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FOREWORD

Allama Iqbal Open University has the honour to present various educational programmes to facilitate the underprivileged students all over the country. The university has offered the BEd programme with specialization in Pakistan Studies. The purpose of this specialization is to prepare the secondary school teachers who will be able to teach “Pakistan Studies” at secondary level.

The book in your hands is the fifth and last one of content major series. After completing the recent degree you will be able to serve as teacher in your practical life; and I think that teaching is a mission instead of profession. You will be able to teach the students of secondary level and I hope that you will perform the responsibilities well.

This course book enables you to understand the concepts of foreign policy of Pakistan. In the modern world, the concept of globalization has become most important. Our students need to understand the international politics and relations of the various states. Pakistan had tried her best to maintain the good relations with the neighbours as well as the Islamic countries. The recent course book will guide you to understand about the regional and universal organisations of the world and Pakistan’s role regarding the peacemaking efforts.

This book is the latest course of “Foreign Policy of Pakistan” which is developed by the Department of Pakistan Studies. Its units have been written by the experts of the subject and I am hopeful after studying the book you will acquire the authentic information and facts about the international politics and foreign policy of Pakistan.

Dr. Khalid Mahmood
(Lecture)
INTRODUCTION

Allama Iqbal Open University Islamabad has offered BEd. Programme under faculty of education. The Department Pakistan Studies has the honour of developing five courses for the university students who enrolled in BEd (Pakistan Studies). This course is developed according to the requirements of Higher Education Commission of Pakistan and the requirement of the teachers who will teach the subject “Pakistan Studies” at secondary level. The course fulfills the needs of the students regarding their queries about foreign policy of Pakistan.

This course is the continuation of the series of five books. You already have studied four books in the previous semester while it is the fifth and last book of the series. The purpose of these books was to provide the knowledge to the scholars of B.Ed. level regarding Pakistan Studies. The first book of the series was “Evolution of Muslim Civilization in Sub-continent” regarding the history and land of Pakistan in which old civilization of India, Islam in India and Muslims’ rule, Mughals rule in India, effects of Islam on Hindu society, role of Sufia in promotion of Islam, Muslim political thoughts, Sufi poets of Pakistan, Muslim identity in sub-continent, and Muslim educational movements in India have been discussed.

The second book “Muslims’ Struggle in British India (1857-1947)” provides the thoroughly information regarding the War of Independence 1857, behavior of Hindus with Muslims, political development of Muslims, new struggle of Muslims, new reforms and Khilafat Movement, journey of negotiations, importance of 1935 Act and 1937 Elections, progress toward Pakistan, and formation of Pakistan.

The third book of this series “Political and Constitutional Evolution in Pakistan” provides the reading material regarding initial problems after formation of Pakistan, role of Quaid-e-Azam as the Governor General, constitution making and political crises, first martial law: government of Ayub Khan, separation of East Pakistan, Pakistan people party/ government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, period of Zia-ul-Haq, journey of democracy from 1977 to 1999, and the rule of General Pervez Musharraf and aftermath.

The fourth book of this series “Natural Resources and Economic Development in Pakistan” provides you the information including physical features of Pakistan, natural and human resources of Pakistan, urban and rural problems, population
and employment, society and culture, important industries of Pakistan, five year planning in Pakistan, and China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC).

This is the fifth and last book of content major series “Foreign Policy of Pakistan” which reveals about the objectives of foreign policy of Pakistan, United Nations and its sub-institutions, Economic Cooperation Organization, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, SAARC and Pakistan, and mutual relations of Pakistan with Iran, India, China, Afghanistan, USA and USSR/Russia.

The course deals with the objectives of foreign policy of Pakistan, the United Nations and its sub-institutions, the Economic Cooperation Organization, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, SAARC and Pakistan. The course also reveals the Pakistan’s mutual relations with Iran, India, Chinaand Afghanistan. Eight unit of the course has been written by Prof. Dr. Mohammad Reza Kazimi on my special request. Prof. Dr. Kazimi has discussed the Pakistan-US relations in his specific beautiful style which enables you to understand the reasons of various ups and downs relations between both powers. The last unit of this book deals with the mutual relation of Pakistan with former USSR and today Russia.

Dear students, I am hopeful that the course will be highly fruitful for those who wish to gain more information about the foreign policy of Pakistan. I have tried my best to provide you authentic knowledge and vast information as you have to learn as non-formal students of Allama Iqbal Open University Islamabad. I believe that after completion your BEd. programme you will be able to serve Pakistan and deliver the contents to the students of secondary level in a better way.

Dr. Khalid Mahmood
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OBJECTIVES

This course is developed for the BEd Programme offered by the faculty of education, Allama Iqbal Open University Islamabad. The course comprises 9 units of 3 Credit-Hours as per HEC approved criteria. The aim is to provide brief introduction to the students regarding the foreign policy of Pakistan, its mutual relation with the other countries and Pakistan’s role in the United Nations and the other regional organisations.
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OBJECTIVES OF FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN

Written by:
Dr. Altaf Ullah
Reviewed by:
Dr. Sajid Mahmood Awan
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INTRODUCTION

The first unit of this course book deals with the objectives of the foreign policy of Pakistan. Foreign policy determines the broad outlines which a state is supposed to follow in its interaction with other states in order to maximize the well-being of its people and empowerment as a nation. Foreign policy is the sum total of the principles, interests and objectives which the state formulates in conducting its relations with other states. Pakistan is an independent and sovereign nation-state by occupying an independent position in South Asia. Pakistan’s foreign policy has historically revolved around its key concerns of safeguarding its sovereignty, preserving its territorial integrity, promoting the well-being of its people through economic development, advancing the collective interest of the Muslim ummah, and securing an honorable position in the comity of nations.

Pakistan emerged on the world map on August 14, 1947 as a strong Muslim state to promote the aspirations of its people, safeguard its Islamic values and achieve its national interests as well. Being an independent state, it had to develop its own foreign policy imperatives just after its separation from India. In order to join the comity of nations, it became the member of the United Nations in September 1947 and immediately initiated the process to formulate its independent foreign policy after independence. In the pursuit of the aforementioned goals, Pakistan developed its relations with the countries all over the world. It also joined a number of multilateral institutions with a view to promote its economic and security interests. Over the course of nearly six decades of its independent existence, the foreign policy of Pakistan marched through a variety of challenges and opportunities with mixed outcomes. However, Pakistan's foreign always strives to ensure a secured and peaceful environment as prerequisite for the socio-economic and political development in the country. This objective accords with the vision of the father of the nation, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah who desired to build Pakistan as an enlightened and modern welfare state of the Muslim world. Pakistan, therefore, firmly believes in a global system based on respect for international norms and principles articulated in the UN Charter.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter you will be able

1. To understand the term foreign policy at conceptual and theoretical level.
2. To know the major determinants of foreign policy of a modern nation-state in general and Pakistan in particular.
3. To observe the foreign policy of Pakistan since its inception.
4. To examine the objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy.
5. To develop an individual analysis and opinion regarding the foreign policy of Pakistan.
1.1. INTRODUCTION

It goes without saying that foreign policy of Pakistan has been determined merely by its national interests. The geopolitical factors, political aspirations, the need for economic development and ideology of Pakistan are the most significant determinants of the process of foreign policy formulation. National interest oriented foreign policy is generally used as a tool by a particular state in order to deal with other states of the globe for the sake of its economic development, security, trade, commerce, culture and technology etc. Pakistan's foreign always strives to ensure a secure and peaceful environment which is a prerequisite of socio-economic development at home and in the region as well. This objective accords with the vision of the father of the nation Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah to build Pakistan into an enlightened and modern welfare state consistent with Islamic values. Also, since its beginning, Pakistan has firmly believed in a global system based on respect for international norms and principles of the UN Charter. Such a system can ensure peace, progress and development, especially the resolution of international disputes.

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The foreign policy is reflective of the ethos of the people and domestic environment. It has to respond to events occurring and circumstances beyond geographical frontiers. Under the changing circumstances, there are so many other issues such as globalization, democracy, human rights, extremism and the overall environment have made their way to the centre stage of global consideration. Economic diplomacy is assuming greater importance in planning and execution of foreign policy. It is mostly focused on the pursuit of promoting stability, economic growth, poverty alleviation, human resource development and projection of state as a strong, dynamic and moderate entity. It is considered as a comprehensive political activity of a state. It goes without saying that a decent foreign policy can lead a country towards progress, prosperity, development and acquire respectable position among the nation-states of the world as well. Indeed, Pakistan has always tried to design a balanced foreign policy and develop friendly and cordial relations with all the countries of the world. In this context, the vision of the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah is worth-mentioning. He expressed:
“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.”

Since its inception, the foreign policy of Pakistan has gone through different stages of development while dealing with the regional and global powers on the one hand and responding to the varying political alignments inside the state on the other. In the first phase, it was an independent foreign policy in the sense that Pakistan was not formally aligned to any bloc. Pakistan’s leadership initiated contacts with other countries, emphasizing friendship with all, promotion of peace and harmony, support for liberation of the colonized people, and a strict observance of the principles of international conduct as enshrined in the UN Charter. In 1954, the second phase started with a formal alignment with the West, which paradoxically coincided with the establishment of a dialogue with China. The meeting of Prime Ministers of Pakistan and that of China at Bandung was historic, because it had them the first ever opportunity to understand each other. It was almost a decade later that Pakistan could put through its case to the Soviet Union. Pakistan’s foreign policy entered its third phase with Sino-Indian border clashes in 1962. It was a policy of dual alignment. While clinging to the benefits accruing from its alignment with the West, Pakistan strengthened its informal relationship with China. This paradoxical twist of diplomacy, tolerated to some extent by the West, reached its climax during the Indo-Pakistan conflict. The Soviet Union came on the scene in a way in the wake of the Tashkent Declaration. In the fourth phase an independent approach to the world affairs initiated by its leadership with a strategy of bilateralism and nonalignment. It was an era of marked by mutual interests rather than permanent alignment. Pakistan tried to establish its mutual relations with the global and regional powers keeping in view its national interests. On the one hand, it tried to maintain its foreign relationship with the U.S. while on the other hand, cultivated its relationship with the Soviet Union and China. It was not a policy of equidistance from these states but emphasized reciprocity of interests at the bilateral level without alienating one for the sake of the other. Pakistan’s foreign policy entered its fifth phase with the soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December, 1979. Pakistan demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and supported the Afghan groups, described as Afghan Mujahideen, in their bid to dislodge the Soviets from Afghanistan. It allowed them to function from Pakistani territory and accommodated over 3 million Afghan refugees who poured into Pakistan within a year of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan was the last mega event in this period. The sixth phase of Pakistan’s foreign policy was dominated by four major issues i.e. Pak-US relations, the Afghanistan problem, the Kashmir insurgency and its impact on Indo-Pakistan relations, and the nuclear explosions. However, with the tragic incident of September 11, 2001, the foreign policy of Pakistan entered its seventh phase which was mainly dominated by the
issue of counter terrorism. This incident was a critical threshold in the foreign policy of Pakistan. Indeed, “9/11 came as a thunderbolt”. Regarding these sudden changes the then President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf expressed that the incident of 9/11 brought unprecedented challenges for Pakistan, which demanded to “absorb external pressure and mould domestic opinion”. Since then Pakistan is an active player in the global efforts for combating religious extremism and terrorism with a policy that extremism and terrorism pose serious threats to global security as well as to Pakistan's internal peace, stability and economic development. Pakistan has made some difficult decisions in pursuing counter terrorism and for ensuring peace and stability in the immediate neighborhood in order to boost its image at the international level, restore international confidence in the ability of the Pakistani state and government to put their socio-economic house in order, and shape up as a democratically oriented, modern and enlightened Muslim polity that does not allow its territory to be used by extremist groups.

1.2. DEFINITION OF FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN

The term foreign policy has been defined in various ways by different scholars and experts. However, they are certain that it is concerned with behavior of a state towards other states. Hermann for instance, defined foreign policy as “the discrete purposeful action that results from the political level decision of an individual or group of individuals. It is the observable artifact of a political level decision. It is not the decision, but a product of the decision.”

According to G. Modelski, Foreign policy is “the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment. Foreign policy must throw light on the ways states attempt to change, and succeed in changing the behaviour of other states.”

Joseph Frankel says, “foreign policy consists of decisions and actions, which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others”. By this, foreign policy involves set of actions that are made within state’s borders, intended towards forces existing outside the country’s borders. It comprises the formulation and implementation of a set of ideas that govern the behaviour of states while interacting with other states to defend and enhance their national interests.

According to Padelford and Lincoln, “A State’s Foreign Policy is totality of its dealings with the external environment. Foreign Policy is an overall result of the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into specific courses of action in order to achieve its objectives and preserve its interests.” Thus, Foreign policy means goals, values and different instruments which the government uses in making relations with different countries. Some things are important to take into account like, environment (international and domestic), available choices and resources before making foreign policy. Foreign policy comes out from the interaction of domestic and international systems.
According to Encyclopedia of Britannica, “Foreign policy is the general objectives that guide the activities and relationships of a state in its interactions with other states. However, the development of foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behaviour of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs. Norman Kogan an eminent scholar of foreign policy believes that “the influence of the domestic system on the process of foreign policy is so dominant that it becomes difficult to make a distinction between the domestic and foreign policies. All policies are essentially domestic in the sense that they seek to attain domestic goal”.

In the words of Huge Gibson, “foreign policy is a well-rounded comprehensive plan based on knowledge and experience for conducting the business of government with rest of the world. It is aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nations. This calls for a clear understanding of what those interests are and how far we hope to go with the means at our disposal. Anything less than this, falls short of being a foreign policy.”

In view of such a variety of definitions it may be concluded that foreign policy is generally consisting of three parts i.e. (i) the ‘end’, (ii) the ‘ways’ and (iii) the ‘means’. The end consists of a vision of a desired outcome or set of interests in interacting with another state. The ways consist of the strategies and ideas (e.g. diplomatic tactics, coercion), to pursue these desired interests. While the means, consist of the available resources at a state’s disposal (e.g. economy, military). Thus, a foreign policy is a vision of a desired outcome or set of interests in interacting with another state, the strategies and ideas used in achieving these goals, and the available resources at a state’s disposal, in guiding its interaction with other states.

However, foreign policy should be based on rationality and in its close consonance with the grand strategy, security and domestic policy of a state. It should be neither static nor so rigid. It means that foreign policy changes in nature, scope and orientation from time to time as per the long, mid, and short-term requirements of a country’s objectives, national interests and the dictates of domestic and international environment. It should also be noted that states do not operate in vacuum, they operate as the members of a larger community of states having international obligations. The rapidly changing circumstances such as technological advancement, globalization, modernism, material and tangible development have affected foreign policy thinking and the conduct of diplomacy in a fundamental way. Globalization has also bound the fate of planet and the people living on it together. Hence, factors such as the promotion of international peace, amity and respect for international norms and international law also have considerable importance in shaping the foreign behaviour of a state.

Regarding the foreign policy of Pakistan, the constitution of 1973 in its article 40 comprehensively mentions that:

“The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, promote international peace and
security, foster goodwill and friendly relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.”

The guiding principles of Pakistan's foreign policy are based on the internationally recognized principles and norms of interstate relations, which include the sovereign equality of all countries, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

**1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN**

Pakistan’s foreign policy reflects the hopes and aspirations of the people of Pakistan. The major aims and objectives of the Pakistan’s foreign policy have remained dynamic and flexible owing to the changing priorities of government, internal socio-political and economic dynamics, varying diplomatic and military strategies adopted for the pursuance of national interest, and the dynamic nature of international relations. To sum up, the aims and objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the contemporary era are as under:

1. The primary objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy is to safeguard the national security, territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the country.
2. To protect Pakistan’s economic interests abroad.
3. To project the image of Pakistan as a progressive, modern and democratic Islamic country.
4. To promote peace, stability and friendly relations with Afghanistan.
5. To find the resolution of all disputes with India including the issue of Kashmir. Raise the Kashmir issue on international forums.
6. To forge cordial and friendly relations with all the neighbours, Muslim countries and the larger international community.
7. To fulfill its responsibilities as a responsible member of the international community.
8. To prevent and respond to threats and capitalize on opportunities.
9. To safeguard the interests of Pakistani Diaspora.”

It is evident from the vision of the founder of Pakistan and its constitution that the quest for global peace remains a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan has always been an important partner of the global community when it comes to the promotion and strengthening of global peace. It has played an important role of a frontline state in ending the menace of terrorism and extremism which has emerged as the most destructive threat to international peace in the present age.

The aims and objectives of foreign policy can be categorized in the following three categories i.e. core aims and objectives, middle range aims and objectives, and long range aims and objectives. The brief description of each is as under:
Core Aims and Objectives

This category of aims and objectives includes sovereignty, autonomy, national interest, territorial integrity and well-being of the people of Pakistan. These must be pursued all times. Every state wants full autonomy and sovereignty of its own territory in order to plan out domestic and foreign policies. These objectives keep a state away from influence, coercion and the rule by other states. Acquisition of power provides influence on other states. Protection and promotion of national interest is important. These are more permanent in character. Compromise on any one of them will lead towards weakening of foreign policy.

Middle Range Aims and Objectives

These are less immediate and require cooperation from other states like economic and social development. Economic conditions determine the status of a state in the international arena. Economically developed states play more effective roles. Economic prosperity can be achieved through an effective foreign policy. Social development is also important. Through a successful foreign policy, states acquire economic prosperity and economic development leading towards the development of society. Not permanent, at one time co-operation with different states may not be co-operation forever.

Long Range Aims and Objectives

These are least immediate; plans, dreams, political vision and ideology. Decision makers have enough time to think and develop and achieve these objectives. Time is no constraint, there is enough time to think, plan and implement the policy.

1.4. DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy formulation is an important and technical task. To design and frame a comprehensive and feasible foreign policy, each and every state strives to give proper heed to all those factors which are directly and indirectly related to its formulation and successful execution as well. A successful foreign policy enhances a nation’s power and prestige in the comity of nations. It includes such matters as security against aggression, development of higher standards of living and the maintenance of conditions of national and international stability. The factors which determine the foreign policy of a country can be classified as under:

Internal Factors

Foreign policy enables a state to establish its relations beyond the borders. A state formulates its foreign policy to cater its multiplicity of interests which is only possible by building strong and cordial relations with the international community. Foreign policy is a process of interaction with other states in a pragmatic way to maximize one's goals and minimizes losses. In other words it may be taken as a technique to avoid the threats and availing the opportunities of benefits in an unfavorable environment. Many internal and
external factors do play their greater role in the formulations of foreign policy of a state. In the following lines an account of both the internal and external factors that determine foreign policy formulation, have been presented.

