings resulted in their losing the kingdom, and turning Afghanistan into a
petty state after its being a vast empire before it fell into their hands.'\textsuperscript{50}

The state of utter anarchy following Timur Shah's death continued till 1826 when
Dost Muhammad Khan finally prevailed over his rivals and imposed a semblance of stability
upon the troubled kingdom. But by this time little was left of the vast empire of Ahmad Shah.
Amir Dost Muhammad's writ ran for less than a hundred miles from Kabul in any direction.
Seldom can an empire have disintegrated quite so rapidly or a dynasty shown itself less cap-
able of unity and sustained effort.\textsuperscript{51}

Amongst the territories lost during the internecine strife was the Peshawar valley. It
had been under the Governorship of Sultan Muhammad Khan when Ranjit Singh defeated
the Afghans at Nowshera in 1823 and took it. He retained Sultan Muhammad as titular Gov-
ernor for sometime but later assumed direct control.
Despite wars with the Sikhs and the British, and a period of exile in India as a British prisoner, Dost Muhammad succeeded in consolidating his hold over Afghanistan before his death in 1863. His ambition to recover Peshawar, however, was never satisfied because after the Sikhs, that city was occupied by the British (1849), who retained possession of it till the transfer of power in India. The present monarch of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, and his family are the direct descendants of Sultan Muhammad and ‘the lure of Peshawar is a passion, deep in their hearts.’

After Dost Muhammad another struggle for succession ensued till one of his sons, Sher Ali, came out victorious in 1868 and became Amir. In 1878 Britain declared war against Sher Ali to forestall suspected Russian moves to gain influence at the court of Kabul and in 1879, Sher Ali having died, dictated the treaty of Gandamak to his son Yakub Khan, compelling him to cede the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi and the control of Khyber and Mischini passes to the British. The Amir also undertook not to have any foreign relations except with Britain and agreed to the posting of a permanent British resident at Kabul, escorted by a small force. In return Britain guaranteed the defence of Afghanistan against foreign aggression. Thus, in effect, Afghanistan was no longer a sovereign state but became a dependency of Great Britain. It was not till 1919 that Britain agreed to restore full independence to Afghanistan by relinquishing control over her external affairs.

A few months after the treaty of Gandamak had been signed a fresh fracas broke out in Kabul and the newly arrived British Agent was murdered. General Roberts marched to Kabul and Afghanistan was again occupied. Amir Yakub Khan abdicated and was taken to India. Looking round for an acceptable occupant for the Afghan throne, Britain’s choice fell upon Abdur Rahman, a grandson of Amir Dost Muhammad, who, having been forced to flee his country by Sher Ali, had been living in Russian Turkestan as an exile for the past eleven years and, regarding the moment opportune for rehabilitating his fortune, was at his time wending his way home. He was invited by the British Resident to come to Kabul and assume charge of the kingdom.

Before finally accepting the offer, Abdur Rahman inquired what the boundaries of his dominion would be and what would be the nature of his relations with the British Government. The Resident’s reply on the first point was that ‘the whole province of Kandahar has been placed under a separate ruler, except Pishin and Sibi, which are retained in British possession. Consequently, the Government is not able to enter into any negotiations with you on these points, nor in respect to arrangements with regard to the north-west frontier, which were concluded with the ex-Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan. With these reservations the British Government are willing that you should establish over Afghanistan (including Herat, the possession of which cannot be guaranteed to you, though Government are not disposed to hinder measures which you may take to obtain possession of it) as complete and extensive authority as has hitherto been exercised by any Amir of your family.’ On the second point the Resident said equally bluntly: ‘...it is plain that the Kabul ruler can have no political relations with any foreign power except the English.’ The Amir was, however, assured that a British Resident would not be stationed at Kabul though ‘it may be advisable to station by agreement a Mahomedan agent of the British Government at Kabul.’ Abdur Rahman accepted the British terms except that he did not give his consent to the separation of Kandahar from the kingdom. The Resident accordingly held ‘an audience’ at Kabul on 22 July 1880 and proclaimed Abdur Rahman Amir.

Three things are thus clear; first, that Abdur Rahman owed his elevation to the throne to the British Government; second, that he was to have no control over external relations and was thus not a fully sovereign ruler; third, that he agreed to the stipulation that he
would not be able to enter into any negotiations with the British Government 'in respect to
arrangements with regard to the north-west frontier which were concluded with ex-Amir
Mahomed Yakub Khan [by the treaty of Gandamak].' Under the circumstances it can hardly
be pleaded on behalf of Abdur Rahman that he was deprived of any part of what is supposed
to constitute 'Pakhtunistan' under duress. He never possessed the area in the first instance
and had clearly accepted the rulership of Afghanistan on the understanding that arrange-
ments which had already been concluded with Yakub Khan were not longer negotiable.

The circumstances under which the Durand Agreement was signed by Abdur
Rahman provide further help in appraising the nature of that border settlement. Though
Abdur Rahman had been seated on the throne of Kabul by the British, his life, to use his own
words, was 'not a bed of roses. On the contrary I was surrounded by difficulties of all kinds.
Here began my first severe fight, against my own relatives, my own subjects and my own
people.'57 ...The claimants to the throne were so numerous that it is impossible to make a list
of their names. 58 There were troubles and signs of a general rebellion all over the country
and he had to fight 'four civil wars,' besides having to put down several smaller distur-
bances.59

After he had consolidated his position to a satisfactory extent, Abdur Rahman's
mind turned towards reforms 'necessary for making Afghanistan a great nation in the fu-
ture... [but] it was of the first and greatest importance to mark out a boundary line around
Afghanistan, so that we should first know what provinces really belonged to Afghanistan be-
fore thinking of introducing any reforms and improvements therein.60

The Amir likened his country to a poor goat on whom both the lion (Britain) and the
bear (Russia) had fixed their eyes. He first moved to have his border with Russia settled with
the help of Britain and, 'having settled my boundary with all my neighbours, I thought it
necessary to set out the boundaries between my country and India, so that the boundary line
should be definitely marked out around my dominions, as a strong wall for protection.61 The
method suggested by him to the Viceroy was that a British Mission be sent to Kabul to
negotiate the matter, and he 'requested that Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary,
might be appointed as the head of it.'62 The Viceroy, however, appointed Lord Roberts to lead
the proposed Mission. The Amir thought Roberts was an unwise choice because of the lat-
ter's part in the recent war against Afghanistan and his unknown support for a 'forward pol-
icy'. Though the Viceroy insisted upon his own choice, Abdur Rahman was able to delay the
matter with one pretext or another till Lord Roberts left India on retirement. Thereupon the
Amir 'at once invited the Mission to visit Kabul. 63 In a letter to the Viceroy Abdur Rahman
pleaded that the frontier tribes be included in his dominions because, as a fellow Muslims, he
would 'gradually make them peaceful subjects and good friends of Great Britain,' but his 'ad-
vice was not appreciated.'64 However, the Amir got his wish to have Durand as head of the
Mission and the latter arrived in Kabul in September 1893.

The boundary, as decided upon by the parties, was made the subject of an agree-
ment signed by the Amir on 12 November 1893.65 At a public Durbar on the following day the
Amir thanked the Mission 'for their wise way of settling the disputes.... All the representatives
and officials of my kingdom who were present received a copy of the address of the
deputation to which they had all set their seals, and in which they expressed their satisfac-
tion and consent to the agreements and understandings.... The misunderstandings and disputes
which were arising about these frontier matters were put to an end, and after the boundary
lines had been marked out according to the abovementioned agreements by the Commis-
ioners of both Governments, a general peace and harmony reigned between the two Gov-
ernments, which I pray God may continue for ever.'66 Though the Amir did not get from the
agreement all he wanted, he was realistic enough, in all the circumstances, to state: 'I am quite contended and satisfied that I have gained more than I have lost by British friendship.'

Basically, the Amir's position was but little different from that of numerous princes in India who ruled the 'states' under British paramountcy. It was a mere accident of history that the British Government did not actually annex Afghanistan and make her a part of their Indian empire. Geographically, a much better frontier than the Durand Line would have been the line of the Hindu Kush mountains, but 'in the interests of British policy, it was desirable to keep a strip of Afghan territory between the British and Russian Empires, the idea being that frontier incidents under such conditions would have less importance than if the outposts were held by British and Russian troops respectively.'

Had it suited the British purpose to add the whole of Afghanistan to their Indian empire, that country today would surely have formed the north-western province of Pakistan.

In 1905 Abdur Rahman's son and successor, Habibullah, signed a pact with the British Government, reaffirming that he would abide by the 'agreements and compacts' concluded by his late father. During the First World War Habibullah wisely resisted the temptation to take advantage of the temporary difficulties of Britain despite the fact that Muslim Turkey had joined the Axis Powers and a German-Turkish Mission journeyed to Kabul to press him to join their cause.

However, in 1919, when India was seething with internal discontent, Amanullah, son of Habibullah, launched an attack on the frontier in the hope of recovering 'Peshawar and areas in the Derajat up to the river Indus.' The invasion was contained and the Afghans were obliged to sue for peace. Britain too, exhausted by war and beset with political unrest in India, was in no mood to prolong the conflict. Two treaties followed the interim Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919) and the permanent Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1921). These, in effect, reaffirmed the Durand Agreement. Responding to the mood of the times, the British Government also declared that Afghanistan henceforth would be 'officially free and independent in its internal and external affairs.' Amanullah was addressed as His Majesty in a letter from King George V and in 1926 assumed the title of Padishah (King).

Though Amanullah had confirmed the Durand Line as the border in the treaties just mentioned, he did not at heart abandon his desire to add the frontier areas to his possessions. When he visited Russia in 1928 Izvestia, with the dual object of pleasing the royal guest and having a swipe at capitalist Britain, said that 'the belt of independent tribes, which the British have pacified and converted into advanced posts for their aggressive policy must under Afghan national policy, be incorporated into Afghanistan, to which they belong by tribal relationship and economic ties....' In the middle of the nineteen-fifties Khrushchev gave expression to similar thoughts, to spite Pakistan for her pro-West stance and to curry favour with the ruling clique in Afghanistan.

When Nadir Shah, father of the present Afghan monarch, ascended the throne in 1930, the validity of the treaty of 1921 was reaffirmed by an exchange of letters between the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Afghan Minister in London. We have already described the constitutional arrangements under which the territories comprising 'Pakhtunistan' elected to join Pakistan. A speech in the House of Commons on 30 June 1950 by Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, set out the resulting legal position: 'It is His Majesty's Government's view that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India, and of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in these territories, and that the Durand Line is the international frontier.' This view was repeated in Parliament by Foreign Secretary Lord Home (3
Let us now list, and examine the validity of, the specific arguments which Afghan spokesmen adduce when campaigning for 'Pakhtunistan.'

1. The Durand Line was established under duress — We have pointed out that the Durand Agreement was negotiated at the request of Amir Abdur Rahman himself, by a British official of the Amir's own choice, and that the Amir and his advisers publicly accepted it and declared themselves satisfied with it. As a matter of fact Abdur Rahman had accepted the kingship in the first instance on the clear understanding that the status of the north-west frontier as decided by the treaty of Gandamak was not negotiable. The Durand Line merely gave a more precise shape to the mutual understanding already existing in principle. For half a century afterwards each and every Afghan ruler reaffirmed the validity of the Durand Line as the agreed frontier between Afghanistan and India.

2. Even after the Durand Agreement the tribal territory remained separate and independent — This myth is largely the result of the administrative arrangements which came into force in 1901. From the annexation of the Punjab by the British until 1901 the five frontier districts had formed a part of the Punjab and the Punjab Government also exercised a loose control over the tribal tracts. Though others before him had recognized the anomaly of a provincial government administering a frontier region of international import, it was left to Curzon to bring matters to a head. In a minute to the Government at home, he represented that the existing system 'interposes between the Foreign Minister of India and his subordinate agents not an Ambassador or a Minister or a Consul, but the elaborate mechanism of a local government and the necessarily exalted personality of a Lieutenant-Governor.' Put more directly, the basic argument for a change was that the management of tribal affairs was inseparable from the conduct of foreign policy and defence of a highly sensitive international frontier. Accordingly, the entire frontier area was detached from the Punjab in 1901 and placed under the direct charge of the Government of India. A new North-West Frontier Province consisting of the five settled districts was created and, though the tribal territory was placed under the same Chief Commissioner, its tradition of local autonomy, based on agreements between the individual tribes and the British Government, was not disturbed. The advance in local self-government brought by the Act of 1919 was not extended to the Frontier Province till 1932 when it was raised from a Chief Commissioner's to a Governor's Province. Subsequently, the province shared equally with other parts of British India in the reforms under the 1935 Act. But the position in the tribal tract remained unaltered throughout and to emphasize the uniqueness of the latter it was now officially designated the 'Tribal Areas.' Clearly, the purpose behind the 1901 separation of the frontier territories would have been lost if the Tribal Areas afterwards had been allowed the same system of government as the rest of India. The only way in which they could be kept clear of a cumbersome local administration and of representative institutions, which proved to be a source of increasing embarrassment to the ruling power elsewhere, including the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province, was by continuing the original arrangements under which both sides got what they wanted—the tribesmen retained their own traditional form of local independence and the British Government continued its direct overall control of an area which, as pointed out by the Simon Commission, was not only the frontier of India but 'an international frontier of the first importance from the military point of view for the whole empire.'

However, the fact that it suited the purpose of the British Government not to extend to the Tribal Areas the administrative system which, either by choice or by necessity, they gradually built up in the rest of India, does not mean that internationally those Areas were
any more independent than the rest of the country. 'Perhaps one of the difficulties in enabling the situation to be thoroughly understood in Britain, America and other Western countries, even to this day,' points out a shrewd observer, 'is that in the great wealth of fiction, films, and writing, the tribal areas have often been referred to as "no-man's land" or by similar vague terms. The fact is, of course, that there has not been, since 1893, any territory the responsibility for which was in any doubt.'

Indeed the whole purpose of negotiating the Durand Line was to delimit the territories over which the Amir and the British Government respectively were entitled to exercise undisputed sovereignty.

3. As the British Government in India has ceased to exist the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 is null and void—This argument does not require a lengthy discussion. It is a well-settled proposition of international law that 'according to the principle res transit cum suo onere, treaties of the extinct State concerning boundary lines...remain valid, and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct State devolve on the absorbing State.'

4. The inhabitants of 'Pakhtunistan' are one nation and the Durand Line arbitrarily splits the nation into two—There are several interesting aspects of this much repeated and seemingly plausible proposition. In the first place the Durand Line was not arbitrarily drawn. 'It generally follows tribal boundaries, separating those tribes which go to market in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tank, and Quetta from those with economic links with Khorasan, having Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar as their market towns. Only in two cases—the Mohmands and the Wazirs—is a tribe divided. The Mohmands were always a two-headed Janus, many of the upper sections looking to Lalpura and Jalalabad rather than to Peshawar. These sections were left to the Amir of Afghanistan....As regards the Wazirs: a few Wazirs living in Birmal were left on the Afghan side of the line, though the great bulk of the tribe remained in India.'

Secondly, Afghanistan's concern for the unity of Pakhtuns is less than genuine because she does not include the Pakhtuns on her side of the line in the proposed state of 'Pakhnistan.' The 'Pakhtunistan' of her conception would consist solely of areas now within Pakistan. The Pakhtuns would, therefore, continue to be split within two sovereign states. 'During an amiable, lengthy and courteous interview with me,' interestingly recounts Griffiths, 'the Prime Minister [of Afghanistan] for just one brief instant sparked a flash of anger; it was when I asked him whether he thought any part of Afghanistan should become part of Pushtunistan. His sharp "never" and subsequent rebuke of my "irrelevant" question betrayed, not only strength of feeling, but perhaps also an awareness of the ambiguity and weakness of the arguments for an independent Pushtunistan.'

When the Afghan Foreign Minister, Mohammad Naim, visited Pakistan in January 1960, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, baffled him with an unexpected proposal. He said that the wishes of Pakhtuns on both sides of the line should be ascertained as to whether they all desired to live together in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Since the Pakhtuns of Pakistan have already declared in favour of Pakistan in a referendum, it remains to ask the Pakhtuns of Afghanistan. In all probability their verdict would be in favour of Pakistan. If not, the matter could be considered further. Naim's only answer was that he had not come to negotiate. Manzur Qadir repeated the offer publicly on 7 March. As two-thirds of all Pakhtuns live in Pakistan and only one-third in Afghanistan, it would appear more rational for the minority to join the majority.

Thirdly, it is not correct that the Pushto-speaking tribes collectively form a nation. As already mentioned, they never constituted a cohesive unit of any sort by themselves throughout the long history of the ancient part of the world in which they live. The first loyalty of every tribesman has always been to his own particular tribe and, far from having any sense of unity, they are notorious for perpetual inter-tribal feuds.
Fourthly, there are innumerable all the world over where persons speaking the same language, or belonging to the same tribe, form a part of more than one nation. Any attempt to redraw boundaries of states according to tribal or linguistic considerations would throw innumerable countries into the melting pot and create far more problems than it would solve. It was no doubt with such a realization in mind that, despite the manifest defects in many cases of the international frontiers left behind by the departing colonial powers, the members of the Second Non-Aligned Nations Conference in their communique from Cairo on 10 October 1964 pledged themselves ‘to respect frontiers as they existed when the States gained independence.’

In central Asia in particular any attempt to redraw political boundaries tribe-wise would lead to utter chaos. ‘Any major unpicking on linguistic lines of South Asia’s existing frontiers, were it to happen, might immediately cause the Afghan Kingdom to fall apart. The northern tract, logically would then joint with the Soviet Union’s Central Asian Republics; the western with Persia; and the rest with Pakistan’s present Pathan tract—where the Pakistani Pathans, having the higher standards of living and education, would doubtless take the lead, and Kabul become secondary to Peshawar, the better-developed country.’

In truth, after the establishment of the Durand Line, the tribesmen allotted to Muslim Afghanistan were no less restive and desirous of freedom to pursue their own way of life than those given to infidel Britain. If Afghanistan was Muslim, British India offered cash allowances and greater opportunities of employment and trade. Many thousands of young tribesmen earned a regular living by joining the ranks of the Indian Army irregular corps and the constabulary, and large numbers of their brethren regularly flocked to the comparatively more flourishing towns of the settled districts for barter and trade. They looked upon Peshawar and not Kabul as their metropolis. The biggest potential factor in Afghan influence was, I suppose, that while the British ruled the tribes felt that, in the last resort, they could appeal to an Islamic champion against an alien power. But in truth history has little to support that apprehension....Not only were they on the whole content to remain under British rule, but they sometimes showed the Afghan Government such antagonism that the latter had to appeal for the British Government’s help.

As a part of Muslim Pakistan, the facilities for trade, employment and other opportunities have multiplied for the tribesmen as well as for the inhabitants of the former Settled Districts. The Pathans have now learned to look unmistakably to the east for education, service and all the higher things of life; the social, economic and political ideas of Durranis have become to them an anachronism. For them Kabul irredentism is empty of meaning; political amalgamation, should it ever come, would take a very different shape. Peshawar would absorb Kabul, not Kabul Peshawar. One respected writer regards the fusion of Afghanistan, once known as India the Less, and Pakistan as inevitable because the Hindu Kush today is no less the ‘great frontier barrier’ of the subcontinent than it always was in the past.

REFERENCES

1. Shamloo, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, p. 236.
2. Ibid., p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
4. Ibid., p. 9.
5. Iqbal’s doctrine, that religion and the State are inseparable, was not, however acted upon by Mustafa Kemal, the maker of modern Turkey. When the Aga Khan sent Kemal a message in 1923 adjuring him not to weaken the moral hold of the Khilafat by divorcing it from politics, Kemal, while not repudiating Islam, held that its ‘indispensable, in order to secure the revival of the Islamic faith, to disengage it from the condition of being a political instrument’. Economist, 13 Feb. 1954.

Iqbal thinks ‘the Turkish Nationalists assimilated, the idea of the separation of the Church and the State from the history of European political ideas.’ Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 155.
37. Ibid., p. 282.
40. I. H. Baqai, ‘Relations Between Afghanistan and Pakistan,’ Pakistan Horizon, Sept. 1948.
42. Rahman Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan, p. 124.
44. A writer who made half a dozen trips through the tribal area in 1951–4 found that ‘the whole “governmental organization” of “Pakhtunistan” appears to exist in theory rather than in fact, and even the theory is often elusive’ (James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, p. 237).
40. The book does not bear the publisher's name nor the year of publication. Its foreword indicates that the author was serving in the Embassy of Afghanistan in London when he wrote it and that it was probably published privately in the early nineteen-fifties.

41. See also p. 8. It may be pointed out that the area includes a number of non-Pakhtun territories such as Chitral, Kohistan, Hazara, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Baluchistan south of Quetta, i.e. the states of Kalat, Kharan, Makran, Las Bela, and the Chagai area and Bolan.

42. See also p. 8.

43. See also p. 8.

44. The Gupta empire did not extend beyond the Punjab in the north-west.


53. Abdur Rahman was the son of Afzul Khan, the eldest surviving son of Amir Dost Muhammad. After Dost Muhammad's death, however, it was not Afzul Khan but Sher Ali who had managed to grab the throne.


65. For relevant extracts from the Durand Agreement see Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 463.


69. For extracts see Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 464.


71. For extracts see Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 464.


73. For texts see Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 465.

74. *Ibid*.


78. Article 2 of the Agreement ran: 'The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.'


82. *Dover*, 8 March 1960. On an earlier occasion Naim had made the interesting observation that the issue did not concern the Pushto-speaking tribesmen living in Afghanistan because their interests were well 'looked after'. *Asian Recorder*, 1955, p. 575.


85. Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 437. On the eve of partition, when Mountbatten visited the north-west frontier, the mass demonstrations he encountered both in Peshawar and the tribal areas were in favour of Pakistan and not at all in favour of independence or joining Afghanistan. 'Perhaps the basic flaw in the entire Afghan position,' observes an American scholar, 'has been Kabul's wrong assessment of the extent to which Pathans in the north-west area have identified themselves with the new Muslim state of Pakistan.' George L. Montagno, 'Pak-Afghan Detente', *Asian Survey*, Dec. 1963.

READING 3

(The article Pakistan’s Relations with Iran, the Arab States, by Devlet Khalid, in ‘Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies’, Vol. V, No. 3 (Spring 1982), USA, The Kings Wood Group).

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In Bhutto’s days Pakistan’s relations with Imperial Iran were not without tensions; on the whole, however, they were good. In a number of spheres there was even an excellent cooperation between the two countries. Friendship with Iran used to be one of the cornerstones of Pakistan’s foreign policy. When Bhutto was overthrown the relations experienced a certain crisis which was soon overcome. During the revolutionary upheaval in Iran the Government-controlled media in Pakistan openly sided with the Shah, but after Khomeini’s rise to power they quickly changed sides and tried to befriend the new rulers in Teheran. The new Iran was hailed as a companion on the road to Islamisation and Khomeini was celebrated as a saint. After a short period of such apparent Islamist harmony Khomeini personally attacked Zia-ul-Haq and accused him of collaboration with the United States. 1 Pakistan’s radical Islamists are split into an old-guard wing that continues to support Saudi Arabia and a younger extremist wing looking for inspiration to Iran. The latter group serves Teheran as a fifth column. Such Islamist dissidents in Pakistan denounce Zia-ul-Haq as a usurper whose Islamisation, they allege, is nothing but eyewash.

The friction came to a head when Pakistan’s Shi’ites started to protest against the introduction of zakat as a government tax to be levied on all Muslim sects likewise. The Shi’ite opposition to the zakat law resulted in the largest anti-government demonstration ever witnessed in Islamabad since the proclamation of martial law in July 1977, forcing the military junta to appease the Shi’ite community. 2 Although Iranian polemics became less acrimonious for sometime, Teheran’s relations with Islamabad did not really improve. In the course of the controversy in Iran regarding Banisadr’s presidency, the Pakistani media generally supported Banisadr. The new Iranian leadership does, moreover, blame the Pakistani military junta for not siding with Iran against Iraq. 3

Pakistan’s relations with Iraq have indeed rather improved after they had been strained for more than a decade. In Bhutto’s days relations with Iraq were bad, whereas those with Syria were excellent. The year 1981 witnessed almost the contrary. Hafiz al-Asad has difficulties in reconciling with the executioners of his personal friend Bhutto, and Islamabad sees itself countered by Damascus’ close ties with Moscow, the Syrian stand vis-à-vis the Afghanistan crisis and the support for the Pakistani opposition that became apparent when a Pakistani plane hijacked to Kabul was finally taken to Damascus as a safe haven for radical PPP activists.

Aside from this new constellation, little has otherwise changed in Pakistan’s relations with the Arab countries. No doubt, Bhutto’s execution caused a disruption for sometime. After all, he had taken special pains to cultivate friends in the Arab world and was fairly successful at this. A particularly close friend of Bhutto’s was the president of Algeria, and
even after Boumedienne’s death the relations between Algiers and Islamabad are not what they were in Bhutto’s days. Things are different with the Gulf states, with whom Pakistan’s relations are again as cordial as ever before.

As regards Libya, relations had been contradictory even in Bhutto’s time. Bhutto feated Qaddafi in Pakistan as his Arab counterpart. Libya, however, was simultaneously wooing the “Islamic Party” of Pakistan that was bitterly opposed to the PPP. As elsewhere in the world of Islam. Libya did this with the purpose of weaning the Islamists away from Saudi Arabia, an effort that met with failure. The contradiction in Libya’s attitude toward Pakistan persists, as Tripoli is cooperating with the military junta in a number of matters, while simultaneously financing a radical faction of the PPP that is in exile (mainly in London), actively engaged in propaganda warfare against Islamabad.

The relationship with Libya does, moreover, illustrate Pakistan’s weak position with regard to its Arab associates. On the one hand several Arab states are in a number of ways fairly dependent on Pakistan. It is not only Pakistani workers who decisively contribute to the creation of an infrastructure in many Arab countries, but also medical doctors, nurses, architects, engineers, contractors and university teachers. The oil rich Arab states avail themselves only too eagerly of this Muslim personnel. Some sectors such as the hotel branch and civil aviation benefit from substantial Pakistani expertise even in far off places such as Morocco. On the other hand prejudices are noticeable against the easily purchasable brethren-in-faith coming from an “underdeveloped” country who are, therefore, more difficult to appreciate than American or European experts. Moreover, the presence of these large Pakistani expatriate communities tempts undemocratic governments to use them as a lever against Pakistan, which has become so utterly dependent on manpower export.

In 1981, Tripoli was the city with the largest percentage Pakistani population outside Pakistan (though less in number than in London, their proportion to the local population was higher in Tripoli). Once provoked, Qaddafi could order the expulsion of the entire Pakistani community, analogous to what happened earlier to Egyptians and Tunisians.

Although the situation of the Pakistani community is certainly more precarious in Libya than elsewhere, Pakistanis remain nonetheless very much exposed to arbitrary measures in other Arab states as well. Sudan, one of the 20 poorest nations of the world, is also one of the countries with the highest ratio of manpower export. The migration of the Sudanese elite into the oil rich Arab states has created vacancies within the Sudan that are now eagerly pounced upon by Pakistanis. This has occurred despite the fact that there exists in scarcely any Arab country anything resembling the concept of job security on a European pattern. Even in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s closest ally among the Arabs, attempts are periodically made to replace Pakistani expatriates with those of other nationalities. In 1972 Riyadh was all out for stopping the influx of Pakistanis by giving preference to Egyptians. Egyptians are often felt to be more useful because of their Arabic language, but political expediency also played a role, as in those days the kingdom wanted to assist Sadat in getting rid of the Russians. Egypt’s eventual return into the fold of the Arab League would inevitably have negative effects for Pakistan’s prospective expatriates wishing to take up jobs in a number of Arab states.

In 1981 another tendency became more and more pronounced in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, viz, to utilize the relatively cheap labor from East Asia, particularly from South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. East Asians are less prone to settle in Arabia than the Middle Eastern Pakistanis, many of whom persistently try to become nationals of the countries they work in. The Gulf Arabs, however, have become increasingly scared of being
turned into minorities on their own soil. Moreover, the East Asian, being non-Muslims, develop contacts less easily with the locals and thus do not introduce additional religio-political tensions. Significantly, the first-ever strike in the history of Saudi Arabia was organized by a Pakistani, Mukhtar Rana, who later even served for a short time as a Minister in Bhutto’s cabinet.