**National Interests**

According to Hans J. Morgenthau, “there is but one guiding star, one standard for though, one rule for action in a nation’s dealing with other nations, the national interest”. It means what is best for a national society or what is best for a nation in foreign affairs and which may embrace objectives like self-preservation, security, well-being, prestige, power, the promotion and protection of ideology. National interests are decided in terms of needs, aims or expectations that are communicated to the policy makers through the citizens of a state. National interest can also be defined in the context of protection against aggression, increasing the standards of living or considering right place in international institutions like UNO. It is the primary duty of all states to promote and further their national interests through their foreign policies. There may be difference between the interests of one state with that of another as they naturally vary according to time, place, location and circumstances, but the interests as self-preservation, security and well-being of its citizens are the common interests on the basis of which foreign policy is generally formulated.

**Geo-Political Setting**

The second major factor that determines the foreign policy of a country is its geo-political setting. Geo-politics is defined as “the study of the influence of political and economic geography of the national power and foreign policy of a country” In other words, it is “the study of the outstanding features of the situation and resources of a country with a view to determine its status in the world politics”. It includes a survey of a country’s geographical location, physical environment, population, economic resources and other major factors underlying its national power which provides a basis for political analysis and key to the understanding of its international relations. States are also concerned with the fact, who are their neighbours, how close or how far, how big and how small, how many they are and also with the features of land and sea. Being an island, or at the centre of continent or at the end, land locked or having rivers, mountains, deserts etc. Being a permanent determinant of foreign policy, geography plays a vital role in the foreign policy formulation. The size of a state, topography, shape, location and climate are important components of geography. Thus, physical location of a state is one of the crucial determinants that mold the foreign policy outlook.

**Historical and Cultural Orientation**

History and Culture provide people with ways of thinking, seeing and interpreting the things around them. It shapes our ideas and serves as instrument for us in analyzing everything happening around us. Everything from our racial features, to the food we eat, the way we dress, the language we speak, the music we listen, and the way we live, all
form a part of culture. The approach of a nation to the foreign problems is determined by its traditional values and beliefs which have emerged on periods of years. Historical experiences, like culture and traditions of a state, exert influence on its foreign policy. In general, states with unified culture and common history find it easier to formulate effective and consistent foreign policy. In such a case, overwhelming majority of the people, who share similar experiences and common perceptions of historical events, support the state’s foreign policy. History is the past record of the doings of a community, of its failures and successes. The past experience, failures and successes guide policy makers to deal with the contemporary problems. If a specific policy had proved to be rewarding in the past, policy-makers would-like to try the same policy for tackling similar situations in future. On the contrary, if a particular policy had proved to be a failure to deal with a situation, the policy-makers would try a different policy under an identical situation in future.

**Natural Resources and Economic Condition**

Natural resources and level of economic development of a country also influence the foreign policy of that country. Many advance industrialist countries play dominant role in world politics, and formulate their foreign policies to maintain such superiority in the system. Such countries like United States, Russia, Germany and France have large resources at their disposal to build military capabilities on one hand, and disperse monetary benefits on other states in the form of aids and loan, with the sole aim of ‘seeking allies’ with these states. The available natural resources that a state has, influence the foreign policy of those states. These resources include minerals, gas, petroleum or crude oil, coal, uranium, nuclear power, metal and water resources. Natural resources along with skilled population and level of technology determine the state’s level of development. A uniform climate is also an ideal situation for a state. Natural barriers such as forests, mountains, oceans, rivers also determine foreign policy of a state. The abundance of natural resources definitely enhances the importance of a country. If natural resources are not locally available, they have to be procured through international cooperation. Availability of strategic and crucial raw materials will place a country in an advantageous position in its foreign affairs. On the contrary, a country lacking in these resources will follow somewhat feeble foreign policy.

**Ideology**

Ideology is an important determinant of foreign policy. It can be derived from the history, belief system and social system of a state, country or nation states. Role of ideology in politics is greater along with the phenomenon of interests. It assumes key position in the formulation of foreign policy making and interacting with other states. In the history of nation states world witnessed different prevailing ideologies at different points of time. Big power either made alliance with the smaller states or the weaker states aligned themselves with the bigger ones with whom their ideology resembled or socio-cultural, political and economic affinities realized. So far as the question of Islamic
ideology is concerned, it can be a source of unity and integration both at national and international level. Unity and coherence in wake of ideology can enable an ideological state like Pakistan to pursue an effective foreign policy. However, ideology does not be so, where security of the state would always be under threat rather it should be viable and dynamic that can sideline the looming dangers and security threats of a state.

**Military Capabilities**

The military strength of a country, also determines the foreign policy strategy of a state. The capability of a state to defend its borders against armed aggression plays a profound role in both internal and external policies that states make. Militarily capable states exercise greater independence from external forces in formulation of their foreign policy. Military capabilities include the military preparedness of a state, its technological advancement and modern means of communication. Military in a developing state may be poorly equipped and less effective in battlefield as compared to trained and heavily equipped military of developed states. The Greater the military capabilities of a state, the more its influence will be in foreign policy decisions.

**Political System**

Political system plays a significant role in the foreign policy formulation of a country. Democracy behaves differently from an authoritarian system. It is generally believed that democracies are more likely to form alliances with other democracies than with authoritarian states. Citizens in a democratic setup can freely express and voice their opinion on the domestic as well as foreign policy of their country, making an impact on the policies their government is pursuing. Democratic leaders tend to respond to these public demands and formulate a foreign policy within it. In such a democratic polity the policy makers cannot ignore public opinion while designing foreign policy. It is often vague, volatile, amenable to quick changes and difficult to mobilize. But once on a particular problem public opinion is mobilized and expressed in clear terms, it becomes difficult for the government to overlook it while taking decision on the issue in question.

**Political Parties and Interest Groups**

Political parties, organizations, groups or associations are the prerequisite of a modern democratic system. They are vital to modern political settings. They play an important role in shaping representative democracy in a country. They have a greater say in the foreign policies of their countries and usually voice their interest directly or through interest groups. Under multiparty system and coalition governments, political parties always have conflicting views and interests, which may alter the formulation of foreign policy. On the other hand, interest groups also try to influence the process of foreign policy formulation of a country for safeguarding their specific interests. However, interest groups do not directly influence the foreign policy objectives. Their pressure would be felt by the decision makers to the extent they manipulate public opinion,
including the role of print and electronic media in their own interest. International political economy explains that there is a direct link between economic interest groups and foreign policy formulation. In democratic as well as in authoritarian societies, the role of economic interest groups has been increased in the foreign policy formulation nowadays. These interest groups mobilize a diverse area ranging from business, labor, ethnic, health, environmental and human rights etc. Thus, it becomes impossible for the ruling party or government to ignore them.

Leadership Character

Leadership plays a profound role in foreign policy formulation. The role of personality in foreign policy encompasses cognitive processes, and assumes that decision making is the result of individual ‘human agency’. Leadership has the responsibility to shape, organize and implement the state’s foreign policy in the best possible way. It determines the strength and direction of a foreign policy. The role that a country performs at a particular time, and the foreign policy that will be pursued are outcome of the qualities of those who are in a position to make decisions. How decision-makers perceive national interest and their image of the external and global environment has much to do with the making of foreign policy as final decision regarding foreign matters lies in their hands. In fact, policy decisions in external matters can never be separated from the psychological traits, the personality or the predisposition of the leaders. According to B. Russet and H. Starr, “decision making focuses on the people involved in the foreign policy process and on the part of the process that deals with choosing among alternative courses of action”.

Press and Public Opinion

In a democratic government, press and public opinion is believed to be an important factor that determines foreign policy of a state. Nowadays considerable attention is given to press and public opinion. Leaders must hear and fulfill the demands and needs of the people e.g. to provide subsidy on electricity, gas, foodstuff, high tariff for protection of certain domestic or local industrial units etc. There are two ways through which the public can shape policy outcomes i.e. election and responsiveness. Firstly, the public can exert influence by electing parties or candidates whose foreign policy positions best match their own. Secondly, after politicians take office, leaders may respond to public opinion out of concern that rebuffing the public can be politically costly. Hence, public opinion affects foreign policy in democracies, both by shaping who is elected and by influencing leaders once they take office. Leaders in countries with advance democracies, consider opinion poll before making any crucial policy decision.

As media broadcast images of mass starvation, ethnic conflict, violent human right abuses, and other sorts of mass suffering; the images arouse strong emotions in the public. Then in turn the public, aroused by those images of suffering portrayed in the media, will demand from their elected officials to do ‘something’ strong and morally correct response. Obviously, elected officials wanting to stay in the public’s favor for all sorts of reasons will respond to these demands with some sort of humanitarian or military intervention or whatever action is necessary in the immediate term.
Science and Technology

The recent advances in technology have transcended almost all areas of international affairs and indeed opened up vast new areas of communication, cooperation and even conflicts among states in their pursuit of security, development and progress. Science and technology considerations are often central to the interaction of states with other governments. It plays a large role in discussions of such critical topics as nuclear non-proliferation, use of outer space, population growth, adequate and safe food supply, climate change, energy resources, and competitiveness of industrial technologies. In order to address all these issues, modern scientific and technological know-how is significant to the anticipation and resolution of problems and to the achievement of foreign policy goals. According to Margaret Sprout, “technology is the application of human skills or techniques to accomplish human purposes.” Technology indirectly influences the foreign policy making. Technologically advanced states are able to dominate the less advanced states.

External Factors

It is evident that international environment plays an important role in shaping the foreign policy of every state. Since foreign policy in general is about the interaction of a state with another, this interaction only takes place at the international level and as such, cannot be ignored in analyzing the foreign policy of any state. The major external factors which determine foreign policy of a state are as under:

External Environment and Conditions

The external environment, global and regional politics and power structure at world level, determine foreign policy formation of a state. Foreign policy of a state which is usually referred to as “the general principles by which a state governs its reactions to the international environment” is naturally determined by its external environment and settings. During the 1980s, the international system was characterized by a bi-polar system as witnessed during the Cold War, and now a unipolar with the US as the only hegemonic power. These events have restructured the power system and have a significant effect on the foreign policies of states. Hence, the general situation around the globe, whether tense or relaxed, cold war like or detente like, war prone or peace oriented, definitely influence and determine foreign policy of a state.

Laws, Treaties, Agreements and Charters of International Stature

International laws, regulations, treaties, agreements, contracts and charters have binding effects on foreign policy of a state. The international law is generally defined as a set of rules that regulate relations among different states. In other words, it is a system of rules and regulations created deliberately and explicitly by states, where they have expressly willed to be bound by those rules. International Organizations play an enormous role in the current international system. It is hard to imagine how world affairs would operate without international bodies such as the United Nations Organization and its affiliates,
international financial institutions, such as International Monetary Fund and the World Bank etc. Such organizations are considered as active interaction between states at the global level. A state’s foreign policies is thus, often affected by its membership of international, regional and sub-regional organizations, since they surrender partially their authority to these organizations. As their operations are guided by the constitution of the organization, the policies of member states are thus, affected by the nature of the particular institution.

Alliances at Global or Regional Level

The formation of alliances at global or regional basis is considered to be one of the most curious aspects of international relations. It is considered as a strategy that states use in the formulation and implementation of their foreign policies. It shapes the foreign policies of states, because the member parties to the alliances have to respond to the requests and demands of their allies and refrain from formulating policies or taking actions which are offensive to the alliance partners. The system of alliances that emerged in the post-1945 period had a big impact on the foreign policies of all the nations. During 1945-90, both the United States and USSR, recognized and used alliances as the means for consolidating their respective positions. Again, during the height of the Cold War, neither the members of the Warsaw Pact nor those of North Atlantic Treaty Organization could pursue any independent foreign policy. Even now, with the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the US still continues to consider NATO as the mainstay of its foreign policy in Europe. Beside it, the European Union, ASEAN, SAARC NAFTA, APEC and the SCO have been major players in international economic relations which influence foreign policy of a member state.

1.5. FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN: IDEOLOGY BASED OR NATIONAL INTEREST BASED

Since the inception of Pakistan, it has been promoting the Islamic ideology in its foreign policy formation and pays special attention to promote unity amongst and forging ties with Muslim states. The close association of Islam with the establishment of the state and the emotional fervour which develops in the wider Muslim world generate amongst the people of Pakistan have led to a strong ideological imprint on foreign policy. The first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, clearly mentioned the relationship between foreign policy and Islamic ideology:

“Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where Islamic ideology and the way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality. It is, therefore, part of the mission which Pakistan has set before itself to do everything in its power to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries.”
It is evident that both the state and society of Pakistan consider Islamic ideology as an important element of Pakistan’s foreign policy. There is a great commitment to Islam among the general masses of this region. The episode of Pakistan’s creation is unique in a sense that it was created on the basis of religious ideology. This ideological aspect influences the internal as well as external policy decision making.

Moreover, the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan states: “The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, promote international peace and security, foster goodwill and friendly relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.”

Some of the policy measures are a direct consequence of Pakistan's Islamic identity. These include the assignment of special importance to its relations with other Muslim states, a strong advocacy of unity of Ummah, promotion of harmony and cooperation amongst these states, and support to the causes of Muslims anywhere in the world. Pakistan played an active role in organizing the first conference of the heads of state/government of Muslim countries in 1969. It contributed to the setting up of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on a permanent basis, and played host to the 2nd Islamic Summit Conference, held at Lahore in 1974. The imprint of ideology on Pakistan's foreign policy turned more conspicuous in after the debacle of East Pakistan. Having suffered a major mishap in 1971 and confronted with a serious crisis of identity, Pakistan sought to overcome these setbacks by falling back on ideology. Domestically, the Islamic component of national identity was reaffirmed and, internationally, Pakistan sought diplomatic and financial support of Muslim countries to restore itself in the international system and to rehabilitate its war ravaged economy. This coincided with an increased emphasis on Islamic identity by the Muslim states and their activism in the international system. They sought to use their numerical strength and economic clout for restructuring the international system and for helping the economically hard-pressed countries amongst them.

However, at the same time one cannot ignore the view of Mahendra Kumar, that “foreign policy is a thought out course of action for achieving objectives in foreign relations as dictated by the ideology of national interest.” The national interest of a state guides its goals and through making relations with other countries, the state achieves those planned goals some times in short time or sometimes in long time. Every state decides its own course of action in foreign policy in the light of its own means. The formulation of foreign policy is essentially an exercise in the choice of ends and means on the part of a nation- state in an international setting. The choice of means and ends varies on issues of the particular state at particular time periods. It is also important to note where the state stands in the hierarchy of world politics.

Though ideological assertions not only have a deep impact on the interpretation of developments at the international, regional, and national levels but also shape the responses to these developments. Since all ideologies are self-justifying, purporting to contain an ultimate truth and a state's most cherished goals, they are used as evaluative
criteria by both leaders and followers. Yet sometimes ideological approach causes problems when other factors, impinging on foreign policy such as geopolitics, human and material resource constraints and power politics conflict with the dictates of ideology. The compulsions of the two sets of factors do not always converge. The perceptual framework derived from an ideology can distort the hard realities existing in the world and undermine a realistic appraisal of the concrete situation. There may also be periods when environmental variables are not conducive to the pursuit of certain elements of an ideology, or there may be a need to play down ideological tenets. The policy-makers in a state which is identified very closely with an ideology are constantly engaged in an effort to harmonize the imperatives of ideology and the concrete realities of international politics: each of the two sets of factors are important in their own right. The inability to do so often brings forth either the charge of neglect of cherished ideological principles or that of non-pragmatists and the pursuit of a uni-dimensional foreign policy.

The views of the realists stand distinct as they hold that the national interests, and particularly national security, must be the paramount consideration in the conduct of a nation’s foreign policy. Of course, ideology is an important factor of foreign policy formulation but it should not supersede the vital interests of Pakistan such as religious and sectarian harmony as well as social cohesion. The state should take into account the changing global and regional phenomena and in the wake of these quickly changing circumstances should specify its priorities. It can be observed that in the initial phase of Pakistan, Islamic identity or ideology was on the top of the state’s priority list while latter on national interests superseded ideology due to external or global world politics. Thus, an objective view on this matter is that ideology alone is not a policy goal. Often ideologies are used simply to obscure the real facts of a situation or real motives of ambitious rulers. Sometimes governments stand for certain ideas only to command popular support at home and preferably abroad also. In the present state of affairs, no country is interested in ideological rigidities. All these recent developments have further lowered the role of ideology in the formulation of foreign policy. Keeping in view the ground realities and assuming a practical and realistic approach, one can opt that in future the foreign policy of our country should revolve around our national interests as it is the cry of the day.

1.6 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. Define foreign policy.
2. What are the internal factors which determine foreign policy of a state?
3. What are the external factors which determine foreign policy of a state?
4. What are the objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy?
5. “There is but one guiding star, one standard for though, one rule for action in a nation’s dealing with other nations, the national interest”, Discuss?
6. What kind of foreign policy Pakistan should adopt? Come up with your own recommendations.
7. What are the challenges to Pakistan foreign policy in the present age? And how can Pakistan meet with those challenges?
BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SUB-INSTITUTIONS

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INTRODUCTION

This unit comprises of brief history of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and its organs including the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat and the Trusteeship Council. The aforementioned bodies are called the chief organs of the UNO.

The UNO was incepted on 24 October 1945 after the World War-II with the name of ‘The League of Nations’. As a matter of fact the world had the dire need to have a collective body which would play an effective role to maintain peace in the world after the havoc of the 2nd World War. Now a days, the UNO has become the most affective institution of the world in maintaining peace and security at the international level.

The Charter of the United Nations contains the rules and regulations of the organisation. The organs of the United Nations are the pillars on which the building of the UNO is established. Through this chapter the students will be informed about the UNO and its organs, as well as the role of Pakistan in the United Nations.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able:
1. To understand the role of the United Nations Organization in the world.
2. To comprehend the role of various institutions working under the UNO.
3. To understand the role of UNO in maintenance of peace in the world and eliminating poverty and diseases from the world.
2.1 THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SUBSIDIARY ORGANIZATIONS

The United Nations Organization (UNO or UN) is an international organization which was established on 24 October 1945. Now a days the body commonly referred as UN, UNO and the United Nations. Almost all of the sovereign states have joined the United Nations willingly. The main objective of the creation of the UNO was to maintain peace in the world. At the time of its establishment, 51 independent states became the members. Now (till 2019) 193 countries have the membership of United Nations. The latest member to join the UNO is South Sudan. It became the member of the United Nations on 14 July 2011.

The United Nations is a platform for all states or nations of the world. United Nations gives the mechanism to find solutions of the humanitarian issues and the states as well. The United Nations is also known as the ‘Parliament of the nations’. However, The UN has no army. It does not have any authority to collect taxes from any country or nation. The United Nations is dependent on the political spirit of her member countries whether any of these implements the decisions of the UN or rejects. The institution of UNO has been playing a key responsibility to decrease the worries on international level.