Thus the relationship between Arab and Pakistani brethren-in-faith is rather a complex one. However, despite the latent menace of expulsion for Pakistanis in most Arab countries there is still much scope for them, particularly in two realms that will probably continue to absorb large numbers of them. 6

First of all there is the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conferences) with its numerous suborganizations such as the IDB (Islamic Development Bank), the ISF (Islamic Solidarity Fund), the IESCO (Islamic equivalent of UNESCO), etc. All of these are more or less Saudi Arabian/Pakistani joint ventures: Saudi Arabia supplies the finances, Pakistan the expertise. The primary purpose of these ventures seems to be to enable the kingdom to utilize its financial support for conservative Muslim governments effectively and not to lose control of the huge enterprise. For Pakistani experts this implies a large number of well-paid positions. Some of the OIC’s suborganizations do in fact have their seat in Pakistan, such as the “Islamic Chamber of Industry and Commerce.’ Even the many religious institutes Saudi Arabia is setting up all over the world in order to spread its formalistic interpretation of Islam would hardly be workable if not for the overwhelmingly Pakistanis staff. 7

The second domain is the military where cooperation between Pakistan and the Arab countries dates back decades. The states primarily concerned are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, but also Syria and especially Libya. The item most in demand are Pakistani pilots for whom almost all Arab air forces offer some scope. However, Pakistanis do not only serve as military experts and trainers, but also as volunteer soldiers. Oman has a peculiar tradition of recruiting Pakistani Baluch to its forces due to its historic and ethnic ties with the opposite coast. Libya recruited in 1981 large numbers of Pakistanis (the figures vary from 2,000 to 30,000) for its “Islamic Legion.” More than any other instance, this case illustrated Pakistani vulnerability in dealings with the Arabs. The Libyans who devised the scheme were frank and explicit in what they wanted the Pakistanis for. Their Pakistani agents, however, who did the recruiting work for them in Pakistan, deceived most of their compatriots by giving them the impression that they would be employed in civilian jobs. Once taken to military bases for training in guerilla warfare, many Pakistanis got frightened and felt exploited. Some of those later sent abroad (to Lebanon in particular) had horror stories to tell. 9

In Saudi Arabia Pakistani officers served in all the different formations of the armed forces, viz., in the army, the national guard and the palace guard, thus constituting, according to some observers, the surest guarantee against the outbreak of violent conflict between the various sections. The deployment of Pakistani Army units in the kingdom is still a matter of conjecture. The dispatch of troops to Saudi Arabia was hotly debated in a session of Pakistan’s military government on May 25, 1979. Due to the opposition of some of the generals, who did not want to provoke the Russians any further, General Zia-ul-Haq seemed to drop the plan of complying with the Saudi request for three infantry brigades and two armoured brigades (altogether nearly two divisions) to secure the border against South Yemen. There is considerable evidence that Zia-ul-Haq later on got his way and did send at least two
brigades, though this has repeatedly been denied by the Saudis. The recruitments to the
Pakistani Army do in fact suggest that more than a division of troops had already been “ex-
ported” by mid-1981. This is one of the reasons for the alarm in India where these moves are
seen as a clever device of increasing the strength of the Pakistan Army. Whatever con-
ingents are being stationed abroad are quickly substituted by means of new recruitments. In
this way the overall strength of the Pakistani Army is increased.

However, in this case, too, Pakistan’s position in the Arab world is not unchallenged;
rather, it remains vulnerable. Since 1980, Riyadh intensified its drive to diversify its sources
of military support. In connection with the Islamic Summit Conference in Taif in January
1981 Saudi Arabia concluded several agreements with Turkey to the effect of obtaining milit-
ary supplies from there. In the future more Saudi cadets are to be sent to Turkey for training.
Until recently Pakistan had, after the United States, a kind of monopoly on the training of
Saudi Army received their training in Pakistan. As for Islamabad every Saudi in Pakistan and
every Pakistani soldier in the kingdom is an important source of foreign exchange; any re-
striction of the Arab market for military exports is bound to affect Pakistan adversely. 9

The same holds true for Pakistan’s endeavour to become the bread basket — or
rather vegetable garden — for the oil rich Arab states short of food. After Lebanon lost its role
as chief food supplier for Kuwait, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Bhutto hoped to attract in-
vestments to the geographically closer Pakistan with its expansive agriculture. However, the
countries concerned took, for sometime at least, a far greater interest in the Sudan, which
was to be turned into the grainary of the Arab world, thanks to mainly French know-how. As
the Sudanese option did not materialize for a number of reasons. Saudi Arabia turned 1981
increasingly to Turkey. There, agricultural surplus does not have to be created; it already
exists and can easily be obtained in exchange for oil at reduced rates. This does also help
Turkey to be less dependent on the EEC and makes her more malleable for the Arab cause.
Although Arabia’s Turkish food option still leaves ample scope to Pakistani suppliers, it cer-
tainly signifies a setback for some of the rather ambitious plans cherished by a number of
Pakistani entrepreneurs.

On the whole, Pakistan’s relations with most of the Arab states are good, if not ex-
cellent, although by no means so entirely free of problems as the military government’s
stress on the brotherhood of all believers would like to make believe. The amiable relation-
ship with the Arab countries on the basis of the common faith is surely an important factor of
Pakistan’s foreign policy; however, it is not a reliable pillar for an edifice to rest upon.

Regarding the alleged Arab assistance for Pakistan’s construction of an “Islamic
bomb,” there is little evidence to support this. 10 On the one hand there is scarcely any reason
to doubt the disclosures of one of Bhutto’s former assistants concerning cooperation be-
 tween Libya and Pakistan. 11 It is, however, unlikley that this corporation continues after the
Islamabad-Tripoli axis was subjected to severe strains. Not lacking in self-confidence, Pakis-
tan’s Atomic Energy Commission shows little inclination to jeopardize its nuclear pro-
gramme by closely cooperating with a little trustworthy partner.
REFERENCES


4. Here I am thinking primarily of the weekly *Inqilab* (bilingual: Urdu/English) published from London by Brigadier Usman Khalid assisted by his sister, Dr. Kaniz Yusuf, a former Vice-Chancellor of Islamabad University. The indebtedness to Libya is more or less acknowledged, as the paper falls in line with as the Qaddafi-type of personality cult.

5. Brigadier Usman Khalid, who defected from the Pakistan Army and started a "Pakistan Liberation Movement" in London, took credit for having averted disaster for the Pakistanis in Libya by interceding for them with his friend Mu'amar al-Qaddafi. S. *Inqilab*, June 6, 1980.


8. Personal communication by some of those who managed to escape.


Pakistan and the Third World

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1. Anti-Colonialism

READING 1


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Pakistan has been particularly concerned in the United Nations about questions in which the principle of self-determination or self-government was involved. Having recently attained its independence, Pakistan has been anxious that other countries still under colonial rule should also become independent. Until that happened, declared Sir Zafrulla Khan in the General Assembly, “they would not be able either to enjoy or to appreciate to the fullest extent their own recently achieved freedom and sovereignty.”

The Kashmir question, to which Pakistan is a party, is, as has been recognised by the United Nations, essentially one of the right of self-determination. Again, it was out of respect for that right that Pakistan fought hard to prevent the partition of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel. Pakistan has supported the claim to independence of Indonesia, the former Italian colonies in Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. Further, Pakistan has advocated the acceleration of the pace of self-government in trust territories and non-self-governing territories.

Indonesia

The Indonesian question was dealt with the United Nations by the Security Council, an organ on which Pakistan was not serving at the time. However, Pakistan was throughout a strong supporter of independence for Indonesia and spoke vigorously for it in the Conference of Asian and Australasian countries convened in Delhi in January 1949. Pakistan supported the proposal for the inclusion of the Indonesian question in the agenda of the fourth session of the General Assembly. When the Dutch started their so-called “police action” against Indonesia, Pakistan reacted to it by denying the use of Karachi airport to Dutch aircraft. The fact that Dutch aircraft could not use the landing and refueling facilities at Karachi, on their way to Indonesia, effectively hindered the delivery of supplies to the Dutch forces in Indonesia and correspondingly helped the Indonesians. Eventually, with the help of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, an agreement was arrived at between the Indonesians and the Dutch and sovereignty transferred in December 1949 to the government of the Republic of Indonesia. This was welcomed in Pakistan. To celebrate that event the government of Pakistan declared a nationwide holiday.

The Indonesian struggle for independence was referred to by Sir Zafrulla Khan in his
address to the 1950 session of the General Assembly. He described it as a United Nations sponsored struggle and the attainment of independence by Indonesia as the coming of age of the principle of self-determination.²

An important offshoot of the Indonesian question has come before the United Nations, namely, the West Irian issue. The Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia had provided that this issue should be settled through negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Negotiations were undertaken but yielded no solution and in July 1954 the Netherlands declared that it would break off the talks.

Pakistan was a party to the Bogor Communique of December 1954 and the Bandung Communique of April 1955. These declarations expressed the hope that the Netherlands would resume negotiations with Indonesia and that the United Nations would assist the two countries in finding a solution to the dispute.

Pakistan was one of the countries that asked for the inclusion of the West Irian question in the agenda of the tenth session of the General Assembly.³ On 16 December 1955, the Assembly adopted a resolution⁴ calling for the early resumption of negotiations and expressing the hope that they would be fruitful. A similar resolution,⁵ with Pakistan co-sponsor, was passed by the First Committee in its eleventh session; but for lack of a two-thirds majority, it was not adopted by the General Assembly. In the twelfth session a resolution⁶ calling for resumption of negotiations was again passed by the First Committee, Pakistan voting for it. But this resolution too was not adopted by the General Assembly for lack of the required majority.

**Former Italian Colonies in Africa**

As a result of its defeat in World War II, Italy had to forego its possessions in Africa. Italian aggression against Ethiopia had been a factor in destroying the prestige of the League of Nations. After World War II Ethiopia regained its independence. After that war, Libya (baring the Fezzan), Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland were under the military occupation of the British. The Fezzan, a part of Libya, was held by the French. The four powers having failed to agree on the disposal of these colonies, the question went to the third session of the General Assembly in 1949. The First Committee, during the second half of the session, advanced a solution identical with that previously agreed upon between Britain, France, and Italy, the so-called Bevin-Sforza agreement. This solution contemplated that Libya should be independent after ten years; in the meantime Cyrenaica should be under British trusteeship, the Fezzan under French trusteeship, and Italy (which was not even a member of the United Nations) should assume trusteeship for Tripolitania. Italy was, in addition, to have trusteeship over Italian Somaliland. It was also proposed that the western provinces of Eritrea should be merged with the Sudan and the rest of Eritrea with Ethiopia.

Pakistan, along with several other smaller powers, including all the states of the Middle East, opposed these proposals. Sir Zafrulla Khan was against the reimposition of colonial rule under a new name and urged that independence should be given to a united Libya, comprising Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan. If it was considered that immediate independence was not feasible, Sir Zafrulla Khan asked that the region be placed under United Nations trusteeship, under the Trusteeship Council.⁷

Pakistan resisted the proposal for an Italian trusteeship over former Italian Somaliland. In the First Committee, Sir Zafrulla Khan advocated a greater Somaliland, comprisi:
Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, British Somaliland, and the Somali areas of Ethiopia. He said: "If the principle of ending colonial exploitation was accepted, it should be applied not only in the former Italian colonies but in neighbouring areas as well."8

However, in the General Assembly, while that part of the First Committee's resolution9 which related to Cyrenaica and the Fezzan was adopted, the other, concerning Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania, failed to secure the required two-thirds majority. Thereafter the Latin American countries, which were primarily interested in an Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania, joined the opposition and voted against the resolution, which was defeated. Thus the way was opened to a reconsideration of the entire question, which was done in the fourth regular session of the Assembly.

Pakistan, playing a full part in the discussions, had the satisfaction of seeing its labours, and the labours of the member state that had collaborated with it, rewarded when on 21 November 1949 the General Assembly10 decided that Libya, comprising Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan, should become independent by January 1952. To prepare for that consummation, the Assembly appointed a Commission of which Pakistan was elected a member.

On Eritrea, too, a start had to be made all over again. It will be recalled that under the plan, contemplated in the draft resolution rejected in 1949 by the General Assembly in the second part of its third session, certain portions of Eritrea were to go to Ethiopia. The justification advanced for this arrangement was that Ethiopia needed an outlet to the sea, that the Christian population of Eritrea desired union with Ethiopia and that, as compensation for what Ethiopia had suffered at the hands of Italy, Eritrea should be handed over to Ethiopia. With regard to this last argument, Sir Zafrulla Khan condemned the mentality of those who looked upon Eritrea as "a bundle of chattels which had been taken away from Italy and the question was whether it should be given as a reward or a prize to Ethiopia."11

The General Assembly appointed a five-member commission to ascertain the wishes of the people of Eritrea and to make recommendations regarding its future. Pakistan was named a member of this commission, its other members being Guatemala, Burma, Norway, and South Africa. The members of the commission were divided in their findings, the majority favouring the original plan of partitioning Eritrea between Ethiopia and the Sudan. When the question came back to the General Assembly, Pakistan proposed in the Ad Hoc Political Committee in 1950 that Eritrea should be constituted a sovereign independent state by January 1953, and that a national assembly be convened to draft a constitution.12 This proposal was supported by all the Communist governments, by most Muslim states, and by some South American ones; but it failed to obtain a majority.

Eventually, on 2 December 1950, the General Assembly adopted a resolution13 to the effect that Eritrea, as an autonomous unit, should federate with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of its Emperor. The resolution provided that an Eritrean government was to be established under a constitution to be prepared by 6 August 1952. In August 1952 the constitution received the approval of the United Nations Commissioner, appointed for the purpose, and the assent of the Emperor of Ethiopia.

As regards Italian Somaliland, it will be recalled that Pakistan had put forward a rather radical solution, namely, that it should be amalgamated with other Somali areas to form an independent Somalia, which would be ethnically and culturally homogeneous. The demand of the Western powers was that Italian Somaliland be placed under Italian trus
To this, public opinion in Pakistan was opposed. *Dawn of Karachi* editorially warned against the dangers of entrusting colonial territories to individual powers. It said: "Colonial rule, whether with or without the blessings of the United Nations, remains the same and that is why Pakistan opposes trusteeship under individual countries." Sir Zafrulla Khan strongly opposed Italian trusteeship. Fifty years of Italian rule over the area, he said, had not prepared its people for independence. Nor was a single newspaper published in their language. Finally, the General Assembly decided that Italian Somaliland be placed under United Nations trusteeship, with Italy as the administering power, aided by an advisory council, consisting of Colombia, Egypt, and the Philippines. This arrangement was to last for ten years, with Italian Somaliland becoming independent in 1960.

The manner of the disposal of the former Italian colonies was unprecedented. As territorial possessions of a vanquished party to a war, they would have, under the old order, gone to the victors by outright annexation or, under the post-World War I arrangements, in the guise of mandates. In the words of an American writer, the United Nations decisions regarding these African colonies constituted "an uncommon event in the annals of international diplomacy," perhaps the first instance of a territorial settlement in which the great powers had bowed before "an international organization acting with binding authority."

Newly independent countries, with their limited resources and small populations, have to face serious problems of finance and technology. This is particularly true when the people of such a country have had no opportunities for education or development. Libya had problems of this nature, to which the representative of Pakistan drew attention when the Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner came up for discussion in January 1952. Colonel Abdur Rahim Khan said:

"The responsibility of the United Nations in the matter had not ended with the transfer of power and authority from the administering Powers to the Libyan people. Economic stability was almost as important as political freedom. Pakistan would welcome any proposal that would enable the United Nations to render assistance to Libya in the economic field...."

Believing that the financial arrangements which had been entered into by Libya with certain powers were not, from the Libyan point of view, the best possible, Pakistan would have liked that assistance to be obtained from international bodies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, but the regulations governing the activities of those organizations were an obstacle. The difficulties might be overcome, but the time for that would be when Libya had become a Member of the United Nations and could raise the issue itself. At the present stage, Pakistan would only draw the Committee's attention to the importance and urgency of continuing and improving the technical assistance which the United Nations and the specialized agencies had been rendering to Libya.

Tunisia

The freedom movements of the three countries of the "Maghreb" evoked a great deal of sympathy in Pakistan. Their leaders, Habib Bourguiba, head of the Neo-Destour party of Tunisia, Allal El-Fassi of the Istiqlal party of Morocco, and Mohammed Yazid of the Na-
tional Liberation Movement of Algeria, and several others, repeatedly visited Pakistan to explain their respective causes and were enthusiastically received. For sometime a branch of the Maghreb Office of Cairo functioned in Karachi, as did also an influential local Maghreb Committee. For its part, the government of Pakistan gave all possible support in the United Nations to the aspirations of the Arabs of North Africa. This was in consonance with a cardinal principle of Pakistan’s foreign policy, namely, that all colonial people struggling to be free should be helped. The people of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria also happened to be Muslims.

The struggle against the French and the Spanish in the Maghreb has been going on for many a long year. In the twenties there was in Morocco a widespread revolt, which the ruling powers were able to suppress because of their superior modern arms. However, agitation continued. The three countries, like their neighbour, Libya, experienced a tremendous upheaval as a result of becoming involved in World War II. The achievement of independence by Libya, through the United Nations, no doubt encouraged the people next door in Tunisia to step up their struggle. The French replied by jailing the leaders, gagging the press, and proclaiming martial law, and generally putting an end to all civil liberties. The Tunisian government complained to the United Nations. In April 1952 it asked the Security Council urgently to consider the “grave situation in Tunisia.”

Pakistan was one of the eleven Asian and African governments which in April 1952 requested the Security Council to consider the Tunisian situation, under Article 34 of the Charter, as one likely to endanger international peace and security. Pakistan was then a member of the Security Council and the Pakistani representative, Professor Ahmed S. Bokhari, was President for the month.

While the Tunisian question was put on the provisional agenda of the Security Council, its adoption was vigorously opposed. Indeed, as Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang, the representative of China, pointed out, never before in the history of the United Nations had such opposition been offered to the mere adoption of the agenda. This opposition was, of course, led by France itself. Professor Bokhari gave a quotation from a speech made by the representative of France on 3 September 1946, at the 59th meeting of the Security Council, when that body was considering the Ukrainian SSR’s complaint against Greece. Mr. Alexandre Parodi had then said: “In my view, to adopt the method of declining to place a question on the agenda involves serious disadvantages and risks.” Bokhari quoted also from Mr. Ernest Bevin’s statement to the second meeting of the Security Council on 25 January 1946, when the British Foreign Minister had said:

...I am very anxious, in all these cases, that complainants should be heard by the Council, whoever they may be. I think it is a mistake if a Government feels that having a complaint against another Power, whether it be great or small, it cannot come to this Council and state its case....

The legal answer to the objection against the competence of the Security Council was to be given later in the year by Sir Zafrulla Khan. However, Professor Bokhari, who was not a lawyer, gave a telling non-legal reply. He asked:

...What is the United Nations for if a situation like this cannot be aired here? What are we to understand to be our functions around this table if a suppressed people cannot raise its voice here, through eleven responsible nations representing, as my colleagues well known, the whole of Asia, with a few exceptions and barring those which are not Member States....
The French delegate opposed the inclusion of the item in the agenda, contending that it related to a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state and was, as such, barred by Article 2 (7) of the Charter. This viewpoint was upheld by the British delegate, who argued that the dispute was like one between the Soviet Union and Uzbekistan. There being only five members (Brazil, Chile, China, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union) in favour of it, the item was not included in the agenda.

Having met with frustration in the Security Council, the Asian-African nations brought the Tunisian question before the General Assembly in 1952. The resolution, which was introduced by Pakistan, asked for the restoration of civil liberties in Tunisia and for negotiations with a view to enabling its people to exercise their right of self-determination. Speaking in the First Committee, after the French delegation had decided to withdraw from the Assembly and to take no part in its proceedings, Sir Zafrulla Khan pointed out that:

...While the Tunisian and the Moroccan questions presented almost as many aspects as were embraced within the Charter—political, economic and humanitarian aspect, as well as those relating to peace and security and the self-determination of peoples—he preferred to view them principally as human problems since he was persuaded that the aspect of the dignity and worth of the person overshadowed all other aspects. He referred to articles on the right of self-determination, drafted in identical terms, in the Draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The articles read: “All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination, namely, the right to freely determine their political, economic, social and cultural status.”

Coming specifically to the issue of jurisdiction, Sir Zafrulla Khan observed that:

...Although the French Government had often repeated its accord with the spirit of the Charter, including Article 73b, it had suggested that Article 2 (7) barred discussion of those matters and any intervention by the United Nations. That paragraph read: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State....” France accepted as “a sacred trust,” under Article 73, the obligation to develop self-government in Tunisia, and he did not believe that anything arising out of that obligation could be treated as a matter essentially within France’s domestic jurisdiction.

Sir Zafrulla Khan recalled that the question of the interpretation of Article 2 (7) had arisen during the discussion on the trial of high church dignitaries in certain East European countries and the discussion on the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa. In both cases, the competence of the United Nations was in question; in both the General Assembly had exercised its competence.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan referred to the Treaty of Bardo and the Convention of La Marsa, which, he said, undoubtedly committed certain specific matters to the government of France. All other matters remained under the sovereignty of the Bey. The specific complaint was that through interference with the Bey’s sovereignty, France had in effect set it aside and substituted its own direct rule in the place of the indigenous authority. “Certainly such interference by France could not be a matter essentially within the jurisdiction of France.” Sir Zafrulla Khan also observed that:
...it could scarcely be contended that a matter arising out of a treaty between two States was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of one of those States. It was certainly at least within the domestic jurisdiction of two States.\(^{27}\)

It will be recalled that Libya had already become independent. Sir Zafrulla asked what distinguished the case of Tunisia from that of Libya:

...Had the members of the French delegation been present, he was sure they would have been the first to repudiate any suggestion that Tunisia was in any respect more backward than Libya. The truth was that the benefits, if they were such, that Tunisia had received from France disentitled her from enjoying the incomparable boon, the honour and dignity of independence.\(^{28}\)

The resolution was supported by most Asian and African states, by all Communist governments, and by Guatemala and Yugoslavia, making a total of twenty-one. Against it were twenty-four votes, including those of the United Kingdom and the United States, whose representative had spoken against it. There were seven abstentions. Thus the resolution was rejected.\(^{29}\) On 17 December 1952 the General Assembly adopted a Latin American resolution expressing the hope that, in conformity with the principles of the Charter, France would develop free institutions in Tunisia.\(^{30}\)

Pakistan was one of the fourteen Asian and African states at whose request the Tunisian question was included in the agenda of the 1953 session of the General Assembly which referred it to the First Committee. France again declined to participate in the debate, claiming that, without contravening Article 2 (7) of the Charter, the Assembly could not interfere in the relations of France and its North African protectorate.

Pakistan was one of the thirteen states which, on 22 October 1953, submitted a draft resolution, recommending that necessary steps be taken to ensure the realisation by the people of Tunisia of their sovereignty and independence, for the restoration of civil liberties, and for negotiations with a Tunisian government established through free elections.\(^{31}\) Though passed by the First Committee in a modified form, the resolution failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority and was not adopted by the Assembly.

That last time the Tunisian question came up before the General Assembly was in 1954, Pakistan again being one of the sponsors. The request for the inclusion of the question in the agenda of the ninth session was sent by letter in July. When it was considered by the First Committee on 16 December, the representative of France was not present. However, negotiations were then in progress between France and Tunisia. A long debate was avoided and an agreed resolution, "expressing confidence" that the negotiations would bring about a satisfactory solution, was passed by fifty-four votes to none, with three abstentions. One of the countries which abstained was the United Kingdom, whose representative explained that while he sympathised with the spirit of the resolution, he felt that the substance of it was beyond the competence of the United Nations. In 1956 Tunisia was admitted as a member of the United Nations.

Morocco

The case of Morocco was analogous to that of Tunisia. In Morocco there was the Sultan, as in Tunisia there was the Bey. Morocco too was bound to France by treaty, that of Fez. This treaty permitted France to conduct the foreign relations of Morocco. Therefore,
said France, the United Nations was debarred from considering the Moroccan question. The French delegation consequently took no part in the discussion on it.

The question was first debated in the General Assembly in 1952, at the instance of thirteen Asian and African states, Pakistan being one of them. Their draft resolution failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority in the Assembly, which on 19 December 1952 adopted a Latin American resolution expressing the hope that France would further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco, in conformity with the principles of the Charter, and continue negotiations towards developing free institutions.32

The same Asian and African states in a letter dated 21 August 1953 requested the President of the Security Council to call an urgent meeting for considering the situation in Morocco, whose Sultan had been deposed and jailed by the French who had, they said, converted it into a colony. Despite very effort by the Pakistani representative on the Security Council (and by his Lebanese colleague) the Moroccan question was not inscribed on the Council's agenda. However, it was included in that of the General Assembly.

Speaking in the First Committee, Sir Zafrulla Khan stated that his sole purpose was to seek

... a satisfactory and rapid solution based on friendly cooperation between France on the one hand and Tunisia and Morocco on the other and ensuring to the latter their right of self-determination and of directing their own affairs. It had never been his intention to create difficulties for France....

Sir Zafrulla Khan observed that:

...Inspired by the principle that the United Nations was a centre for harmonizing the action of nations in the attainment of a common goal, Pakistan had always staunchly upheld the principles of freedom, independence and law within the United Nations. It was unfortunate that France had not recognized the sincerity of his delegation's motives. France itself, which considered no sacrifice too great when the triumph of its ideals was at stake, would appreciate that those ideals must be applied to all mankind and not merely to a privileged few.33

Sir Zafrulla Khan referred to the Treaty of Fez, which, it had been argued, barred the discussion of the question in the United Nations.

He held that:

... Those using that argument would do well to reflect on the circumstance in which such instruments were normally imposed.... the people of Morocco would be quite entitled to plead that it was null and void today....34

Referring to the disillusionment of the peoples of Asia and Africa, Sir Zafrulla said:

... After the Second World War, when the Charter had been adopted, they had believed that a great organization had been created to defend the fundamental rights of man.... They had felt that the world could not survive half free and half enslaved. In several cases, including that of Pakistan, that hope had become a reality. But today it seemed that the great Powers were ashamed of the ideals that they had proclaimed.
and were ready in certain cases to repudiate them deliberately. The peoples of Tunisia and Morocco who had, through difficult times, lent their support to what was proclaimed to be the cause of freedom had firmly believed that the days of their bondage were drawing to a close. Today they were disillusioned. Even if the French regime were the most benevolent possible, it would be no substitute for freedom.\textsuperscript{35}

In the course of the discussion on the competence of the United Nations in the matter, Sir Zafrulla Khan made no reference to the Act of Algeciras of 1906, under which, it had been determined by the International Court of Justice, France was not competent to legislate for Morocco. He felt that “it was enough to recall that the General Assembly, by placing the item twice on its agenda, had declared itself in favour of its own competence.”\textsuperscript{36}

The draft resolution of the thirteen Asian and African states, recommending that martial law be terminated and civil liberties restored in Morocco and that steps be taken to make it independent within five years,\textsuperscript{37} was defeated in the First Committee, which adopted a mild Bolivian draft resolution asking for the “reduction of tension in relation to the question of Morocco.”\textsuperscript{38} This resolution failed to obtain a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and was consequently not adopted.

At the request of fourteen Asian and African states, of whom Pakistan was again one, the Moroccan question was included in the agenda of the ninth General Assembly. France did not participate in the discussion. The matter was debated in the First Committee and then in the Assembly, where, eventually, on 27 December 1954, a resolution was passed taking note of the impending negotiations between France and Morocco and deciding to postpone further consideration of the item. In 1956 Morocco was admitted as a member of the United Nations.

Algeria

Pakistan was one of the fourteen Asian and African states which, in July 1955, asked for a consideration of the question of Algeria by the tenth General Assembly. Since November 1954, a war had been going on between the Algerian nationalists and the French authorities. The Bandung Conference in April 1955 had urged the French government to seek a peaceful solution of the issue. The matter was one of international concern.

Tunisia and Morocco were French protectorates. Algeria had been conquered by the French. Without consultation with the Algerian people, Algeria had been “integrated” with metropolitan France. The French delegate pleaded in the General Committee that in view of the status of Algeria the item related to a matter that fell within the domestic jurisdiction of France. As such, the United Nations was barred by Article 2 (7) from discussing it. The General Committee decided not to recommend the inclusion of the item in the agenda. This decision was overruled by the Assembly. The representative of France protested and declared that his government would not accept the intervention of the United Nations in the matter which he declared to be beyond its competence. He gave the warning that the decision of the General Assembly to consider the Algerian question might influence the relations of France with the United Nations.\textsuperscript{39} The entire French delegation then withdrew and ceased to attend the meetings of the General Assembly and its Standing Committee. On 25 November 1955, on a procedural motion by India, the First Committee decided not to consider further the Algerian question in the tenth session. This was reaffirmed in the General Assembly on the same day, without a debate or objection.\textsuperscript{40}
Meanwhile, the war in Algeria raged fast and furiously. Speaking in the general debate in the eleventh session, Mr. Firoz Khan Noon referred to this unhappy fact and said:

We are deeply concerned about the tragic happenings in Algeria, of whose claim to freedom Pakistan is a staunch supporter. If wiser counsels do not prevail and the forces of repression that have been let loose in North Africa are not checked, the whole of that area will be submerged under chaos and anarchy. In respect of several of these grave situations, this Organization has stood aside helplessly and watched the situation grow worse. My delegation feels that in addition to giving clear directives to the parties concerned in such situations, the United Nations should bring into play its resources of reconciliation, clearly enunciated in its charter. 11

The Algerian question was debated at length in the First Committee where Pakistan co-sponsored a resolution which, recognising the right of the people of Algeria to self-determination, invited France and the Algerian people to enter into immediate negotiations for cessation of hostilities and a peaceful settlement, in accordance with the principles of the Charter. 42 The representative of France participated in the discussion with a view to elucidating the position of his country. He, however, made it clear that in his view the General Assembly had no competence in the matter and no recommending powers with regard to the right of self-determination. The principle of self-determination, he said, was so vague that it should not be laid down in a provision governing competence. 43

Speaking for Pakistan, Begum Ikramullah declared her country's support for the Algerian cause. She held that:

...Pakistan's attitude was not anti-Western, but her country stood for the right of peoples to self-determination.