The UNO did not only work for the maintenance of peace in the world but it also handling other issues such as environment and the outer space. United Nations performed its responsibilities to control the various diseases including Polio, Malaria and chicken pox etc. United Nations had played a remarkable role in the protection of refugees, providing foods during earthquakes and other disasters. The UN has also been working for the protection of the rights of the children, minorities, women and labourers of the world. Antonio Manuel de Oliveira Guterres (Antonio Guterres) the former Prime Minster of Portugal became the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 1 January 2017.

Charter of the United Nations:

The Charter of the United Nations comprises of several chapters. In this regard Chapter-I consists on the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. According to the Article-I of the United Nations the purposes of the United Nations are the following:

1. The maintenance of the peace and security is the basic purpose of the United Nations. The United Nations had the option to take effective as well as collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. The United Nations can take necessary action against the aggression of a country against the other.

2. The United Nations will do her best for developing the friendly relations among the nations of the world on the basis of respect for the principle of equal human rights and self-determination of the peoples.

3. The United Nations would work for forging international cooperation to resolve the economic, social, cultural and other humanitarian issues of the world. Moreover, the United Nations will work for the promotion and protection of human rights as well as the fundamental freedom for all without any discrimination of race, language, religion or sex etc.

4. The UN will work for balancing the measures of nations in the achievement of these general goals.
The Article-II of the United Nations is relevant to the Organization (UN) and its Members. The article state that:

All the member countries of the United Nations will provide every possible assistance to the organisation to take any action accordingly to the present Charter. The Organization shall work according to the Principles which would be necessary for the continuation of international peace and security.

Chapter-2 of the United Nations Charter discuss about the membership of the organization. The membership rule is open for all peace loving countries or nations of the world. However, to attain the membership of the United Nations it is necessary to accept the obligations defined in the UN Charter.

Chapter-3 of the Charter introduces the organs of the United Nations while chapter-4 describes the Structure of the General Assembly. The composition, functions and the power has been discussed under Articles 10 to 22.

Chapter-5 describes the structure and power of Security Council of the United Nations under Articles 23 to 32. According to the Article 24, the Members countries of the United Nations’ Security Council are awarded the prime responsibility to maintain the international peace and security.

The chapter-6 of the United Nations’ Charter provides the regulation for “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”. United Nations believes that in case of any dispute, the parties should solve their issues through negotiations as it is considered the best principle to maintain the international peace and security. The chapter-7 is regarding the “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. According to the Article 39, the Security Council of the United Nations will conclude the reality of any threat to the peace, violation of the peace, or any act of aggression. After the judgment the Security Council would provide recommendations. However, the Council may decide to take other measures to maintain and restore the international peace and security.

According to Article-54 the Security Council will remain itself completely conversant of activities regarding the regional arrangements for maintenance of peace and security in the world.

The next chapter is regarding the “International Economic and Social Co-operation”. Under the charter the United Nations will promote the activities in context of higher standards of living of the people and provision of employment. The another chapter discusses the composition, functions and powers of the Economic and Social Council. According to Article 67 the decisions of the Economic and Social Council would be ended through the majority of its present members while each member of the have single vote. The next Chapter describes “Declaration Regarding non-Self-Governing Territories’. The member states of the U.N which assume the tasks for the management of territories whose inhabitants are still unable to attain self-government will recognize the principle that the welfare of these people is supreme. The ‘INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM’ has been discussed in the separate chapter under Article 75 to 85 while the composition, functions and power of “The Trusteeship Council” has been discussed in next chapter. Another chapter of the charter
comprises the organ “The International Court of Justice”. Under Article 96 the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations may demand the International Court of Justice for any consultation regarding any legal question.

THE SIX MAIN UNO ORGANS:

The United Nations has its six chief organs including the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat. All of the organs of United Nations except the International Court of Justice are located in New York. The head office of the UN is also in New York which controls all the subsidiary organizations of the United Nations. It is the head-quarter of the UN where most of the meetings are being held. However, sometime United Nations held its meetings in other countries of the world also.

2.2. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

The General Assembly is the chief organ of the United Nations. The total number of its members is 193. The United Nations also have the membership of the General Assembly. Every country or member state has its one vote. Every member of the Assembly got the equal opportunity to discuss any issue arising under the Charter of United Nations. The two-third majority is the basic requirement for taking decisions regarding security and peace, United Nations budget and regarding the membership of any state. However, decisions regarding the other matters require the simple majority i.e. more than fifty percent votes.

The General Assembly starts its session in the mid of September and continues till December. It is called the busy season for the Assembly and during this session many resolutions are adopted. On the other hand, the special sessions of the General Assembly may be called by the Assembly as per the request of the Security Council of the United Nations. The session may also be called if the majority of United Nation’s circulate a request.

The President of the General Assembly is elected every year to neutrally preside over the session of the Assembly representing the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly has its six committees. These committees are as under:

1. Disarmament and International Security Committee
2. Economic and Financial Committee
3. Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee
4. Special Political and Decolonization Committee
5. Administrative and Budgetary Committee
6. Legal Committee

2.3. THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

Security is also an important organ of the United Nations like the General Assembly. It works under the UN charter with the basic responsibility of maintaining the
international peace and security. However, the Security Council does not arrange regular meeting as is the case of the General Assembly held. The Council may call its meeting at any time according to its requirements. Normally, the meetings of Security Council remain all over the year. The member countries of the United Nations are legally bound to follow the decisions of the Security Council.

The Security Council adopts a method to maintain peace in the world. If the matter of danger comes to Security Council which may harm the peace, the Council requests to the both or more parties to reach an agreement through negotiations. In case of war or attack of a state on another, the Security Council attempts for ceasefire through conciliation, the second step may be taken as the financial or other sanctions. If the parties do not follow the Security Council’s decisions, the Security Council may use the power with the approval of the member states.

The Security Council of the United Nations has 15 members in all; out of these five are the permanent members including Russia, America, United Kingdom, France and China. These five members are the permanent members of the Security Council because they had played a vital role in the formation of the United Nations at the end of the World War-II. Therefore, the five members are considered the key player to maintain the peace at international level. There are ten temporary members of the Council. These are rotating members in fact elected by the General Assembly for the period of two years. The General Assembly elects the temporary members on the basis of geographical representation.

Every member country of the Council is important as the Council requires at least nine votes out of the 15 members to pass any resolution. However, sometimes the support of more than nine members fails to pass a resolution if any one of the five permanent members uses the power of Veto in the Council. The Security Council of the UN also recommends the appointment of Secretary-General of the United Nations and the new member of the United Nations. Most of the member states of the UN wish to increase the permanent and temporary members of the Security Council.

2.4. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL:

The Economic and Social Council is the organisation of the United Nations that looks after the financial and social work of the United Nations. The Economic and Social Council consist of 54 members. The members are selected through equivalent geographical representation for the period of three years. Each member of the council has one vote.

The council fulfills the promotion of living standard, employment and social development. The Economic and Social Council recommends the activities for economic development of third world countries, supports the human rights and fight against poverty. The General Assembly of the United Nations had set up various particular agencies i.e. the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Many other programmes including the UN Children Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
have also been functioning under the United Nations. The Economic and Social Council coordinates with all of these agencies of the United Nations.

2.5. THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL:

Another organisation of the United Nations is its Trusteeship Council. The council was established under the United Nations Charter to manage the running of 11 Trust Territories. These are the former dependent territories or colonies, which were kept under the International Trusteeship System.

This was created at the conclusion of the Second World War and its aim was the promotion or development of the residents of dependent Territories or colonies. With the help of United Nations Trusteeship Council, more than 70 colonial territories have achieved their independence including 11 trust territories.

‘Palau’ is the very last Trust Territory which achieved independent in 1994. However, the Trusteeship Council has decided to suspend the operations for future. The five permanent members of the Security Council including China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are also the members of the Trusteeship Council. Each member has one vote and the decisions are made by a simple majority i.e. three votes.

2.6. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:

The International Court of Justice is one the United Nations main organ for judicial matters. The International Court of Justice was established in 1945 and is situated The Hague, Netherlands. The Court became functional in 1946. This is an international court for provision of justice in case of disputes between or among the states. The decisions are made here according to the international law.

After the acceptance of jurisdiction of the Court, each country has to obey the decisions of the Court. The Court has decided more than 150 disputes since its creation. The rights of economy, protection of environment and to avoidance of the use of force are the common cases decided by the Court.

The judgments passed by the Court are considered as final and no one has the chance of appeal. The International Court of Justice is chaired by fifteen judges. The judges are appointed for a period of nine years. The judges belonged to various nations but more than one judge cannot be appointed from any country. According to the electoral system, one third judges retired after three years and the new elections held. However, a judge may also be elected again after the completion of his/ her tenure. The judges work independently and none of them can be a symbol of his/her state or nation. The decisions are made with the majority of nine judges and none has the power of veto here.

The wonderful building of the International Court of Justice is called as ‘Peace Palace’ located at The Hague in the Netherlands. The building was constructed by an NGO ‘Carnegie Foundation’ and was officially opened in 1913.
2.7. THE SECRETARIAT:

This organ of the United Nations works at New York. The other United Nations offices are situated at Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi etc. The Secretariat is also considered as the United Nations' executive arm. It is the organ that coordinates the various activities of the UN. The Secretariat is running under the directions of Secretary General of the General Assembly. Secretary General is in fact the Principal administrative officer of the Secretariat. The staff of the Secretariat is called the ‘international civil servants’. The staff works without any pressure of their governments or nations. The Secretariat is consists of a large number of offices with more than sixteen thousands (16,000) staff members. The staff members have been adopted from the Member States of United Nations. The staff is appointed on the basis of merit.

2.8. PAKISTAN’S ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS:

Pakistan became the member of the United Nations on 30 September 1947, just after a few days after its creation. On United Nations day 2011, the Secretary General of the United Nations; Ban Ki Moon, said that “The mission of the United Nations is to build a better world, to leave no one behind, and to stand for the poorest and most vulnerable in the name of global peace and social justice,” The United Nations had been supporting Pakistan to run various programmes for the elimination of poverty and illiteracy. The UN promoted the concept of human rights in the country and had been working for the equality of the humans. During the natural disasters, the UN effectively worked to assist the public in collaboration of the Government of Pakistan, various NGOs and the organisations of the civil society. The United Nations played a role to save the lives of those who were affected by the disasters. In the past, thousands of men, women and children were affected by the natural disasters and the UN launched it programmes to assist them. “UN day is an appropriate occasion to pay tribute to the people of Pakistan for their longstanding partnership with the United Nations in peacekeeping, development and the recent emergency relief efforts,” said Timo Pakkala, UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Pakistan. He added that “Pakistan has contributed significantly in peacekeeping efforts around the world and is an active participant in many key areas of work of the United Nations, including its strong leadership in UN reform both globally and in Pakistan. Pakistan’s election to the UN Security Council is a testimony to the country’s important role in the international stage”. It is a fact that for more than half a century, of course; Pakistan had done remarkable services in maintaining peace and security at international level. To help humanity, more than 130,000 Pakistani have served worldwide as peacekeepers. It is the matter of happiness for Pakistan that it played a fundamental responsibility to facilitate the regional cooperation in South Asia. The services had been performed for economic development and peace-making. On 8 October 2005, there occurred a severe earthquake in Pakistan/Azad Kashmir and more than 70% of casualties were estimated in Muzaffarabad district. According to the estimate of the government of Pakistan almost 87,350 people died while 138,000 were injured. More than Rs. 400 billion came to Pakistan from all over the world for the rehabilitation of the affectees. The United Nations played the role of coordination for the world organizations.
In 2010, almost 18 million people were affected due to flood while the following year in 2011, Pakistan had to face the monsoon rains in which 5.4 million people were affected and the United Nations provided help at a large scale. United Nations always stood by Pakistan in crisis and helped in rehabilitation of the communities. Moreover, the United Nations appealed to the world societies to extend the essential support to the Pakistani people who were affected by floods. In February 1948, the founder of the nation Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah said that:

“We believe in all principles of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the UN Charter”.

Pakistan always supported the efforts of the United Nations regarding the peacekeeping. Pakistan considers that operations for keeping of peace are one of the duties of the United Nations. Under the UN Charter, it is the responsibility of the Organization to preserve the world peace and security. In this context, Pakistan played a remarkable role and practically contributed in the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations. Pakistan contributed in the various operations of the United Nations for the sake of international peace.

Specially, in the military actions of the United Nations, Pakistan became her part during military operations in various countries of the world. Some to the United Nations operations in which Pakistan participated are as under.


The members of United Nations and the Security Council have been working to maintain security and peace at international level. Pakistan presented its services to United Nations and proved itself as a peace loving country. According to the current position of the United Nations Security Council, there are five permanent members while ten non-permanent members.

Pakistan accepted The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and committed to promote the fundamental human rights. Being a member country of the Commission on Human
Rights, Pakistan always supported the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and made the efforts to ensure the fundamental human rights in the country. Pakistan also accepted United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Minorities and according to the constitution of Pakistan 1973, the religious minorities are declared as the equal citizens of Pakistan and they have been enjoying all the fundamental rights. Non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan are free to celebrate their religious festivals and manage their religious institutions.

Moreover, Pakistan has supported the ‘Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (CEDAW). The state of Pakistan is also committed to implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action. The Government took various steps to empower women in the country in economic and political fields. For this purpose, the government has established a separate ministry for women which is working to empower women. The women are being preferred in public sector organisations for recruitment.

Pakistan also adopted ‘The Declaration of the Rights of the Child’ and made the efforts to promote and protect the rights of the children. According the declaration, the severe crimes against children including kidnapping, sexual abuse, torture, forced labour and forced marriages are crimes. The government of Pakistan had introduced the laws in this regard and declared these crimes as punishable including financial penalty as well as imprisonment.

There are various agencies working in Pakistan under the United States. These are:
1. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
2. International Labour Organization (ILO).

2.9 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Discuss the introduction, needs and significance of the United Nations.
3. Highlight the significance of the Economic and Social Council and International Court of Justice of the United Nations.
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ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, SAARC AND PAKISTAN

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INTRODUCTION

This unit deals with the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Pakistan. The unit elaborates the importance of these organizations and their role in the trade, peace and regional cooperation with special reference to Pakistan.

In 1964, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) was established among the three Islamic states Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Later on, the organisation was restructured and was named as Economic Cooperation Organization. The basic purpose of this organisation was to develop the cultural and trading relations among three Islamic countries. However, after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) six former Soviet Republics joined the ECO including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. At the same time Afghanistan also joined the Organisation.

The organisation of Islamic cooperation was initially formed with name of Organisation of Islamic Conference in 1969 after the burning of Al-Aqsa mosque by the Jews in Jerusalem.

This brutal act of the Jews was strongly condemned by the Muslims and was declared as the “Jewish Crime”. The former Mufti of the Jerusalem ‘Amin al-Hussaini’ called for all the Muslim heads of states to assemble a summit on urgent basis. After passing a month to this incident an Islamic Conference was held on 25 September 1969. It was a summit held in Rabat, Morocco and was attended by the representatives of 24 Muslim majority states. Most of the representatives were the heads of states.

The unit also reveals the peace-making efforts of SAARC in the region. SAARC remained the most significant organisation in South Asia. Although Pakistan and India could not develop their good mutual relations; however, SAARC provided a platform to both powers to maintain bilateral relations.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter you will be able

1. To understand the role of Economic Cooperation Organization in the regional development.
2. To know the major functions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the role of Pakistan in the organisation.
3. To understand the role and contribution of the SAARC in South Asia.
4. To understand the role of Pakistan in the regional organisations and Pakistan’s efforts for maintaining peace.
3.1. INTRODUCTION

Since its creation Pakistan has been following the policy of cooperation among the mankind especially the states of the world generally and among the Muslim communities as well as the countries particularly. Pakistan believes that such coordination and cooperation is essential for the well being of the people of the world irrespective of their caste and creed.

That is why Pakistan joined the United Nations Organization immediately after its establishment. Then onward Pakistan extended its full support to any association at or organization that were aimed at the betterment of the human society.

However, being a Muslim country, Pakistan believes in special connection and cooperation among the Muslim communities and countries. For this reason, Pakistan always supported the right of self-determination of the Muslim communities like Palestinian and Kashmiries. With a view to foster closer cooperation among the Muslim states, Pakistan made prolonged efforts to establish an organization of the Muslim countries of the world and that ultimately resulted into the formation of the OIC. At the same time Pakistan believes in the idea of regional cooperation and consequently has been extending full support to the organizations like ECO and SAARC.

3.2. ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (ECO)

Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is an organisation which has been working as inter-governmental level on the basis of regional cooperation. The ECO is an important organization including of the many countries from Europe, Central Asia, Middle East and South Asia. ECO is the famous organisation that covers millions of square kilometers area. The same is connecting Russia to Persian Gulf and China to Europe. The organisation has the objective of sustainable economic development of its member states as well as in the Region.

In fact, the Economic Cooperation Organisation is the reformation of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). The RCD was established in 1964 by three Islamic states including Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. In 1990, the members of RCD met at Islamabad to improve the Izmir Treaty and the same time it was decided to rename the organisation as ECO.

After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) six former Soviet Republics joined the Economic Cooperation Organisation including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Later on, Afghanistan also joined the ECO. The organisation has been working for the development of the region.

In March 2017, 13th Summit of the Heads of States or Government of the Member States of the ECO held in Islamabad and the member states endorsed ‘ECO Vision 2025’. The
ECO proved useful not only for Pakistan but the overall region of the Central Asia. It is an organisation which covers the various features of the issues faced by the human beings. The organisation disbursed a lot of concentration to all magnitudes relevant to the developments of human beings.

In is a matter of concern that the organisation had to face a number of issues especially of the ethnicity. However, it has also been performing well in fields of economy, politics and defence. The governments of Pakistan mostly in all eras had to face various issues regarding the economic development.

**Membership:**

There is no obstacle to get membership of the organisation and “Any State enjoying geographical closeness with the ECO region and/or sharing the objectives and principles of ECO may apply to become a member of the Organization”. There were 10 members of Economic Cooperation Organization (till 2019) including Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

**Activities of the ECO:**

The ECO is aimed at close cooperation among the member states in the fields of trade, tourism, transportation and investment.

**Trade and Investment:**

Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plays a vital function in the economic development and growth of under-developed countries. The states can boost their economy through increasing exports and minimizing the imports. This action gives a heavy opportunity to provide jobs to the young generations.