Moreover, she added that:

The Pakistan delegation understood perfectly that the national aspirations of a non-self-governing people could be fulfilled by the free association of the territory with the metropolitan country: but no such association would be fully valid without the consent of the population concerned. 44

The resolution, of which Pakistan was one of the co-sponsors, was not adopted. The counsel that moderation was the best means of securing a satisfactory solution in Algeria, as it had been in Tunisia and Morocco, prevailed and the General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1957, which took note of the statements of the various delegations and of the suffering and loss of human lives in Algeria, and expressed the hope that a peaceful, just, and democratic solution would be found. 45

When the Algerian question came up for discussion in the First Committee in 1957, Mr. G. Ahmed, speaking for Pakistan, declared that his country shared the apprehensions expressed by the critics of the loi-cadre, that, because it was a unilateral measure and lacked the element of consent, it would lead to a permanent division of Algeria: furthermore, it transferred only limited power to the people, and ruled out, apparently indefinitely, what had been called "Algeria's vocation for independence." As regards the interest of the colons, Mr. Ahmed thought that they could be durably guaranteed only through a generous understanding with the majority of the Algerian people. 46 The General Assembly, in its resolution adopted on 10 December 1957, expressed concern over the situation in Algeria and took
note of the offer of good office made by the King of Morocco and the President of Tunisia and expressed the wish that *pourparlers* would lead to a solution in conformity with the United Nations Charter.\(^{47}\)

**Race Relations in South Africa**

The racial issue in South Africa is not a colonial question, nor is South Africa a colonial country. But, as Professor Bokhari pointed out:

...inaasmuch as it [is] a country where people of one race in their own native land [are] being subjected to indignities and relegated to a lower stage of civilization to the advantage of a minority representing the early conquerors of the country, it was practising a form of colonialism. The colonial Powers in their respective colonial areas had acquired the best lands and were exploiting the raw materials therein for the benefit of the home economy...\(^{48}\)

The question of the treatment by the Union of South Africa of its citizens of Indian and Pakistani origin is by no means a new one. For quite half a century before the partition of the subcontinent, all sections of political opinion in it as well as the government of India, then controlled by British officials, had felt deep anxiety about this question. The people involved were descendants of settlers who had gone to South Africa in the last quarter of the nineteenth century from various parts of the subcontinent that is now comprised by India and Pakistan. Their status is, therefore, a matter of concern not only for the present government of India, but also that of Pakistan.

It was in the first session of the General Assembly in December 1946 that the pre-partition government of India brought up the question. The Indian complaint referred, in particular, to discriminatory measures such as the Asiatic Land Tenure Act and the Indian Representation Act of 1946. These measures segregated India settlers both commercially and residentially. The government of India charged South Africa with violating the human rights provisions of the Charter and the agreement entered into between India and South Africa at Cape Town in 1927 and renewed in 1932, which defined the status of South Africans of Indian origin. The Indian government asked the General Assembly to call upon the South African government to revise its policy and its laws affecting its Asiatic citizens and to bring them into conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

The case of the Union of South Africa was put before the Assembly by no less a person than Field Marshal Smuts, regarded in the West as a great apostle of internationalism. Smuts argued that the Assembly was debarred under Article 2 (7) of the Charter from taking cognizance of the matter, which fell within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa. It was also denied that the Cape Town Agreement was an international instrument giving rise to treaty obligations. South Africa asked that the question as to whether the matter was essentially within its domestic jurisdiction or not should be referred to the International Court of Justice for its advisory opinion.\(^{49}\) This proposal was rejected by the Assembly, which took the view that the matter affected friendly relations between two member nations of the United Nations and that the treatment of South African citizens of Asiatic origin should be in conformity with the obligations imposed by agreements concluded between the governments of South Africa and India and the principles and purposes of the Charter. The two governments were asked to report to the next session of the General Assembly.\(^{50}\)

South Africa expressed its willingness to negotiate, but not on the basis of the As-
sembly's resolution, which it regarded as unconstitutional. Consequently, no talks took place. South Africa was unwilling to admit that it had broken agreements or violated the principles of the Charter.

When the question came up for discussion again at the General Assembly in 1947, Pakistan had come into existence and had been admitted as a member of the United Nations. Mr. Mirza Ispahani, speaking for Pakistan, listed the following as the most serious violations of the fundamental rights of Indian and Pakistani settlers in South Africa:

(a) They had no right to vote, nor any right to be represented in local, provincial and central administrative bodies of the country;

(b) they had not the right to move from one Province to another;

(c) their right to engage in commerce and their property rights were severely restricted;

(d) since 1912 Indians had been prevented from acquiring arable land, and the 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure Law confined them within certain urban areas of limited extent;

(e) finally, there was complete segregation of Indians in schools, hospitals, railway stations, public parks, etc.  

Mr. Ispahani disputed the validity of the contention of the South African government that these measures of discrimination did not proceed from any intention to suppress those against whom they were applied and its further contention that fundamental human rights of all races could not be safeguarded unless a distinction was made with regard to rights which were not fundamental. Mr. Ispahani said further:

...The right to vote the right of ownership, the right to take part freely in commercial activities, the right to participate in public administration, were, without any possible doubt, fundamental human rights.

South Africa again challenged the competence of the Assembly and again denied that it had violated any international agreements, the agreements of 1927 and 1932 carrying, in its view, no international obligations. South Africa also asserted that it had not violated any fundamental human rights and repeated its request that the Assembly should ask for the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Replying to these arguments, Sir Zafarulla Khan said:

A study of the history of the question showed that the treatment of the Indians in the Union of South Africa could not be regarded as exclusively a domestic affair. The labour conditions of Indians in the Union of South Africa had been settled at the beginning of immigration into that country, and formed the subject of agreements between the Governments of India and Natal, and later on the Union. The Governments of India and Pakistan were in duty bound to take an interest in the fate of the Indians until they acquired full liberty....

He then went on to propound the thesis that a purely domestic question could at a certain time and in certain circumstances assume an international character. The case of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia was an example. He said:
...If it was remembered that the treatment of Indians in South Africa had been regarded in England as one of the causes of the Boer War, it must be admitted that the international character of the question was beyond dispute. Sir Zafrulla Khan then went on to ask:

What had the South African representative in mind when he had stated that the Cape Agreements were not binding but were merely an honorable statement of principles? Had he meant that a word of honor did not involve any obligations?

Replying to the South African demand that the matter should be referred to the International Court of Justice, Sir Zafrulla said that it would be useless to do so, for even if the Court pronounced it to be a purely domestic question that would not in the smallest degree hasten its solution; and it had to be solved. A remedy had to be found in order to improve relations between the Union of South Africa on the one hand, and India and Pakistan on the other. "The United Nations must play its part in finding such a solution."

At the 1947 session of the Assembly, however, no resolution could be passed for the reason that of the two proposals before it, neither could secure the necessary two-thirds majority. In 1949 India, Pakistan, and South Africa were asked to hold a Round Table discussion, taking into consideration the purposes and principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Preliminary talks were held in Cape Town in February 1950 and an agenda for the talks was agreed upon. In the meanwhile, however, the South Africa government had introduced further discriminatory laws, in the form of the Group Areas Act. As a protest against this, Pakistan and India withdrew from the Conference.

In the Ad Hoc Political Committee in 1950 the Pakistani delegate refuted the South African contention that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights imposed no obligations on member states of the United Nations to observe human rights. He stated that:

...The terms of Articles 13, 55 and 56 clearly implied the existence of mandatory obligations. The legal duty to promote respect for human rights included the duty to respect them. The General Assembly had taken that view when it had recommended to the Government of the USSR, in resolution 285 (III), the withdrawal of certain measures taken with regard to USSR citizens who were the wives of foreign nationals. Moreover, the absence of a definition of human rights did not destroy the obligation to respect them. Although aggression had not yet been defined, action had been taken against the invaders in Korea.

With regard to the argument that the matter was one of domestic jurisdiction for the Union of South Africa, the Pakistan delegate held that:

...An unduly rigid interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7, could lead to the virtual annulment of the most of the provisions of the Charter. Although that Article was important, it had to be considered in relation with other provisions. A violation of human rights was a matter of international concern and ceased to be a question of domestic jurisdiction. When the Union of South Africa recognized the Pakistanis and Indians in its territory as nationals in the full sense of that word, Pakistan and India would withdraw their complaint.

The Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the parties to hold a conference on the basis
of their agreed agenda, bearing in mind the provisions of the Charter and those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the meanwhile to refrain from taking any steps which would prejudice the success of the negotiations, particularly by enforcing the Group Areas Act.  

South Africa refused to hold a conference on the basis of the resolution and the matter again came up in the General Assembly in 1951, when a resolution was passed providing for the establishment of a Special Commission to assist India, Pakistan, and the Union in conducting negotiations. One of the members of the Commission was to be nominated by India and Pakistan, one by South Africa and the two nominees were to nominate the third member or, on their failure to do so, he was to be nominated by the Secretary-General.  However, no action was taken on these provisions.

When the matter came up again before the General Assembly in 1952, the Pakistani permanent representative, Professor Bokhari, declared in the Ad Hoc Political Committee that:

...The laws enacted and recently strengthened by the South African Government were avowedly designed to keep the native and coloured inhabitants at the lowest possible level of civilization. They were denied land, forced to live in segregated areas, prevented from earning more than a specific wage, and deprived of educational, trade-union and political rights. Their dignity as human beings was being degraded by the discriminatory practices which refused them access to common public facilities and placed them in economic sub-servience to the white population.

The only place in the world, said Professor Bokhari, where the representatives of the South African government sat side by side with others not of their colour was at the United Nations. He referred to a statement by a leader of the South African white community that racial inequalities had been divinely ordained and should be perpetuated.

...If such was the racial doctrine of the National [1st] Party of South Africa, the people of Pakistan repudiated it with all their force, for it was a blasphemy according to their religion and to the principles on which their country had been founded.

Professor Bokhari thought that the situation in South Africa was explosive and warned the colonial powers about it. These powers, according to him, did not seem to realise that there were in Africa only four million whites — more than half of whom were in South Africa — in a continent of 150 to 200 million non-whites. The lives of the white minority were being placed in the gravest jeopardy. To leave the question alone was to sanction a struggle to the death between the Africans and their white masters. For so long as the latter continued to enforce their position by brute force and inhuman laws, a final bloody clash was inevitable. Pakistan and the countries sharing its views did not wish to see the blood of Europeans or Africans shed in such a holocaust. Moreover, a violent bloody revolution in the continent of Africa would not necessarily be inevitable if the United Nations exercised one of its basic functions properly. Professor Bokhari went on to say that:

...The United Nations could not prevent war by closing its eyes to the perpetuation of circumstances which must lead to war. The possibility that the conflict between the whites and non-whites throughout the world might take precedence over the prevailing struggle between communism and anti-communism must compel all nations to pause to think and to act rightly. The heritage of European culture and its libe-
ral tradition was a justifiable cause of pride. But the small nations had joined with Pakistan to call a halt to the European process of civilizing with the whip and the gun and the enforcement of white superiority in the colonial parts of the world. The United Nations should not be deterred from abolishing that process by the short-sightedness of some who failed to realize that the problem of racial inequality and persecution was clearly a threat to international security and to the security of white and non-white alike.”

The General Assembly passed a resolution constituting a Good Offices Commission, with Cuba, Syria, and Yugoslavia as its members. The Commission reported to the 1953 session that it had been unable to carry out its task, South Africa having refused to recognize it or the constitutionality of the resolution on which it was based. The General Assembly in 1953 resolved to continue the Good Offices Commission. Then, in 1954, the Assembly, after considering the report of the Commission, called upon the governments of India, Pakistan, and the Union of South Africa to negotiate directly. Under the terms of the Assembly’s resolution, the Secretary-General in June 1955 appointed Ambassador Luis de Faro Jr. (Brazil) to assist the parties in settling the dispute. Pakistan and India offered their full co-operation to him but the South African government declined to collaborate. In 1955 the Union government withdrew its delegation from the General Assembly, which, nevertheless, adopted a resolution urging the parties to pursue negotiations with a view to the settlement of the question. Again in 1956 and 1957 like resolution were passed, but in vain.

Thus the situation in respect to discrimination practised in the Union of South Africa against its citizens of Asian origin remains unresolved. The resolutions passed by the General Assembly and its appeals to the Union government have been of no avail. That government has with impunity defied the United Nations.

No condemnation can be strong enough against the policy of apartheid, which is legally enforced by such measures as the Group Areas Act which divides the country into racial zones, the Populations Registration Act which compels all inhabitants to register themselves by race, and the Bantu Education Act which aims at training Africans as servants or unskilled workers for the whites. Under other laws, the movement of Africans is controlled; they may not move out of their reserve areas without permission, travel without identity cards, mingle with whites on trains or buses or park benches, or own property except in the reservations. Of course, Africans may not marry whites or go to the same schools as whites or hold public office or belong to a union or go on strike.

Speaking on apartheid the representative of Pakistan in the Special Political Committee of the 1956 session of the General Assembly observed:

"...If the United Nations did not stand for the dignity of man, and for peace and progress in the world, it would be nothing more than a sounding board for rival ideologies and a battleground for national rivalries. He hoped he would not be misunderstood by his friends in the West if he appealed to them to readjust their ideas and recognize the passion for equality which dominated the thinking of the people of Asia and Africa. If due respect was not shown to those peoples, economic, social or political assistance would fail to win them.

His delegation was convinced that human rights were the concern of the whole human race, and that the solution of the Union of South Africa's racial problem lay
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His delegation was convinced that human rights were the concern of the whole human race, and that the solution of the Union of South Africa's racial problem lay
not in the domination of one race by another but in a partnership of races on the bases of equality and freedom....64

After a long discussion, a resolution was passed by the Assembly calling upon the Union of South Africa "to reconsider its position and revise its policies in the light of its obligations and responsibilities under the Charter and in the light of the principles subscribed to and the progress achieved in other contemporary multi-racial societies".65 In 1957 the Assembly passed a resolution appealing to the government of the Union of South Africa to revise its policy in the light of the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and of world opinion.66

The question naturally arises, where will apartheid take South Africa? It is, of course, clear that the South African negroes will not forever remain subservient or accept their present situation as a final settlement of their status. Unless the situation is rectified, as Bokhari pointed out, there is bound to be an upheaval in South Africa. If the South African whites are determined not to accept the negroes as their equal, the logical result of apartheid must be a separation. It is interesting to note that the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa in its second report, presented to the 1954 session of the General Assembly, examined various possible solutions, one of which is separation, as in the case of India and Pakistan.67 Such a solution has also been put forward by certain organisations and individuals in South Africa.

It is noteworthy that when the West European and South American countries have supported South Africa in the General Assembly, they have done so on the ground of the jurisdictional competence of the United Nations. They all condemned racial discrimination. Most of the South American countries, however, have voted against South Africa. The United States of America has either abstained or voted in support of South Africa, depending upon the nature of the resolution.

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The primal issue in human affairs on the international plane today is the division between the poor and the rich. There are hewers of wood and drawers of water, on the one side, and those who wield mastery over the planet's resources, on the other. The reality of this division, sometimes described as the North-South polarization, has been sharpened by the developments of the last three years.

The division need not amount to an unbridgeable gulf. A unique historical situation of which we are witnesses calls for nothing else but a creative dialogue between the two classes of nations. It demands the translation into international terms of the same process of building equitable economic orders and resolving class conflicts in which the leadership of many nations, north or south, east or west, is currently engaged in their domestic spheres.

Despite manifold appearances to the contrary, the dialogue is yet to be initiated in the manner and the kind of forum which can lead to a definite conclusion. It has been confused and fragmented. Soaked in a welter of formulations, it stands in danger of being smothered in verbiage. Worse still, it can be made a pawn in power politics, a base for manoeuvres or a cover for making arrangements which may not be ignoble in themselves but which distort the centrality of the historic issue.

What are the reasons for the confusion of the dialogue? To bring them into focus is not to deny the merit of the prodigious work done under the aegis of the Group of Seventy Seven which is reflected in the Algiers Charter, the Lima Declaration and Action Programme, the Dakar decisions and the Manila Declaration. Nor does it detract from the value of the resolutions on economic issues adopted by the non-aligned countries in Cairo, Georgetown, Algiers, Lima and, most recently, in Colombo. Least of all does it connote any disinterest in the kind of debate on a new economic order which was initiated at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly and which made some progress at the Seventh Special Session. It is clear, however, that all this effort has built only the infrastructure of thought for lending that new dimension of justice to international economic relations which alone can constitute an adequate response to humanity's present challenge.

Why this dimension of justice is not yet a reality is because there has yet been no organized movement for it from the Third World. The demonstrations of solidarity, made by the developing countries at international forums under the aegis of the United Nations, are
no doubt sincere and deeply felt. Yet we cannot lull ourselves into the belief that the energies of the Third World are thereby focussed on the principal issue facing it today. The fissiparous condition of the Third World is apparent from the fact that all existing groupings of development countries are based on the regional or political affiliations of their members and, being so self-limited, cannot address themselves to the issue which encompasses all regions and transcends differences of political or ideological orientation. Associations like the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity and the economic organizations of Latin American countries, by virtue of their restrictive charters are confined to countries of a certain continent, region or faith. They do not, therefore, claim to comprehend the entirety of the economic interests of the developing countries.

Nor is such a claim advanced by the Group of Non-Aligned Countries. Though this Group has now enlarged itself to more than eighty members, it still excludes a large number of developing countries. A principle of composition which was linked to great-power relations at the time of the Group's genesis cannot bear an organic relation to the basic objectives and struggle of the Third World today. Leaving aside the fact that, contrary to the inclination of most non-aligned countries, the principle has been invidiously applied over the years, it is apparent that a division between one group of developing countries and the other can serve only to splinter the collective strength of the Third World. Both groups consist of countries which have suffered from imperialist or neo-colonial domination and are equal partners in the struggle to end international economic iniquities. I am happy that this reality has been powerfully articulated at the recent Colombo Conference. My esteemed friend, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, gave an authoritative utterance to the feeling of the majority of non-aligned states when she said that the non-aligned movement was not 'an exclusive club' and that the exclusiveness, if any, was that of the underprivileged. She added, 'It is not the non-aligned nations alone who have realized the potential for change. The entire Third World is now engaged in the process of organizing its political and economic strength to change old patterns of dependence and exploitation'. There could not be a better acknowledgement of the need to establish a wider basis for common action by all the deprived nations.

For a certain period, the necessity of the unity of developing countries was blurred by the appearance of a rapid re-alignment of economic power and influence in the world. The assertion by the oil-producing countries of their right to control their basic and depleting resource and to determine its price caught the imagination of suffering humanity as the dramatic correction of an age-old wrong. This gave rise to the hope that the older dispensation in which the principal resources of a group of countries were controlled, cheaply bought and extravagantly used for the growth and luxury of the richer countries would give way to a new order in which these resources would be used for the benefit of their rightful owners. That these hopes have languished is an indubitable fact. But the development itself relating to the price of one commodity, oil, demonstrated the effect that can be achieved by a unity of purpose and the exertion of the political and economic will of the producing countries. It showed that long-standing institutions crumble, and conventional economic practices wither, when nations unite for their common benefit at turning-points in history.

The corollary is that when nations are divided, when they cannot forge a unity of purpose, they continue to suffer not only existing iniquities but also their aggravation through the workings of global economic forces. For the newly-independent countries of the Third World, the international economic environment was hostile even when they attained
sovereign statehood. But, during the decades of their political independence, countries have grown immeasurably. The result is that, in real terms, they are today behind even their starting point for economic and social development. Not to speak of the famine which took a tragic toll in recent years in parts of Africa, the hunger which stalks other lands, the chronic deficits in balance-of-payments and worsening terms of trade are but some indications of their plight. When a group from among them strives to end these iniquities, the massive economic power of the affluent countries asserts itself and the inherent bias of the institutions of trade and capital in their favour enables these countries to shift the weight of internal and external adjustments to the poorer nations. When the price of oil increased, the developed countries as a whole, made little or no sacrifice; they raised the prices of their industrial products and thus shifted the burden of the so-called oil crisis back to the Third World. When it comes to the primary products exported by the Third World, the developed countries again determine the prices because they are the main markets and disagreement on production quotas and other causes inhibit the developing countries from exerting their weight. This process cannot be arrested unless all the developing countries unite their objectives and act in unison. In the last decade and a half, the prices of primary commodities, with the exception of oil, which constitute the bulk of the Third World exports, have deteriorated by a substantial percentage in real terms. Added to this is the phenomenon of violent year-to-year fluctuations in the prices of these exports depending largely on economic activity in the affluent countries. When some developing countries acquire a manufacturing capacity and can sell manufactured goods, their products are excluded from the markets of the rich by restrictive quotas. All these factors lead to several consequences. The uncertainty about the prices of primary commodities turns the economic planning of the poorer countries to a gamble. The position regarding their manufactures thwarts their aims of achieving self-sufficiency. The necessity of having to pay more and more for the same imports from the richer countries sinks many among them deeper into the mire of debt. This is a pattern which repeats itself inexorably in the daily economic exchange in commodities, manufactures, technology and finance between the developed and the developing countries. Its cumulative results is almost total dependence.

In the face of all this, the thesis is being increasingly propagated that the growth and development of the poor must depend upon the continued rapid growth of the rich; for only then can the markets for the goods of the poor expand and the prices of their commodities hold. This is a pernicious doctrine. It means that the gap between the poor and the rich must continue to expand. It means that the rich must continue to appropriate an overwhelming proportion of the earth's wealth. It means that if, because of sheer saturation with goods, the rich should choose to grow less rapidly, there is no hope for the poor. But the irony is that, while we may justly denounce this doctrine, it merely describes an in-built feature of the present international economic order. It reflects the undeniable fact that our terms of trade, our markets and our-resource flows are overwhelmingly dependent upon economic and political policies in the richer countries. While the fundamental underpinnings of this system may not be changed overnight, there is an urgent need to provide the poorer countries an insurance against disaster. The future of the less privileged cannot be allowed to depend upon growing inequality. A way has to be found to improve the terms of trade for the Third World, to remove the iniquities of quotas and trade restrictions in the affluent countries and to reduce the paralysing burden of external debt which is largely a result of unequal trade and exchange between the poor and the rich.

We, the countries of the Third World, are called upon to squeeze centuries into de-
Not for us is the relaxed stance of countries which built their economics in an earlier and more tranquil age, which had to dismantle no institutions and which could be content with gradual reform and the steady workings of social change. We are trying to create an environment of opportunity, an ethos of dignity and hope for the under-privileged majority of our peoples. We cheerfully undertake the toil and sweat for a better life for our masses. We accept the denial of immediate comforts. But we cannot allow the value of our sacrifice to be jeopardized by institutions and practices which structurally operate against us. The labour of our masses is constantly being devalued by unequal economic relationships between us and the richer countries. We live on a thin margin. The radical changes in our societies that are inescapable for us permit little room for manoeuvre. The crisis of the mid-seventies, which originated in the developed countries, had its worst impact on us and retarded our development for many years. In a large number of Asian, African and Latin American countries, per capita income has declined. Some, like Pakistan, may have maintained and even accelerated the momentum of their development effort but this has inevitably resulted in greater indebtedness. In order to ensure self-generating growth, we all need to examine and review the external economic environment, and its integral link with our collective weaknesses, so that the global economy ceases to act like a strong current setting us back in our voyage to self-realization.

While all these elemental truths have been uttered at countless forums, the ironical fact remains that, instead of evoking the natural response of a sense of interdependence, they have caused the opposite reaction. This is visible in the growing self-righteousness among the rich. Poverty among nations is regarded as the result of inherent defects in peoples; one hears more and more the assertion that the less developed have none but themselves to blame for their plight. The rich are strengthening their groupings and associations and focussing their attention on the consolidation of their own gains. Thus issues of international monetary reform, trade and resource flows are largely settled amongst themselves and the influence of the developing countries is at best peripheral.

It is wholly unrealistic to expect from existing international institutions the capacity to rectify this imbalance. Those concerned with aid and monetary affairs have fallen prey to a regressive trend among the rich and the powerful. The proportion of external assistance to gross national product in the leading nations among them has been steadily declining. Organizations like the International Development Association and the United Nations Development Programme suffer from paucity of funds. Perennial negotiations on trade have failed to eliminate the restrictions of quotas on the exports of developing countries. Textual battles are being fought on the issue of stabilizing and improving the prices of raw material exports of developing countries. Anodynes are administered in the form of resolutions. The Paris Conference as anticipated faces a pathetic stalemate. Operating at the level that they do, such institutions cannot possibly rise to the height of the present challenge. A tepid conversation cannot betoken a creative dialogue.

We are told that the countries of the Third World do not have common interests regarding all the subjects at issue in the international economic order. There is said to be a discordance between those who are concerned exclusively with the issue of commodities and those who are semi-industrialized. Likewise, it is asserted that the issue of debt relief is not important for countries which have direct access to capital markets and are interested in...
maintaining their 'creditworthiness'. But the common interest of all the developing coun-
tries of Asia, Africa and Latin America—the achievement of a position of equality in the world
economic order—far overrides any sectional divergence. A complete identity of interest on
each and every issue is not the inescapable essential for unity. Difference is not opposition.
To give an example, the economic unity of the Common Market, sustained by a network of
institutions and generating a common political purpose, is a more striking phenomenon
than any disparities between its member countries. Unity is nurtured by mutual accommo-
dation. It is born out of the realization that, in its absence, everyone’s interest will inevitably
suffer.

6

We in the Third World are united by our common suffering and our common struggle
against exploitation. Regardless of our political systems or our external outlook, we have the
common mandate to extricate the world’s majority from a throttling economic order. We
need to develop a personality of our own. Let not this personality be torn by the schizop-
phrenia which is caused by the failure to reconcile short-term interests with long-term goals.
Let it not be confused by our inability to review the scope and area of mutual cooperation for
our economic and social development. Let it not be enfeebled by the lack of the political will
to exert our combined strength for changing a system that patently discriminates against the
developing countries.

This political will cannot find expression except at the highest level of our collective
leadership. Though the Third World has the vehicle of the Group of Seventy Seven to co-or-
dinate its common endeavours, the fact cannot be overlooked that the Group was created
within the context of the Trade and Development Organization. Its perspective is, at times, li-
mit ed by its origins and its mechanisms are too cumbersome to respond adequately to the
imperatives of change. A restrictive organization which cannot articulate the political urge
and the supreme authority of the developing countries can hardly be entrusted with the task
of guiding their strategy.

There exists a growing awareness in the Third World of its latent strength. The con-
sciousness is unmistakable that the most significant issue of our times is the opening of op-
portunity to the majority of the human race. On this issue there is no division between the so-
called aligned and the so-called non-aligned; there exists only the difference between the
developed and the underdeveloped. To underline this difference is not to call for a global
class war. It is to call for that redistribution of economic power which alone can prevent un-
ceasing strife and recurrent upheavals. It is to plead for the survival of the global community.

We do not harbour the illusion that the objective of a new and just economic order
can be achieved through a single meeting or conference. The path to the economic indepen-
dence of the Third World will be tortuous. But it can be made easier if the leadership of the
Third World, backed by the power of human opinion, is united and resolute. For this purpose,
I have issued an appeal for convening a conference of the developing countries of Asia, Af-
rica and Latin America at the summit level in order to mobilize the full force of the peoples of
the Third World behind their common struggle for liberation from international economic
exploitation and oppression.

This appeal corresponds directly to a growing recognition of the imperative of the
Third World’s unity. Last month, the Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries met
in Colombo and addressed itself to this supreme issue of our times. Next week, representa-
tives of the developing countries will meet at ministerial level in Mexico to consider ways and means of promoting economic cooperation among these countries. I am confident that the Mexico Conference will be another milestone along this path. The General Assembly of the United Nations is also going to meet later this month. The appropriate time has therefore arrived for Pakistan to set forth the basic considerations behind the call for the Third World Summit which will decisively consolidate the unity of the underprivileged majority of mankind.

Pakistan asks for cooperation from all developing countries in convening this conference and making its deliberations fruitful. It is more than two decades ago that the newly-independent countries met in Bandung and set out the political principles and purposes which would guide their international conduct. The Bandung Conference belied the fears that it would exacerbate the world political situation. Indeed, its declarations constitute a basic text for peaceful international relations. Likewise, the Third World Summit will be a significant step in an evolutionary process. It will mark the reaching of the next stage after political liberation of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America: the one at which an equality of opportunity for the world's peoples does not depend on charity through larger foreign assistance or piecemeal reform through selective trade concessions and the like. It will signal the turning away from the threat of a simmering and potentially disastrous confrontation to the promise of a global partnership. In the ultimate analysis the generation of economic activity in the developing countries is an essential for the well-being of the developed countries as well. The Summit of the poor will demonstrate their resolve not to wait passively for this realization in the industrialized economies.

By taking stock of the situation, devising a strategy for the future and making appropriate institutional arrangements, the Third World Summit can co-ordinate the policies and reconcile the positions of the Third World countries vis-a-vis the developed countries and evolve and implement an agreed minimum programme of cooperation among the developing countries. It will thus bring together and harmonize the efforts launched in several groupings of developing countries, regional or inter-regional, and enable the Third World to emerge stronger and take its rightful place in the world economic community.

The Third World's message must not be clothed in the jargon of a bygone age nor be tailored to the political ends of any country or group of countries. If the opulent and the powerful can combine, as they invariably do at critical moments, to maintain their dominance on the basis of their wealth and technology, it would be perpetrating a wrong on humanity if the poor nations should dissipate their relatively limited strength in dividing their own ranks, in creating a gulf between the poor and the poor. The impoverished masses of the Third World are yearning for a new focal point of their collective will. They are seeking a new bastion of power to wage the crusade for man's final victory against inhumanity. This is the need of the hour; the priority of the poor. The conference that I envisage will have one and only one ironclad criterion for inclusion: the non-developed and oppressed community of the Third World. Whether aligned or non-aligned, communist or non-communist, white or yellow or black or brown, the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America will join in this mission and become the harbinger of one world under one law for all humanity.
Having achieved their new state after a great struggle, both against the alien ruling power and against the preponderant Hindu majority, and having paid the price of that triumph in blood and suffering of every imaginable kind, the people of Pakistan are naturally very jealous of its integrity and freedom. Whatever they may think of themselves, and whatever others may think of them, and judgement on the affairs of Pakistan which is not based upon a recognition of this fact would be wholly unreal.

To preserve Pakistan, to safeguard and to defend it, has throughout been the first consideration on its policy makers. The urgency of this consideration will be appreciated when one recalls that the neighbouring state of India has followed a policy which, to put it mildly, is unfriendly towards Pakistan. It is against this background that Pakistan's foreign policy and in particular its policy in respect of regional alliances should be understood.

Pakistan consists of two territories, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, separated from each other by over a thousand miles of India. West Pakistan has a common border with Iran and Afghanistan and is separated from Soviet Asia by a narrow belt of Afghan territory which is nowhere more than fifty miles across. At one point, the Wakhan tongue, as this belt is sometimes called, is only eight miles wide, and it is possible to look across from Pakistan to the USSR. As the crow flies, Karachi, the first capital of Pakistan, is less than a thousand miles from the Soviet frontier.

Pakistan controls the northwest mountain passes through which alone a physical invasion of the subcontinent has been considered possible. It was through these passes that Cyrus in the sixth century B.C. and Alexander in the fourth century B.C. invaded the subcontinent. They, in turn, were followed by other invaders, Turki, Persian, and Afghan. It was through these passes that the British, in the nineteenth century, feared an invasion of the subcontinent by the Russians, who were extending their empire in Central Asia. Except for the border areas and the extensive wastes of Baluchistan, West Pakistan is generally level country, with a railway system connecting its principal towns and linking the Khyber Pass and other fortified points on the frontier with the port and city of Karachi.

East Pakistan is flat and tropical, with large torrential rivers and a criss-cross of smaller streams. It has a common frontier with Burma but the lush jungle here is mountainous and, as was demonstrated on World War II, extremely difficult country. To the northeast, with Burmese territory intervening, is the vast Chinese perimeter. To the east and south of Burma lie Thailand and Malaya. Both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans wash their shores. The Indo—Chinese frontier beyond Thailand is less than five hundred miles from the eastern frontier of East Pakistan.
Such, then, is the geographical setting of Pakistan. This situation places Pakistan in both the Middle East and Southeast Asia and is of considerable military importance. However, until sometime after the creation of Pakistan, the Western powers evinced no apparent interest in this situation. It is hard to believe that they did not regard it as important. The British had a long tradition of dealing with this region. The Americans, too, had during World War II acquired military experience in this area and amplified their knowledge of the territory. It may be that the Western powers were waiting to see whether the new state of Pakistan would collapse, as was predicted in India. So far as the United States was concerned, its main centre of interest in Asia was still China, and American hopes and endeavours were concentrated on the prevention of a Communist victory over Chiang Kai-shek.

We have noticed the proximity of the northern frontier of West Pakistan to the Central Asian territories of the USSR. The creation of a new state so close to their borders must have made an immediate impression on the Soviet leaders. They had devoted a great deal of attention and effort to consolidating and developing their Central Asian territories. They had a systematic understanding, partly inherited from the previous Czarist regime, of the demarcation of the southern approaches to their frontiers, and generally of the areas that lie between those frontiers and the Arabian Sea. Take just one sentence uttered by Georgi Vasilievich Chicherin in 1923: "The old English policy was to make Russian—English conflict impossible by the interposition of barriers—a closed Dardanelles at the one side, and an independent Afghanistan at the other." The Soviet Commissar also had some ideas about "the ridge of the Hindu Kush" on the Pakistan side of Wakhan. The significance of Karachi, seaport and airport, as a strategic base and a nerve centre of communications, could not have been lost upon the Soviet leaders. In any event, they were not slow in manifesting their interest in Pakistan. In 1949, even before the two countries had exchanged diplomatic representatives, there came an invitation to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to visit Moscow. Mr. Khan did not go to Moscow.

Ideologically, an alliance with the Soviet Union could have had no attraction for Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan or for any other Pakistani statesman. It is doubtful that such an alliance had ever been favourably contemplated by them. They may have feared that if they entered into such an arrangement with the Soviet Union they would ultimately have to change their political and economic systems, adopt Communism, and identify themselves wholly with the USSR in matters of foreign policy. Furthermore, Pakistanis were deeply disappointed by the Soviet attitude in the Security Council towards the Kashmir question, which in its earlier stages was apparently one of sheer indifference and later became one of positive antipathy to the Pakistan case. The Soviet government's part in the creation of the state of Israel, too, made a most unfavourable impression in Pakistan. Thus, Pakistanis had seen that Soviet policies could be just as opportunistic and unprincipled as those of the other imperialist powers.

Pakistanis were profoundly interested in the republics of Central Asia, the Turkistan of the pre-Soviet days, with which they had not only religious but deep racial, cultural, and historical ties. Were not the arches and domes of Samarkand the prototypes of those of Lahore? And Turkistan was just a few miles from Pakistan's frontier. Pakistanis had respect for the impressive agricultural and industrial development that had taken place there amid social conditions similar to their own. But development is not everything. In December 1917 Lenin and Stalin had issued their famous appeal to the "toiling and disinherited Moslems of Russia and the East." Through this appeal all those whose mosques and prayer houses were destroyed, and whose religion and customs were trampled on by the Russian Czars and tyrants were assured: "Henceforward your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are declared free and inviolable! Build your national life freely and without hind-
rance." Pakistanis wondered to what extent the faith and customs and national and cultural institutions of the Muslims of Turkistan were free and whether they had really been able to build up their national life unhindered. The Republics of the Soviet Union were supposed to possess the right to diplomatic representation in foreign countries. No representative came to Pakistan from any of the Central Asian Republics. To say that least, it was all very bewildering.

In 1950 Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan went to America. His speeches in the United States and Canada left no room for doubt that, ideologically, Pakistan was pro-West and put an end to all speculation about the possibility of an alliance with Russia. However, there was no urgency for forging any formal bonds with the West. The foreign policy of Pakistan remained independent. Thus, speaking in March 1951, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that:

Pakistan was neither tied to the apron-strings of the Anglo-American bloc, nor was it a camp follower of the Communist bloc. It steered clear of the inter-bloc rivalry, and had an absolutely independent foreign policy. Pakistan had all along seen uninfluenced by the inter-bloc struggle going on in the world, and had supported the cause which it considered to be just. The records of the U.N. debates bear testimony to this fact. Sometimes we agreed with the Western bloc and sometimes with the Communist bloc, as the situation and the matter under discussion demanded. Pakistan could pursue such an independent course because it was not under the obligation of any foreign Power. We have not been assisted by any country in the world and whatever we have achieved has been through our own resources. Therefore, the question of subservience in foreign policy did not arise.  

In July 1951, some three months before Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, came the threat of the Indian invasion, with almost all of India's forces and its armoured divisions concentrated on the borders of Pakistan. Although the threat did not develop, it showed vividly, as nothing else had done before, that even an outright full scale attack by India on Pakistan was not beyond the range of possibility. This made Pakistani statesmen reflect on some hard facts, the very facts which negated the Indian allegation that Pakistan intended to invade India. India had nearly five times the population of Pakistan and far greater resources. India had in 1951 at least twice the armed strength of Pakistan and, to sustain it, a relatively industrialised economy, which Pakistan lacked. India had also been fortunate in inheriting all the arsenals and ordnance factories that the British had established in the subcontinent. Pakistan had none of these although it was building some. On the other hand, India had denied to Pakistan the latter's share of the military stores left by the British in the subcontinent. Although Pakistan made extensive purchases of arms at high prices in foreign markets, risking a severe strain on its finances and in particular on its foreign exchange resources, it was far weaker than India.

The tortuous steps by which India had sought to consolidate its hold over Kashmir were in themselves alarming evidence of India's attitude towards Pakistan. India had spent vast sums of money in fighting a war in Kashmir, and was spending similar large amounts in maintaining its military occupation of that state. India's refusal to allow a plebiscite was a violation of international agreements to which it was committed, and a defiance of the United Nations. This stand had given India a bad name throughout the world. Why was India enduring all this? Not, as Pakistanis appraised the situation, for a small bit of territory, but rather because with India in possession of Kashmir, Pakistan would be strategically encircled. Indian occupation of Kashmir means political and financial stresses for Pakistan. But Pakistan cannot abandon its stand on Kashmir.
In the event of possible war-like action against Pakistan by a superior power like India, how was Pakistan to protect itself? Clearly its own armed strength would not be sufficient. Nor could reliance be placed in the United Nations, for it had fail to develop into an effective instrument for the maintenance of world peace. Recognition of this fact had led to the establishment of regional defence arrangements such as NATO and ANZUS. Countries like Britain and France and less-developed ones, like Yugoslavia and Turkey, were taking military aid from the United States. Should Pakistan do likewise in its desperate situation? The United States, as we shall presently see, was keen on having a defence pact with Pakistan.

The collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's authority in China and the establishment of Communist regime in the country changed the entire aspect of international relations in Asia. It meant an immeasurable accession to the strength of the Soviet Union and the Communist world and an equally great setback for the Western powers. It meant that the United States, the leader of the West, should re-examine its position in Asia. Up to that point, the Americans had taken steps to bolster Turkey at the western end of the Russian "barrier" in Asia. South of that barrier lay the greatest oil resources of the world—in Iran, Bahrein, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There were in these oil fields vast wealth and vast resources of industrial power. The safeguarding of the oil resources of the Middle East as well as the preservation of their communications through it was an urgent necessity for the Western powers. Hitherto, they had depended mainly on the base at Suez, whose efficacy had been demonstrated in World War II. But in view of pressing Egyptian claims, the future of Suez was uncertain; and in any event, the nature of war had changed to such an extent that Suez was no longer sufficient. What was needed was a larger and a different structure in which the people of the area themselves could participate (under the patronage of the West). 6

In October 1951 the Western powers and Turkey put forward a proposal for an Allied Middle East Command. This was rejected by Egypt. Nearly a year later came the plan for a Middle East Defence Organization. The proposal was abandoned because of Britain's disputes with Egypt and Iran, and hostility between the Arab nations and Israel. 7 Britain's dispute with Egypt related to the latter's demand for the evacuation of the Suez Canal zone. The dispute with Iran arose out of the nationalisation of that country's oil industry, which was run by a British company. Pakistan fully appreciated and sympathised with the Arab and Iranian claims. As regards the Arabs' dispute with Israel, Pakistan had completely identified itself with the former. If the Arabs and the Iranians, after settling with the British, had agreed to join the Middle East Defence Organization, it was conjectured that Pakistan would also join it. This raised a storm of protest in India 8 and was denounced, both officially and unofficially, as a threat to the security of India. This was the first occasion when Indian opinion plainly declared its resentment of any increase in the defence potential of Pakistan.

In the winter of 1952-53 Pakistan was faced with severe difficulties in the form of a serious economic crisis and a desperate food shortage, the latter due partly to a drought and partly to India's now allowing Pakistan, in the judgement of Pakistanis, its full share of water in the canals that originated in India. There had been "a catastrophic fall in the country's revenues. Heavy and drastic cuts had been imposed on Government expenditure, including that on defence, which had to be curtailed at the risk of security." 9 The leaders of Pakistan were, however, still following the late Liaquat Ali Khan's policy of not placing their country under obligation to a foreign power. In the spring of 1953 the United States came forward with a gift of 610,000 tons of wheat, of the value of $67,200,000. The friend in need began to be looked upon as a friend indeed. This went a long way towards removing the hesitation of Pakistani leaders in agreeing to further arrangements with the United States, arrangements that were indicated by Pakistan's ideological affinities and calculated to insure it against aggression and to lighten its financial burdens.
When, for lack of support, the plan for a Middle East Defence Organization was abandoned, the United States began looking for some alternative arrangement for the region. That country was, as we have seen, giving aid to Turkey at the western end of the Russian barrier in Asia. At its eastern end was Pakistan. Following the logic of former British policy in the area, to which Mr. Chicherin had referred in 1923, it seemed imperative to strengthen Pakistan. If Pakistan and Turkey could be persuaded to enter into an agreement with each other, they would provide the core in a substitute for the abortive Middle East Defence Organization. Iraq and Iran had been sounded and there was hope that they would join the new arrangement. The Turco-Pakistani Pact was announced on 19 February 1954. A week later President Eisenhower revealed the decision to give military aid to Pakistan. This was confirmed the same day by Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan.

Explaining why Pakistan had entered into the aid agreement with the United States, the Prime Minister said:

Hitherto, Pakistan has striven to build up her defences with her own unaided resources. But under rapidly changing requirements of modern warfare, the demands of adequate defence are becoming progressively heavy and are imposing an increasingly burdensome strain on the country’s economy. In consequence, the development of the country’s resources has, to a considerable degree, had to be sacrificed to the primary need of building up its defences. Assured thus of the adequacy of its defence for safeguarding its security and preserving its independence, Pakistan will be able to devote its resources increasingly to the development of its human and material wealth, so as to achieve greater economic stability and prosperity. It must be emphasized that the decision to obtain military aid from the United States is not aimed against any country whatsoever. Pakistan has never entertained, and does not entertain, any aggressive intentions.

In Pakistan the pact with Turkey was welcomed as an alliance between two Muslim countries; and, of all the Muslim countries, none was respected more than Turkey. The Prime Minister of Pakistan referred to the pact as “the first major step towards strengthening the Muslim world”, and said that it was “in the interest of all the people of the region”. While no reference was made by Turkish statesmen to the Islamic character of the arrangement, there was no doubt that it was very popular in Turkey also. There was a precedent for it in the Sa‘adabad Pact of 1937, entered into by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. Between the two instruments there are many points of similarity, both emphasising the need for the maintenance of friendly relations between the contracting parties and of international peace generally. Under both there is a promise of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the participants. While the Sa‘adabad Pact declared allegiance to the League of Nations, the Turco-Pakistan Pact affirms faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Under the Sa‘adabad Pact the contracting parties undertook to refrain from “any act of aggression directed against the other”; under the Turco-Pakistani Pact “from participating in any alliance or activities directed against the other”. Both contain provisions for consultation and co-operation, those in the later document being of a more specific nature, extending to such matters as technical experience and progress and the production of arms and ammunition.

The agreement between the United States and Pakistan aims at fostering “international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations”, at promoting “individual and collective self-defence” in support of the purposes and principles of the Charter. It reaffirms determination to give full co-operation “to the efforts to provide
the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter. Assistance to Pakistan is to be governed by the provisions of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 of the United States. Explaining the requirements of the relevant provisions of those Acts, President Eisenhower said:

...equipment, materials or services provided will be used solely to maintain the recipient country’s internal security and for its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part. Any recipient country also must undertake that it will not engage in any act of aggression against any other nation.

Does the acceptance of American military aid make it obligatory for Pakistan to take sides with the United States in the event of a war? That there is no such obligation was categorically stated by Prime Minister Mohammed Ali. This was confirmed by the American Ambassador to Pakistan, Horace A. Hildreth. The same was the assertion of Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan in an interview on 12 April 1954 with an American journalist, Norman Cliff. But the Foreign Minister was careful to point out that:

...the possibility of remaining neutral does not depend merely upon the desire of a people or a government. Left to themselves, no people or government would wish to invite the miseries and horrors of war to their areas. Should, however, a conflict between the Great Powers become unavoidable, the choice of neutrality might become an illusion.

Nor did the pact imply the granting of military bases by Pakistan to the United States. This was reiterated by the government of Pakistan in its note of May 1954, rejecting the Soviet protest against Pakistan accepting American aid.

Did the acceptance of American military aid make Pakistan subservient to the United States in matters of foreign policy? Answering this question, Sir Zafrullah Khan said:

Certain values that we share, we shall continue to share; where our policies differ, we shall continue to differ. If the feeling of sharing together deepens, then there will be greater accord. For instance, on the question of colonial domination, Pakistan has often opposed the stand taken by the Western Powers and has been supported by the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern Group. We continue determined to press our point of view.

In the neighbouring country of India, the proposal for American aid to Pakistan was not only received with disfavour, but every effort was made to prevent its finalisation. As early as 15 November 1953, Pandit Nehru had stated: "We are deeply concerned at the consequences that will follow from Pakistan joining an American sponsored defence organization." On 31 December 1953, he stated: "The cold war comes to India’s borders." Three days later, he declared: "It is a step not only towards war, even world war, but one that will bring the war right up to our doors." Pandit Nehru expressed the fear that American military aid "might possibly be used against India." In the meanwhile, in violation of the Indian undertaking to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, steps were being taken to integrate that state with India. On 22 February Pandit Nehru, speaking about the plebiscite in Kashmir, said: "American aid to Pakistan would change the context of events." Finally, he made the astonishing announcement that:
American military officers serving as United Nations observers in Kashmir could no longer be treated by India as neutrals, in view of the American military aid to Pakistan, which was foreign intervention in Pakistan–Indian problems.24

Indian contentions against Pakistan’s military aid pact with the United States were answered by Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan. Referring to the view that India’s acceptance of large scale economic assistance from the United States had not brought the cold war any nearer to the subcontinent, Sir Zafrulla Khan wondered how it could be argued that United States military aid to Pakistan was an invitation to cold war, especially considering the strict limitation that such aid could not be used for aggression. That in effect there was no difference between military aid and economic aid, such as India was receiving, was not exclusively a Pakistani view.25 It was held in other quarters, too, and was advanced for example, by Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, the British High Commissioner in India.26

Regarding United Nations observers of American nationality in Kashmir, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister said that they had discharged their duties with absolute impartiality. By impeaching their loyalty, Pandit Nehru was merely seeking:

...excuses, however flimsy, for not proceeding with the implementation of the international agreement with regard to the settlement of the Kashmir problem and of his own undertaking that the plebiscite administrator shall be appointed by the end of April.

Referring to Pandit Nehru’s statement that military aid was obtained by a country “either for making war, or for preparation for war,” Sir Zafrulla Khan said that if that argument was correct:

...then the mere maintenance of any defence force could be characterised as maintenance of forces for the purpose of making war, or as a preparation for war. If that were accepted, it must follow that the very maintenance of an army by India, on Pandit Nehru’s own reasoning, is for the purpose of making war, or is it peaceful preparation for war?

India, a vast country, was able by its own resources to maintain military forces at a very much higher level of effectiveness than any other country in southern Asia. The Foreign Minister asked:

Does this mean that India’s object in maintaining such effective military forces is war, or preparation for war? If not, then how does it follow that if any other country seeks to maintain its armed forces in a state of effectiveness, to ensure its security, by procuring from outside what it cannot supply itself, such effort must be for the purpose of making war, or preparing for war?

He made it clear that Pakistan’s relations with China and the USSR were friendly.27

One of the grounds on which Pandit Nehru bases his opposition to pacts with the West is that they go counter to his conception of “non-alignment.” It is difficult to understand what exactly that conception means, for clearly it is not identical with genuine neutrality such as is practised, for example, by Switzerland. India does not denounce China for its pact with the Soviet Union, nor the Soviet Union for its military alliances with East European countries, nor even for the presence of Soviet forces in those countries. It has been India’s
consistent policy to do everything to build up the prestige and influence of the Communist powers. On the other hand, India has done everything possible in the international sphere to checkmate the policies of the Western powers. It is not suggested that everything that the Soviet Union does is bad, nor that everything that the Western powers do is good. But India does certainly promote the belief that everything that the Soviet Union does is good and everything that the Western powers do is bad. At the same time, India has, year after year, obtained grants and loans on a most generous scale from the Western powers. That is one explanation of the strange kind of "neutralism" that India follows. But there is another one too, which is linked with India's stand on the Kashmir question. According to an American writer:

...The possibility that one day India might have to fall back on the Kremlin's vote in the Security Council, or its nine votes in the General Assembly, goes far to explain Nehru's policy of neutralism in the cold war.28

The logic of the pact with the United States led Pakistan to join the South East Asia Defence Organization. In this instance, too, the United States was prompted to step in by the fear of the expansion of Communism, which had established itself as the state system of the vast area of China and which had waged a successful war with French colonialism in Indo-China. The British had the wisdom to withdraw from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma. The French obstinately insisted upon remaining in Indo-China. Pakistan was throughout very critical of French policies in that area. Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan condemned the French war in Indo-China and said: "It may now be difficult to convince Indo-China and large sections of the people of South Asia that a conflict is being waged in Indo-China's interest."29

The war in Indo-China involved the most senseless waste of human life and money. From 1946 to 1954 it cost the French 2,385,100,000,000 francs. The United States gave France arms supplies of the value of 200,000,000,000 francs in 1954, and of an equivalent value in 1952 and 1953.30 It might be pointed out that a major part of the expenditure incurred by the French government was paid for by the United States in dollars. Indeed, the Indo-Chinese war was, in the later stages, to a great extent an American effort. However, nothing could prevent the fall of Dein Bien Phu after a siege of 55 days. Viet Minh pressure against the French continued to increase, until the armistice agreement was concluded at Geneva on 20 July 1954. The main provision of the Geneva Agreement was that Vietnam was to be partitioned by a demarcation line near the 17th Parallel, the northern part to be under the control of the Vietnames government. It was further provided that an election should be held simultaneously in both parts by 20 July 1956, with the aim of establishing a unified government. It is difficult to say whether a genuine French settlement with Ho Chi Minh in 1946 would have prevented the establishment of a Communist regime. However, after the Geneva decisions of 1954, with international consent, a Communist regime did come into existence in North Vietnam, the first one of its kind in Southeast Asia. This was an unmistakable defeat for the United States in the region.

At Manila on 6 September 1954, the representatives of Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States met to evolve a South East Asia Defence Organization. Speaking for the United States, Secretary of State Dulles said that his country was concerned in opposing the spread of Communism, which could take the form of open aggression, subversion, or indirect aggression. Against the first of these dangers, it would not be possible to ensure defence by stationing adequate land forces at selected points. The United States would, therefore, think in terms of mobile striking power with strategically placed reserves.31 Sir Zafrulla Khan stressed Pakistan's view that the Conference should be concerned with resisting aggression of every description and from any quarter and said that it was a mistake to imply that one kind of aggression, rather
than another, required speedier action.\textsuperscript{32} It was reported in \textit{The New York Times} of 3 September 1954 that the United States delegation had desired the pact to be of an exclusively anti-Communist character, whilst all the other delegations had favoured a pact against aggression in more general terms. The Conference ended on 8 September with the signing by all the delegates of a Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, which was accompanied by a unilateral United States declaration in the form of an “Understanding,” and a general statement of principles by the eight signatories in the form of a “Pacific Charter.”\textsuperscript{33} The “Understanding” declared that United States adherence to the pact was directed against Communist aggression, with the stipulation that in the event of other aggression, the United States would consult with the other signatory countries.

Each party to the Manila Treaty, in the event of an armed attack in the treaty area, is “to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process.” Thus, it does not provide for automatic military action against aggression, which would mean that if one member were the victim of aggression, the others would automatically come to its aid. Such a provision was demanded by Philippine and Thai spokesmen.\textsuperscript{34} But this demand was resisted by the United States on the ground that Congressional sentiment had hardened against such commitments.\textsuperscript{35} The treaty, however, does establish a Council with wide powers for military and other defence planning. The “treaty area” is defined as

\dots the general of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude.\textsuperscript{36}

Thus, the area in respect of which the treaty is effective includes both East Pakistan and West Pakistan and excludes Formosa, about which the United States has a special attitude, not shared by all the other signatory countries.

In Pakistan the Manila Treaty was received without enthusiasm. There was disappointment at the United States “Understanding” that the pact was directed against Communist aggression only. The United States and the other signatories to the treaty, Pakistan included, were all conscious of the Communist danger. But so far as Pakistan was concerned, it was primarily perturbed about its troubles with India. Clearly it was illogical and inconsistent with the principle of peace that one kind of aggression should be considered less reprehensible than another kind. Nor was Pakistan alone in taking this view; for the Australian statesman, Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, too, “criticised the United States’ insistence that her obligations under the treaty were limited to countering Communist aggression.”\textsuperscript{37}

In general, criticism of the Manila Treaty, in its provision of an organisation for Southeast Asia, entered on the fact that the important states of the region were not parties to it and that others that did not belong to the region were members. Needless to say, the treaty was condemned in several parts of Asia. Pandit Nehru condemned it on the ground that it would add to unrest in Southeast Asia and convert it into an area of war.\textsuperscript{38} Similar comments were officially made in China and Indonesia.

In Southeast Asia, two other patterns of international relations were developing. One was the Panch Shila, or the “Five Principles,” which for the first time found expression in the treaty between India and China on Tibet, concluded on 29 April 1954.\textsuperscript{39} These principles were also accepted by the Prime Minister of Indonesia, Ali Sastroamidjojo, when he visited New Delhi in September 1954.\textsuperscript{40}
The other pattern of international relations in Southeast Asia was represented by the Conference of the Prime Ministers of Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia, the so-called Colombo powers. They first met in Ceylon from 28 April to 2 May 1954. However, the area of agreement that the Conference achieved was not very large. Pandit Nehru refused to accept a proposal on the Kashmir dispute by Mr. Mohammad Ali, who described it "as the biggest potential danger to peace in South-East Asia." Pandit Nehru also refused to accept a proposal, made by Sir John Kotelawala and supported by Mr. Mohammad Ali, declaring that international Communism was danger to South and Sotheast Asia. In this, Pandit Nehru was supported by Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo. Eventually, the five Prime Ministers issued a compromise statement condemning colonialism and interference by all external agencies, Communist or anti-Communist; asking for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations; supporting self-determination in Tunisia and Morocco; and expressing sympathy for the Arabs of Palestine. Certain proposals relating to mutual economic co-operation were also considered. The most important achievement of the Conference was the constructive influence that it exerted on the negotiations which were at that time proceeding at Geneva and which led to the cease-fire in Indo-China. The five Prime Ministers also considered a proposal for holding a conference of Asian and African nations and asked the Prime Minister of Indonesia (who was the author of the idea) to explore the possibility of holding such a Conference. A second meeting of the Colombo powers, held at Bogor in Indonesia, in December 1954, decided that the Asian-African Conference should be held at Bandung in the same country in April 1955.

A third meeting of the five powers took place at Bandung in April 1955. At the fourth meeting held in November 1956 in New Delhi to consider the Suez situation, Pakistan was not represented. Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy was at that time in Teheran conferring with the representatives of the Asian members of the Baghdad Pact.