The Economic Cooperation Organisation has been working to provide the opportunities of trade and investment among the member states. One of the priorities of the ECO is to develop the atmosphere of the trading and circulation of the investments among the member states. The organisation is doing its best to conduct meetings at high level forums including the ministerial meetings on Commerce and Foreign Trade, meetings on Finance and Economy, the meetings of the heads of Tax Administration, heads of Customs Administrations, the heads of Central Banks and the heads of Trade Promotion Organizations.

**Transport and Connectivity:**

Transport, mobility and connectivity play a very important role in ensuring regional development and prosperity. Accordingly to achieve the maximum possible connectivity and its impact on socio-economic development, there is a dire need to cooperate on
fundamental transit related policy issues. Other vital prerequisite to that end are full implementation of the Transit Transport Framework Agreement (TTFA), facilitating regular and commercially justified operation of ECO corridors/Routes, and modernization of border crossing points.

Tourism:

Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) also played a remarkable role in the region to protect the natural beauties and cultural heritage. It has become the representative of the 450 million people of the member states covering the area of almost eight million square kilometers. Moreover, the organisation is considered as well-known association which saved the diversity of the historical inheritance stretching from central to south and south-west Asia.

In this regard the region has a considerable potential to be one of the most important area of the tourism. The Region under the ECO is regarded as one of the world’s richest in terms of historical and cultural heritage and due to it there is a wider scope of promotion of tourism for the people of the region under the organisation. Now a days, the tourism has become as one of the largest growing economic sectors in the world which is helpful to creation the employment opportunities as well as to improve the economic development of the countries. The contribution of this sector cannot be neglected in the growth of the GDP and it had increased the world economy. The ECO can make its efforts to create the attractive amount through tourism.

Economic growth and Productivity:

In almost all over the world, the agriculture and industry are considered as the key sectors which play their role to boost economic growth of the all areas. The both sectors may increase the productive capacity on any country. The main aim of the organisation is to bring the member states close to each other. This act is highly useful for the people the member states as the collective efforts proved fruitful in this respect. In 2001, seven member states of the ECO out of ten were suffering from the food shortage. It was due to efforts of the ECO that the number decreased to four in 2015. According to the statistics, in 2015, almost 53 million inhabitants of the region were under-nourished and these were 12% of the total population of the member states. Most of the suffered people are belonged to the rural areas while half of the population of ECO member states belongs to such areas.

There is a dire need to take immediate steps to improve the quality of productive material and on the other hand to decrease the cost of materials to satisfy the regional population’s demand for food. If the ECO states succeeded to increase the raw material through agriculture in the region; the industries will also get parallel development.

Through the promotion of investment and importing the foreign capital the ECO may fulfill the needs of the inhabitants of the region. In this regard, the organisation may
generate the job opportunities through acquiring the foreign investments and in this way the developing human index of the region will be improved.

**Social Welfare and Environment:**

Social welfare is also chief objective of the organisation. In previous lines we have discussed about the uplifting the standards of living, quality of life, economic welfare and wellbeing of people of the Region. This objective can be achieved through regional cooperation but not without it. This requires adoption of social protection and environment preservation policies in the Region. Realization of the above strategic objective which is also ECO’s main objective requires a multi-faceted and supportive policy environment to address and tackle challenges like food security, health problems and education systems. The environmental policy should be created by implementation of the helpful national and regional strategies.

**Capacity building and training:**

In response to the needs and requirements for regional cooperation, the organisation provides various programmes for capacity building. It also provides a number of training sessions in diverse sectors to the experts, officials and academic communities of the Member States. These trainings are useful for the mobilizing of knowledge among the training institutes as well as of the individuals of the member states.

**Partnerships:**

The Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) believes on partnership with the non-ECO states. The organisation arranges a number of programmes with the collaboration of other states of the world. The organisation has brought the inhabitants of various regions of the world towards peace and harmony through the partnership.

3.3. THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC)

**Historical background**

The Al-Aqsa Mosque was burnt on 21 August 1969 in Jerusalem. Amin al-Husseini called for all the Muslim heads of states to assemble a summit on urgent basis.

After passing a month to this incident an Islamic Conference was held on 25 September 1969. It was a summit held in Rabat, Morocco and was attended by the representatives of 24 Muslim majority states. Most of the representatives were the heads of states. In this summit, a joint resolution was passed in which it was stated that:

‘Muslim government would consult with a view to promoting among themselves close cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields, inspired by the immortal teachings of Islam’.
After 6 months in March 1970, the First Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers was held in Saudi Arabia at Jeddah. In 1972, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC, now the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) was founded. It was the tough time for the ‘Muslim Ummah’ and the need of unity for Muslims was felt. ‘Al-Aqsa Mosque’ was the first “Qibla” of the Muslims and it was a very difficult time for the Muslims.

**Goals**

According to its charter, the OIC aims to preserve Islamic social and economic values; promote solidarity amongst member states; increase cooperation in social, economic, cultural, scientific, and political areas; uphold international peace and security; and advance education, particularly in the fields of science and technology. According to the Charter, the OIC has determined its following objectives:

1. To enhance and consolidate the bonds of fraternity and solidarity among the Member States;
2. To safeguard and protect the common interests and support the legitimate causes of the Member States and coordinate and unify the efforts of the Member States in view of the challenges faced by the Islamic world in particular and the international community in general;
3. To respect the right of self-determination and non-interference in the domestic affairs and to respect sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each Member State;
4. To support the restoration of complete sovereignty and territorial integrity of any Member State under occupation, as a result of aggression, on the basis of international law and cooperation with the relevant international and regional organisations;
5. To ensure active participation of the Member States in the global political, economic and social decision-making processes to secure their common interests;
6. To promote inter-state relations based on justice, mutual respect and good neighbourliness to ensure global peace, security and harmony;
7. To reaffirm its support for the rights of peoples as stipulated in the UN Charter and international law;
8. To support and empower the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self determination and establish their sovereign State with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, while safeguarding its historic and Islamic character as well as the Holy places therein;
9. To strengthen intra-Islamic economic and trade cooperation; in order to achieve economic integration leading to the establishment of an Islamic Common Market;
10. To exert efforts to achieve sustainable and comprehensive human development and economic well-being in Member States;
11. To disseminate, promote and preserve the Islamic teachings and values based on moderation and tolerance, promote Islamic culture and safeguard Islamic heritage;
12. To protect and defend the true image of Islam, to combat defamation of Islam and encourage dialogue among civilisations and religions;
13. To enhance and develop science and technology and encourage research and
cooperation among Member States in these fields;
14. To promote and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms including the rights of women, children, youth, elderly and people with special needs as well as the preservation of Islamic family values;
15. To emphasize, protect and promote the role of the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society;
16. To safeguard the rights, dignity and religious and cultural identity of Muslim communities and minorities in non-Member States;
17. To promote and defend unified position on issues of common interest in the international fora;
18. To cooperate in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, organised crime, illicit drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering and human trafficking;
19. To cooperate and coordinate in humanitarian emergencies such as natural disasters;
20. To promote cooperation in social, cultural and information fields among the Member States.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is the world's leading Islamic organization. The Organization of the Islamic Conference was founded in 1969, originally by 24 states, as well as representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Currently, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) consists of 57 Member States with a total population of more than 1.9 billion. People as of 2018, with 53 countries being countries with a Muslim majority.

The contradictory views of member states on the organization and divergence of interests in global politics mean that the organization was able to take on only a limited role in the international arena. Despite this predicament, over the past decade, the organization has gradually become more relevant, enhancing its visibility as a representative body of Muslim unity and promoting its role as a reliable conversationalist on behalf of Muslims in global society. The main goal was to strengthen Muslim solidarity. In its early decades, the organization focused on the cause of the Palestinians, the protection of Islamic holy places, and the strengthening of economic cooperation between member states.

Current OIC membership in 57 states spans four continents: Africa (27), Asia (26), Europe (two), and Latin America (two). Created on the model of the United Nations (UN), the OIC deals with a wide range of issues: promoting peace and conflict resolution; protecting the rights of Muslim minority communities; promoting the rights of women and children; humanitarian assistance; the fight against Islamophobia; stimulation of trade and investment within the OIC; and promoting cultural exchange and education. Its permanent missions in New York, Geneva and Brussels are working to strengthen ties with the UN and the European Union (EU). First of all, as an intergovernmental organization designed to protect the interests of all Muslims around the world, it personifies the consciousness and commitment of the Muslim world to solidarity. Although his ability to maintain his existence in a fragmented and fragmented Muslim world implies success, the OIC also disappointed those who hoped that ambitious goals were codified in his charter, such as “preserving and promoting the high Islamic values of
the world, compassion, tolerance, equality, justice and human dignity “will be supported by its global actions and influence. This is often exaggerated and often behind; taking words as a substitute for action and achievement, it shows little but resolutions and statements. Many explanations were given for the limited influence of OICs in global politics: conflicting interests of the Member States, the uncertainty of the Charter, the lack of executive autonomy of the OIC, financial difficulties and the lack of political will on the part of member states. All this made the OIC a tortoise on its back. Against this background, critics of the 2000s became a decade of reform for the organization. The Ten Years Program of Action (TYPOA), a comprehensive change plan, was introduced in 2005. Although the main organs of the OIC, namely the Islamic Summit, the Council of Foreign Ministers and the General Secretariat, continued to perform their main functions, the reforms led to several changes: a revision of the OIC Charter, renaming of the organization in 2011 (the Organization of the Islamic Conference became the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), expansion organizations to cover new areas of concern, such as human rights, and increase the budget. Reforms put the OIC turtle on its feet. Over the past two decades, international human rights have become the main focus of the OIC. The organization introduced the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (1990). The declaration introduced what many human rights defenders consider an alternative set of rights based on a conservative interpretation of Islamic law.

The organization sponsored several (controversial) resolutions in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). As part of the 2005 reform program, it established the Independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to promote human rights in its member states. This indicates a modest start, but the OIC has yet to convince skeptics of the effectiveness of its human rights instruments and the compatibility of its vision of human rights with international norms, principles and practices. Over the years, the OIC has become a complex institution with several bodies, standing committees and specialized agencies dealing with various issues, including security, intra-Muslim trade, and the fight against Islamophobia; fostering intra-OIC trade and investment; and promoting cultural exchange and education. Its permanent missions in New York, Geneva, and Brussels work to strengthen its ties with the UN and the European Union (EU). Above all, as an intergovernmental organization designed to advance the interests of all Muslims worldwide, it epitomizes the Muslim world’s consciousness of and commitment to solidarity. While its ability to sustain its existence in the midst of a divided and fragmented Muslim world suggests success, the OIC has also disappointed those who hoped that the ambitious goals codified in its charter, such as “preserving and promoting the lofty Islamic values of peace, compassion, tolerance, equality, justice and human dignity,” would be matched by its global actions and influence. It often overpromises and frequently underperforms; taking words as substitutes for actions and achievements, it has little to show but resolutions and statements.

The organisation also has a number of limitations in the international politics. It has limited influence among its own member states; the areas of conflict are vast, deficient in executive control over the members. Financial troubles and shortage of political will are other prominent issues face by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
Islamic Summit and the Council of Foreign Ministers and the General Secretariat are the major organs of the organisation. The OIC has brought some reforms to improve its role as the OIC charter was revised. The former name of OIC was ‘Organization of the Islamic Conference’ while it was renamed as ‘Organization of Islamic Cooperation’ in 2011. Moreover, the new issues were covered under the organisation including the issue of human rights and enhancement in the budget. As the Muslim Ummah had a number of expectations to the organisation; now the OIC came on the right way as it is working more actively than before and since the two previous decades, the OIC has been working in the issues of human rights in the Muslim World. In this regard, the ‘Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam’ was presented by the organisation in 1990.

The Declaration was presented in Cairo, Egypt on 5 August 1990 and was adopted by the member states of the OIC. The same Declaration provides an overview on the perspectives of the human rights in Islam. According to the article 2 of the declaration:

‘Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being. It is the duty of individuals, societies and states to safeguard this right against any violation, and it is prohibited to take away life except for a Shariah prescribed reason’.

In the light of this article the non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic States guaranteed their rights and in this way the image of the Muslim countries in the international community became soaring. The undeviating missions of OIC have been working in Geneva, Brussels and New York to strength the ties with the United Nations as well as with the European Union. English, French and Arabic are the official languages of the OIC. On the other hand it is an inter-governmental organization which works to support the Muslims’ interests in the world. However, there are some failures of the OIC and the a school the thought of the Muslim Ummah is disappointed as the Organisation failed to sponsor the superior values of Islam including the peace, tolerance, parity, sympathy, social justice and human pride among the Muslim countries to some extent. The organisation remained unsuccessful to give the Muslims their healthier position in the world politics.

The organisation has recognized itself to be a chief forum of the Muslims to converse about the religious, economic, political and social matters. According to the supporters of OIC, it became the symbolic of the solidarity and unity of the Muslims of the world. The opponent of the organization had the opinion that that OIC proved itself as incompetent, feeble and ineffective institution. Despite of it, the ‘Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation’ confirms that OIC is "the collective voice of the Muslim world" which has been working for "safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony".

Till December 2019, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) had 57 members while out of these 56 also had the membership of the United Nations (except Palestine). The overall population of OIC member countries was more that 1.9 billion according to the statistics in 2018.
3.4. SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC)

Evolution and Origin of SAARC:

South Asian regions has been bestowed with vast human and natural resources like culture, civilization, arts, history, mineral assets, agriculture, technology and manpower etc. due to these qualities, the region has a potential to become vibrant in the world.

Evolution and Origin:

SAARC is an abbreviation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. It is an International Organization of the South Asian country. The idea of its formation was first mooted in November, 1980. The idea was first floated in Bangladesh by the then president “Zia-ur-Rehman. He was of the view that South Asian nations had been sharing common values which rooted in their ethnic, social, cultural as well as in traditional customs. Further, it was observed that it was a common desire of all south Asian countries to overcome their shared problems through mutual consensus, cooperation and agreements. Its status has been boosted with frequent intra-regional exchanges and trade among its member states.

Member States:

SAARC comprises the eight-member states including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. Each state had selected its own representative i.e. foreign secretary of the member state.

Observers:

- Australia
- China
- European Union
- Japan
- Iran
- Mauritius
- Myanmar
- South Korea
- USA

Objectives of the SAARC:

The idea of the SAARC was presented by the President of Bangladesh Mr. Zia-ur-Rehman. The major objectives of the SAARC included:

1. To promote the welfare of the people of the South Asia.
2. To improve quality of their life.
3. To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region.
4. To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance.
5. To contribute mutual trust, understanding and appreciation within the region.

**Basic principles of the SAARC:**

Every association works within the framework of co-operation. Based on the same framework, SAARC has its own principles with respect to:

1. Sovereign equality.
2. Territorial integrity.
3. Political independence.
4. Mutual interests and benefits.
5. Non-interference in the domestic/internal affairs of the member states.

**Areas of Co-Operation:**

Its area of co-operation includes people-to-people contacts, culture, tourism and social development, energy and environment, science and technology, information, communication and media, education, trade and finance, agriculture and bio technology.

**Functioning of the SAARC:**

Decisions are made on bilateral terms and based on unanimity. According to charter of the Association, there are number of committees, sub-committees, different organs and institutions. “Summit” holds the highest authority which is a combination of the Heads of the member States. To discuss the matters of mutual interests, the Summit meets only for the same. The council of the ministers comprise of Foreign ministers of the member states. The key objective of the council is to formulate and review different policies and their progress, explores new areas of co-operation.

**Meetings:**

It was decided on its inception that SAARC meetings will be held twice a year but can meet also in case of extraordinary attention if needed but is done with the approval of all member states.

**Functioning of Different Committees**

The Standing Committee has foreign secretaries of all member states. The committee monitors and co-ordinate all the programs related to finance, regional mobilization, searching and highlighting new areas which are best for co-operation. The Technical Committee is responsible for specialized programs and projects. This all is done under the SAARC Integrated Programme of Action (SIPA). Many meetings in this regard were held. If there are common interests on specific areas, then specialized meetings are arranged.
Secretariat of SAARC:

Its secretariat is in Kathmandu which monitors, and co-ordinate various activities and decisions made in different meetings. It acts as a mediator and channel of communication between member states and other international organizations.

Composition of Secretariat:

It consists of:
1. Secretary-General; (nominated by member states and then appointed by the council of ministers)
2. A director from each member state; (appointed by Secretary-General for a period of three years but tenure may be extended)
3. The general services staff.

SAARC Summits:

19 Summits have been held:
1. Dhaka, Bangladesh (6th-8th Dec 1985)
2. Bangalore, India (16th-17th Nov 1986)
4. Islamabad, Pakistan (29th-31st Dec 1988)
5. Mali, Maldives (21st-23rd Nov 1990)
7. Dhaka, Bangladesh (10th-11th April 1993)
8. New Delhi, India (2nd-4th May 1995)
9. Mali, Maldives (12th-14th May 1997)
14. New Delhi, India (3rd-4th April 2007)
16. Thimbu, Bhutan (28th-29th April 2010)
17. Addu city, Maldives (10th-11th Nov 2011)
19. Islamabad, Pakistan (15th-16th Nov 2016)

Formation of SAPTA:

Formation of SAAFTA was one of the impressive achievement of SAARC. Idea of its formation was first initiated during 6th Saarc Summit held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (1991). Later, the agreement was signed on 11th April 1993. In 1995, it officially came into effect. Twelfth Saarc Summit was held in 2004 in which SAPTA has been replaced with SAAFTA i.e. South Asian Free Trade Area. It came into effect on 1st January 2006.

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Establishment of South Asian University (SAU):

The idea of its formation was first floated by Manmohan Singh who was the former Indian Prime Minister during the 13th SAARC Summit in 2005. The formal agreement was signed during the 14th Saarc Summit in 2007. Its temporary campus was established in the Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi). First session of the university was commenced in 2010.

Role of Pakistan in Strengthening SAARC:

No country in this world can live in isolation and same strategy was adopted by Pakistan since its inception. It never favored isolation in regional as well as in international matters. One of its key objective and principle of foreign policy is to develop close and cordial relations with its neighboring countries hence declared as an active permanent member of the SAARC.

Pakistan played a key role when first Summit of SAARC was launched at Dhaka in 1985. Till then, the country has been committed to agreements and different activities of the SAARC and participated in a positive way always. No meeting of SAARC has been postponed or delayed for any unusual circumstances i.e. certain political reasons. Pakistan always appreciated the visit of various personalities in the same regard and always gave warm welcome to the personalities who visit the country for the same cause.

One important and good fact is that; there are some major and minor issues which has been developed with the passage of time between different states and obviously, it is natural in its terms, but it was made key principle that mutual disputes would be kept away from the decisions and working of SAARC. Issues would be solved through proper channel and through mature negotiation. The principles made for SAARC are rigid to some extent but there is also a chance of elasticity and modification so that the main objective behind its formation can be fulfilled on surer grounds.