The purposes of the proposed Asian-African Conference were defined at Bogor as the promotion of goodwill and social, economic, and cultural co-operation between all nations of Asia and Africa. Special problems, such as racialism and colonialism, and the contribution that the two continents could make to world peace were also to be discussed. Countries not to be invited to the Conference were Korea (because it was "in a fluid state"), Israel (because of the hostility of the Arab States), and Central Asian (because "it was politically part of a European unit, namely, the Soviet Union"). Also to be excluded were Formosa (because it was "not a State") and South Africa ("because of her very aggressive racial policy"). But because the Colombo powers had a special responsibility in regard to Indo-China (even though the situation here was also fluid), all the states of that region were to be invited.

The Asian-African Conference was one of the most spectacular as well as one of the most important international conferences ever held. It was the largest official conference to have been held on Asian soil and it contained a record number of heads of governments. The great powers and the powers of the West, that had hitherto dominated all international discussions, were excluded from it.

The responsibility for organising the Conference was borne entirely by Asians. This responsibility required the making of elaborate preparations and providing the required accommodation and equipment for the Conference, its Secretariat, the over 2,000 delegates, observers, pressmen, and cameramen who came to the Conference. The Secretary-General of the vast organisation was an Indonesian, Ruslan Abdulgani, who was guided by a committee consisting of the envoys in Djakarta of the five sponsoring powers. The principle res-
ponsibility of the Conference proper rested on the shoulders of an Indian and a Pakistani. The responsibility consisted chiefly in the preparation and circulation and background papers on the questions to be discussed at the Conference, and in the preparation and circulation of its documentation, almost from hour to hour; and in keeping the machinery of the Conference running. Other departments of the organisation were headed either by Indians or Pakistanis or Indonesians, valuable assistance being given by officials from Burma and Ceylon. The Conference was in every respect a very large undertaking. If it had been held in Europe or America, it would have presented far fewer problems in respect of accommodation, equipment, and staff than it did in Indonesia. But, largely because of the determination and resourcefulness of the government of that country, the direct personal interest of President Sukarno, and the co-operation of the governments of the other four sponsors, these problems were overcome. Indeed, the Conference was an object lesson in co-operation amongst countries, some of which had deep political differences.

The countries that participated in the Bandung Conference were 29 in number, namely, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippine Republic, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the State of Vietnam, and Yemen. Many of them had until recently been under the domination, in one way or another, of the West. They were united, said President Sukarno who inaugurated the Conference, by their desire to see colonialism disappear altogether. The Prime Minister of Ceylon saw for the Asian and African nations a mediator's role in the world conflict between Communism and anti-Communism. In the words of the leader of the Cambodian delegation, the Conference shattered the frontiers which separated the Communist world from the non-Communist world. Pandit Nehru, who had through his speeches worked up a great deal of enthusiasm for the Conference, hoped it would record a verdict against Asian and African nations entering into alliances with the Western powers. Countries like Pakistan that had entered into such alliances were anxious to obtain a recognition of their right to do so as a means of warding off possible aggression and assuring peace. The Arab states were there to canvas support for their demands in respect of Palestine and North Africa. Mr. Chou En-Lai, the Chinese Premier, stood for peaceful co-existence.

So far as the problems of cultural and economic co-operation between the Asian and African countries were concerned, and these were dealt with in two separate committees, there were no significant differences between the participants. In respect, however, of political problems, there was inevitably very great divergence. In effect, this divergence arose out of the differing attitudes of the participating countries towards the proposal of the Prime Minister of Pakistan that the Conference accept "seven principles of peace," namely:

1. Sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
2. Equality of all independent and sovereign nations;
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one country by another;
4. Non-aggression;
5. Right of self-defence of each country, to be exercised singly or collectively;
6. Self-determination for all peoples and abhorrence of colonial exploitation in every shape;
Settlement of internal disputes through peaceful means, that is, by negotiation, mediation and arbitration.

The fifth of these principles, giving recognition to the right of a state to enter into alliances with other states for the purpose of self-defence, was condemned by Pandit Nehru in the strongest possible language. He declared that Mr. Mohammad Ali had introduced it to shield the recently concluded SEATO alliance, and criticised Pakistan for aligning itself with the Western world. Pandit Nehru said it was intolerable humiliation for any Asian or African country to degrade itself by becoming the camp follower of any great power. Mr. Nehru took his stand on the “Five Principles.” However, Mr. Chou En-Lai, also committed to the “Five Principles,” saw nothing sacrosanct in numbers, and said that he was prepared to add to or subtract from them. Mr. Chou revealed that the Pakistan Prime Minister had assured him that Pakistan had no fear aggression by his government. This was confirmed by Mr. Mohammad Ali. In the final communique of the Conference, “the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations” was recognised.

While all the participants in the Conference were prepared to record their condemnation of colonialism, there was a difference of opinion on whether this should be taken to include Soviet colonialism. Sir John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, referred to the Russian satelites in Europe and asked for the condemnation of colonialism, old and new. The charges against Russia were denied by Mr. Chou En-Lai and by Pandit Nehru, who affirmed that the so-called Russian satelites were independent states. While the Pakistan Prime Minister supported his colleague from Ceylon, he made it clear that Pakistan did not regard China as imperialistic, for China had no satellites. It was eventually agreed that “colonialism in all its manifestations was an evil and should speedily be brought to an end.”

The Conference recorded its approval of the principles of self-determination and human rights and its condemnation of racialism with special reference to South Africa. Support was given to the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, the position of Indonesia in the dispute over West Irian, and that Yemen in respect of Aden. The Conference asked for universality in United Nations. Membership and for greater Asian-African representation in the Security Council. This was proposed by Pakistan. The Conference called for disarmament and prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

Inasmuch as the Bandung Conference recognised the right of a country to enter into collective defence arrangements, and did not consider the “Five Principles” sufficient, it was a major defeat for Pandit Nehru. These decisions were made possible by several factors, foremost among them being the determination of Mr. Chou En-Lai to “seek a common ground”, despite differences in ideology. At the same time, Mr. Chou, the leader of the world’s largest nation, was not prepared to let go the opportunity of destroying in impression that he was but a protege and “yes-man” of Pandit Nehru. In contrast to the Pandit, Mr. Chou adopted an attitude of “sweet reasonableness” and “real give and take.”

It will have been observed that the Bandung Conference did not redraw the map of the world; nor did its decision instantaneously affect the fate of mankind. Nevertheless, those decisions have had a far-reaching influence on thinking about world affairs, especially on Western thinking about the affairs of Asia and Africa. Significant also was the fact that the Bandung Communique permitted collective defence pacts, a fact which is too often forgotten by “neutralist” statesmen who were parties to and swear by that communique.
A year after the signing of the Turco-Pakistani agreement came the Turkish-Iraqi Treaty of 25 February 1955 which led to the so-called Baghdad Pact. The parties to the treaty were Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Under Articles I and V of the pact, states acceding to it may conclude special agreements amongst themselves for the purpose of giving effect to the purposes of the pact. On 4 April 1955 Britain and Iraq concluded such an agreement and Britain acceded to the Baghdad Pact. This agreement took the place of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1932 which was terminated. The effect of the new treaty was that the pre-existing defence arrangements between Britain and Iraq would continue. Sir Anthony Eden explained to the House of Commons that there would be joint planning and exercises in peacetime and effective help would be given to Iraq in case of aggression. Assistance would also be given in establishing an air defence organisation. Britain would be entitled to stock military stores and equipment in Iraq. British instructors would train the Iraq Army and facilities for overflying, landing, and servicing aircraft would continue. British air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba would pass under Iraqi control and British squadrons stationed there would be progressively withdrawn. Installations at the airfields, required for British use, would remain British property. Eden was careful to point out that “no aspect of the treaty could possibly be directed against Israel.”

In effect the new agreements confirmed Britain in its position of power in the Middle East. It will be recalled that British policies in that region, particularly those which led to the establishment of the state of Israel, had caused much bitter resentment in Egypt and the other Arab countries. Having failed in their efforts to prevent the Baghdad Pact, those countries denounced it as aiding Western imperialism and giving implied recognition and support to Israel.

Realising that the pact would be extremely unpopular in the Arab countries, the United States did not formally join it and contented itself with being represented at the meetings of the pact Council by observers, though it is a full member of its Committees. Nevertheless in the Arab countries, the United States is as much blamed for its support of the pact as it would have been if it had become a formal party to it.

Generally, the pacts with the West have resulted in three distinct disadvantages to Pakistan. First, Pakistan has suffered a setback in the position that it enjoyed among the Asian-African states in the United Nations, most of those states being themselves uncommitted in the inter-bloc rivalry and opposed to close alignment with the West. Secondly, Pakistan has fallen in the estimation of the Arabs, who are all strongly opposed to alignment with the West. Pakistan's participation in the Baghdad Pact has been strongly condemned by them, a typical Arab reaction being that of Radio Makkah, which said:

It is therefore possible for any person to believe that an Islamic State such as that of Pakistan should accede to those who have joined hands with Zionist Jews... Whatever may be the case, Pakistan, a country so dear to us and to other Arab countries, cannot be expected to put her hand in the hands of those who have bad intentions towards the Arabs.

The Baghdad Pact undoubtedly divided the Arab world. Pakistan by its membership in that pact was held responsible for contributing to that division. By destroying Arab unity and by making the Arabs more suspicious of Western intentions, the Baghdad Pact increased instability in the region. If the intention of the Western powers was to keep out, through the pact, instability and Soviet influence from the Middle East, they have succeeded in achieving just the opposite. Thirdly, the pacts with the West, far from bringing any advantage to Pakistan in
respect of its disputes with India, in particular, the all-important dispute over Kashmir, are believed to have made the position worse for Pakistan. Hitherto, whenever a resolution on that dispute came before the Security Council, the Soviet Union had always abstained on it. But subsequent to Pakistan's entry into the pacts, every resolution proposing effective action in Kashmir has been voted by the Soviet Union. In 1955, Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev went to the extent of declaring that they looked upon Kashmir as a part of India.\textsuperscript{52} Wrote \textit{Dawn} of Karachi:

Never would Russia have used her veto and actively participated on the side of Bharat in the matter of Kashmir if Pakistan had not aligned herself so closely with the Anglo-American bloc.\textsuperscript{53}

For their part, the western Powers, after their pacts with Pakistan, have been less keen to exert themselves about Pakistan's case than they were before. In fact, they have tried to keep Pakistan quiescent over Kashmir.\textsuperscript{54}

Nevertheless, each successive government of Pakistan has seen wisdom in continuing firmly to adhere to the pacts. In 1958, revolutions took place in Iraq and Pakistan. As a consequence of the revolution in Iraq, that country withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which was renamed Central Treaty Organisation, for short, CENTO. The new regime in Pakistan, headed by Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, made no change in the country's foreign policy and it has maintained Pakistan's alignment with the West. The value of the pacts as a means of collective security and a safeguard against aggression has been greatly enhanced by the Pakistan-United States Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation, signed at Ankara on 5 March 1959. According to Article I of that agreement, the government of the United States will, in the event of aggression against Pakistan, take appropriate action, including the use of armed forces. In Article II, the government of the United States reaffirms that it will continue to furnish, on an agreed basis, military and economic assistance to Pakistan with a view to helping in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and the promotion of its economic development.

Speaking in March 1960, Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir said that the alliance with the West was the sheet anchor of Pakistan's foreign policy and that Pakistan regarded her alignments as the guarantee of her independence and sovereignty. He claimed: "We are not being so much misunderstood about those alignments now as we were some years ago."\textsuperscript{55}

True, Pakistan has entered into the pacts with the Western powers in its own interest. But it is equally true that under those pacts Pakistan has undertaken grave and risky obligations. India has undertaken no obligations and staked nothing. Yet in every respect India is in a more advantageous position with regard to those powers than Pakistan. Nor is this due to the fact that India is the larger country or more "democratic". The aid offers of the two great powers have little to do with ideologies. The United States is giving aid to Yugoslavia which is Communist. The Soviet Union is giving aid to some states that are monarchical and altogether feudal. The "neutralist" countries, whatever their size or their political and economic systems, are able to make exactions on both sides. Thus, "neutralism" is better business for countries looking for assistance.

In the prevailing political climate of a world divided into two frankly hostile camps, it was inevitable that each one of them should seek to protect its far-flung interests through regional defence arrangements. The powers that made these arrangements have now gone
beyond them and are engaged in a neck-to-neck race for purchasing either support or "neut-
realism." Countries get cold war economic aid because they can be influenced toward or away from one side or the other or because of their strategic location. However, the altruistic motive of the countries that give this aid is being more and more recognised by the countries that receive it.

For their part Pakistani leaders and diplomats have sometimes taken too much for granted. Having entered into the pacts with the West, they believed they had entered a new millennium in which matters would be determined according to ethical principles. They forgot that the essential nature of diplomacy had not changed, that astute and rugged defiance still achieved better results than unqualified consistency. But when is the millennium, which is promised in the United Nations Charter, going to be ushered in?

REFERENCES

2. In referring to the Hindu Kush, Chicherin said: "You are uneasy because our horsemen have reappeared on the heights of the Pamirs, and because of you no longer have to deal with the half-witted Tsar who ceded the ridge of the Hindu Kush to you in 1895." *Ibid.*, p. 350.
11. *Ibid*.
25. *Ibid*.
35. *Ibid*.
55. *Dawn* (Karachi), 12 March 1960.
Pakistan and the International and Regional Organizations

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1. Dynamics of Pakistan's Behaviour in International Forums

READING 1


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(Before studying the following Reading, see Reading 3 of Block 8)

On the twin question of control of atomic energy and disarmament, Pakistan has played but a modest part in the United Nations. The reason for it is obvious. A solution of these questions can emerge only out of an agreement between the great powers. From time to time Pakistan has urged the need for such an agreement and for bold decisions both on atomic energy and on disarmament. Thus Mr. K. Sarwar Hasan, addressing the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the fourth session of the General Assembly, referred to "the profound concern of all mankind regarding the most serious problem of atomic energy and its important implications as an instrument of destruction or benefit to humanity." He emphasised that "the constantly increasing anxiety of the peoples of the world could be allayed only by a genuine agreement providing for effective guarantees amongst the nations possessing atomic energy atomic weapons." It was the view of the delegation of Pakistan, he said, that the search for an agreement should continue, for the atomic bomb could be banished only if the great powers agreed to an arrangement whereby its use was abandoned. The conflicting attitudes of the great powers must be reconciled. Improvement in their political relations would facilitate an understanding between them on this issue. The representative of Pakistan also urged consideration of the question of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, particularly in view of the difficult economic situation prevailing in the world.

It will be recalled that the Atomic Energy Commission had been established in January 1946 by a unanimous vote of the General Assembly. The Commission was constituted to provide for the exchange of knowledge about atomic energy between all nations, for its control, so that it is used only for peaceful purposes, for the elimination of atomic weapons from the nations' armaments, and for safeguards against violations and evasions through inspection and other means. The Commission consisted of the eleven members of the Security Council with Canada.

In February 1947 the Security Council set up the Commission on Conventional Armaments for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. But because of
lack of agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers neither of the two
Commissions, although they had numerous meetings was able to report the conclusion of its
task.

In the absence of a settlement the great powers continued to arms themselves and
to spend more and more armaments and on the production of yet more destructive
weapons. It was not that they did not desire peace. The speeches made by the representa-
tives of all countries, large and small, in the United Nations showed that there was full con-
sciousness of the consequences of another war, most likely fought with nuclear and ther-
monuclear weapons; and there was an unmistakable desire to avert it. Thus Dean Acheson,
United States Secretary of State, speaking in the General Assembly on 20 September 1950,
said:

...Men and women everywhere are weighed down with fear, fear of war, fear that
man may be begetting his own destruction.

But man is not a helpless creature who must await an inexorable fate. It lies within
our power to take action which, God willing, can avert the catastrophe whose
shadow hangs over us. That terrible responsibility rests upon every man and every
woman in this room....

Mr. Andrei Vyshinsky, speaking for the Soviet Union, said:

It is the duty of the United Nations to put an end to the atomic weapon and the other
major weapons of mass slaughter of populations. This is what millions and millions
of people are demanding.

The Government of the Soviet Union deems it essential that the General Assembly
should take all the steps in its power to implement the measures it has itself already
approved in this matter, in order to achieve the unconditional prohibition of the
atomic weapon and the condemnation as a war criminal of any government which
is first to use the atomic weapon against another country.

Thus we see the leaders of the two opposing camps unequivocally affirming their
desire for peace and for the abolition of the weapons of mass destruction. However, in the
words of Sir Zafrulla Khan, "with that affirmation the limits of peace are reached and disag-
reement starts."

In the 1951 session, the First Committee had before it two resolutions, one submit-
ted by the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, proposing the creation of a new
Disarmament Commission, and the other, offered by the Soviet Union. The latter amended
the Western proposal by asking amongst other things, for a disarmament conference. Pakis-
tan, along with Iraq and Syria, sponsored a resolution asking for a subcommittee, under the
chairmanship of the President of the Assembly and consisting of the representatives of the
USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The task of the subcommittee would be to
formulate agreed proposals, concerning the control and reduction of armed forces and ar-
maments as well as the abolition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction.
Sir Zafrulla Khan, on introducing the draft resolution, "implored the Great Powers to attempt to
reach an agreement which would serve mankind." Without such an agreement, he em-
phasised, "all the resolutions that could be adopted would be of no use unless perhaps for
purposes of propaganda." Sir Zafrulla regretted that there was a contradiction between the
declared purposes of men and their actual behaviour and warned that "the world was close to the abyss." The joint Iraqi, Pakistani, and Syrian resolution was adopted.

The subcommittee reported that while there was agreement or the possibility of agreement on general objectives and, in general terms, on the machinery for attaining those objectives, there was disagreement on the specific means and the principles which should be applied to the guidance of the new Commission. The Assembly, while rejecting the USSR amendment, adopted the three power proposal to establish a Disarmament Commission. Not only was this body to agree to the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces but it was also to provide for the international control of nuclear energy that would assure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of nuclear energy only for peaceful pursuits. While wholeheartedly endorsing the purposes which the three power draft resolution and the USSR amendment sought to achieve, Pakistan abstained from both of them on the ground that the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission would not be sufficiently flexible to enable the great powers easily to reach an agreement.

The three power resolution was passed and, as a result, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments were dissolved. A Disarmament Commission for dealing both with atomic and other weapons was established. This Commission consisted of all members of the Security Council together with Canada when it was not a member of the Security Council. Pakistan, by virtue of being a member of the Security Council, was a member of the Commission.

During the two years (1952-54) that Pakistan was a member of the Disarmament Commission, there was little that Pakistan could do in it; indeed there was little that the Commission itself did. The Commission could not have achieved any results without an agreement among the great powers and such an agreement was not forthcoming. Because of this deadlock the Disarmament Commission in April 1954 passed on its task to a subcommittee consisting of Canada, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The long drawn out proceedings of the subcommittee were marked by acute differences between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

In May 1964 the Colombo Powers, of whom Pakistan was one, demanded that "no further explosions of hydrogen bombs should take place." In April 1955, at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali pleaded for the outlawing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The communique of the Bandung Conference, to which Pakistan was a party, declared:

The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such prohibition, and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end. Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, this conference appealed to all the Powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

Addressing the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1955, Mr. Mohammed Ali reviewed the progress made by the Disarmament Sub Committee and the problems that remained unsolved. He observed that:

During the previous year, disagreement on certain measures of disarmament had been narrowed. There was agreement on ceilings for armed forces, on the im-
plementation of the programme in progressive phases, on the timing of the prohibi-
ition of nuclear weapons and on the establishment of a single permanent control
organ. Unresolved were the questions of the subjection to the Security Council veto
of the use of nuclear weapons in defence against aggression, of the discontinuance
of tests of nuclear weapons, of the liquidation of military bases, of the reporting of
violations of the disarmament treaty, and in particular of the rights, powers and
functions of the control organ. Since the Sub-Committee had recessed its London
session, formidable technical difficulties had appeared. It had been agreed that
there was no infallible device for detecting nuclear stockpiles. It had, therefore, been
concluded that complete control over the elimination of nuclear weapons was im-
possible. Further, the failure of the Conference of Foreign Ministers to reach agree-
ment on political questions had further undermined international confidence.

The present situation, according to the representatives of the United States, the Un-
itied Kingdom, France and Canada, was that, until science devised a means for find-
ing hidden stockpiles, a plan of disarmament involving nuclear weapons had to be
ruled out. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, while admitting the difficulties,
maintained that the necessary elements for a disarmament agreement under effec-
tive safeguards still existed. The Pakistan view was that, if detection was not possi-
ble, the stage for prohibition of nuclear weapons had not been set. The dangers in-
volved in the margin of error of detection were such as to make any responsible
statesman hesitate to agree to a programme without watertight guarantees.

It had been emphasized that a disarmament agreement required unanimity, which
did not exist; the impasse could only be resolved by science. Pakistan had wondered
whether there had been sufficient reconciliation between the West and the Soviet
Union to warrant the hope of an agreement on disarmament in the field of conven-
tional weapons. There also was the question whether effective control was possible.
It was reassuring to read a statement made by the representative of France at the
47th meeting of the Disarmament Commission in which he had asserted that the
technical means to ensure complete control in the conventional field did exist....The
Soviet Union's emphasis in the past on sovereignty had discouraged the hope of a
compromise. However, it should be possible to arrive at a synthesis, in which event
it would be practicable to enforce any agreement on the reduction of armed forces
and conventional armaments. The statements of the representatives of Sweden
(799th meeting) and of the States members of the Sub-Committee supported that
view. Thus, while there was an impasse on nuclear armaments, a large measure of
disarmament was still feasible which might transform the international situation.
Such a partial solution would enhance the prospects of a solution in the nuclear
field.

Any disarmament plan had to be drawn up so that each stage increased the security
of all parties and not of only one. Secondly, it should avoid a disequilibrium of power
dangerous to international security....

In the same speech Mr. Ali referred to his government's support of the four power
draft resolution on a comprehensive disarmament plan although he regretted the omis-
sion of a proposal which would have diverted savings arising from disarmament to the im-
provement of underdeveloped areas. However, Pakistan fully concurred with those provi-
sions in President Eisenhower's plan that were intended to prevent a nuclear war, just as it
welcomed Marshal Nikita's proposal for control posts.
In August 1957 the Disarmament Sub-Committee ceased to function as a result of the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's representative from its deliberations. Thus the problem of disarmament was left unsolved. Speaking about it in debate in the General Assembly in 1957, Mr. Firoz Khan Noon, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said:

I now turn to the fateful issue of disarmament. It is not necessary for me to elaborate upon the terrible prospect of mass annihilation which faces mankind as a result of the perfection of thermonuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Warnings have been uttered during the past few years that the problem of disarmament is a race against time, since science and technology are placing weapons of mass destruction in the hands of man faster than his ability to devise measures of control or defence against them. The admission by the "nuclear" Powers that an adequate and reliable system of control over nuclear disarmament is not possible at the moment because of the impossibility of detecting hidden stockpiles of nuclear weapons is most disconcerting. Through frittering away precious time in mutual suspicion and distrust, have we been carried beyond the point of no return? However, nothing will more surely spell the doom of our existence than a fatal acceptance of that inevitability. All Members of the United Nations must therefore bend their urgent efforts to narrow the differences between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union over the question of achieving comprehensive disarmament under an effective system of inspection and control.

The Pakistan delegation attaches great importance to...a partial agreement. A reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the great Powers cannot but remain the first pre-occupation of those nations which are not among the "nuclear" Powers. If such a reduction could be agreed upon between themselves initially, appropriate reductions could be brought about in the armed forces and conventional armaments of all the nations of the world. Tensions would be relaxed and the danger of local wars which might develop into a world conflict would be reduced. A large part of the world would be relieved of the crushing burden of unproductive expenditures which could then be devoted to constructive purposes....

In the First Committee and the plenary meetings of the General Assembly in 1957, questions of disarmament and control of atomic energy were debated together. There was a detailed discussion of the progress made by the Disarmament Sub-Committee and the attitudes of the various powers. In the First Committee, Pakistan voted against the Indian draft resolution which sought to create a scientific-technical commission of experts for recommending to the Disarmament Commission a system of inspection and supervision to render suspension of test explosions effective and to maintain other controls. The member states were to report to the scientific commission whenever they found any evidence of an explosion. This resolution was rejected both in the First Committee and in the Assembly.

Pakistan abstained on the Japanese resolution calling for a provisional suspension of test explosions, while parallel efforts were made to expedite agreement on unsettled points in evolving a system of supervision and inspection. The proposal was opposed both by the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The resolution was rejected by the First Committee. Pakistan voted against the Soviet draft resolution proposing the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all member states of the United Nations. This resolution was rejected both in the First Committee and in the Assembly. Pakistan also
voted against another Soviet resolution, which proposed an experimental five-year moratorium on the use of hydrogen and atomic weapons. This resolution was rejected by the First Committee.

The latter resolution contradicted the Twenty-Four Power resolution, which was passed by the First Committee by 59 votes to 9, with 16 abstentions. This resolution embodied the proposals set out by the four Western powers to the Disarmament Sub-Committee in their working paper of 29 August 1957, which had occasioned the withdrawal from that Sub-Committee of the Soviet Union. To this draft resolution Norway and Pakistan jointly submitted two amendments, which were accepted by 61 to 9 votes with 10 abstentions. They proposed the study by groups of technical experts of an inspection system for disarmament measures on which agreement might be reached in principle and indicated how the groups should be constituted and the time within which they should report.

Introducing the amendments in the First Committee Mr. G. Ahmed put forward the view of the Pakistani delegation on the Twenty-Four Power draft resolution and commented on the progress made by the Disarmament Sub-Committee. He said:

The general debate in this Committee has disclosed the extent of the narrowing down of differences between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union which has resulted from the Sub-Committee's deliberations in London on measures of partial disarmament represented by the first stage plan which, both sides agree, should be given priority in further negotiations. Specifically, the points on which agreement in principle exists are the suspension of test explosions of nuclear weapons, the reduction of open inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of surprise attack. The general debate has established beyond doubt the earnest desire of all Governments for continued negotiations between members of the Sub-Committee in order to break the present stalemate by reaching similar agreements in principle on the other measures of the first stage plan as set forth in the operative part of the twenty-four Power draft resolution. Also certain specific recommendations to salvage the negotiations have been made by a number of delegations, including my own. We have pointed out that the most promising way out of the dead end reached in the negotiations is to take out from the package proposals put forward by the Western Powers the two questions of reduction of levels of armed forces and conventional weapons and the establishment of an open inspection system against surprise attack and, having separated these two proposals from the package, to give them independent consideration. We have expressed the view that the interlinking of these questions with the proposals for nuclear disarmament is unnecessary and that insistence on simultaneous acceptance of proposals in these two categories on an all or nothing basis would tend to freeze the present deadlock.

Mr. Ahmed stressed the desirability of the nuclear powers' not taking up inflexible attitude and welcomed the assurance of Canada that it would not regard the Western proposals as the last word on disarmament.

The Twenty-Four Power resolution was adopted by the General Assembly. While welcoming the narrowing down of the differences in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, it laid down principles for a disarmament agreement and asked the Sub-Committee to resume its efforts to evolve such an agreement and to report by 30 April 1958. The hope was also expressed that funds saved through disarmament would be spent on improving living condi-
tions, "especially in the less developed countries."\(^{15}\)

(For further study see Reading 1 of Block 8)

REFERENCES

Several reasons combined to enable Pakistan to play a significant role in the United Nations in the years immediately following her admission to the world organization in September 1947. The explosion of membership, which accompanied the attainment of independence by several African countries, had not yet taken place and India and Pakistan were initially the main spokesmen for Afro-Asia. Many of the issues which came up for consideration at the time related to the right of self-determination and independence of peoples who were still struggling to be free, and India and Pakistan, having been the most prominent sufferers from imperialism, were regarded as the natural spokesmen for them. Several countries whose problems came up for discussion had predominantly Muslim populations, which made Pakistan an ardent advocate of their cause. Lastly, in Sir Zafarulla Khan, her first Foreign Minister, Pakistan had the most eloquent, able and respected Afro-Asian diplomat to project her image and policies abroad.

Pakistan’s general attitude towards the United Nations has naturally been conditioned by her own experience and needs. In her disputes with India, the balance of power being against her, she has needed outside support. Starting with high hopes in the United Nations, she gradually realized that it is almost powerless if an important country chooses to defy its resolutions. Pakistan, therefore, has consistently pleaded that the United Nations should have greater authority, and an international force at its disposal to enforce its decisions. Pakistan thinks there is no alternative to the United Nations, because no other forum exists where a weaker nation can appeal to the conscience of the world against the high-handedness of a stronger antagonist. As such, the United Nations is a greater necessity for the less powerful countries than for the big powers.

We have already discussed the Korean question and the Kashmir dispute. A reference to some other important questions of the day will further help towards appreciating the part played by Pakistan in the United Nations.

I. Palestine Issue

The Palestine problem was the offspring of two contradictory promises made by Britain. First, a pledge was given to the Arabs during the First World War that, in the event of an Allied victory, the Arabs would be granted independence. Secondly, and subsequently, the Balfour Declaration said that His Majesty’s Government favoured the setting up of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The question was referred to the United Nations by Britain, who held Palestine under a League of Nations Mandate.

When Pakistan became a member of the United Nations, two proposals were under
consideration: (1) partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state, and (2) establishment of a unitary state compromising the whole of Palestine with safeguards for the Jewish minority.

Zafrulla, for Pakistan, forcefully opposed partition. He argued that the pledge given to the Arabs, being earlier in time, should have precedence over the Balfour Declaration. As it was being doubted whether Palestine was included in the pledge to the Arabs, the question could be referred to the International Court of Justice which could also be asked to decide the legality and scope of the Balfour Declaration. As to the humanitarian aspect of the question, Zafrulla suggested that the Jewish displaced persons should be repatriated to their original countries and those who could not be repatriated ought to be allotted to Member States in accordance with their capacity to receive such refugees.

The Pakistani Foreign Minister accused the Western Powers of forcibly driving 'a Western wedge into the heart of the Middle East:' and said, 'Remember, nations of the West, that you may need friends tomorrow, that you may need allies in the Middle East. I beg of you not to ruin and blast your credit in those lands.' He warned also that 'if partition is accepted, the fatal step will have been taken. The Arabs and the Jews will have been set by the ears and never again will there be a chance of bringing them together. Too many unfinished vendettas will then bar the way.'

Many people asked why Pakistan, herself a child of territorial division, was against the partition of Palestine. Zafrulla said the analogy was false because: (1) The population of Pakistan was 80 million, i.e. more than 100 times that of the Jewish population of Palestine, and the disproportion between the territory involved was even more striking. (2) In India, however unwilling the majority party was to agree to partition, eventually partition came about as the result of an agreement. If both Jews and Arabs came to an agreement that partition was the only solution, Pakistan would be the first to vote for such a course. (3) In India the Muslim minority was an integral part of the population, in Palestine a minority had been artificially created by settling Jews against the express will of the people. (4) Muslims in India had claimed only those regions where they were in a majority. In Palestine the Jews were in a minority everywhere except in Jaffa, one out of fourteen sub-districts.

The vote on the Palestine question was due to be taken in the plenary session of the General Assembly on the afternoon of 26 November 1947, and Zafrulla, who was lobbying actively, is positive that the proposal for partition would have failed to secure the required two-thirds majority that day. At lunch time it began to be rumoured that the President intended to adjourn the meeting in the afternoon. Zafrulla and Foreign Minister Fadhil of Iraq protested to the President but the latter said that the staff was unwilling to sit late because it was Thanksgiving Eve. 'The curious thing is,' Zafrulla states, 'that ever since then not only has the staff worked late on Thanksgiving Eve but the Assembly has sat regularly on Thanksgiving Day till 2 p.m.' When the session was resumed on 29 November some of the votes had shifted and the resolution for partition was carried through. Zafrulla feels convinced that 'it was the personal intervention of President Truman that brought about these changes.'

II. Treatment of Citizens of Indian Origin in South Africa

Both India and Pakistan strongly disapproved the racial discrimination practised by the Government of South Africa against persons of Indian origin who had gone to South Africa as labourers. Gandhi had started his political career in South Africa and had conducted
his first experiment in Civil Disobedience there, and Jinnah's first speech upon election to the Imperial Legislative Council had also concerned the ill-treatment of Indians in South Africa.

India had submitted the issue to the General Assembly in June 1946, and when Pakistan joined the United Nations both countries joined hands in the cause. South Africa took up the position that Indians there enjoyed better economic, social, and educational advantages than they did in India; that the question being essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa, the United Nations was not competent to deal with it; and that an advisory opinion be sought from the International Court of Justice on whether the matter was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa.

Various Pakistani spokesmen refuted the South African contentions by arguing that a violation of human rights was a matter of international concern and ceased to be a question of domestic jurisdiction; that the labour conditions of Indians in South Africa having formed the subject of agreements between the Governments of India and Natal, and later between the governments of India and the Union of South Africa, the treatment of Indians in South Africa could not be regarded as exclusively a domestic affair; and that, even if the International Court of Justice ruled the matter to be a purely domestic question, the problem would continue and had to be solved in order to improve relations between South Africa on one side and India and Pakistan on the other.

In 1957 the Assembly passed a resolution asking South Africa to revise her policies, but without effect, and the problem continues to this day.

When South Africa decided to become a republic the question of her continuance as a member of the Commonwealth after assuming that status came up for consideration by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in March 1961. The occasion evoked a general debate on South Africa's racial policies and it became clear that, if South Africa was allowed to remain in the Commonwealth, some other countries, notably India and Pakistan, would leave it. Yielding to the inevitable, South Africa withdrew her application and ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth.

III. Colonial Questions

Jinnah had set the tone of Pakistan's policy towards colonial questions by declaring: 'Our heart and soul go out in sympathy with those who are struggling for their freedom.... If subjugation and exploitation are carried on, there will be no peace and there will be no end to wars.' We have already referred to Pakistan's support of Indonesia in her struggle for independence from Dutch rule. A reference to some other concrete cases will show further how indefatigably Zafrulla worked in the cause of freedom from colonial domination.

Former Italian Colonies in Africa — At the conclusion of the Second World War Britain was occupying Libya (except the Fezzan), Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland, and France was occupying the Fezzan. In the third session of the General Assembly the First Committee was of the view that Libya should become independent after ten years and that in the meantime she should be divided into three trusteeships — that of Britain in Cyrenaica, France in the Fezzan, and Italy in Tripolitania. Italy was further to hold Italian Somaliland as a trustee. Eritrea was to be divided between the Sudan and Ethiopia.

Zafrulla played a leading role in marshalling opposition to these proposals. He pleaded hard for immediate independence for a united Libya and proposed a greater Somali-
land consisting of Italian, French, and British Somalilands and certain areas of Ethiopia. The General Assembly threw out the recommendation of the First Committee in respect of Libya and in November 1949 decided that the whole of Libya should become an independent state by January 1952. Pakistan's efforts thus helped towards blocking a course which would have put the question of Libya's independence into cold storage for ten years and might have perpetuated her division into three parts.

The Pakistani Foreign Minister also strongly opposed Italian trusteeship over Italian Somaliland. The General Assembly finally placed that country under United Nations trusteeship, which was to end with the independence of Italian Somaliland in 1960.

Ethiopia strove to obtain Eritrea as war compensation from Italy. Zafrulla castigated the subconscious approach that Eritrea was 'a bundle of chattels belonging to Italy' which had been taken away from Italy, 'and the question was whether it should be given as a reward or a prize to Ethiopia'. Pakistan supported independence for Eritrea but could not muster the requisite majority to carry through the proposal. Ultimately a compromise was effected that Eritrea should federate with Ethiopia as an autonomous unit.

*Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria*—Pakistan played a prominent part in the campaign for the independence of these countries and for having the question considered by the United Nations, against the French objection that the matter fell exclusively within France's domestic jurisdiction. Eventually all three countries won independence by negotiations with France, but the pressure of world opinion undoubtedly affected both the timing and the result of the negotiations.

**IV. General**

In East-West differences regarding the scope of the provisions of the Charter, Pakistan usually followed an independent line. Three examples will illustrate the point.

1. On the question of admission of new members the Western Powers, faced with the Soviet veto against membership of countries of which the Soviet Union did not approve, propounded the view that unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council was not essential for a 'recommendation' of the Council favouring membership. Zafrulla Khan for Pakistan supported the Soviet contention that the admission of new members was a substantive question requiring the unanimity of the permanent members, and not a procedural matter requiring a simple majority in the Council. In an advisory opinion the International Court of Justice rejected the Western view.

2. In 1947 the General Assembly created the Interim Committee or the 'Little Assembly' for one year to deal with questions relating to peace and security. This was done to get over the problem of deadlock among the permanent members in the Security Council. The Soviet Union had opposed the proposal on the ground that it was an 'attempt to get rid of the veto by creating an organ parallel to the Council' and had refused to sit on it. In 1948 the life of the Interim Committee was extended for another year. Pakistan had supported the setting up of the Committee initially, but in 1949 was the only non-Communist country to vote against its prolongation for an indefinite period.

3. When the Soviet Union ended her boycott and returned to the Security Council it was clear that the Council would no longer be able to take effective action in Korea or in any similar situation elsewhere. On 3 November 1950 the General Assembly, mainly on United
States' initiative, passed the Uniting For Peace resolution which authorized the Assembly to make recommendations for collective measures if the Security Council failed to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain peace and security because of lack of unanimity among the permanent members.

Though India formally abstained from voting on the resolution, she was in fact opposed to it. Nehru said, 'It seems like converting the United Nations into a larger edition of the Atlantic Pact and making it a war organization more than one devoted to peace.' Consistently with her general view, that the United Nations ought to be made a more effective organization, Pakistan voted in favour of the resolution. Zafrulla conceded that under Article II (2) enforcement action lay within the exclusive domain of the Security Council, but he argued that recommendations could be made by the Assembly and that it could be held that, where the Council had been unable to act, the General Assembly had responsibility to take action under Article 10.

V. Zafrulla's Brilliance

It is difficult to overestimate Zafrulla's services to Pakistan in the early years of independence. In the first years, without an organized Foreign Office to prepare adequate briefs for him, he often managed to function as a formidable one-man secretariat. He possessed an encyclopaedic memory and the gift of devastating repartee. While sponsoring Pakistan's membership of the United Nations, Hector McNeil, the British Delegate, said, 'Sir Zafrulla Khan is well known to many of us. He will be a great asset in the work of the Assembly and the Committees.'

Zafrulla's performance as the chief Pakistani spokesman abroad won unqualified praise from friend and foe alike. In the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan members frequently paid glowing tributes to their Foreign Minister. Feroze Khan Noon said, 'The whole world knows that an advocate and jurist of his calibre does not exist in any country in the world.... I know during my tours in Arab countries, the Arab kings had his speeches translated two or three times and read to their people to tell them what this great man has done for them.' Begum Shah Nawaz, who had worked with Zafrulla in a number of conferences, declared that he had placed the name of Pakistan on the world map. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan also praised the 'great part' Zafrulla had played in the halls of the United Nations in the cause of the freedom of Afro-Asian countries. Though Pakistan's claim to Kashmir is inherently just, it could have suffered by poor presentation in the face of Indians who are noted for the gift of the gab. The former Chief Justice of India, Mehr Chand Mahajan, said Zafrulla's 'brilliant advocacy stole a march over the Indian delegation'. Campbell-Johnson, too, thought Zafrulla's exceptional pleading was one of the main factors in turning the tables on India, who had gone to the United Nations as the complainant in the Kashmir case.

VI. Why did not Pakistan's Independent Stand on Colonial Issues Adversely Affect her Relations with Western Powers?

Zafrulla could truthfully aver that 'Whenever there is a question of liberty and independence from imperialism or opposing colonialism, of pushing forward a people's march towards freedom, Pakistan is always to the fore and second to none.' As a result of this policy, Pakistan was often found voting on the same side as the Soviet bloc, and against the Western Powers, on colonial issues. However, this did not impair her image as fundamentally a good friend of the West. The reason for this was that Pakistan did not classify the two leaders of the Western camp as imperialist powers. Pakistani leaders frequently praised the
United Kingdom for voluntarily liquidating her empire and they commended the United States for her dislike of colonialism. In a remarkable address to the General Assembly, Zafirulla castigated the remnants of colonialism and the arrogant assumption that certain sections of mankind are entitled, as of right, to exercise domination over other groups of their fellow-beings. In the course of the same speech, however, he observed that 'Great Britain, which has set an example in this regard to the other colonial powers, is continuing its efforts to carry on the process in its West African colonies'. He went on to praise the statement which John Foster Dulles had made to the Assembly the previous day and quoted from it, as well as from Dulles's speech at the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference, and noted 'with particular gratification the reaffirmation on behalf of the Government of the United States of the belief expressed in the Declaration of Independence that governments derive their just powers only from the consent of the governed'. During his American tour Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had also said, 'You have no colonies and I believe no territorial ambitions. Has not your history, therefore, equipped you more than most nations to be among the leading architects of the enlightened internationalism of the future?'

Pakistan's anti-imperial moves often led India and Pakistan into the same voting lobby, but this harmony was obscured by their acrimonious exchanges in the debates relating to their disputes with each other. As recent victims of foreign domination, their indignation at the continuation of the same evil elsewhere was undoubtedly sincere, but it must be added that, not having any colonial possessions of their own, it was easier for both of them to adopt a high moral attitude towards colonial issues than towards questions in which their own national interests were directly at stake.

REFERENCES

4. See p. 127.
10. In the Constituent Assembly on 27 March 1952.

2. Pakistan and the United Nations

READING 3

(See Reading 2 of this Block)
The Preamble of the United Nations Charter speaks of social progress and better standards of life. Amongst the purposes of the Charter is listed international cooperation in economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian matters. Article 55 recognises that the creation of conditions of stability and well-being is necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations. It sets down as objectives the achievement of higher living standards; full employment and economic and social progress; the solution of international economic, social, health, and related problems; the promotion of cultural and educational cooperation; and the inculcation of universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These are truly revolutionary provisions and, in their comprehensiveness, unprecedented in any international statute. It is fortunate that these provisions were embodied in the Charter, for the activities that have resulted from them, though still of a very restricted character, serve as a needed counterpoise to the many failures of the United Nations in the political sphere.

Pakistan has taken a keen interest in the activities of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which was established to carry out the objectives stated in Article 55. Pakistan has already been elected to ECOSOC for three terms, namely, 1950–52, 1954–56 and 1957–59. Twice Pakistan has been elected its President, once its Vice President, and once Chairman of its Technical Assistance Committee. It might even be claimed that Pakistan has influenced thinking in the United Nations on economic and social questions. In this sphere Pakistan has played a part that has been more sustained, more constructive, and more decisive than its part in the political sphere.

How economically backward certain parts of the world are, and how deficient in worldly goods certain peoples are, as compared with others, can easily be judged from a few simple figures. Out of an estimated total world income of $548 billion in 1948, the United States, with less than 6 percent of the world population, had in 1948 a national income of $223.5 billion, accounting for 40 per cent of the world total. On the other hand, Asia, with about 55 per cent of the world population, has only $90 billion, or less than 17 per cent of the total world money income. The per capita income in the United States is over $2,000 a year, in the United Kingdom $900, and in countries like Pakistan the money income is only $50, although the corrected real income would yield a somewhat higher figure. As a consequence, the mass of the people of these economically backward countries ekes out a miserable existence, with poor housing, poor food, few schools, and few facilities for medical treatment.

At the 1952 summer session of ECOSOC, Mr. Chaudhri Salah-ud-din, the Pakistan representative, pointed out that this state of general poverty was due to two facts, namely,
overpopulation and the inability of the countries concerned to plan their economies during the period of colonial rule. However, Mr. Salah-ud-din did not give the whole explanation. Even until the end of the seventeenth century the West was no more "advanced" than Asia. Thereafter the people of Asia, a good many of whom had come under the rule of the West, lost all intellectual initiative and became stagnant. There was little encouragement for them to develop their talents for progressive purposes. Clinging to the tradition of their past glories, they began to look upon it as a virtue. The West, on the other hand, breaking away from its tradition, embarked on a new adventurous age of exploration, discovery, and conquest. This age gave it vast empires in America, Africa, Asia, and Australia. There followed the invention of the steam engine and a succession of other inventions, which were applied to industry and transport. Raw materials were cheaply bought in the colonial countries and, after being mechanically processed, were sold back to them. By the middle of the nineteenth century the West had become far richer and the fabulous East far poorer than they had been a century earlier. The West also utilized effective measures for birth control.

The representative of Pakistan also observed that "there had spread among the people of the underdeveloped countries an awareness that they, too, could attain the standard of living of the people of the highly developed countries." But he warned that:

...when they [the people of underdeveloped countries] compared their standard of living with that of the people of other countries, they were inclined to jump to baseless and irresponsible conclusions....

Significantly, he noted that:

...The problem of over-population in South and South East Asia was acute. In the circumstances prevailing, birth control could not be successfully advocated. Apart from the solution of the problem through the development of more and more resources in the countries concerned, the United Nations might take up the question of migration on a global basis. Any discrimination on racial or territorial grounds would be against the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter. There were certain areas in the world which were under-populated and in need of manpower.

If the desideratum was that the living standard of the economically underdeveloped countries should approach that of the more developed ones, certain complicated problems must be faced. In the summer of 1952 Mr. S. Amjad Ali pointed out before the Economic and Social Council that:

...the gap between the standards of living in the developed and in the under-developed areas was increasing. The position in some under-developed regions represented a vicious circle. In order to achieve economic and social progress and even political stability, those countries had to use their resources in direct improvement of standards of living. Nevertheless, the level of their national income in relation to that of the necessary investments did not enable them to do so. In most cases the circle could only be broken by external help added to internal effort. Although the external help added to internal effort. Although the external help essential to prevent the gap from widening might seem considerable, it was comparatively modest when set against the level of current expenditure on armaments. It was in any case well beyond what private investors could provide in the existing circumstances, although that did not mean that private investment, which had hitherto been lacking, could not make an important contribution.
...the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, and other extensive technical assistance programmes that had been undertaken, could greatly increase the technical capacity of the under-developed countries to solve their own problems. 4

That technical assistance was not enough was argued by Pakistan in 1954 at the eighteenth session:

The problems facing the under-developed countries were an inadequate flow of capital and an insufficient and uncertain return for their raw materials in relation to their import requirements. The problem of the stabilization of commodity prices was not one for the under-developed countries alone but could seriously affect the industrialized countries as well. A fall in foreign exchange receipts inevitably led to a tightening of import restrictions and the balancing of world trade at a lower level. A vicious circle could thus be created and lead to a depression affecting production and employment everywhere. Such a situation could be mastered only by international cooperation based on the realization that peace and prosperity were interdependent, and that the world could not remain permanently divided into prosperous and needy nations. 5

The needs of the economically underdeveloped countries in the financing of their economic development led Pakistan to strive for the establishment of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). Pakistan sponsored a resolution for the establishment of IFC and urged member governments to extend their cooperation in giving it a concrete shape so as to facilitate the flow of international capital for financing economic development in the economically backward countries. 6 The IFC is an international institution, closely linked with the World Bank, with a capital of 92 million dollars subscribed by 52 member states.

The idea of SUNFED took shape in March—April 1949. In 1951 a group of experts was appointed by the Secretary General to study measures for the economic growth of the under-developed countries. This group recommended the establishment of an International Development Authority for the purpose of assisting economically underdeveloped countries. After this proposal had been examined in 1951 at the thirteenth session of the ECOSOC, the plan for SUNFED was evolved. By the summer of 1952 the Council set up a Committee of Nine (Experts), which included Mr. S. Amjad Ali, to prepare a detailed plan for a Special Fund. The plan envisaged grants-in-aid and low-interest long-term loans to economically less-developed countries, designed to accelerate their economic development by financing non-self-liquidating projects basic to their economic growth. According to Mr. Said Hasan: "In spite of its statements to the contrary, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) seldom financed projects that were non-self-liquidating." 7

The report of the Committee of Nine was presented to the Council, which decided that the member states should be asked to furnish their views on the scope, nature, and structure of SUNFED. At the summer session of the Council in 1956, Pakistan co-sponsored a resolution to keep the subject alive. 8 Pakistan's thinking with regard to SUNFED is to some extent reflected in the following report of Mr. Said Hasan's speech to the 1956 summer session of ECOSOC:

...In its reply to the questionnaire, Pakistan had expressed the view that SUNFED should be primarily concerned with long-term, low-interest-bearing loans, in order
to avoid becoming a charitable organization and also in order to ensure that the recipient country would have given high priority to the project in respect of which assistance was requested. Pakistan had also emphasized that the repayment of interest should be permitted in local currency for such time as its repayment in foreign exchange would strain the balance-of-payments position of the recipient country. As he had informed the Council at the eighteenth session (812th meeting), the long-term loan agreement between the United States of America and Pakistan provided that the loans should be repayable in local currency and that payments would not be convertible without the consent of Pakistan or without taking Pakistan’s currency situation into account. In the view of his delegation, repayment of SUNFED loans should be on a similar basis. Once the conditions of a loan had been agreed upon between SUNFED and the recipient country, however, they should not be subject to change. The sanctity of contract should be ensured.

So far as concerns the minimum amount necessary before SUNFED could start operations, he would like to repeat what he had said at the twentieth session (885th meeting)—that $250 million would be only a drop in the ocean in view of the fact that $1,900 million would be needed to raise per capita income in the under-developed countries by a mere 2 per cent. The amounts suggested in the replies to the questionnaire ranged from $62.5 million to 2,000 million, thus revealing considerable differences of opinion on the subject. Perhaps it would be appropriate to keep the estimate of the minimum amount necessary to start operations at the figure of $250 million suggested by the Committee of Nine.

At this session, it became clear that the principal Western powers, who would be the chief contributors to the Fund, were not in favour of its immediate establishment. They felt that unless a general agreement on disarmament was reached and resources released from armaments, they would not be able substantially to contribute to SUNFED. Speaking on this critical point, Mr. Said Hasan raised the question of:

...whether the establishment of SUNFED should be conditional upon agreement being reached on internationally-supervised disarmament under the auspices of the United Nations, or whether, as had been affirmed by the Government of Denmark (A/2646, p. 36), it was “neither necessary nor desirable” to hold the establishment of SUNFED in abeyance pending such agreement. While the underdeveloped countries almost universally adhered to the latter view, the major contributing countries seemed to favour the establishment of SUNFED only after they had succeeded in making some budgetary economies as the result of the institution of an internationally supervised system of disarmament. Only Canada, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, among the prospective contributing countries, did not seem to stipulate such a condition. It therefore seemed that SUNFED might have to wait until such time as international tension was sufficiently relaxed to allow for the agreement envisaged. As suggested by the French Government, however, it would be worthwhile to take steps to draw up a draft statute for SUNFED.

Despite these reservations, Pakistan supported a resolution recommending that the General Assembly establish a preparatory commission which would set up SUNFED and select a limited number of projects. At the 1958 session of the General Assembly, a compromise resolution was adopted providing for the establishment of a Special Project Fund, which would be an expansion of the technical assistance and development activities of the United Nations. According to that resolution the level of the United Nations Technical Assis-
The Lance Programme would be raised from $31 million to $100 million and its scope widened. To define the projects to which the resources of this Fund would be applied, a preparatory committee was appointed, Pakistan being one of its members. It might, however, be noted that the Special Project Fund and SUNFED are two different things and the former is not to be a substitute for the latter. SUNFED has been shelved, at least for the time being.

Industrialisation, which is an essential element in the over-all economic development of a country, involves economic, social, fiscal, technical, and organisational problems regarding which ECOSOC has been promoting studies. Through a resolution sponsored by Pakistan at the Council's 1956 summer session, the need for industrialisation of underdeveloped countries was emphasised and the Secretary General was requested to consider what further steps and facilities were needed for that purpose. That a separate specialised agency was called for was the view of the Pakistan delegation. This view had been first put forward by Mr. Said Hasan at the spring session in 1956 when he had urged as primary requirement the establishment of:

...a body within the United Nations responsible for assisting the underdeveloped countries on industrial questions; manpower training was not the only problem involved in industrialization. The body in question might undertake to collect and disseminate information on industrial principles and techniques....

That the United Nations should furnish more than technical assistance had also been urged by Pakistan in the Second Committee in 1952:

...Pakistan was grateful for the assistance received under the programme. When the programme had first been launched, Pakistan had been confronted with a serious shortage of technical and trained personnel, following the greatest population movement in history across national frontiers. Under the expanded Programme scores of experts had been supplied and personnel from Pakistan had been trained abroad. His [the Pakistan] Government had at times felt somewhat dissatisfied with the quality of some of the experts provided....

Emphasis [had been] laid on supplying experts and fellowships. Its facilities were primarily of value to countries at the initial stage of surveying their resources or of drafting plans for their development. Countries which had evolved beyond that stage urgently required training facilities and institutions within their own territory. The technical assistance programme should include provision for establishing such institutions and for supplying them with staff and equipment. It should also lay increasing emphasis on demonstration projects and on supplying equipment, machinery and personnel for them....

So far as Pakistan is concerned, this position has not altered. It has been ascertained that the experts that have been supplied to Pakistan are not always such as are required. This feeling exists not only about experts furnished by the United Nations, but also about those that have come under other programmes.

With regard to "the chronic problem of under-employment in the rural areas of the under-developed countries," the representative of Pakistan in 1952 declared in the Committee on Economic and Financial Questions that it "could be solved only by establishing a network of cottage and small-scale industries.... There was need for a new large-scale experiment in rural rehabilitation."
As a country whose economy is dependent upon the export of a few primary commodities, Pakistan is vitally interested in the stability of the prices of such commodities. ECOSOC reviews annually the reports presented by such bodies as the Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Agreements (ICCICA) and the Commission on International Commodity Trade (CICT). The main function of the former is to facilitate through appropriate means intergovernmental consultation or action with respect to international commodity problems. The task of the latter is to examine measures designed to avoid excessive fluctuations in the prices and volume of trade in primary commodities. This includes measures aimed at the maintenance of an equitable relationship between the prices of primary commodities and the prices of manufactured goods in international trade as well as making recommendations for that purpose.

Pakistan was not a member of ECOSOC when the proposal for the setting up of ICCICA was approved. The government did not join ICCICA because it felt that the demand for Pakistan's exports, particularly jute and cotton, was stable and that there would be no advantage to the nation from commodity agreements. Pakistan also felt that the pegging of maximum prices would deprive it of gains resulting from upward trends in the prices of raw materials.

At the 1954 spring and summer meeting of the Economic and Social Council, Pakistan supported the creation of the Commission on International Commodity Trade, and has been a member of that Commission since its inception in 1954. The stabilisation of prices and of the volume of trade in primary commodities is of considerable importance to a country like Pakistan whose main source of foreign exchange is the export of primary commodities. At the summer session of the Council in 1957, Pakistan expressed the view that CICT had not justified the hopes that had been entertained about it and indicated a willingness to support any proposal for the merger of CICT with ICCICA.

The idea of the establishment of a world food reserve emanated during the 1954 session of the United Nations General Assembly at which a resolution was adopted requesting the Secretary General to invite the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to prepare a factual and comprehensive report on the feasibility of establishing a world food reserve. This reserve would relieve emergency situations, prevent extreme short-term fluctuations in the prices of agricultural commodities, and promote rational disposal of intermittent agricultural surpluses.16

When the report of FAO was considered by ECOSOC at its summer session in 1956, the delegation of Pakistan stressed the need for a food reserve for combating unforeseen food shortages and short-term balance of payment difficulties. The Council adopted a resolution sponsored by Pakistan; recognising the need for such a reserve to stabilise prices and assist less-developed countries to resist strains on their foreign exchange position caused by unexpected food shortages. At the summer sessions of the Council in 1956 and 1957, it was pointed out by Pakistan that a single world food reserve would not serve all the various requirements and it was suggested that a world food capital fund, complementary to the proposed SUNFED, should be established.

The need for a world food reserve was stressed by Mr. Firoz Khan Noon in the course of his address to the General Assembly in 1956. He said:

My delegation is convinced that the establishment of a food reserve is urgently needed to provide assurance, in time of emergency, of an adequate stock of food to
prevent distress as well as shortage caused by scarcity. In our opinion, it is necessary to devise a method by which a country may procure foodgrains to meet a shortage in any one year, without up-setting for that year or the following years its programme of economic development, which would be upset if it had to use its limited foreign exchange resources for importing food. Asian countries could be helped to become self-supporting in food if some of the foreign aid were given in the shape of modern aids to agriculture—for example, tractors. Part of the cultivable land—already much partitioned into small holdings—which at present is given to raising fodder for the oxen would, with the help of tractors, be able to produce much needed foodgrains. The tractors could be worked on a cooperative basis. Each cultivator could easily afford to pay the hire. Thousands could be purchased privately if we had the foreign exchange. There is no doubt that the position would be the same in many Asian countries.17

However urgent the need for a world food reserve and whatever the extent of its utility, it is of the highest importance that each country should take steps to meet threats to its food production and indeed to augment that production. So far as Pakistan is concerned, three primary problems to be faced are: the development of arid zones, the rational utilisation of water resources, and land reforms. At various times Pakistan has drawn the attention of ECOSOC to these problems. Speaking at a 1952 Council meeting, the representative of Pakistan reported that:

Almost all of West Pakistan lay in an arid zone, where crops could only grow by irrigation. In addition, Pakistan must now face the problem caused by the increase of population. Since partition in 1947, Pakistan had had to take in a very large number of refugees... That influx raised many problems of rehabilitation, housing and food in a country where the economy was predominantly agricultural...