Trust and co-operation maxim was considered as sole priority between the member states and they have full confidence in it. The mechanism of positive consultation has promoted the conciliation and strengthen the peace. India-Pakistan relations remained hot cake issue and it is the focal point of SAARC summits wherever and when held. Pakistan supported and worked deliberately for the proper development of SAARC and faced all obstacles which came in its way. Political situations of member states were usually handled with the decisions and development of SAARC and it became a major diplomatic achievement.

SAARC always received positive responses from member states and from the international community; for example USA and China always encouraged and appreciated the decisions and steps taken by SAARC. SAARC always showed a hope of trust and more potential with its further growth. Its progress has been expanded to plausible areas of member states, since its inception, it went through many tough and critical phases but now it is more than stable and is in completely functional stage.
It had developed international interest having large number of observers. Collective well-being and mutual benefits is its first and fore-most objective which SAARC has provided to its member state. Since last years, slow and steady growth is there but still some important steps has been taken to fulfill its targets. Combating terrorism is one of the key issue which was discussed almost at every forum of SAARC Summits. Special reference for this was the SAARC convention on suppression of terrorism.

In the same regard, third SAARC Summit which was held in Kathmandu in 1897, a convention was signed to deal with the issues related to terrorism. Another step for the same cause was taken which was the establishment of STOMD i.e. SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk. ‘The SAARC Food Bank’ was established that is the food security reserve which deeply focused on poverty alleviations.

When twelfth SAARC Summit was held in Islamabad, all member states adopted Social Charter with an aim to promote a regional aspect of co-operation. The idea of adopting social charter was basically floated in 10th SAARC Summit held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (1998).

**Aims behind adopting the Social Charter:**

1. To provide a practical platform for coherent social priorities
2. To improve the structure and content of different programs
3. To ensure greater efficiency
4. To utilize all resources i.e. internal and external (both).
5. To enhance the equity and sustainability of social programs
6. To improve the living standards of their beneficiaries.

All steps taken for the said cause was basically for the facilitation of people-to-people contacts and it has been proved to be very successful. Different programs were launched for this for example Saarc Chairs, saarc Audio-Visual Exchange Program, Saarc Fellowship and Scholarship Schemes etc.

Pakistan has proposed many significant ideas in the regional co-operation and it had an honor that Saarc-2000 Basic need proposal was adopted in the summit held in Islamabad, Pakistan in 1988. On economic issues, Pakistan always stood firm with the SAARC and work deliberately for the same cause. It worked consistently regarding nuclear restraint and disarmament and has suggested many solutions to the problems which were concerned highly at global level.

Many new activities have been introduced which included the participation of women and on international as well as domestic forums, Pakistan strongly recommended their participation. Pakistan is second largest contributor towards all activities related to SAARC.
Factors responsible behind the failure of SAARC:

1. Political instabilities
2. Lack of social cohesion
3. Trust deficit
4. Differences of opinions
5. Lack of political co-operation
6. Lack of economic resources etc.

3.5 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Discuss the role of SAARC for the maintenance of peace in the region.
2. Highlight the role of Pakistan in the regional development through joining the various organisations in this regard.
3. Evaluate the role of ‘The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’ for the unity of Muslims of the world.
4. Elaborate the objectives, functions and achievements of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).
MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND IRAN

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(the contents of the article are the part of course outlines which have been covered in section-I and Section-II)
INTRODUCTION

This is the fourth unit of this book which reveals about the relation between Pakistan and Iran. Iran is our Islamic brother country. At the time of establishment of Pakistan, Iran was the very first country to recognise Pakistan. Both countries have been connected through historical, cultural and religious similarities. To provide the authentic information to the students, the editor has selected two articles which fulfill the criteria of the outlines approved by the experts of the subjects.

The first article included in section I shows the history of mutual relations between Pakistan and Iran. The authors has thoroughly discussed about the bilateral relations between two countries and highlighted the strategic cooperation. The paper reveals the need and significant of the security matters as well as the border management and development in the economic sector. The author has also discussed in his paper about the economic sanctions on Iran implemented by USA. The second article is relevant to Pakistan-Iran bilateral relations development about the post nuclear deal. The author discussed the challenges faced by the both countries. According to the author the both powers came to close due to their same issues specially the issue of survival.

Overall, the both articles are very authentic and easy to understand the mutual relations between Pakistan and Iran.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit you will be able
1. To develop understanding of the mutual relations between Pakistan and Iran.
2. To learn about the role of same problems faced by the two Islamic Powers.
3. To learn the relations of both states regarding Post Nuclear Deal.
4. To comprehend the multiple aspects of the Pakistan Iran relations.
Section I:

In this section, a peer review published research paper entitled “Iran-Pakistan Relations: Challenges, Constraints and Opportunities” is included. The same was originally published by the “FWU Journal of Social Sciences”. The editor /coordinator is adding this article with thanks to the author Mr. Muhammad Tehsin who acknowledged the request and permitted to reproduce the article to the students of Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad. The author is Assistant Professor at Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

Iran-Pakistan Relations: Challenges, Constraints and Opportunities
Muhammad Tehsin (PhD)

Abstract:

Effective border management between Iran and Pakistan is an area in bilateral relations where tactical coordination could eventually result in strategic convergence. This is due to the affiliated commonalities between the two nations in terms of culture and commerce. Common cultural and shared economic interests would be instrumental in the effort toward rebuilding strategic relations. The benefits of strategic cooperation could emerge in the form of enhancement in bilateral trade, and increased stability in Afghanistan. This paper explores how the nuclear agreement between Iran and P5+1 has prepared the grounds for improvement in bilateral cooperation. It is recommended here that effective border management would be the relevant CBM to establish post-nuclear deal tactical coordination. This could result in the revival of strategic ties between Iran and Pakistan based on economic integration and defense cooperation.

Keywords: border management, bilateralism, trade, energy, security

The removal of economic sanctions, in consequence of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (US, France, China, Russia, UK and Germany), termed as the joint comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA) signed on July 14, 2015, would reduce the restraint on Iranian economic involvement in South Asia and the Middle East.

This paper explores how the nuclear agreement between Iran and P5+1 could become the building block for improvement in Iran-Pakistan bilateral ties. It is recommended that effective border management would be the most relevant CBM to establish tactical coordination. This could further result in the revival of strategic convergence between Pakistan and Iran based on economic integration and defense cooperation (Alam, 2004).

The foreign policy of enhanced ties towards Iran is in line with Pakistan’s traditional posture of bilateralism (Burke & Ziring, 1990).

Iran’s renewed economic activities in the South Asian and the Middle Eastern regions would be reminiscent of the pre-1979 era. However, during the reign of Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi Iran was not only the regional gendarme due to the American alliance, but it also enjoyed close security relations with Pakistan. Iran provided support to Pakistan in its 1965 and 1971 wars with India. Iran was also involved in quelling the Baloch insurgency against the state of Pakistan in the 1970s in the Iran-Pakistan border areas.

The Middle East plays the role of a major transmitter of cultural influence into South Asia and Pakistan due to the religio-cultural factor. Pakistan’s historical relations with Iran relate to the high culture based upon Persian language. Iran was the first state to recognize Pakistan in 1947, and Pakistan was the first to recognize the new Iranian government in 1979 after the Islamic revolution. These ties cooled off when Iran was under international economic sanctions owing to the controversy surrounding Iranian nuclear program. There is a recent factor of divergent security perceptions on both sides. In Iran, it is the threat perception caused by Pak-Saudi relations. In Pakistan, there is a concern that India-Iran ties could lead to “strategic encirclement” of Pakistan (Ezdi, 2015).

The economic opportunities offered by the Iran nuclear agreement create conducive environment for both states to move away from mutual suspicions and progress toward bilateral convergence. Bilateral economic interactions would reduce the likelihood of conflict in inter-state relations. In light of the above, border security assumes importance. It is an area that impacts upon trade amongst the three states of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as facilitating overall security within Afghanistan.

**Problem Statement:**

The Iran-Pakistan relations did not entirely break off in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979. Yet significant matters of mutual interest were put on hold in bilateral ties during the last two decades because of international economic sanctions on Iran. This includes collaboration in high technology surveillance of the border, exchange of notes on Gwadar and Chahbahar seaports, and progress on the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline (Panda, 2015). In case of complete removal of sanctions, there is catching up to do in various sectors, but would it be done? In other words, would bilateral ties undergo resurgence? In this paper’s view, the following two factors would be important in the context of resurgence of ties. The first factor is the significance of the JCPOA for Iran-Pakistan relations.

The JCPOA is important for Iran-Pakistan relations in general, even though the JCPOA should be considered a necessary albeit insufficient condition for substantial improvement in ties. The second factor pertains to the significance of confidence building measures (CBMs). The most important CBM required for improving ties in the backdrop of the JCPOA could be in the form of effective border management, especially in view of the recurrent border tensions and the resultant economic costs.

The two states could revive strategic cooperation via improvement in an area of significant mutual interest in both economic and security domains i.e. effective border management. Pakistan and Iran are neighbours who share a long and porous border. There is no dispute
over border delimitation. The role of border management has increasingly come into focus in the last few years caused by illegal cross-border movement. This impacts upon bilateral trade. During the Shah’s era in the 1970s, both countries forged strategic cooperation. However, the bilateral ties were adversely affected subsequent to the Iranian revolution in 1979. The imposition of international economic sanctions on Iran in the 1980s further restricted bilateral economic interaction. In the aftermath of the JCPOA, Iran and Pakistan are favorably poised to avail this economic opportunity.

**Theoretical Framework and Literature Review:**

Pakistan and Iran are located in contiguous yet separate regions i.e., South Asia and the Middle East, respectively. Therefore, the two states are not involved in a regional security complex (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). This effectively means that these states do not face any reason and compulsion to compete against each other in the security sector despite being neighbors. This situation can be contrasted against India-Pakistan relations where a security complex clearly exists.

The significance of bilateral ties between Iran and Pakistan go beyond merely extending the courtesy of good neighborly gestures. According to Alam (2004), these relations are dictated by geopolitical logic to ensure national security. Iran has always pledged support in the past whenever Pakistan’s relations worsened with archrival India. Similarly, Pakistan did not join efforts to challenge Iranian interests even during the peak days of Iran-Iraq War, and despite the influence of Saudi Arabia and the U.S. (Jan, 1993). According to Mazari (2000), the reason is simple and supported by the logic of survival. Iran did not want removal of the Pakistani buffer to find itself neck-to-neck with India, South Asia’s regional power. Pakistan considered the land beyond its western borders, which includes both Afghanistan and Iran, as its strategic depth vis-a-vis India (Daily The News, May 10, 2017).

During the 1970s, Pakistan adopted the foreign policy posture of bilateralism. This was meant to balance its relations with both the Eastern and Western camps in the midst of the Cold War politics (Burke & Ziring, 1990). Pakistan’s well-established policy of bilateralism provides the contemporary framework for improving ties with Iran irrespective of its relations with other countries.

However, even states on friendly terms with each other are aware that competition cannot be subtracted from the international system. The principle of realism espouses self-interest. The security calculus of any state prioritizes perceived threats to territorial integrity, population, and government viz. the three attributes of a nation-state. This security-centric perspective is the preferred approach in realism because it places the state at the center of global politics.

This study recognizes security dilemma as a determinant of state behaviour within the realist framework. It is therefore posited that border management is an effective mechanism to deal with persisting security dilemmas. The security of any state is a
dynamic affair. There are many components of state security. The issue of border security is among the most significant components of a state’s security dilemma. It relates to the territorial permanence of a state, which is a primary component of sovereignty.

The geographical limits of a state would only be secure if its physical boundaries were safe (Andreas, 2003). In the age of globalization, contemporary international trends have increased state insecurity in terms of borders. There is international perception of the world as a global village. Similarly, there are increasing efforts leading toward economic and cultural globalization, and information revolution.

In these conditions, the state is drawing both closer to and away from other states. While the ideational borders with other states are becoming insignificant, the states are getting increasingly concerned with solidifying their physical borders to augment their stability and statehood. In the case of Iran and Pakistan, increased cross-border movement has given rise to problems of illegal travel, smuggling, and drugs and arms trafficking. Furthermore, this becomes more acute in a region that has to deal with the threat of extremism and terrorism. Last but not the least, the problem of border security becomes serious for weak states (Adamson, 2006). Their weak state structures often have to deal with fissiparous tendencies internally and hegemonic designs externally. The existence of soft borders like Iran and Pakistan is a natural corollary of these conditions.

This study merges two separate, albeit interrelated issues; Iran’s nuclear deal and its impact on nonproliferation and regional security in the Middle East; and Iran’s relations with Pakistan, which draws the South Asian region into the sphere of study. While the regional area of interest includes both South Asia and the Middle East, the main issue that is instrumental in merging these two regions is violent extremism. A successful effort to deal with violent extremism through effective border management could improve long-term regional security. The success of the Iranian nuclear agreement could serve as a contributing factor toward joint regional efforts aimed at countering violent extremism.

This work has drawn from Alex Vatanka’s book on Iran-Pakistan relations published in 2015 entitled Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence. Some important insights on the evolution of Muslim religious thought in South Asia and influences from the Middle East, as well as the reasons behind the sharpening of theological divide and rise of sectarian intolerance, were derived for the intellectual enrichment of this paper from Khalid Ahmed’s book Sectarian War: Pakistan’s Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East published in 2011.

The following paper is divided in two main parts. The first part takes a bird’s eye view of the Iran-Pakistan border. It delves into the peculiar features of the Goldsmith Line, and the major contemporary issues in border management. This includes the cross-border illegal activities, smuggling and human trafficking. The second part looks at the history of cultural ties and the future prospects of effective border management, with particular emphasis on bilateral trade, and security and stability of Afghanistan. The study concludes with the observation that renewed strategic cooperation between Iran and
Pakistan has become feasible, although not inevitable, in the backdrop of the JCPOA. Therefore, it is the recommendation of this work that joint border security, bilateral trade and other sectors of mutual interest should be improved by both countries, in order for the re-establishment of tactical coordination, in the lead up to the revival of strategic cooperation.

**Goldsmith Line: A Soft Border**

The border adjoining the two states is termed as “Goldsmith Line” and is 564 miles long. It starts from the Koh-i-Malik Siah tri-junction of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and runs up till the coast of Gawadar on the Arabian Sea. The Goldsmith Line is the meeting point between two important regions of Asia. It links Middle East with South Asia. The demographic composition of the Iran-Pakistan border region is based upon being part of the Balochistan province on the Pakistani side and the Sistan-Balochistan province on the Iranian side of the border. The Baloch community is straddled along both sides of border. There are ethnic Baloch in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

Border management is an area where security and economic domains intersect. The border is a source of connectivity and economic integration as well as possible venue for security competition. The past involvement of both Iran and Pakistan in intermittent security tension that adversely affected regional and border security was caused by the following three factors i.e.,

(i) Regional alliances,
(ii) Relations with the U.S., and
(iii) The sectarian factor

Going forward, both Iran and Pakistan should be cautious about border security, because the border is where the inter-state games of war and peace are played out, and therefore efforts directed towards effective border management would help deal with the persistent security dilemmas.

The bilateral relations between Iran and Pakistan have experienced variants ranging from strategic cooperation in the 1970s, to disagreements over divergences in foreign alliances in 1980s and 1990s. In the backdrop of a significant development for Iran i.e. JCPOA - the national interests of Iran and Pakistan currently intersect in securing their common border, and striving to achieve shared economic prosperity.

Certain issues e.g. border security, energy cooperation, and strategic ties, existed between Iran and Pakistan prior to the signing of the Iranian nuclear agreement. These issues would be impacted by the JCPOA and would thus determine the future course of bilateral relations. It should be realized by both states that the bilateral relations ought to be determined by geopolitical imperatives of strategic partnership, and not the illogic of sectarianism. Consequently, an important CBM in this context would be to jointly secure the common border areas.
Main Features of the Goldsmith Line:

There is no outstanding territorial dispute related to this border. The ‘Border Accord’ between Iran and Pakistan was signed on 31st August 1960 (Pattanayak, 2011). The accord was considered a landmark event in bilateral relations. The location of the border is not a source of conflict. The security situation in the border regions is the issue i.e. cross border movement. The illegal movement of people and the smuggling of goods are the two main causes of concern. The drugs and narcotics smuggling is an Iranian focus. The latest factor to add to the border friction is the wave of extremism and emergence of separatist movements, which has made the border a source of tension between the two countries.

The Iran-Pakistan border is vulnerable to illegal activities, which sometimes result in misunderstanding between the two states. There have occurred some border skirmishes involving the security forces of Iran and militants operating from Pakistani side of the border. On 21st May 2016, the leader of the Afghan Taliban movement, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, was killed in U.S. drone strike in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region reportedly while entering Pakistan from Iran (BBC News, 2016). In another incident, on 3rd March 2016 Pakistan arrested an Indian national Kulbhushan Jadhav from Pakistani Balochistan, on charges of spying for India’s intelligence agency the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) while being based at Chabahar in Iran (The Hindu, 2017).

In the light of cross-border incidents noted above, the efforts toward improving border security between Iran and Pakistan could be the most effective CBM to broaden the scope of bilateral ties. The efforts to build bridges between the two states are dampened by the incidents of extremist attacks across the Iran-Pakistan border. Of Pakistan’s four borders, the border with Iran is a reliably peaceful one. However, it is long, porous, difficult to monitor effectively, and impossible to close off completely. The areas adjacent to the border on both sides are prone to conflict due to ongoing ethnic or sectarian insurgencies. On the Iranian side, this is one of Iran’s eight external borders with other states. It is among the comparatively peaceful ones considering other borders include Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan.

The Goldsmith Line is a porous border that makes provision of security an arduous task. The difficulties of managing this border are considerable. Ground patrolling and aerial surveillance both require substantial infrastructure. Both states lack the highly technological surveillance systems required for securing the border. Pakistan and Iran signed a border security management agreement in Tehran on February 9, 2013, that provides a framework to deal with issues like drug trafficking, human smuggling, illegal immigration, jointly fight against terrorism, improved security cooperation on the border, and collaboration in the effort against kidnapping and human trafficking (Iran Parliament report, 2017).

The two sides also agreed to improve border markets and fast track extradition of prisoners. Earlier on, after an unclaimed bombing on February 7, 2007, in provincial capital Zahedan, which killed 13 people, including nine IRGC officials, Iran started
building the Taftan-Mand boundary wall. It is a concrete boundary wall, stretching 434 miles from Taftan to Mand. This wall is part of the larger project, which includes building trenches, deep ditches, barbed wire fencing, and watchtowers (Lewis, 2011). Pakistan has defended Iran’s right to fortify its border. Both sides have agreed to share intelligence to counter terrorist movements and increase surveillance (Express Tribune, Apr 7, 2014). There is also a hotline between frontier corps in Pakistan and the border security guards in Iran. There is a suggestion that similar hotline should be established between the directors general of military operations.

**Cross-border Illegal Activities:**

The issue of border security between Iran and Pakistan has emerged as an important concern due to cross-border illegal activities during the past few years. Differences have cropped up over border security, and both Iran and Pakistan have openly expressed their frustration on different occasions. The border area is remote, rugged, and sparsely populated. Incidents of violence in both Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan have increased over the years and there is a danger that the ethnic Baloch on both sides of the Iran-Pakistan border could join forces (Rehman, 2014).

On the Pakistani side, the border is patrolled by the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force. The border security guards backed up by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) man the Iranian side. The problem of movement of drugs and militants has exacerbated over the years. The fact that both Pakistan and Iran expressed their frustration at the highest levels shows that either the border is a lawless zone, or there is lack of trust, which would be worse in terms of security implications. The serious aspect, however, is that the Iranians allege that the border issues with Pakistan are, in fact, being instigated at the behest of Saudi Arabia because of the Saudi-Iranian ongoing balance of power competition in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle Eastern region. Similar feelings have been expressed in Pakistan with reference to Iran and India.

The issue of border security came to the forefront when an attack took place against IRGC officials in Sistan and the former Iranian president Mahmud Ahmedinejad accused certain officials in Pakistan for the incident (Bokhari, 2009). According to the Iranian president, these terrorist groups received financial aid and safe havens in Pakistani territory. Moreover, he opined that the Pakistani government was displaying reluctance in taking strong initiative against such groups. These Iranian statements were backed up by Iranian ‘hot pursuit’ incidents inside Pakistani territory, which violated Pakistani borders.

The extremist group active in Sistan-Balochistan province of Iran was Jundallah (Soldiers of God). The leader of Jundallah, Abdul Malik Rigi, was reportedly apprehended and handed over by Pakistan and hanged by Iran in June 2010. Another group named Jaish-i-Adl (Army of Justice) emerged in 2013. It ambushed Iranian border guards killing 14 in October 2013 and claimed a local official prosecutor’s assassination in November 2013. The high point occurred on February 8, 2014, when five Iranian border guards were kidnapped and allegedly carried to the Pakistani side of the border by Jaish-i-Adl.
militants. Iran reported the matter and sought Pakistan’s help, but Pakistan denied knowledge of the incident. This provoked the Iranian interior minister to threaten military action in order to create a ‘security zone’ in the border region (Reuters, Feb 18, 2014).

**Smuggling and Human Trafficking:**

The focus on cross-border militant activities means that the mundane border violations are de-emphasized. The everyday problems related to border security stem from smuggling and trafficking, which is a common concern for countries with shared borders. The trafficking across the Iran-Pakistan border raises security concerns besides reducing the options for growth in economic ties.

The underlying reason for smuggling and human trafficking can be characterized as being the same as elsewhere in the region and globally. The gap between supply and demand within societies compels its citizens to access external suppliers to fill this gap. These illegal methods are adopted to avoid legal taxes and tariffs. The operative reason behind smuggling is the slackness of the government in channelizing bilateral exchange and transfer through a valid process. The governments are duty-bound to check those who are involved in illegal trading. The Iran-Pakistan border also forms South Asia’s boundary with the Middle East. There are some individuals who attempt to illegally move over to Europe in search of employment. This makes trafficking a noticeable problem similar to smuggling.

The problem of dealing with mundane border security issues like smuggling of goods and even human trafficking might be manageable with latest technology. Both Iran and Pakistan are middle powers with medium military capabilities and sufficient regional clout to gain access to equipment from technologically advanced nations, if so desired. But it is relatively difficult to provide assurances against socio-economic evils and non-state violent groups. In an era of globalization huge quantities of goods are moving around the world. It would be harder to ensure border management to prevent illegal activities, particularly of a border as susceptible as the Goldsmith Line.

Nonetheless, these illegal activities in the border region cast a shadow over bilateral relations. Therefore, in order to facilitate cooperation and peace an agreement was signed between the two countries in 2004 declaring Sistan and Baluchistan as ‘twin provinces’ (Daily Dawn, Nov 24, 2004). Under this agreement, Iran would help the Pakistani Baluchistan government in advanced agricultural technology. It included greater interaction between educational institutes of the two countries. There was to be an exchange of teachers and students between the two provinces. The signatories were to ensure that visitors received maximum facilities and security on both sides. The penultimate objective behind efforts towards effective border management between Iran and Pakistan must include enhancement of bilateral trade, and overall improvement in the security situation in Afghanistan.
Relations in Perspective: Historical Ties and Future Prospects:

This part looks into the future prospects of effective border management in the backdrop of the Iranian nuclear agreement in two significant areas i.e. bilateral trade and the security of Afghanistan. The national policies of the two states and within their respective power echelons sometimes tend to oscillate between convergences and divergences. However the evidence from geography, history and culture demonstrates that in future the convergences and linkages would be prioritized over divergences and rivalries in bilateral relations between Iran and Pakistan.

During the Middle Ages three huge Muslim empires straddled these two geographically contiguous regions of South Asia and the Middle East: Ottomans, Mughals, and Safavids. The pre-British Muslim rulers in India particularly the Mughal Empire (1526-1857), not unlike the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) in the west, received the Persian language and court culture from Iran (Haneda, 1997). The dominant culture in both empires subsequently came to be known as the Turco-Persian culture.

The Mughal court was an interesting amalgam of Turkish and Persian influences. There were two factions in the Mughal court, which often vied for influence. These were known as the Turani (Turkish-Central Asian) and the Irani (Persian) factions. While the former were predominantly soldiers, the latter were mostly men of letters. The Mughal court did not make any professional distinctions. This meant that it was not uncommon to find a poet leading a Mughal army in battle as the general-in-command. The Safavids (1501-1736) in Iran, however, separated “men of the pen” from “men of the sword” (Burn & Haig, 1937).

The strong Persian literary influence was curtailed by the British through the substitution of English as the official language instead of Persian. It was only by restricting the path of Persian learning to government jobs that the aristocracy’s (both Hindu & Muslim) infatuation with Persian language could be reduced. Nonetheless, the foremost poets of Urdu language and Pakistani nationalism, Mirza Asadullah Ghalib (1797-1869) and Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), considered their Persian poetry to be superior in content and quality to their oeuvres in Urdu, Pakistan’s national language.

In the contemporary era this influence survives to a much lesser degree through the Iranian cultural centers in Pakistan (total eight in number all over Pakistan). This is much the same way as the English influence continues through the British Council offices. There might be some who would consider that the replacement of Persian by English was just one imperial language being substituted by another and therefore ultimately inconsequential. However, there is persisting admiration for both Persian and English and their underlying cultures among educated Pakistanis, although Persian is considered rather indigenous in nature due to its close-to-home origins. Beyond these intangible factors such as language and culture, the most tangible feature that indicates the continuation of closeness between Iran and Pakistan is the economic potential of the shared 564 miles long border.
The regional collaboration between Iran and Pakistan in pursuit of stability along the borders and within states has considerable history. In 1937, the Treaty of Saadabad was signed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. It was a non-aggression pact (Dann, 1988). Following India’s independence from Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran joined the US-led Baghdad Pact, which also included Britain, Iraq and Turkey. After Iraq withdrew in 1958, it was rechristened as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In July 1964, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan founded the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). It was renamed Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985. It later increased to include Afghanistan, five of the newly formed Central Asian countries, and one Caucasus country (Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan). The latter forum needs to be strengthened for increased regional coordination and economic development.

**Iran-Pakistan Bilateral Trade Volume:**

According to the geopolitical and the historical factors, it is quite apparent that Iran and Pakistan should act as cooperative partners in both the economic as well as the security domains. The traditional emphasis of the post-revolutionary Iranian government has been on communications, border markets, and transport (IRNA, 2017). A recent statement by an Iranian official spelled out five areas of potential collaboration. These included, energy, railway, transport, steel, and petrochemicals (The Iran Project, 2017).

The issues in regard to border security negatively impact the trade volume between Pakistan and Iran, which remains low. Two other important factors responsible for the low trade volume include, smuggling and the international economic sanctions. During 2014 the Iran-Pakistan trade was 217 million dollars. The volume of trade between both states has remained consistently low since 2008-2009, when it had experienced a boost and crossed 1.32 billion dollars (Rafique, 2016).

The official Pakistani reason for less economic interactions is the multilateral economic sanctions on Iran due to its nuclear activities. In the aftermath of the nuclear agreement the sanctions might be softened. This should help both states to increase their trade. Furthermore, any possible Iranian participation in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects could become a major source of economic convergence and include the Middle Eastern and West Asian region into CPEC (Daily Dawn, Jan 27, 2017).

A long-standing drawback in bilateral trade was the absence of banking channels. This was rectified on 14th April 2017 when the State bank of Pakistan (SBP) signed an agreement with the central bank of Iran, Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran (BMJII) in Tehran. The agreement provides a trade settlement mechanism and is expected to help boost trade between the two countries (Daily Dawn, Apr 14, 2017). The bilateral trade occurs regularly but in the absence of banking channels, it was done either through smuggling or through the help of third countries. The institution of proper banking channels would enhance mutual trade between both states. Pakistan operates banking channels in many countries and neglecting these in Iran was counterproductive once Iran is returning to economic and financial mainstream (Pakistan Point, 2016).
There are some proposals for facilitation of trade according to which, there should not be any embargo on Iran-Pakistan trade. The economic interaction should be facilitated through trains, and in indigenous mode of exchange. The Iran-Pakistan Economic Commission was formed to bolster mutual exchanges and enhance existing agreements. Pakistan endorsed “Preferential Trade Agreement” vis a vis Iran in 2004. Subsequently both states expressed the desire to expand the agreement. They resolved to increase the merchandise for the development of bilateral trade relations. According to Zahra-Malik (2016), the trade turnover would be increased to 5 billion dollars and both countries plan to sign a free trade agreement.

**Implications for Stability in Afghanistan:**

Stability in Afghanistan is a significant factor of common interest. It is a critical state in the region located at the geographical junction of Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. If the security situation in Afghanistan worsens, it is bound to increase threat perceptions in South Asia and beyond. The collaboration between Iran and Pakistan along their shared border and in Afghanistan can improve Pakistan’s diplomatic position inside Afghanistan, and thereby enhance security with reference to the Pak-Afghan border i.e. the Durand Line.

The U.S. has been following a general policy of military drawdown in Afghanistan despite the occasional troop surges. In the absence of a strengthened Afghan National Army during the U.S. drawdown, this country could become a hub of violent extremism. In order to prevent such a scenario, both Iran and Pakistan would find themselves burdened with enhanced roles for the stability of Afghanistan. They would have to avoid a replay of the events following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 (Cornell, 2003).

During the Afghan Civil War in the 1990s subsequent to the Soviet pullout, both Iran and Pakistan backed the two opposing sides. This led to another decade of internecine fighting followed by the rise of the Taliban. Neither Afghanistan nor the region can afford a repeat of that episode. Currently, the state of Afghanistan remains a potential source of instability for the region including Iran and Pakistan. Therefore, these two states would have to work out a workable formula for peace and security of Afghanistan in concert with other interested regional actors along with evolving U.S. policies within Afghanistan itself.

**Conclusion:**

This paper contends that the JCPOA has prepared the grounds for improvement in bilateral economic and strategic ties. It is recommended that effective border management would be the most relevant CBM to establish tactical coordination. This could further result in the revival of strategic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan based upon economic integration and defense cooperation. The renewed strategic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan has become feasible in the backdrop of Iranian nuclear agreement. Iran and Pakistan are both security-deficient states. There is a security-relevant context to the Iran-Pakistan bilateral relations predicated upon principles of realism. The immediate concerns related to Afghanistan and border security could be ameliorated through a revitalized diplomatic rapport.
between the two countries. This would also open avenues for substantial uplift in economic relations.

The major issue that states encounter vis-à-vis immediate neighbors is of border management. Of all the problems in Iran-Pakistan ties, those relating to the border management issues are the most threatening to bilateral relations. While Pakistan and Iran wish to maintain friendly terms, the fact is that both countries remain wary of interference from the other side, which puts the interests and nationals of either side in danger.

There are two important sectors where bilateral relations could attain strategic cooperation. These are areas of possible convergence between major stakeholders and policy makers in Iran and Pakistan. The first is the security sector, which involves improved border management. The second is the economic sector. The strengthening of economic ties and cooperation in the security sector would mutually reinforce one another. The current trade volume remains much below the desired level. The U.S. economic sanctions have also remained a factor in the past, but in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear agreement, there is much that the two states can do to improve the volume of bilateral trade. Furthermore, there is the area of energy security. China, Pakistan and India are three energy-starved states, which can benefit from natural gas pipeline networks originating from Iran.

The future energy needs of these consumer states signify that preferences in pipeline routes might not serve their needs since they would eventually require transmission through all potential routes. Therefore despite the presence of other potential energy producers in the Middle East, Iran’s role as a significant energy provider would remain unchanged. A similar case can be made for developing seaports on the Arabian Sea (Khan, 2013). Both states possess prime real estate on the coastline. There are concerns raised in hawkish quarters on both sides that the simultaneous development of seaports is a zero-sum game. However, in reality both the seaports, Gwadar and Chahbahar, can supplement each other and increase overall profits for both sides.

Last but not the least, the case of Afghanistan brings together many negative and positive attributes of Iran-Pakistan bilateral ties. In a way the security competition in Afghanistan is an extension of the border management since Afghanistan lies at the northern end of the Iran-Pakistan border. The issues related to border security also pertain to Afghanistan. It is the country where violent extremism germinated in its current form. It is where the Iranian-Saudi Arabian rivalry found fertile battleground. It is also a potential route for gas pipelines and an access point to Central Asia. Pakistan can play a bridging role between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Afghanistan, and between China, India and Iran for energy security. Hence the future of Iran-Pakistan bilateral ties could be improved through policies directed towards border security and economic integration.

In the aftermath of the Iranian nuclear agreement, Iran would be able to exert its socio-political and economic influence in a less restrained manner than before. Iran should utilize this window of opportunity to deal with outstanding regional problems in concert with neighboring states. The efficiency and effectiveness in border management would create an enabling environment for Pakistan and Iran to pursue further improvement in economic and security ties between them.
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Section II:

In this section, a peer review published research paper entitled “Prospects of Pakistan-Iran Relations: Post Nuclear Deal” is included. This paper was originally published by the HEC approved journal “Strategic Studies”. The editor/coordinator is adding this article with thanks to the authors Mr. Najam Rafique who acknowledged the request and permitted to reproduce the article to the students of Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad. The author is Director Research at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.

Prospects of Pakistan-Iran Relations: Post Nuclear Deal

Mr. Najam Rafique

Abstract:

Now that the threat of Western sanctions on Iran has been removed, the prospects for improved relations between Pakistan and Iran provide increased opportunities. Both the countries have the opportunity to expand their bilateral political and economic relations as well as to move towards a broader integration of regional and international markets, particularly through the reinvigoration of the long awaited and long delayed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Indeed, while there are many challenges, there are also bright prospects that this pipeline, dubbed as the ‘peace pipeline,’ can eventually be merged into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative that is underway to link China with the other regional markets, including Iran, through Pakistan.

Keywords: Nuclear Deal, Sanctions, Economic Integration, CPEC, Gas Pipeline.

Introduction:

In July 2015, Pakistan welcomed¹ the nuclear deal between Iran and the six major powers hoping that with the lifting of sanctions on Iran following the deal, there will be increased opportunities for both Pakistan and Iran to expand their bilateral political and economic relations. The eventual lifting of sanctions on Iran will allow for the Islamabad-Tehran relationship to be increasingly driven by economic and geographic realities, rather than the interests of exogenous actors. In anticipation of the lifting of sanctions on Iran, Islamabad and Tehran are moving forward with the two major energy projects: a natural gas pipeline and an electricity transmission line. Together, both the projects will help alleviate Pakistan’s crippling shortages of both electricity and vehicle fuel.

Following the landmark nuclear deal with the P5+1, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif visited Pakistan in August 2015 to explore opportunities for greater economic and security cooperation in the region. In extended meetings between Sartaj Aziz, Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs and the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, both the countries agreed to expand mutually beneficial cooperation on a number of issues.
including expansion of economic linkages, enhancing bilateral collaboration in the energy sector, progress on the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, increasing regional cooperation, and carrying out joint efforts in the fight against extremism and terrorism. Both the countries agreed that economic integration and connectivity within the region should be improved in order to achieve better economic and commercial activity not just between Iran and Pakistan, but among all the neighbouring countries. In February 2016, Pakistan decided to revive economic and commercial relations with Iran including trade, investment, technology, banking, finance, energy. Moreover, in March 2016, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif welcomed the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to Islamabad, which set the course of future relations between the two countries. Pakistan and Iran had signed a US$1.5 billion natural gas pipeline deal in 2013. However, because of the western sanctions on Iran, the project could not move ahead despite the stipulations of the deal that Pakistan would be fined up to US$3 million a day if it failed to complete construction of the pipeline by the end of 2014. During his visit to Pakistan in March 2016, President Hassan Rouhani revealed that while Iran has already completed the work on the pipeline on its side of the border, construction of the Pakistan portion did not begin until the summer of 2015 following the Chinese consent to fund and build the pipeline. It is important to note here that Iran has not opted to exercise the gas deal’s penalty clause, indicating its keenness to become an energy partner with Pakistan.

With a population of close to 200 million, Pakistan is a large and growing energy and economic market. An important element for Iran to go through with the deal is Pakistan signing of a US$46 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative. The project seeks to connect not only the Pakistani port of Gwadar with the northern Chinese province of Xinjiang, but also extend the rail and road networks of the project to regions beyond Pakistan to West and Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. The project eventually hopes to bring in Iran to connect with the CPEC. The Iranian Ambassador to China has already expressed his country interest in extending the Pakistan gas pipeline to China. Already, Iran is connected to Gwadar by road and a freight rail connection between Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan has now also been restored.

In addition to the gas pipeline, Tehran is also making additional investments in the stability of Balochistan. Iran and Pakistan are close to finalising a 1000MW electricity transmission deal that would supply Pakistan’s Balochistan province, which faces, along with other parts of Pakistan, the most severe electricity blackouts. Iran, which presently supplies Pakistani Balochistan with at least 75MW of electricity, has expressed interest in expanding the 1000MW supply to 3000 MW.