In its efforts to cope with the situation, his Government had made use of new agricultural techniques and was attempting to bring arid land under cultivation. To do so it would have to develop their irrigation system considerably...Pakistan had therefore undertaken multi-purpose irrigation programs, and projects for the exploitation of hydro–power resources, which were scheduled to be carried out under the six year national development plan. Under this plan there was a Lower Sind barrage project which aimed at bringing 2,800,000 acres of arid land under irrigation....

A second project known as the Thal project was based on the utilization of the waters of the Indus: 250,000 acres of land had already been brought under the plough....

The third project in the multi-purpose programme for the exploitation of water resources was the dam on the Kabul River, a tributary of the Indus. That installation, with a capacity of 180,000 kilowatts, would also make possible the irrigation of 100,000 acres of land. On the Kurram River, similar work would make possible the irrigation of 150,000 acres of arid land and the construction of a 4,000-kilowatt power station.18

The representative of Pakistan also referred to the problem of waterlogging and accumulation of salts, which had rendered waste 236,000 acres of land in Pakistan. Such waste areas were increasing at the rate of 40,000 acres annually, of which the government was able to reclaim 25,000 acres annually. The representative of Pakistan said that:
The carrying out of such schemes had imposed a very heavy burden, and if Pakistan did not receive technical, material and financial help from abroad, it would be difficult to finish the programme according to schedule...Australia, Canada and New Zealand gave Pakistan valuable financial assistance under the Colombo Plan.

At the 1956 spring session of ECOSOC, Pakistan sponsored a resolution proposing the drafting of a covenant to define the rights and duties of states with respect to the utilization and development of international water resources. In support of the resolution, the representative of Pakistan observed that:

...If the Council really wished to ensure the development of those resources, it would have to begin precisely by establishing rules for the utilization of the waters of international rivers. If it took no step in that direction, progress was hardly to be expected. In making his proposal he had been motivated not by the special interests of Pakistan, but simply by the great importance of the question to millions of human beings. He had cited examples of certain disputes regarding the utilization of river waters, not with any desire to cast aspersions on the countries concerned, but merely in order to bolster up his arguments and bring out the real importance of the question and the need to take it up without further delay. He cited figures to show that the water resources wasted each year were considerable. The economy of many countries, including Pakistan, depended mainly on agriculture, which in turn depended on irrigation; in most of those countries, irrigation techniques were quite advanced and active research was being pursued.

He therefore saw little to recommend the draft resolution submitted by France and the United States (E/L.721), which merely requested the Secretary General to make a preliminary study of hydrological data despite the fact that the United Nations had been working on the question for eight years. The study would not represent any progress over what had been done in some countries, in whose case irrigation was a vital necessity. It was not desirable to give the impression that adequate international action was being taken in that regard when, in fact, that was not the case.

It will be recalled that in view of its dispute with India over the waters of the Indus basin, Pakistan had a direct interest in the matter. However, the Pakistani draft resolution did not find favour with the Council.

On the problems of land reforms, which the representative of Pakistan described as "basic," he reported that:

...In East Pakistan a great new venture in land ownership had been launched. The Provincial Government was buying up all proprietary and intermediary holdings of land above a certain minimum with a view to eliminating all intermediary interests between the state on the one hand and the tiller of the soil on the other. In West Pakistan, where there were vast numbers of peasant proprietors owning the land they cultivated, the problem was largely one of better technique, better finance and better marketing....

In that context, he drew the Committee's attention to one aspect of the land reform question which had not received adequate attention in the past. Land reform was not merely a matter of willingness to initiate a certain process; it was also a question of finance. His Government did not believe in expropriation without adequate and
reasonable compensation. The total value of all the landed interests to be acquired would however be so great as to leave practically nothing for other development projects. The will to initiate reforms was therefore limited by the availability of funds.

In order to facilitate thorough consideration of the subject, he was submitting a draft resolution... requesting, first, that the Secretary-General include in his questionnaire to governments a question on the financial implications of their projected programmes of land reform and in his report to the Economic and Social Council consolidate and analyse the replies received and secondly, that a study of the financial aspects of land reform should be undertaken by the Committee of nine....

So many and so varied are the activities of the United Nations in the economic and social sphere that it is obviously not possible to take account of all of them in this study. We might, however, note one more, viz., the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Speaking about it in a plenary meeting of the 1957 session of the General Assembly, Mr. Noon said:

... This organization, which is financed by voluntary contributions from different countries and organizations, has this year a budget of $24,000,000, a considerable increase over last year's budget. It hopes, through continuous efforts, to abolish malaria throughout the world in about ten years' time, having made considerable progress in this direction already. What this means to the poorer nations living in unfavourable climates can be imagined only by us who live there. In Pakistan, the UNICEF has set up a DDT factory which is already in production. It is also setting up a penicillin factory which will soon go into production. This antibiotic is in very short supply in the eastern countries. In fact, it is almost unobtainable because of the shortage of foreign exchange....

At the 1956 session of the General Assembly Pakistan drew attention to an important new fact relative to the economic programme of the United Nations, namely, that the financial resources of the world organization would be subjected to a further strain as a result of its enlarged membership. Mr. M. Ahmed observed:

... that the percentage of total assistance allocated to Africa in 1957 was 10.7 as compared with 9.3 in 1956, an increase which had inevitably reduced the amount of assistance available to Asia and the Far East. Pakistan willingly accepted the sacrifice in favour of the newly independent countries, among them Tunisia and Morocco. However, past experience had shown that the extension of the geographical range of countries and territories covered by the Programme, however desirable in itself, did not always prove effective. It meant spreading the limited resources even thinner than before. Attention must therefore be directed towards increasing the total resources of the Programme. The Programme for 1957, the financial resources for which amounted to over $31 million, was inadequate when measured in terms of the area to be covered. A target of $50 million should be set.

So far as currency utilization was concerned, in many cases when the contributions were not large the problem of utilization was not difficult, particularly when those currencies were used for meeting the local costs. Special problems had arisen in connection with large contributions in inconvertible currencies. It was a disadvantage in the present system that countries like Pakistan, which had been unable to use some of those inconvertible currencies, had found their proportionate share of...
the funds reduced. If the available resources could be treated as a pool from which
their shares could be apportioned to the various countries irrespective of their ability
to use any particular currency, the disadvantages of the existing system would be
partly overcome. The draft resolution on currency utilization, co-sponsored by
Pakistan, went a long way towards securing the principles his delegation had in
view...24

The United Nations is not the only source of foreign aid for Pakistan, nor by any
means the most important. In fact the United Nations provides only technical assistance, i.e.,
experts, training facilities abroad, and demonstration equipment. It provides no capital as-
sistance. Pakistan has received aid of a varied kind and on a very large scale from the United
States. Pakistan has also received substantial aid under the Colombo-plan from Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand. Technical assistance has come also from the Ford Foundation
and from Sweden, West Germany, Japan, and other countries, including a large measure of
such aid from the United Kingdom.

Foreign economic assistance has played a vital part in the development of Pakistan.
Beginning with a relatively small amount in 1950, given by a few countries, the scope and
volume of this assistance had by the end of 1959 increased to $1,541.68 million, serving a
variety of needs in a wide range of fields, such as agriculture, industries, mining, transport,
health services, trade, commerce, labour, and public administration.

By far the largest amount of aid to Pakistan has come from the United States. It
began coming in 1950, after President Truman had announced his Point Four programme.
Until the end of December 1959 the United States had given as economic aid to Pakistan
$1,118.97 million.

The total allocations from Colombo plan countries until the end of 1959 were as follows:

1.  Canada  $(c)109.56 million
2.  Australia  $ 27.55 ”
3.  New Zealand  $ 5.71 ”
4.  United Kingdom  $ 3.80 ”

The assistance received from the United Nations and its specialised agencies since
the inception of their programme in Pakistan in 1950 has been as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (in US dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>268,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,042,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>946,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>993,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>981,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,283,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,299,569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The World Bank has so far allocated to Pakistan twelve loans of the value of $151.35 million and the International Finance Corporation has given two loans totalling $1.38 million. The Ford Foundation had until 1959 allocated grants of the value of $15.02 million.25

The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs Study Group on the United Nations examined the working of the aid programmes, particularly those relating to technical assistance. With regard to the expanded technical assistance programme of the United Nations, the Group expressed the view that the programme lacked the flexibility to take account of the varying needs of the recipient countries. That was due to the rigid programming procedures of the United Nations. There is the Technical Assistance Committee of ECOSOC and under it the Technical Assistance Board, on which are represented all the specialised agencies as well as the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. The Board prepares its programmes for aid about two years in advance. However, when the time comes for using the aid, it is often found that the programme is no longer relevant, conditions and attitudes in the recipient country having in the meanwhile changed. For situations like this, Pakistani officials are sometimes themselves to blame. The Group thought that most of the difficulties resulting from procedures of the agencies giving or administering aid and discrepancies between what is offered by them and desired by the recipient countries are bound to be resolved, if the latter take up definite attitudes, backed by adequate advance planning.

The shelving of SUNFED, whose creation had been urged by Pakistan and recommended by ECOSOC, was due mainly to political considerations of the more powerful countries. This was a great blow to the underdeveloped countries. There are specialised agencies like UNESCO, FAO, and WHO for education, agriculture, and health; but there was none for the industrial development of the underdeveloped countries. Proposals for creating such an agency had on one ground or the other been opposed and put off. The International Finance Corporation had, however, been established and started functioning in 1956. But it was taking too long in deciding on the applications made to it and no funds had been received from it in Pakistan (at any rate until April 1958). In any case, the scope of the Corporation was confined to private industry of a very profitable type.

The United Nations provides technical assistance in the form of experts but makes little provision for supplying equipment. The experts that came out under the various aid programmes, the Group felt, were far too expensive and their utility was not commensurate with their cost to Pakistan. In several instances, experts came and wrote reports that called for still more experts to advise on the same problem. Thus, to deal with the problem of waterlogging, which is an extremely serious one in Pakistan, four groups of experts submitted four reports. How much better it would have been if the problem had been attacked in the field. More often than not, the experts that came out to Pakistan under the aid programmes, it had been found, did not give practical advice. In any case advice was not what was wanted most. The country needed equipment, training centres, and results above all.

The Group thought that a most important task which the United Nations could do was to sponsor and finance research programmes on problems that are vital to underdeveloped countries. Such programmes are beyond the technical and financial resources of those countries. They need, for example, research to check the growth of their populations and therefore a cheap, easy, safe, and effective method of birth control. Another thing they need is a cheap fuel for cooking. If the United Nations could devote a few million dollars to research for such purposes and get results, that would make all the difference to the lives of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries.
The Group noted that there was overlapping in aid programmes. Even the fields of the various agencies of the United Nations were not altogether exclusive. At one time in Pakistan three different agencies were working in the same field. This lack of coordination was known to the United Nations which was trying to introduce some sort of discipline.

The Group considered that the procedures of the World Bank were also very rigid. The Bank insisted on very high standards, which, whatever their long range value to the underdeveloped countries, were extremely difficult for them to meet. As a result of these procedures and standards sometimes the funds promised by the Bank for a project arrived after it had been completed. This happened in the case of the Karnafuli Paper Mills in East Pakistan.

Another criticism of the Bank was that it levied a commitment charge of one percent on every loan provided by it. Of course, this charge substantially adds to the resources of the Bank. However, the underdeveloped countries feel that the Bank could afford to go without it.

The Group recalled the oft-expressed view that what the Western countries gave in aid, they took away in trade. Through adverse terms of trade, the basic wealth of the underdeveloped countries was being gradually reduced in value and a very small part of it was being paid back in the form of grants or loans. The question regarding measures to improve the terms of trade, in order to stabilise the prices of the commodities produced by the underdeveloped countries, had been taken up by Pakistan in practically all the forums of the United Nations. A Commission on International Commodity Trade has been appointed but as has been noticed no concrete measures have emerged from it. Prices of manufactured goods continue to rise, because of the labour component involved in their manufacture, and wages in the advanced countries are allowed to go on increasing. The result is that for a given quantity of goods exported by the raw material producing countries, these countries get ever fewer manufactured goods in exchange. This is a major factor in the inability of those countries to make progress with their own resources.

The Group was strongly of the opinion that the quantity of foreign aid received by the underdeveloped countries was not sufficient to meet their needs. It was not by any means sufficient to lead to development on such a scale as would make an appreciable difference to the standard of living of the masses of the underdeveloped countries. To achieve that end, transfer of funds on a very large scale is necessary. This is absolutely necessary if there is to be a stable world order, and if the human race is to live in freedom and dignity. The United States made possible the miracle of the recovery of Germany by giving that country $5,000 million dollars over a short period of time. The wealthy nations have plenty and to spare. It would not be just generosity on their part if they gave in an ample measure to the people of Asia and Africa. These people produce so many of the raw materials whose utilisation is a factor in building up the superprosperity of the wealthy nations. For the latter, it is also the call of enlightened self-interest, concluded the Group.

REFERENCES

3. ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 207.
15. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
3. Pakistan and the Regional International Organizations: Evaluation of Pakistan's Diplomacy and Her Role in Forums of CENTO, SEATO, RCD, SAARC, OIC, etc.

READING 5

(Excerpts from 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis', by S.M. Burke, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1975).

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Perhaps the most satisfying, and potentially the most fruitful, partnership which Pakistan has so far forged with Muslim countries is the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), set up largely as a result of the initiative taken by President Ayub Khan in the summer of 1964. Its other members are Turkey and Iran with whom Pakistan has always enjoyed a cordial friendship. As fellow members of CENTO, the three countries had already built up a tradition of mutual consultation and cooperation. Together they form three links of a highly strategic chain.

As stated in our discussion of the Baghdad Pact, the RCD was a by-product of the growing disenchantment of Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey with their ties with the Western countries. The RCD partners, moreover, could see that the USA and the USSR were edging towards a relaxation of tension, reducing the value of military pacts. If the USA desired a more cooperative relationship with the USSR why should not Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey move in the same direction, specially when Moscow seemed so eager to play the role of a beneficent neighbour?

The idea that the three Muslim members of CENTO should meet outside CENTO auspices, to forge a new partnership, was first discussed by their representatives in Washington in April 1964, when they went there to attend the CENTO Council meeting. It was furthered in the first week of July, when the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey conferred at Ankara, with President Ayub Khan also in town. On 4 July Ayub told a press conference that he had proposed a new 'united front between Turkey, Pakistan and Iran'.

From Ankara Ayub proceeded to London, to attend the Common-wealth Prime Ministers' Conference. On the way back he stopped at Istanbul where the Shah of Iran and President Cemal Gursel of Turkey joined him. A joint statement by the three Heads of State, issued on 22 July 1964, named the new organization 'Regional Cooperation for Development' and resolved that appropriate means should be adopted to step up cooperation 'in all
fields' in a spirit of 'regional cooperation'. It was decided to create a Ministerial Council composed of Foreign Ministers and a Regional Planning Committee composed of heads of the three national planning organizations. A permanent Secretariat was later established at Tehran and has been functioning effectively.

It was no doubt hoped by the founders that their new organization would attract a wider regional membership than CENTO because it contained no non-regional Western power and had no cold-war overtones. Ayub had passed through Afghanistan on the way to Ankara and sounded King Zahir Shah, but had been unable to persuade that monarch to take his country into RCD. Arab reaction to the new system was openly unfavourable. The agreement was suspected to be a disguised extension of CENTO under imperialist instigation and yet another attempt to organize a confederacy against the rising forces of Arab unity.

Though no formal alliance for mutual defence has been created, the relations of the RCD partners, who meet regularly at various levels, are growing more intimate with the passage of time. The Shah of Iran told Pakistanis that Iran had decided to share her destiny with Pakistan and 'to stand by you in good and bad days', and a few months later President Cevdet Sunay said that Turco-Pakistani relations had 'reached a level far above that of alliances'.

In concrete terms, the most commendable progress has been registered in the field of 'Joint Purpose Enterprises'. By January 1970 the following projects had gone into production:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Bank Note and Security Paper Project</td>
<td>Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Machine Tools (Turret and Capstan Lathes)</td>
<td>Pakistan and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Gear Boxes and Differential Systems</td>
<td>Pakistan and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Borax and Boric Acid</td>
<td>Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Machinery for Tea Industry</td>
<td>Pakistan and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Tungsten Carbide</td>
<td>Pakistan and Turkey</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Locomotive Diesel Engine Project</td>
<td>Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Centrifugal and Special Filters for Chemical Industry</td>
<td>Pakistan and Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Methanol Industry</td>
<td>Iran and Pakistan</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Urea Formaldehyde Project</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>Glycerine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Glycerine</td>
<td>Pakistan and Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Polystyrene Project</td>
<td>Pakistan and Turkey</td>
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</table>
Seven more projects were expected to go into production before the close of 1970 and thirty-one others had been approved. There has been useful cooperation in some other directions also, but the important sector of trade between the RCD partners has been stubbornly stagnant.

The RCD is an attractive conception which, given internal stability and progress within the territories of its individual members, could develop impressively and serve as a model for other developing regions.

Located, as she is, right in the middle of the RCD region, Afghanistan would be the most natural fourth member of the organization. Her addition to the group would dissolve much of the unjustifiable suspicion that RCD is just a reincarnation of the Western-inspired CENTO.

The First Islamic Summit Conference and the First and Second Islamic Conferences of Foreign Ministers.

On 21 August 1969 the Muslim world was shocked to learn that extensive damage by arson had been caused to the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which was under the military occupation of Israel.

President Yahya Khan issued a statement deploiring the desecration of the mosque which was the first Qibla of the Muslims and one of their holiest shrines. He said Muslim unity was a paramount necessity at the juncture and Pakistan would concert her course of action with other Muslim countries.

President Nasser urged King Feisal, in the latter's capacity as the custodian of the Muslim shrines at Makkah and Medina, to take the initiative in convening a summit conference of Muslim States to consider the situation arising out of the vandalism in Jerusalem. This suggestion was endorsed by an urgently summoned ministerial meeting of the fourteen members of the Arab League, which authorized King Feisal and King Hassan II of Morocco to organize a Muslim summit meeting.

Hassan having offered to play host to the conference, leaders representing twenty-five countries met at Rabat on 22 September. The Palestine Liberation Organization was invited to attend as an observer, despite opposition by Turkey and Iran. Earlier in September a seven-nation preparatory meeting, of which Pakistan was a member, had met in the same capital and adopted the principle that only those countries should be invited to the summit who had a majority of Muslim population or had Islam as the state religion.

At its termination, on 25 September, the Rabat Conference issued a Declaration of which the preamble stated that the participants were convinced that their common creed constituted a powerful factor for fostering understanding between them. The Declaration said that the Governments represented at the summit 'shall consult together' to promote collaboration between them. A Permanent Secretariat would be established at Jeddah 'pending the liberation of Jerusalem'. It appealed to the international community to secure the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied during the war of 1967. Finally, the authors of the joint Declaration affirmed their full support to the 'Palestine people for the restitution of its usurped rights and in its struggle for national liberation'.

India, who had not been invited to Rabat, expressed great indignation at being ig-
nored and pressed for admission on the ground that she had a population of fifty-five million Muslims. On the morning of 23 September the conference accepted King Feisal’s proposal to invite a delegation from India. A statement issued by the Pakistani delegation said: ‘In recognition of the historic and abiding concern of the great Muslim community in the Indian-Pakistani subcontinent, the Islamic summit adopted a proposal by His Majesty King Feisal of Saudi Arabia to accord representation to the Muslims of India.’ When the parley resumed in the afternoon Yahya noticed that India was represented by her Ambassador to Morocco, Sardar Gurbachan Singh, a Sikh. The Pakistani President thereupon decided to stay away from the hall until India was excluded.

Pakistan gave two grounds for her stand. First, she took the view that the conference had decided to allow the participation of the Indian Muslims, not of the Indian Government. Any Indian delegation would, therefore, have to be mandated by the Indian Muslim community and not by the Government. Secondly, Pakistan argued that, if the criterion for participation was to be changed by including India, then other countries with large Muslim populations, such as China, Russia, and Ghana, ought also be asked to send representatives. Turkey, Iran and Jordan stood firmly beside Pakistan and threatened to boycott the proceedings. Ultimately it was decided to exclude the Indian delegation from future sessions of the conference.

In his closing prayer King Hassan, the conference President, said, ‘May God help Muslims in Palestine, in India, and wherever they are being persecuted.’

Mrs. Gandhi’s Government was severely criticized at home for the rebuff at Rabat. An editorial in the Statesman summed up the general feeling: ‘New Delhi has only itself to blame for the humiliation to which India has been subjected at the Islamic summit at Rabat is being asked to withdraw from a conference to which it had secured a belated invitation only after persistent and, at times, pathetic importuning. The very idea of secular India wanting to go to a conference of Islamic States was open to serious objection.’

The Muslim Foreign Ministers’ Conferences at Jedda (24 to 26 March 1970) and at Karachi (26 to 28 December 1970) gave further shape to the decisions taken at Rabat. A budget of US $450,000 was approved for the Secretariat for 1971; Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaysia, resigned his office to become the first Secretary-General of the Secretariat; and proposals for setting up an ‘Islamic Bank and an Islamic International News Agency, for the ‘creation and reinforcement’ of Islamic Cultural Centres, and for drafting a charter for the Islamic Conference were referred to various experts.

The ‘revolutionary’ regimes of Iraq and Syria declined to attend the Rabat, Jedda, and Karachi conferences, and the UAR was a lukewarm participant.

Muslim solidarity could be a great force in world politics but it remains to be seen whether Islam in the twentieth century is a strong enough force to weld together such a large number of heterogeneous peoples into a meaningful partnership. The Rabat Declaration called for Israel’s withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied by her in the 1967 war and also affirmed support to the people of Palestine for the restitution of their rights, but did not prescribe any sanctions against Israel, such as severance of diplomatic relations or economic boycott. Pakistan, for one, would do well first to demonstrate that the people of her own two geographical units can form one brotherhood under the flag of Islam.

Other Developments

The Foreign Minister of the UAR repeated his country’s view, during his visit to
Pakistan in September 1967, that there would be no 'Muslim brotherhood' because brotherhood, in his view, should embrace all men of good purpose. However, President Nasser died in September 1969 and it remains to be seen how rigidly his successor will adhere to all his policies. After meeting 'my brother' Sadat at Cairo on his way to the USA in October 1970, Yahya said he found the new UAR President 'sympathetic to Pakistan's viewpoint on important present-day issues'. Though Mrs. Gandhi also went to the USA in the autumn of 1970, Sadat asked Yahya, not the Indian Premier, to convey the Arab point of view to Nixon. Hasan El Tohamy, Minister of State and Political Adviser to the President, who led the UAR delegation to the Karachi Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference, called the meeting 'a landmark for forging Islamic cooperation' and wished Pakistan to be 'the real cornerstone' in the process.

Indonesia improved her relations with India after Soekarno fell from power, in the wake of the unsuccessful Communist-supported coup d'état in the autumn of 1965, and also ended her confrontation with Malaysia, but her relations with Pakistan remained cordial. Foreign Minister Adam Malik affirmed in Karachi in November 1966 that ties between Pakistan and Indonesia were not based on transient considerations but were deeply rooted in the 'common faith' of the two countries. In the joint communique, Malik reiterated his Government's stand that the Kashmir dispute should be settled 'in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State'. Not long afterwards when the Indian Foreign Minister, M. C. Chagla, claimed that Indonesia would no longer support Pakistan on the Kashmir question, the Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan promptly refuted the assertion and declared that his country's position remained unaltered.

REFERENCES

2. Pakistan Horizon, 3rd Quarter 1964.
5. For a complete list see Pakistan Affairs, 31 Jan. 1970.
6. The Muslims said their prayers facing Jerusalem until they adopted the practice of facing Makkah.
Since the beginning of the Eighties, seven countries of the South Asian region, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have taken preliminary measures to set up a regional grouping with the aim of promoting amongst themselves cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and scientific fields. The objective of the participating countries is to adopt the functional approach to bringing about a just and lasting peace to this volatile part of the world. It is hoped that regional cooperation in the non-political fields mentioned above will help them to overcome problems of backwardness. At the same time, this increasing cooperation in non-political fields is expected to generate a climate of goodwill and understanding, which would lead in turn to cooperation in the political sphere among the South Asian countries.

This paper will examine the developments which have occurred so far in the South Asian regional scheme; analyse the stresses and strains contained in the movement, and finally evaluate the prospects of regional cooperation in South Asia, keeping in mind the limitations inherent in the process.

The Process of South Asian Regional Cooperation

Regional cooperation is not a new phenomenon can be found in practice in various parts of the world including Western (the European Economic Community), Africa (the Organization of African Unity), Southeast Asia (the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)), etc. For South Asia, however, the concept is a relatively novel one since it is only within the last few years that the South Asian countries have taken an interest in the creation of a grouping for cooperation at the regional level.

General Ziaur Rahman’s Proposal

The concept of regional cooperation was initiated by the Bangladesh President, General Ziaur Rahman. In the late Seventies (1977–80), General Ziaur Rahman put forward the idea of South Asian regional cooperation during his visits to a number of South Asian countries, including India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. General Ziaur Rahman then sent letters to the heads of government of India, Pakistan, Maldives, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, proposing that the South Asian countries explore the possibilities of institutionalizing regional cooperation and the holding of a summit conference to this end.

General Ziaur Rahman said that the improved political climate in South Asia made it possible for the regional countries to start thinking in terms of evolving institutional arrange-
ments for South Asian regional cooperation. He argued that, "In South Asia, as in other regions of the world, we have countries at different levels of development, some are relatively less developed than others ... (but) the countries of South Asia share many common values that are rooted in their social, ethnic, cultural and historical traditions; perceptions about certain specific events or political situation of the world may differ, but such differences do not seem to create a gulf between them that cannot be bridged".  

The fields in which South Asian regional cooperation was possible and which would mutually benefit all regional countries, General Zia suggested, were the economic, technological, scientific, educational, social and cultural.

At the same time, General Ziaur Rahman stressed that institutionalized regional cooperation in South Asia did not imply the formation of a new bloc or alliance; nor would the non-aligned principles of the South Asian countries be compromised by participating in the scheme.

The initial response of the countries to General Zia's proposal was cautious. Some of the countries concerned, including Pakistan and India, rejected the proposal of a summit meeting to initiate the process, favouring a more modest step-by-step approach. General Ziaur Rahman finally succeeded in obtaining the assent of the South Asian nations to meet at the official and ministerial level in order to critically examine the prospects of holding a summit conference, which would institutionalize the process of regional cooperation.

The Bangladesh Paper

The Bangladesh Government prepared a Working Paper on South Asian Regional Cooperation which was sent to the countries concerned on 25 November 1980.

Explaining the necessity for South Asian regional cooperation, the Working Paper stated, "countries of the region have cooperated with one another both bilaterally and regionally under the umbrella of such forums as the ESCAP, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth. The efforts have not fully exploited the vast potential of regional cooperation that exists and the consequential benefit that this will bring, collectively and individually, to the countries of the region".

The Working Paper expressed the hope that the common history, language culture, and ethnicity of the South Asian regional countries would help them to adopt a regional approach, which would advance their economic interests and enable them to gain an effective collective voice in international forums.

The Working Paper identified eleven potential areas of cooperation in the economic, cultural and scientific spheres among the South Asian countries. These were: Telecommunications, Meteorology, Transport, Shipping, Tourism, Agricultural Research, Joint Ventures, Market Promotion, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and Educational and Cultural Cooperation.

Referring to the disparities in the levels of economic development in the South Asian countries concerned, the Working Paper argued that these disparities should in themselves "inspire on the one hand the less developed to catch up with their more fortunate neighbours, while on the other hand, encourage the more developed to help narrow the gap existing between them".

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The Working Paper advocated a "step-by-step" approach to regional development envisaging the holding of a number of regional conferences at various levels culminating in a summit conference of Heads of State/Government which would tackle the key contentious issues in the broader perspective.

The Colombo Meeting (April 1981)

The seven countries of the region held their first meeting, at the level of Foreign Secretaries, in Colombo in April, 1981. The Bangladesh Working Paper was accepted by the participants of the conference as the basis of their discussion.

One of the tasks before the Colombo conference was to prepare the ground for further consultations among the regional countries which were to culminate in a conference at Foreign Ministers' level and finally in a summit of Heads of State/Government.

Although all participating countries expressed their willingness to cooperate regionally, the proceedings of the meeting revealed the existence of pronounced differences between the two larger South Asian states, India and Pakistan on the one hand and the smaller countries, including Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh on the other, on the issue of institutionalizing the scheme of regional cooperation.