**Approach to the Study:**

A review of literature and news reports reveals that Pakistanis overall has a favourable view of Iran. A 2013 Pew Poll found that 69 per cent of Pakistanis had a favourable view of Iran, the highest percentage of 39 countries polled worldwide on perceptions of the Islamic Republic. According to a survey, conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Peace in 2013, political and religious parties in Pakistan hold on to the notion that Pakistan’s ties
with Iran should not be determined by the fears of upsetting the US but need to be based on Pakistan’s own national interest. It will not only improve relations with Iran, but also promote security, economic cooperation and sectarian harmony. According to a report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2013, while Pakistan ranked as the 11th largest trading partner of Iran, trade between the two countries has been well below its true potential despite geography and the infrastructure available under the Economic Organization Cooperation (ECO) framework. There is, however, a high volume of trade between the two countries through third country channels, smuggling and other illegal modes of financial transactions, mainly because of the western imposed sanctions on Iran, and the threats of penalties on the countries doing business with Iran.

In the framework of cooperative theory, this study attempts to make an overview of the current nature of relations between Pakistan and Iran in the background of the lifting of sanctions on Iran, and the potential for increased political, trade and economic ties. It also aims at analysing the issues that will and can form the basis of relations between Pakistan and Iran beyond 2016 including regional political issues and the potential for trade and investment between the two countries. A major question that this study seeks to answer is whether the (CPEC) and the politics of the two important ports – Gwadar and Chabahar – will become a uniting factor or lead to divisive politics between Pakistan and Iran.

The purpose of the study is to attempt a contemporary overview of the extended region in which the two countries are situated so as to analyse the geostrategic realities of their shared neighbourhood which call for a much greater cohesion in their policies. Due to the nature of the relationship, most of the analyses and arguments relating to economic relations between Pakistan and Iran are based on reports extracted from newspaper sources and conversations with officials at Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP) and businessmen and women at the Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI).

The study while introducing the subject, is divided into two sections. The first section, “The Nature of Pakistan-Iran Relations” looks at the nature of relations between the two countries since the 1950s. The second section, “The Future of Pakistan-Iran Relations” deals with the new opportunities for both the countries that are now available in terms of bilateral trade as well as the prospects presented by the development of the CPEC.

**Nature of Pakistan-Iran Relations:**

The starting point for this section is based on the realisation that the security and economic well-being of Pakistan and Iran are closely linked. The two countries were a source of strength to each other whenever they cooperated in dealing with important regional security issues. Both of them suffered when they worked at cross purposes. The mutual sentiments of friendship between Pakistan and Iran are based on the solid foundation of historical ties spanning several centuries, ethnic links, shared strategic outlook, close cultural bonds, and economic complementarities buttressed by alliances such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) and Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). The advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran brought about a paradigm shift in Iran’s internal and external policies. While Pakistan remained allied with the West despite the differences because of the former’s nuclear programme, Iran left the Western alliance and adopted an independent foreign policy. So, instead of a shared strategic outlook, Pakistan-Iran relationship became the victim of strategic divergence with its inevitable negative consequences. Economic cooperation between the two countries lost its substance and military-to-military links lost their warmth.

Political and Strategic Ties:

The extent of Pakistan’s relations with Iran and its standing in the Pakistani society is evident in various aspects ranging from language and culture to religion. Even the national anthem of Pakistan is almost entirely written in Persian language. The foundations of relations between the two countries were laid down in the Pakistan-Iran Friendship Treaty signed in May 1950. Throughout the 1950s, the relations grew closer as the two countries signed a cultural agreement in March 1956, an air travel agreement in 1957, and a border agreement in February 1958. High-level contacts blossomed over 1950s and the 1960s. These contacts were cemented even further with the signing of the US-led Baghdad Pact in 1954 between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, which was renamed as CENTO in 1955. Despite the fluctuations in political and strategic relations, economics continued to hold sway in the bilateral relations which got further impetus with the signing of the RCD in July 1964 between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in order to strengthen their socio-economic development. A new association known as the ECO in January 1985 replaced the organization. Over the Cold War years, the relations were strongly influenced by regional and global shift of alliances.

Both the countries, however, had divergent security perceptions. Iran’s main security interests lay, primarily in West Asia, especially in the Persian Gulf region. Whereas, on its northern and eastern sides, Pakistan’s principal security concerns revolved around India, and in the 1980s, Afghanistan. Therefore, developments either in the Persian Gulf or South Asia had a direct bearing on relationship between Pakistan and Iran largely due to regional contiguity and security complexes that played an important role in the formation of relations largely influenced by their relations with Saudi Arabia, India, and the United States.

Thus, while Pakistan and Iran had worked together to support the Afghan Mujahedeen, against the Soviet Union, Pakistan’s anti-USSR efforts that were heavily supported by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the US, did not sit well with Iran. Pakistan and Iran extended full support to the Afghan pushback against the Soviet invasion in 1979, and together supported the Bonn Agreement for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in December 2001, even though the bilateral relations were constantly tested, following the rule of the Taliban and the civil war in that country. Subsequently, the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan emerged as a bone of contention between Iran and Pakistan over their respective influence in Afghanistan.
Following the Islamic Revolution, the departure of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in January 1979 and the subsequent US sanctions, and Pakistan’s close relations with Saudi Arabia, the 1990’s were an unequal patch in the bilateral relations due to competing and diverging geopolitical and ideological interests.

After the establishment of the Taliban government in most parts of Afghanistan in 1996, the relations between the two countries further deteriorated that further led to a climate of mistrust. Though a peaceful and stable Afghanistan was in both countries’ interest, Pakistan was more inclined to support the Pashtun groups of the Mujahedeen whereas Iran extended its help to the Northern Alliance comprising other ethnic groups that held its sway over north-eastern Afghanistan. This support for the opposing groups worsened relations between the two. As Tehran was not comfortable with the radical Sunni Taliban regime, it felt insecure and perceived it as a serious threat to its national security, consequently adopting a proactive policy towards Afghanistan.

The murder of six Iranian diplomats and some agents by the Taliban in August 1998 was a watershed as President Mohammad Khatami sought to thaw relations between Iran and both the US and the Taliban.

In a visit to Tehran in December 1999, President Musharraf formally invited President Khatami to Islamabad. Nearly two years after his invitation, in December 2001, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharazi visited Pakistan, which led to an improvement of relations between the two countries. In his meeting with Kharazi, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar told his Iranian counterpart that the “sun was shining” on ties between the two countries, and both the countries needed to put the six years of Taliban rule behind them by taking full advantage of the new beginning in Afghanistan. The two countries moved towards not only developing a common understanding on Afghanistan but also to revive a number of joint ventures including a multi-billion dollar gas pipeline.

Moreover, both the countries decided to establish a joint Pakistan- Iran committee for the reconstruction of Afghanistan under the UN development programme and other international aid agencies. During a visit by President Khatami in December 2002 and the follow up visit to Tehran by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in February 2005, both the leaders focused on developing economic and trade relations which stood at US$376 million with Pakistan’s export to Iran amounting to US$92 million for 2005. Though the then Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri set the tone of taking concrete steps to promote economic ties, Afghanistan continued to hamper closer relations with the emergence of a new militant Sunni Baloch group – Jundallah (Soldiers of Allah) – claiming to fight for the rights of Iran’s ethnic Baloch and minority Sunni population. The group’s violent operations put Iran on the defensive and a more rigorous monitoring of its border with Pakistan.

The activities of the group, along with drug and gasoline smuggling led Iran to build one of the world’s most fortified barriers including a new fence and a 700 km long and three metres high concrete wall including deep ditches, barbed wire and watchtowers. As
militant sectarianism grew as a phenomenon on the border with Pakistan, the menace became a headache for both Pakistan and Iran.

While sectarian violence and terrorism rose between 2007 and 2013 in Afghanistan, Pakistan has managed to insulate itself from the regional sectarian war following the launch of the Operation Zarb-e-Azb by the Pakistan Army in June 2014 in North Waziristan, which served as a safe haven for the anti-state TTP and a medley of other sectarian, regional and transnational jihadist groups. The government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has also begun a comprehensive, nationwide crackdown on Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its expressive anti-Shia partners, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, which has weakened their ability to target Shia Muslims. Consequently, sectarian terrorists, now, find far less operating space inside the country than before. Since the beginning of 2016 sectarian terrorism continues to decrease in frequency following the elimination of several hardcore sectarian terrorist leaders including Usman Kurd, the leader of the Balochistan wing of prime anti-Shia terrorist group, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, and Malik Ishaq and Ghulam Rasool Shah, the prime Ahle Sunnat Wal Jammat (ASWJ) militants in Punjab. There is now an unprecedented intelligence sharing and coordination between the civilian and military security agencies in Balochistan and Karachi, where most of the sectarian violence has taken place in recent years. Since the launch of counterterrorism military operations by Pakistan in North Waziristan and nationwide, the incident of terrorism, including sectarian violence, has dropped to a considerable extent. It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan’s decision of not to play an active combat role in the Saudi-led Yemen war has, and will continue to have, mitigating effect on Iran. Additionally, there is an alignment in how Iran and Pakistan view stability in Afghanistan. Iran has expressed support for the Pakistan-backed reconciliation process in Afghanistan, and which has been evident in Tehran’s hosting of multiple Afghan Taliban negotiations. At the same time, both the countries see the so-called rise of the Islamic State, which has an embryonic presence in South Asia as a threat.

Trade and Economic Cooperation:

Since the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, economic and trade relations between Pakistan and Iran have remained marginal because of many reasons. It includes the lingering mistrust, the American pressure, the complexity of the Afghanistan situation, the discord between the US and Iran concerning Iran’s nuclear programme, and the Western economic sanctions against Iran which did not allow Pakistan and Iran to take full advantage of the opportunities that became available after 9/11.

In 2014, overall trade with Iran was US$217 million out of which exports from Pakistan amounted to US $53. The key export items of Iran to Pakistan included: iron ore, iron scrap, dates, detergents, transformers, chemicals, bitumen, polyethylene, propylene, etc. while export items of Pakistan to Iran include rice, fresh fruits, meat cloth and mechanical machinery.
Table No. 1
Pakistan’s Trade with Iran (Million USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A number of reasons contributed to the low trade volumes. These included: high non-tariff barriers in Iran; high customs duty on items in which Pakistan has comparative advantage (e.g. textile); slow process of import approvals in Iran; lack of enabling infrastructure that can facilitate trade on Pakistan’s side; poor rail, road and air connectivity between the two countries; and less number of land border trade posts.14

Despite the abysmal trade relations, Pakistan and Iran have, over the years, been able to develop a broad range of institutionalized steps under the ECO framework that provide tremendous opportunities for widening the scope of their trade relations. In the 1990s for example, both the countries conceived the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project that was eventually signed in March 2009 by the then President Asif Ali Zardari and President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. It was formally inaugurated in March 2013. The project dubbed as, ‘Peace Pipeline’ that envisaged delivery of gas from Pars gas field to Pakistan through a 1,150 km pipeline on the Iranian side, and a 781 km pipeline on the Pakistan side of the border to be joined eventually to the domestic pipeline network in Pakistan. The construction of the pipeline was scheduled to be completed by December 31, 2014. However, while Iran has almost completed the portion of the pipeline on its side of the border, the pipeline on the Pakistani side of the border could not be completed because of the lack of funds and the sanctions on Iran.

Import of electricity from Iran has also been on the cards. In 2002, Pakistan and Iran signed an agreement for import of 74 MW of electricity from Iran. This project was postponed due to the sanctions on banking transactions with Iran. Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2012 to import 1000 MW of electricity from Iran, and according to the National Electricity and Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) of Pakistan imported 31.3GWh of electricity from Iran in December 2014. The transmission of electricity was carried out through a 132KV transmission line from Iran to Pakistan.15 In March 2015, Iranian company Tavanir and the National Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC) approved the feasibility report on 1,000 MW electricity supply from Iran to Pakistan for which a 500 kV Iran- Balochistan line will be laid at a
cost of US$700 million.\textsuperscript{16} In August 2015, Iran also offered to export 3000 MW of electricity to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{17}

An agreement, Economic Cooperation Organization Trade Agreement (ECOTA) was signed between Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Tajikistan in 2003, which envisaged the establishment of a free trade area that represents another framework that holds the potential of bringing Pakistan and Iran closer. However, this agreement has not been implemented yet, due to different interpretations of the articles of the agreement on tariff Pakistan and Iran had also signed a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in March 2004. According to officials at TDAP, the agreement would be finally converted into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The purpose of the agreement is to strengthen economic and political relations between the two countries and to promote a more secure environment for sustainable growth of trade and expand mutual trade by exploring new areas of cooperation. The trade embargo on Iran was another reason why PTA could not achieve its full potential. Also, a substantial amount of trade had to be routed through a third country – Dubai and the UAE in this instance — despite that fact that Pakistan, Iran and Turkey have established the Istanbul-Islamabad-Tehran railway network proposed in the 18th Regional Planning Council of the ECO held in Islamabad in 2008. This 6,500 km long rail network is one of the major projects of ECO with the aim of connecting Central Asia with Europe. While Pakistan Railways is now running freight operations between Zahidan in Iran and Quetta in Pakistan, the decision for the revival of the „Gul Train” – an Islamabad-Istanbul via Tehran freight train – is still pending.

Under the ECO framework, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey have also established a number of initiatives including the ECO Trade and Development Bank headquartered in Turkey and representative office in Karachi. A comprehensive Transit Transport Framework Agreement (TTFA) — an ECO Fund for the implementation of the TTFA has already been established, and the joint ECO Secretariat and Islamic Development Bank (IDB) regional project for the implementation of TTFA is in its final stages of implementation.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, an ECO truck caravan initiative was launched in 2010 in Islamabad under TTFA besides the establishment of ECO Reinsurance Company for the purpose of promoting regional linkages and to support economic development. Unfortunately, all these initiatives have yet to achieve the goal of increasing trade within the ECO member countries.

Pakistan and Iran have also signed five MoUs in December 2014 to enhance trade cooperation, which include a Joint Investment Committee to identify areas for investment in both the countries. Furthermore, both the countries agreed to open bank branches and facilitate a currency swap for bilateral trade. It was agreed that cooperation between Pakistan’s Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA) and Iran’s counterpart organization would be enhanced. An agreement was reached to establish a sister port relationship between Karachi and Chabahar ports. Trading centers along the Iran-Pakistan border were also identified that could be used as common markets to sell goods at
concessional rates of customs and other duties in order to control illegal cross border trade.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite the huge potential for cooperation and the infrastructure for economic linkages, the trade volume between the two countries remained low due to the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraphs. In April 2015, both Pakistan and Iran agreed on a five-year trade facilitation plan to enhance bilateral trade to $5 billion, and an early elimination of all non-tariff barriers under the 2006 Preferential Trade Agreement to fulfill the shared vision of Prime Minister Sharif and President Rouhani to increase bilateral trade from $1b to $5bn. Both the sides also agreed to form a working group to suggest widening of the 2006 Pakistan-Iran Preferential Trade Agreement.\textsuperscript{20}

**Future of Pakistan-Iran Relations:**

Pakistan is especially interested in improving and coordinating its economic relations with Iran. With the lifting of the international sanctions on Iran, all legal hurdles of doing trade with Iran have now been removed. This will give a boost to economic relations between the two countries and both the countries would no longer have to rely on indirect trade. While economic relations will be the major focus of future relations, there will be many foreign policy issues that will impact such relations. Of particular concern would be China’s efforts to develop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and Iran’s growing relations with India.

**Prospects for Emerging Bilateral Ties:**

Pakistan has always endeavoured to maintain a special bond with Iran. Keeping in view, the sanction on Iran and repercussion for the states doing business with Iran and the subsequent lifting of sanctions on Iran in January 2016, presented opportunities for Pakistan to widen and deepen the scope of the 2006 Preferential Trade Agreement with Iran. The changing regional and global environment in terms of security and the growing prospects of economic cooperation between states in the region would have both implicit and explicit impact on such relations. Pakistan-Iran relations are now increasingly being defined by economic realism\textsuperscript{21} and cooperative framework of interaction. One can see two major opportunities in this regard:

1. Trade and energy cooperation between Pakistan and Iran can be increased through the revival of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. The gas pipeline could meet 25 per cent of Pakistan’s energy needs. The total cost of the project is estimated at US$7.50 billion with the cost, on the Pakistani side, of about US$1.25 billion. The project would supply 750 mcft daily through its 1700 km length, and it is estimated that at least 5000 MW of electricity could be generated through the use of Iranian gas.\textsuperscript{22} The pipeline can also become a part of the larger China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative;
2. The increased cooperation of Iran can be sought to extend and develop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from Gwadar to Chabahar.

The geo-political situation is undergoing a remarkable paradigm shift. Iran has become a prominent player in this new configuration. Pakistan’s increasing cooperation with Russia, the efforts for reconciliation in Afghanistan, and the expanding economic ties with China call for an inclusive approach. The change of guard in Iran, where a reformist like Hasan Rouhani has replaced hardliner Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, has also introduced new dynamics in Iran’s national agenda.

Iran, under President Rouhani, has displayed pragmatism that will usher in an encouraging environment. President Hassan Rouhani has been quick to conclude six MoUs, including a “Five-Year Strategic Trade Cooperation Plan” with Pakistan to bolster bilateral relations in the areas of trade, economy and energy. The two sides have also agreed to deliberate on the ways to boost bilateral trade by means of preferential trade and to move forward for a free-trade agreement through an opening of two additional crossing points along their border to encourage and facilitate trade and people-to-people contacts that have suffered due to sanctions. President Rouhani also agreed to explore the possibility of sea trade through Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and Iran’s Chabahar Port.

**China Factor:**

The growing ties between China and Iran is an important factor that needs to be weighed by the leadership in Pakistan to immediately take necessary steps to ensure a trilateral cooperation among Pakistan, Iran and China. There is an added factor to push this kind of cooperation forward.

During a visit to Iran by Chinese President Xi Jinping in January 2016, both Iran and China signed a US$600 billion trade deal. Both agreed to expand multidimensional ties and increase bilateral trade more than tenfold in the next decade. The two countries signed seventeen accords including agreements on cooperation in nuclear energy to become a part of China’s One Belt, One Road’ initiative.

China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau, a subsidiary of Chinese energy giant China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), has already agreed to build Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline on the Pakistani side under the CPEC initiative. The 435 miles (700 kilometers) of pipeline from the western Pakistani port of Gwadar to Nawabshah in the southern province of Sindh will connect to Pakistan’s existing gas-distribution pipeline network, and is expected to cost US$1.5 billion to US$1.8 billion. Under the deal, 85% of the financing will be provided by a Chinese loan, with Pakistan coming up with the rest.
Concisely, Iran has agreed to consider options of involvement with the proposed CPEC, with the aim to improve and upgrade links via railways as well as road, targeting to widen scope of goods transit.