Both the Indian and Pakistani representatives expressed reservations about the premature creation of an institutional framework, advocating a gradual and step-by-step approach to the concept of South Asian regional cooperation.

Putting forward his government's stand, the Pakistani delegate, Foreign Secretary Riaz Piracha stated, "We in Pakistan feel that we should move forward in a measured manner, one step at a time, without forcing the pace of progress. We must first of all identify the areas in which cooperation is feasible and practicable at present and consider the most suitable way in which this cooperation can be furthered. As the field of cooperation expands, we shall be moving to higher ground and a framework will naturally grow out of functional requirement".

Mr. Piracha's warning to the participants to refrain from taking "precipitated steps, when the time and conditions were inopportune" and his advice that the institutionalization of the concept follow and not precede greater regional understanding and complementarity of economies were echoed by the Indian representative.

The smaller regional countries, including Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, however, expressed support for the early establishment of an institutional arrangement and structured regional cooperation among the South Asian states.

The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the Colombo meet accepted the step-by-step approach advocated by India and Pakistan.

The Colombo conference also adopted the basic principles to guide further regional cooperation in South Asia. In the joint communique, the principle of "unanimity" was agreed upon and the decision taken to exclude "bilateral" and "contentious" issues. It was further decided that regional cooperation would not be treated as "a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation but could complement both; nor should it be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations".

The participating countries agreed, as an initial step, to the formation of the follow-
ing five Study Groups for which Coordinators were appointed, i.e. (i) Agriculture, Bangladesh; (ii) Rural Development, Sri Lanka; (iii) Telecommunications, Pakistan; (iv) Meteorology, India; (v) Health and Population Activities, Nepal.

The Study Groups were to examine the scope and potential of regional cooperation in their particular areas by conducting indepth studies and then making recommendations to the next meeting of South Asian Foreign Secretaries.

The Foreign Secretaries also agreed to set up a Committee of the Whole comprising of senior officials, with Sri Lanka as Coordinator, to identify and report on other potential areas of cooperation.

**The Kathmandu Conference (November 1981)**

At their second meeting in Kathmandu (2-4 November 1981), the Foreign Secretaries of the seven South Asian countries reiterated their conviction that regional cooperation in South Asia was "beneficial, desirable and necessary".

The participants of the conference considered and endorsed the recommendations of the five Study Groups. They recognized that these recommendations fell into two broad categories of classification, i.e. those that were amendable to immediate implementation of cooperative activities on the one hand and those that were long term in nature, requiring a longer gestation period, on the other. Agreeing on the necessity for establishing appropriate modalities for implementation of these recommendations the Foreign Secretaries decided to convert the five Study Groups into Working Groups, whose Chairmanship would be by rotation. According to the joint communique signed on November 4, 1981, the major task of each Working Group would be to draw up a comprehensive programme of action for cooperation both in the immediate and longterm phases. The immediate action programme would include such components as "exchange of data and information; exchange of experts, training facilities, scholarships, organization of seminars, workshops, etc., on a regional basis". The longterm programme of action would include "assessment of needs and resources; preparation of specific projects of a regional nature (an) modalities for financing the projects".

The meeting identified three new areas of cooperation: Transport, Postal Services and Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Three additional Study Groups were constituted for these areas, which were to be coordinated by Maldives, Bhutan and Pakistan respectively.

Seven senior officials of the South Asian states had held a preparatory meeting in October 1981, at Colombo, in their formal capacity as the Committee of the Whole, under the Chairmanship of Sri Lanka. The report of the officials was presented to and endorsed by the Foreign Secretaries at Kathmandu.

The Kathmandu conference was also to examine the prospects of convening a meeting at Foreign Ministerial level. Once again there was a definite polarization between the views of the smaller and larger South Asian countries.

Both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka called for an early ministerial meeting and the provision of an institutional framework for the process. Expressing satisfaction at "the degree of mutual accommodation" that had been reached "despite differences and constraints in national perceptions and orientation of the individual countries", the Bangladesh representative, H. R. Chowdhury, expressed the belief that "firm foundation" had been laid "in fostering and promoting the idea of regional cooperation on a formalized basis".
Ile warned that in the absence of an institutional framework, regional cooperation would be "relegated to the realm of the ideal".  

Both the Indian and Pakistani representatives, taking a similar stand on the question of institutionalizing the concept, advocated lower-level meetings until sufficient progress had been made to hold a meeting at the Foreign Ministerial level.

The Indo-Pakistani stand once again dominated over the viewpoint of the smaller regional countries, with the conference deciding that the holding of a Foreign Ministerial level meeting and the establishment of an institutional framework were matters requiring further examination.

All the countries concerned agreed that South Asian regional cooperation was an "evolutionary" and "flexible" process to be seen in the "longterm perspective".

The Islamabad Meeting (August 1982)

The South Asian Foreign Secretaries held their third meeting in Islamabad from 7 to 9 August 1982. Inaugurating the meeting, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, reaffirmed his country's strong commitment to the concept of regional cooperation "as an important vehicle for establishment of mutual confidence and promotion of good-neighbourly relations in the region".

The Islamabad meeting endorsed the recommendations of the five Working Groups on Agriculture, Rural Development, Telecommunications, Meteorology and Health and Population Activities. After studying and approving the reports of the three Study Groups on Transport, Postal Services and Scientific and Technological Cooperation, the Foreign Secretaries agreed to convert them into Working Group, under the Chairmanship of the present coordinating countries. The meeting decided to set up an additional Study Group in the field of Sports, Art and Culture.

Another area of cooperation added by the Foreign Secretaries was the holding of "regular consultations by the countries of the region, as deemed appropriate, on matter of common interest relating to international economic issues".

The Foreign Secretaries decided to set up a Committee of the Whole under the Chairmanship of Sri Lanka to prepare, on the basis of the reports of the Working Groups, an "integrated Programme of Action in the agreed areas of cooperation and to recommend modalities and mechanisms for implementation, coordination and monitoring of the agreed programme of Action... and recommend funding modalities and arrangements for its longterm component". The Islamabad Conference also recommended that a meeting of the representatives of the national planning organizations of the seven countries be held in New Delhi prior to the fourth meeting of the Foreign Secretaries.

The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting stressed that the ongoing process of regional cooperation had acquired an "irreversible momentum". The delegates acknowledged that the step-by-step approach had succeeded in laying a firm basis for cooperation among the seven countries and decided to widen the scope of that cooperation.

The most significant development in Islamabad was the decision taken to raise the level of consultations among the regional countries. The participants agreed to meet again at foreign Secretarial level in February or March 1983 in Dhaka to decide upon the schedule and venue of a conference of regional Foreign Ministers in mid-1983.
Despite their agreement to upgrade the level of consultations, the larger South Asian states, such as Pakistan, still expressed certain reservations and emphasized the need for caution. In his inaugural address, the Pakistan Foreign Minister attributed the success of the South Asian regional cooperation scheme to the ability of the regional countries "to reach consensus" on complex issues on "the basis of careful preparation and expectations" tempered by "realism". He stressed that: "In these circumstances it is our belief that we should move forward at a deliberate and measured pace to enable us to consolidate the gains of each stage before proceeding to the next". The process, he said, was an "evolutionary" one and the participating countries must be realistic in their approach and refrain from "contemplating ambitious projects" which they could ill-afford.17

Committee of the Whole

The Committee of the Whole met in Colombo in January 1983. The meeting was attended by the high officials of all seven South Asian countries, along with the Working Group heads.

The Committee of the Whole drew up a comprehensive programme for regional cooperation, based on reports submitted by the Working Groups at the Islamabad conference on the eight agreed areas of cooperation, i.e. Agriculture, Rural Development, Health and Population Activities, Telecommunications, Meteorology, Postal Services, Transport Services and Science and Technology.

In its report, the Committee identified two categories of action programmes for regional cooperation, i.e. 'short-term' and 'long-term' programmes.

The short-term programmes, involving minimum financial involvement could be implemented immediately on a cost-sharing basis. They would include the exchange of data, expert services, training and research and the holding of seminars and workshops in the South Asian countries on the agreed areas of cooperation.18

The long-term programmes envisaged the establishment of regional institutions for training and research and the creation of linkages among existing national institutions in the countries concerned, again in the eight agreed areas. The long-term programmes also included the strengthening of infrastructural support in such areas as postal services, telecommunications, railways, highways, shipping, meteorology, etc., which would require extensive capital investment by the participating countries.19

The "Integrated Programme of Action" (IPA) formulated by the Committee of the Whole would be placed for consideration before the Dhaka meeting of the South Asian Foreign Secretaries. The Committee also decided that the fourth meeting of Foreign Secretaries would prepare the necessary groundwork for the holding of a Ministerial meeting to give the concept of regional cooperation a political direction.

The Dhaka Meeting (March 1983)

The fourth meeting of the South Asian Foreign Secretaries took place in Dhaka on March 28, 1983. The Foreign Secretaries met to prepare the grounds for the proposed political-level meeting of South Asian Foreign Ministers and to consider the report submitted by the Committee of the Whole on an "Integrated Programme of Action" for regional cooperation. Another agenda item of the Dhaka meeting was to consider the offers,
of assistance by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to the South Asian regional forum.

Inaugurating the meeting, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Mr. A. R. Shams-ud-Doha expressed the belief that the current endeavour towards South Asian regional cooperation had assumed the "phase of implementation" from the critical stage of its "preparatory build-up" through a climate of trust and goodwill.20

Mr. Doha's assessment was accepted by the other participants. The meeting affirmed the belief of the participating countries that the stage for launching the implementation of regional cooperation, through a structured platform, had now been reached. The Foreign Secretaries, therefore, endorsed the "Integrated Programme of Action" in the eight agreed areas contained in the report of the Committee of the Whole. They then decided that the Regional Forum with its IPA would be formally launched at a meeting of South Asian Foreign Ministers in New Delhi on August 1-3, 1983.21 The Foreign Ministerial conference would be preceded by a preparatory meeting of the South Asian Foreign Secretaries in New Delhi on July 28-29.

The joint communique issued simultaneously from the capitals of the participating countries at the conclusion of the meeting called for "all efforts" to be made "for expeditious implementation" of the Integrated Programme of Action under a structured regional cooperation for South Asia.22

The Regional Forum's "Integrated Programme of Action" included short and long-term programmes in the eight agreed areas of cooperation. The field of Sports, Arts and Culture was excluded from the IPA, although it constituted an area of cooperation, with India as the coordinating country. The joint communique also re-affirmed the participating countries' resolve to continue to seek additional areas of cooperation, since South Asian regional cooperation was an evolutionary process.

The funding of the IPA, it was decided, would come from the available resources of the member-countries. The Chairman of the Dhaka meeting, Mr. Ataul Karim disclosed that decisions would be taken by "unanimity" and not by "consensus" at the proposed Forum.23

The Foreign Secretaries also decided that a Standing Committee should be constituted at Foreign Secretariat level for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the "Integrated Programme of Action". Finally, the Foreign Secretaries welcomed the efforts of or assistance received from the EEC and the ITU for activities connected with South Asian regional cooperation.24

Regional Cooperation: Stresses and Strains

The pace of regional cooperation in South Asia and the institution of the process are being adversely affected in the attitudes of the participating states. The stresses and strains exist mainly on two levels: the economic and the political.

Economic Constraints and South Asian Regional Cooperation

Economically, the South Asian region, inhabited by more than 900 million people is one of the poorest in the world. The seven South Asian countries, presently involved in an ambitious scheme for regional cooperation, are confronted with serious economic constraints. According to the Marga Institute Survey of the Economy, Resources and Prospects of South Asia, the economic situation of the region is characterized by "the persistence of the
growth, high rates of population growth, heavy pressures of population on land, scarcity of natural resources..., under-utilization of large manpower resources and high incidence of poverty, income inequalities, illiteracy and infant mortality, low expectation of life at birth, lack of safe water supplies for large proportions of population, recurring food shortages in spite of the predominance of agriculture in the economies of the region, excessive dependence of agriculture on weather, adverse terms of trade, heavy balance of payments deficits, high costs of oil imports, heavy debt service burdens, Governments' expansionary fiscal and monetary policies and inflation remaining at double digit figures in most countries. 25

A UN Study measuring development in terms of 73 socio-economic indicators (including demographic, health and nutrition, housing, cultural and political indicators, agriculture, industry, labour, transport and communications, international trade, etc.) placed the following South Asian countries in the ranks given below in comparison with 97 other developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Measures and Ranks of 3rd World Countries on Compositive Social, Economic and Socio-economic Indices of Development26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Socio-economic</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>97</td>
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Moreover there are pronounced differences in the sizes of the South Asian states and wide disparities "with regard to the endowment of natural resources size of population and the structures of the economies and their technological capability". 27

The aim of the South Asian regional cooperation scheme is to select such areas of cooperation in which there would be mutual benefits for all regional countries irrespective of levels of economic development and other fiscal disparities. 28 According to the Indian Foreign Minister, "the format for cooperation that has been evolved is so well conceived that there can be no question of any of the partners being disadvantaged or of there being any contentiousness, since only that which is acceptable to all seven countries will be pushed through". 29

The difference in the levels of development and other glaring economic disparities have, however, led to divergent views on the economic issues involved and difficulties in identifying courses which would result in the economic betterment of all states concerned.

The scope of economic cooperation achieved by the South Asian regional countries has, therefore, been limited so far to a few relatively insignificant areas. Vital subjects such as trade and industry have not been tackled by the participating countries due to lack of unanimity and mutual suspicions.

The development and expansion of intra-regional trade, with the goal of the common good of the states concerned, is in particular constrained by the existing imbalances and disparities present in South Asian regional trade today. Bangladesh, for example, has an unfavourable balance of trade with India to the extent of Takas 251 crore (1978-79 to 1981-82). 30
Diversification of trade from the bilateral to the regional level is particularly difficult for landlocked South Asian states like Nepal and Bhutan. In the case of Nepal, the Himalayan Kingdom is heavily dependent on India for her transit trade and commerce. Nepal has been attempting to diversify her trade and transit links to lessen her dependence on India by encouraging investment by international consortiums; attempting to obtain greater external assistance from diversified sources including the People’s Republic of China; developing her trade links with a number of countries including the US and Japan; and expanding her economic relations with and seeking alternative transit routes through Bangladesh. All the same, until 1980, out of Nepal’s total imports of $345 million, some $233 million or approximately 70 per cent came from India with the remaining 30 per cent from other countries.

Bilateral trade between the two largest South Asian countries i.e. Pakistan and India is minimal. Bilateral Indo—Pak trade exchanges in 1980 amounted to approximately $40 million only out of their overall foreign trade turnover of over $8000 million for Pakistan and $20,000 million for India. This is largely due to Pakistani apprehensions that unregulated and increased trade exchanges with India will result in more and more dependence on that country. These apprehensions are shared by the other South Asian countries. Thus the Indian proposal for cooperation between the trading agencies of the member-states has, for example, been found unacceptable due to the fear that Indian goods could swamp the markets of the relatively less-developed regional states.

Two main factors seem responsible for hindering the expansion of intra-regional trade and commerce. One is the lack of complementarity and presence of competitiveness in the South Asian regional economies and the other is the geophysical and economic status of India vis-a-vis the smaller South Asian states.

The element of competitiveness is visible, for example, in the Indo—Bangladesh competition to capture markets for the export of jute; over tea in the case of Bangladesh and India; and between India and Pakistan in the field of textiles.

According to a Bangladeshi analyst, a “stumbling block in the fullflowering of the process (of regional cooperation) is the self-perception of India as a colossus in the region”. Apart from Indian ‘self-perception’, India does overshadow both economically and by sheer size most of its fellow participants in the regional cooperation scheme. India is a great deal larger than all the other South Asian countries put together. Its population is three times more than the combined populations of all the other regional states. “It has virtually 100 per cent of the total resources of the region in respect of uranium, iron ore, bauxite, copper, gold, lead, manganese, silver, tungsten, zinc, asbestos and diamond. It has more than 90 per cent of the resources in coal, crude petroleum, chromium, magnesite and salt”. Moreover, as far as relative stages of economic development are concerned, India is far more advanced than most of the South Asian states especially in the field of industry. India has “attained high levels of sophistication in the development of certain industries and can produce the bulk of the capital equipment, required for its own development and for export”.

These economic disparities, especially in the production of capital goods between India and the rest of the South Asian region, therefore, raise “doubts about the role of ‘big brother’ among the smaller nations of the region”. Pakistan and the other regional states fear that the removal of all trade barriers in the interests of regional cooperation could result in the smaller states becoming India’s dependent trade partners, selling primary commodities in exchange for manufactured goods from India. This apprehension has been expressed by a Nepali analyst, who warns that his country should be watchful, that “in the name of regional cooperation, Nepal should not become the village of South Asia”, a mere supplier of primary commodities to the more industrialized countries. None of the South Asian countries are interested in promoting cooperation which would result in a
one-sided dependence of India. "There is also a political aspect", adds the Marga Institute Survey on regional cooperation, "Economic dependence can result in political dependence and countries jealous of their independence cannot contemplate such relationship with equanimity".\(^{40}\)

A number of measures can be undertaken to promote meaningful regional cooperation in South Asia, which would result in greater economic complementarity among the regional states and would ensure an equitable sharing of the costs and benefits of cooperation. Such cooperation can only come about "if and only when substantial initiative comes from India herself".\(^{41}\) It has been suggested that greater complementarity in primary products could be brought about if, for example, India reduced its cultivated area under jute production and increased rice production to accommodate Bangladesh, a jute exporter but a rice importer.\(^{42}\) The scope for cooperation in the industrial sector could be enhanced if India decides "to vacate certain (manufactured consumer goods) industries over a period of time for other countries of the region", purchasing such consumer goods from them and itself moves to "higher stages of processing" using the "more sophisticated techniques of which it is capable".\(^{43}\) It is doubtful, however, that India would accept such suggestions since the first would involve a decline in export earnings and the second an abandonment of its present policy of self-sufficiency in respect of manufactured consumer goods.

Yet until the present imbalances are rectified, regional cooperation in the fields of trade and commerce is unlikely to take place for some time to come.

External factors are also responsible for preventing the South Asian countries from increasing the volume of their intra-regional trade. Although the Indian permanent representative to the UN, Natrajan Krishnan told the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, that South Asia "is no longer helpless, no longer entirely dependent on the industrialized world for technology, consultancy services, managerial skills and resources" and that "multilateral economic cooperation must be strengthened",\(^{44}\) the regional countries are in fact heavily dependent on the developed world for foreign aid, technology and assistance. This dependence on the developed countries and their institutions in turn determines the pattern and direction of the trade of the South Asian countries. Moreover the South Asian states are very poor in fuel resources such as oil and gas. Hence they are forced to spend a large proportion of their scarce financial resources on the purchase of fuel from other parts of the world. This dependence on external fuel sources also affects the direction of their foreign trade. Thus in the case of Bangladesh only 4 per cent of its import and 7.50 per cent of its export trade is regional.\(^{45}\) In the case of India, only 4.32 per cent of its exports and 0.78 per cent of its imports were regional in 1979-1980.\(^{46}\) In Pakistan's case its foreign indebtedness and its huge energy bills tie up its foreign trade to the markets of the developed and oil-exporting countries. The direction of its foreign trade reveals that its major export partners are the industrialized countries, including Japan, which account for 35 per cent of Pakistan's exports, followed by the Middle East (26 per cent). In the case of Pakistan's imports, the industrialized countries account for 39 per cent of its total imports, once again followed by the Middle Eastern countries which account for 30 per cent of its imports.\(^{47}\)

Aside from economic constraints, whether internal or external, there are also political obstacles adversely affecting enhanced South Asian economic cooperation. For example, increased trade, better transit arrangements and beneficial uses of water resources at the regional level are not possible without greater cooperation among the two most significant South Asian states, India and Pakistan. Yet the prospects of the extension of overland transit facilities alone between the two countries are not bright in view of both the economic constraints faced by them as well as bilateral political differences which act as a barrier towards greater regional cooperation.
Political Tensions

Thus the caution and reservation which marks the movement can also be explained by the differences on bilateral and international political issues dividing the South Asian grouping. The Tamil question in Sri Lanka is an area of discord in Indo-Sri Lankan relations. The links between the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party are resented by the ruling Sri Lankan United National Party (UNP). Furthermore the differences in Indo-Lankan perceptions on the Indian Ocean zone of peace issue are proving to be an irritant in that relationship. Total dependence on India for transit and commerce are matters of concern for land-locked Nepal and Bhutan, with both countries seeking alternative trade and transit routes to lessen that dependence. According to Fredrick Gaige, Nepal, sandwiched between India and the PRC "has always regarded India as a greater threat to its independence than China, because of Nepal's proximity to and economic dependence upon India." Other irritants in Indo-Nepal relations include their common open borders, leading to problems such as smuggling, unauthorized movement of nationals of both countries, etc. Despite the ongoing attempts at rapprochement between India and Pakistan, the two countries have yet to resolve their main issue of contention, i.e. the Kashmir dispute. Recent accusations on the part of the Indian government of alleged Pakistani intervention in India's internal affairs, Indian accusations of Pakistani violations of the Simla accord and what has been interpreted as 'hostile anti-Indian propaganda' in the Pakistani news media are introducing new strains in their relationship.

Moreover, the divergences in the external threat perceptions of the two countries have become more acute since the Afghanistan crisis. Indo-Bangladesh relations are also beset with tensions of due to issues such as India's failure to stand by its commitment on the lease of the Tin Bigha corridor, continuing differences on questions of railway transit disputes on the maritime boundary, etc. The main issue of discord is Bangladesh's unresolved dispute with India on the harnessing of the Ganges waters. Nor are the Indians pleased with Bangladesh's present attempts to involve Nepal in its dispute with India on the development and harnessing of Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Ershad, has, on several occasions, stressed upon the necessity of Nepal's involvement and cooperation for the resolution of the issue "since she (Nepal) is the source of the Ganges water." The Nepalese, on their part, have shown a certain sympathy for the Bangladeshi stand. For example, the Bangla-Nepal joint communique issued at the conclusion of General Ershad's visit to Kathmandu in November 1982 recognized the vast untapped potential for harnessing regional water resources for the common benefit of the riparian states. The communique then called for close cooperation among the regional countries, both at the bilateral and regional level, for the development of these resources for irrigation, power, river navigation, flood control and other uses. Then again addressing a press conference during a visit to Dhaka, in February 1983, the Nepalese Prime Minister, Mr. Surya Bahadur Thapa stated, "We (Nepal) want to extend cooperation in the development of water resources bilaterally and regionally."

India's opposition to the inclusion of Nepal in the Indo-Bangladesh negotiations on the Ganges waters issue is in accordance with its version to the internationalizing or regionalizing of 'bilateral' matters.

This emphasis on bilateralism is closely connected with India's self-perception of its regional role as the 'dominant' power in South Asia. India insists on the exclusion of bilateral issues from the regional forum due to its apprehensions that the smaller South Asian states could use the forum as a counterweight to Indian dominance. This is obvious in the writings of a number of Indian analysts on the South Asian regional scheme.

Exploiting India's policy of separating regional cooperation from the path of
bilateralism, K. R. Singh states, "...South Asia constitutes a geopolitical sub-system" and unlike other regions such as Europe, Latin America or ASEAN, one power i.e. India "is not only the major power but also constitutes the core of the region", with the other relatively smaller states, constituting the periphery. "This has led", he adds, "to the policy of the periphery searching for options not only outside the region but also has created an impression that the states on the periphery are seeking to contain the core state within the framework of regional cooperation". He warns that, "such a policy instead of promoting regional cooperation, tends to polarise intra-regional diversities and this proves counter-productive to the very concept of regional cooperation". 56 Fears are even expressed by the Indian news media that "Pakistan hopes to use the South Asian Forum's next meeting to internationalize and politicize bilateral issues". 57

India's reservations about the South Asian regional cooperation scheme have been strongly criticized by some of the smaller South Asian participating countries. According to a Nepalese journal, "the lack of shared appreciation to regional approach to development cooperation is one obvious factor (retarding moves towards regionalism). Notwithstanding the reiteration made at the official level meetings that the regional efforts were in no way intended to subtract bilateral dealings, excessive concern over bilateral relations have considerably affected the processes of regional understanding (in South Asia)". It adds that, "India, one of the major participants in the regional grouping is set on making hair split distinctions between bilateralism and regional cooperation, showing the marked preference to the former". 58 Criticizing the Indian attitude towards the institutionalization of the process of South Asian regional cooperation, a Sri Lankan paper feels that the Indian stand can be explained by their "fear that their Big Power status in the region will be deflated by a body which will have equal rights for the member countries". 59

Both the larger South Asian countries, i.e. India and Pakistan, have reservations about the premature institutionalization of the concept of South Asian regional cooperation. These reservations do, in large part, stem from their reluctance to accept the authority of an intra-regional body in which all participating states will have an equal say. Having much more at stake than the smaller South Asian countries, India and Pakistan would be unwilling, at least in the foreseeable future, to entrust complete authority to a structured regional forum in which they might be outvoted or forced to concede national interests for the common regional good.

The absence of a common political purpose among the South Asian states is also hindering the move towards regionalism. Within the South Asian participants there are even differing perceptions on the political role of the South Asian regional cooperation scheme. All the countries concerned agree that they have "no intentions" of running "a regional military bloc", 60 but they seem to differ on whether the forum has any political objectives or not. While some of them insist that the regional cooperation process is completely non-political in nature, 61 others are hopeful that the forum would, in the long run, become a "major pillar" to be utilized by the participating states to express their stand on "vital issues" such as opposition to foreign "interference and subjugation" in countries such as Afghanistan and Kampuchea. 62

Similarly some of the participants have expressed the hope that the institutionalized and structured South Asian forum will resemble the successful Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 63 while others are of the opinion that the proposed forum would have its "own character", stressing that "we can't copy other such regional forums for cooperation like the ASEAN...". 64

It would, indeed, be difficult for the fledgling South Asian regional forum to emulate the ASEAN. The ASEAN block, comprising of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand is a relatively prosperous third world grouping, possessing strategic raw materials
like tin, rubber and oil, with the regional economies being linked to those of the West. The GNP growth rates of the ASEAN countries range between 6 to 10 per cent annually and they have a combined GNP of approximately $100 billion. Most important of all, the pro-western and anti-communist ASEAN countries have common domestic and foreign policy orientations. Although the objectives of the bloc at the time of its formation were "formally limited to economic, social and cultural cooperation", the motives behind their forming a regional grouping have been "diplomatic and political in nature", mainly to combat 'communist' internal and external threats. In fact, ASEAN's very strength lies in the absence of major bilateral differences and its common internal and external threat perceptions.

The South Asian countries, in comparison, have serious bilateral political and economic differences. In the South Asian region, "the forces of nationalism have far outstripped those of cooperation" and this "militant" nationalism stands in the path of South Asian regional cooperation.

Furthermore, the stability of the South Asian region has been constantly eroded by external pressures. The Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Mr. A. R. Doha, is of the opinion that this factor (external intervention) constitutes "both a constraint and an impetus to cooperate regionally." However, in the absence of common external and internal threat perceptions, it is difficult to foresee the South Asian countries effectively combating such pressures and working towards common political goals through an institutionalized regional structure.

Prospects of South Asian Regional Cooperation

Despite the stresses and strains contained in the process of South Asian regional cooperation, there are some grounds for optimism about the movement's future.

A certain amount of success has been achieved in the development of regional cooperation at least in a number of low-key non-political areas in the economic, social and scientific fields.

The common historical heritage, ethnic origins and social and cultural affinity of the South Asian states are conducive to regional cooperation. It is also argued that "the beginning of cooperation on a regional basis" may in itself "be a positive force in generating a climate of harmony conducive to a better perception of what the countries of the region have in common and the value of this shared heritage."

On the political level, the decision taken in Dhaka to convene a Foreign Ministerial conference in August 1983, thus raising the level of consultations, is a welcome sign. The conference will also formally launch the forum with its "Integrated Programme of Action". The improvement in the regional political climate due to the on-going Indo-Pakistan moves for rapprochement is promising for the future of regional cooperation. A continuation of this process is essential since the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia cannot possibly materialize in the absence of the active cooperation of these two states.

It is the hope of some of the regional countries that this "exercise in regional cooperation will consolidate our common desire to live and let live, strengthen our friendship and reconcile or minimize our differences if any". It is not enough to merely hope for a climate of goodwill and harmony in South Asia. The regional countries must heed the advice of the Bangladesh Working Paper on South Asian Regional Cooperation that the success of the scheme would depend on greater political understanding amongst the South Asian states and that "both historical and emotional heights will have to be scaled and lingering suspicion and distrust will have to yield place to a reversed spirit of understanding and goodwill".
For, in the final analysis, it is clear that the future viability of South Asian regional cooperation will largely depend on the ability of the regional states to sort out their bilateral political differences.

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