**Indian Factor:**

Although, there are growing prospects of increased economic cooperation and connectivity between Pakistan and Iran, the growing Indian influence and ties with Iran may present obstacles as India pushes ahead in its relations with Iran, particularly in the context of developing the Iranian port of Chabahar, both as a competitor to Gwadar and a means through which India can access Afghanistan and Central Asia. India’s relations with Iran center on two main issues:

1. Entrepreneurial opportunities that are particularly in the oil and gas sectors;
2. Regional issues, notably Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are pursued mainly by Indian intelligence agencies.

India backed out of the multi-billion dollar IPI gas pipeline project in 2009. This was done largely due to Indo-US nuclear deal, the US sanctions and the fact that the pipeline would traverse Pakistan. However, it continued to develop economic and political relations with Iran using the exemptions from the US sanctions provided especially to India.

In the attempts to forge more direct links with and through Iran, onto Afghanistan and countries of Central Asia, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has now pledged up to US$ 500 million to develop the port of Chabahar as part of the trilateral transit agreement.
between India, Iran and Afghanistan. Iran and India have also signed a number of agreements to enhance cooperation in technological fields including aerospace, biotechnology, and nanotechnology, petrochemical, counter-terrorism, and banking cooperation.26

Chabahar port, which is a symbol of Indo-Iran economic and strategic cooperation, will give India access to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan entirely. Chabahar port is also linked to India’s receiving natural gas imports from Iran as the port would also serve as the point of origin for the proposed Iran-Oman-India pipeline. India’s strategic thinkers also view the port as a strategic counterweight to China’s pursuit of Gwadar port in Pakistan.27 Reports have also emerged over the likelihood of India sealing a new US$ 4.5 billion deal with Iran that will see the construction of a direct 1,400 km undersea gas pipeline from the Iranian port city of Chabahar to the Gujarat coast.28

Although India’s presence in Iran is substantial, however, after the lifting of sanctions, it is bound to lose the advantage it gained over the sanctions period to the other trading partners of Iran including Pakistan and China. Pakistan has already won a political victory by not taking side in the Iran-Saudi spat, and it must avoid India-centric moves. On the contrary, India must be met with this competition on economic grounds rather than muddy it with sentiments of political rivalry. For that to happen, it is also necessary that our borders with Iran are properly monitored to discourage smuggling and anti-state elements. Pakistan would need to establish normal trading relations with both Iran and India.

So far as geopolitical rivalry over construction of Chabahar (by India) and Gwadar (by China) is concerned, it is more imaginary than real and raises unnecessary concerns. Both the ports can be complementary to each other rather than competitive. The more the regional actors get engaged for development, the better it would be for the prospects for peace in the region.

**Saudi Factor:**

Pakistan has a history of cooperation with Saudi Arabia against Tehran’s interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, therefore, make a complicated triangle. Pakistan, keeping in view the international dynamics of Shia-Sunni schism, faces the dilemma of balancing between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, given the changing dynamics of its relations in the present context, it cannot afford to embroil itself directly in the most sensitive aspect of Iran-Saudi cold war. Pakistan’s decision not to play an active combat role in the Saudi-led Yemen war was, in fact, the test of its diplomatic skills that have proved successful in keeping Pakistan out of the Iran-Saudi tussle. It has urged restraint in the current Iran-Arab tensions and has opposed any military action.

On top of all this, there is now a growing alignment in how Iran and Pakistan view stability in Afghanistan that had once been the hotbed of proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The shift in Tehran’s stance over reconciliation talks with Taliban is one of the major reflections of Iran’s pragmatism. Iran, who had disapproved any kind of
negotiations with the Taliban till 2009, has offered to play its role in mediating with the Taliban. It has now expressed support for the Pakistan-backed reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Tehran has hosted multiple Afghan Taliban negotiations. At the same time both Iran and Pakistan see the so-called Islamic State, which has an embryonic presence in South Asia, as a threat.

However, balancing Iran-Arab relations will be a difficult and uphill task for Pakistan, especially when Pakistani guest workers are employed in the Gulf and it is mostly their remittances that keep the country’s economy afloat. Notwithstanding these difficult circumstances, Pakistan will have to remain neutral and alert against the import of toxic ideology of fresh violence at home.

**Conclusion:**

The times for Pakistan and Iran are challenging, but they equally provide the opportunity to close their ranks. In order to achieve the objective, the two sides need to develop a joint strategy to secure their land and maritime interests. Even as the two countries move to improve and upgrade their transportation and communication linkages, those trying to create differences between them are creating a negative impression of presenting the Gwadar Port in Pakistan and Iran’s Chabahar as rival international trade ports. The joint waterways have more than enough real and potential trade volume. Viewed through the lens of cooperation, both the ports present an opportunity that must be tapped by opening up discussions on building links between Chabahar and Gwadar, as well as enhanced road links between Iran, Pakistan and Iran.

There is a lot of room for trade and business dealings between Pakistan and Iran. However, both countries need to strengthen their banking connection and currency swap to promote trade. Iran has already offered that Iran’s Bank Milli and Pakistan’s National Bank could open branches on reciprocal basis, but this process is taking time and remains pending. It would be far more profitable for trade to be permitted in local currencies.

Also, the ongoing security issues such as smuggling, drug trafficking and encroachment of non-state actors along the border areas need to be handled through positive cooperative efforts including joint security exercises both on land and sea on a regular basis. To this end, border control technologies need to be incorporated in manning cross-border check posts and streamlining rules against smuggling and illegal cross-border traffic. The construction of walls to seal illegal movements or smuggling is no longer an enduring solution. When border trade and development takes place in enough quantum and frequency, the issues of insurgency would subside, if not totally ceased. At least it would provide lesser temptation to outsiders in meddling or acting as spoilers.

Opportunities for trade and industry must not take these in a complacent manner. Pakistan and Iran have joint chambers of commerce, and these must work to divert informal trade to legal channels by checking smuggling, revision of trade policies and tariff and non-tariff barriers. It is difficult to check smuggling through administrative
measures only. The best way would be to work through elimination or reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. As an additional step forward, both the countries must extend trade relations by arranging trade fairs and exhibitions.

Pakistan and Iran have to become major players in the region. The goalposts have moved, but the bond of brotherhood, cooperation, and economic survival still remains firm. History is being created in the neighbourhood of Pakistan and Iran, and now that the menacing albatross of economic sanctions has been removed, the two countries must move swiftly to ensure that it favours the future of not only both the countries but the larger regions connected to them.

SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Keeping in view the foreign policy of Pakistan highlight the Pakistan- Iran relations from 1947 to 1955.
2. Elaborate the Pakistan- Iran relations form 1955 to 1971.
3. ‘The period from 1971 to 1977 was a good development phase between Z.A. Bhutto and Reza Shah Pahlavi’. Give your arguments.
4. Describe the Pakistan’s relations with Iran from 1977 to 1988.
6. Evaluate the Pak-Iran relations from 2001 to 2013 in detail.
7. Discuss the Pakistan’s relations with Iran from 2013 and aftermath.
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MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA

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INTRODUCTION

This is the fifth unit of this book focuses on the relations between Pakistan and its closed neighbour India. Pakistan and India came into existence in 1947 as a result of partition of British India. Naturally, India became our neighbour country; however, unfortunately the relations between India and Pakistan have never remained cordial since the since the interests of the both countries collide on several issues. The Redcliff Award astonished the father of nation, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah as it was against the partition scheme. The issue of states including Kashmir, Junagarh and Hyderabad was also a matter of concern for the people of Pakistan and their leadership.

During the freedom movement of United India, the Indian Muslims demanded their separate state on the various reasons but the most important was the ideology; the ideology of Pakistan. The reality cannot be neglected that the lack of trust between two immediate neighbours built up since 1947.

There are various grounds due to which Indo-Pak relations had been having gap. The seed of conflict developed into a strong tree of enmity and various historical and political events happened. After a few months from getting rid of British, Pakistan and India initiated a war at Kashmir due to Indian aggression in Kashmir. In the first week of September 1965, India attacked West Pakistan and Pakistan had to defend. In the beginning of very next year of the next decade, India activated in East Pakistan and at last attacked on East wing which ended with the fall of East Pakistan. These three wars proved harmful for the both countries. Of course, the both states are belonged to third world countries and their people need peace as well as wish to get rid of poverty, illiteracy and other social issues through removing the enmity.

This unit would be fruitful for the students to understand the causes of rift to establish mutual relations between Pakistan and India.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit you will be able to
1. To understand the circumstances which paved the way to disrupt mutual relations between Pakistan and India.
2. To learn about the initial issues of Pakistan developed by India.
3. Examine the Pakistan-India relations in the context of nuclear clash.
4. Assess the causes and consequences of the Indo-Pak wars.
5.1. INTRODUCTION:

Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947 after the partition of United India. Hindus as well as the All Indian National Congress was against the partition and one of its examples was to declare the ‘Lahore Resolution’ as ‘Pakistan Resolution’ after its approval by the All India Muslim League. However, due to untired efforts of Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the other prominent Muslim Leaders of the South Asia; the Muslims succeed to achieve their separate homeland.

After the creation of Pakistan, India became our neighbour country but the relations between India and Pakistan were not warming due to border issues. Redcliff Award astonished the father of nation, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah as it was against the partition scheme. The issue of states including Kashmir, Junagarh and Hyderabad was also a matter of concern for the people of Pakistan and their leadership.

In this way India and Pakistan could not develop the warm relations between them. Both states developed the history of conflict with each other after the freedom. The conflict between two states continued since the beginning. During the freedom movement of India, the Indian Muslims demanded their separate state on the various reasons but the most important was the ideology; the ideology of Pakistan. The reality cannot be neglected that the lack of trust between two immediate neighbours built up since 1947.

There are a number of reasons due to which Indo-Pak relations remained complicated in our history. There was a huge gap between the foreign policy of the both powers. Pakistan associated with the United States while India connected herself with United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The seed of conflict developed into a strong tree of enmity and various historical and political events happened. After a few months from getting rid of British, Pakistan and India initiated a war at Kashmir. In the first week of September 1965, India attacked West Pakistan and Pakistan had to defend. In the beginning of very next year of the next decade, India activated in East Pakistan and at last attacked here which ended with the fall of East Pakistan. These three wars proved harmful for the both countries. Of course, the both states are belonged to third world countries and their people need peace as well as wish to get rid of poverty, illiteracy and other social issues through removing the enmity. To understand the nature of mutual relations between Pakistan and India the events are being discussed in chronological order. To understand the mutual relations of Pakistan and India, the history of relations is distributed into seven phases.

5.2. FROM 1947 TO 1955

We know that the establishment of Pakistan was not accepted by the Hindus. Unfortunately, the relations between two powers could not develop in the early days after independence. Before and after the creation of Pakistan, the founder of Pakistan clarified
that Pakistan did not believe on aggressive foreign policy.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had the idea that Pakistan will be peaceful country and he expressed his views about the foreign policy that “peace with all, and enmity with none” and Pakistan would follow the doctrine of non-alignment. In February 1948, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah conveyed the message to the people of the USA through his broadcast address:

“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and good-will towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the policy of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed of the United Nations Charter.”

Quaid-i-Azam wanted to make the rules of Pakistan’s foreign policy according to the charter of the United Nations including the principles of autonomous equality, diplomatic settlement of two-sided clashes, regional integrity and non-involvement in other’s affairs. In other words Mohammad Ali Jinnah had the idea to establish Pakistan’s foreign policy based on peace and harmony.

It is a reality that Pakistan had to face a number of issues due to hostile policy of India. After two month of the creation of Pakistan, in October 1947, Sir Claude John Eyre Auchinleck (Field Marshal) reported to the British Prime Minister Attlee:

“The present Indian cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis”. According to S.M Burke India wanted “to destroy Pakistan as rapidly as possible so as to restore it to the dominion of Delhi”.

India had been miscalculating about Pakistan and the Indian government took many actions against Pakistan since early days. For example, India stopped the river water to Pakistan, occupied a number of Pakistani areas with the support of Lord Mountbatten including Mangrol, Junagdh, Hyderabad and Manavader. Kashmir was the most important state for Pakistan but Indian troops entered Jammu and Kashmir to occupy on the basis of power. Indian government also held a large amount of Pakistan’s share from the capital or assets which were almost 25 percent of the undivided India. Moreover, India did not provide us the share from military assets and the arms which was provided was useless at all.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah appointed Sir Zafar Ullah Khan as the first foreign minister of Pakistan. Before this, the office of the foreign minister was being run by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan. However, the Prime Minister was dependent on Governor General because most of the documents were put up to Quaid-i-Azam for final
decisions. On the other hand Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had been facing health issues and was unable to focus on the foreign relations. Particularly, Pakistan could not develop the good relations with two close neighbors including India and Afghanistan. There were a number of reasons; however, one of these was the deficiency of fully trained foreign minister. Due to shortage of ambassadors, Pakistan remained fail to develop cordial relations with the other powers except a few one. In this critical situation, Pakistan remained under pressure to maintain foreign policy towards India.

This was the matter of concern for the newly established state Pakistan and its people. Just after the establishment of Pakistan, a variety of disagreements appeared between the both countries. The history of Indo-Pakistan relations is full of clashes as the conflicts between both started from the day of the independence. There was a huge disagreement between the two countries over the Kashmir issue. In October 1947, the Indo Pakistan war was started over the Kashmir dispute. When Pakistani tribesmen tried to enter in Kashmir, the Maharaja of Kashmir sought help from India. In the meanwhile, in 1948, Pakistan had to fight a war with India over Kashmir when India crossed the limits of brutality in Kashmir.

In May 1948, the soldiers of Pakistan Army had to fight on borders till the end of the year. In response to the war, Pakistan Army succeeded to achieve almost one third part of the Kashmir with the help of Kashmiri Mujahideen and tribesmen. At last, the United Nations arranged the ceasefire with the recommendations of referendum in Kashmir. However, still the Kashmir issue is unsolved and United Nations failed to hold referendum in the occupied Kashmir.

With the help of Mujahidin and Kashmiris, Pakistan liberated almost one third part of Kashmir from the Indian domination. After the death of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in September 1948, Pakistan stuck in her internal issues badly. Negotiations between India and Pakistan also remained in progress side by side. Liaquat-Nehru pact was signed in 1950 between the both states.

It was the bilateral treaty between the India and Pakistan. According to this agreement:
1. The refugees from both sides were allowed to return in their states to dispose of their property.
2. The abducted women and looted property were to be returned.
3. The forced conversions in India and Pakistan were unrecognized by the governments.
4. The minority rights were confirmed by Liaquat Ali Khan as well as by Nehru.
5. Minority commissions were set up in both countries.

In the following year Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on 16 October 1951. It was a great shock for the people of Pakistan as they lost two prominent leaders one by one.

In the early days, keeping in view the geo-strategic realities; Pakistan made its foreign
policy against the India. For this purpose, Pakistan had to seek some friends and the US was one of them. For acquiring the military as well as financial assistance Pakistan became the member of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1954 and 1955 respectively.

India maintained good relations with the United States and former USSR. India opted the non-aligned foreign policy. Therefore, U.S. step forward towards Pakistan for getting support and offered for strategic partnership which was acknowledged by Pakistan with pleasure. Contrary to it, India avoided to be a part of any alliance. In this regard, the Indian Prime Minister Nehru has already said that:

“If there is a cold war today, certainly we are neutral, it does not matter who is right or wrong we will not join in this exhibition of mutual abuse”. It seems that India and her government had already decided the way of their foreign policy at the very beginning stage. Due to visionary leadership, India established good relations with both superpowers at the same time.

There was duality in the pacts including SEATO and CENTO, in the perspective of Pakistan and US. Pakistan took these agreements as her protection from India while US aimed was not to save Pakistan from Indian invasion but to found powerful block against Soviet Union as well as against Communism.

On the other hand during early years after the creation of Pakistan, the British focused towards India’s friendship while Pakistan was neglected. On the same pattern, the United States also bent towards India due to its huge size. As India was giant in size and had largest population in the South Asia; India was able to contribute a remarkable role against the Communism. That was why the U.S. government always gave importance to India instead of Pakistan. However, India achieved the benefits from U.S but adopted the policy of non-alignment. Moreover, India also got advantages from the Soviet Union.

Pakistan had decided in her early days to ally with capital block against the socialists. Pakistan tried to maintain friendly relations with the United States of America while the first visit of US was paid by Liaquat Ali Khan. Within the period of three years from 1950 to 1953, a number of Pakistani military civil leaders visited USA including Sir Zafrullah Khan (Foreign Minister), Mr. Ikram-Ullah Khan (Foreign Secretary), Mr. Ghulam Muhammad (Finance Minister) and Mr. Sikander Mirza (Defense Secretary). The chief objective of these visits was to obtain the financial aids only. In May 1954, Pakistan signed the ‘Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement’ with USA. Pakistan became the member of SEATO and CENTO on the wish of USA in 1954 and 1955. The governments in Pakistan had been looking towards USA for the aid and help since early days. On the other hand, United States of America had shown a great interest to make relations with Pakistan.

The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was signed after a conference in Philippine’s famous city Manila. The United Kingdom, Philippine, New Zealand, France,
Thailand, Australia and USA were included in the SEATO. It was declared in this treaty that if any country was attacked by the communist country, all countries included in the agreement would help it. However, Pakistan was warned that the agreement will be useful for her in case of aggression by the communist countries. The choice of joining this agreement was decided by Sir Zafarullah Khan, the then foreign minister of Pakistan. In the very next year, the Baghdad Pact was signed on 24 February and was joined by two countries Turkey and Iraq. The agreement was signed in Baghdad, the city of Iraq and in the same year, Pakistan, Britain and Iran also joined the agreement.

It was an organisation for the promotion of political, military and economic goals. Due to various political changings in international politics, the United States of America invoked the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’ as a justification and interceded in Lebanon (Under this Doctrine, any Middle Eastern country could request for economic assistance form U.S. or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression). Except Iraq, all the other members included in ‘Baghdad Pact’ endorsed this intervention while Iraq announced to leave the Pact in 1959. In response to it, the Secretariat of the organisation was shifted from Baghdad to Ankara (Turkey). The remaining members changed its name as Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).

In response to the SEATO and CENTO, United States presented almost $17.5 million military while $60 million economic aid to Pakistan. From 1954 to 1965, almost in the period of 11 years, the United States supplied Pakistan the military grant of at $619 million while the cash and commercial credits of $55 million. In the same period the sale of arms and weapons was on its peak. Pakistan proved herself as the faithful friend of United States by joining the defence agreements; therefore, Pakistan’s faithfulness was appreciated by America.

It have to be clear that in response to all the assistance, Pakistan had handover some of its airports to the United States. On 1st May 1960 the incident of U-2 occurred when the spy plane was shot down over Soviet Union airspace and the pilot of U-2 was arrested. The pilot told that he had flight from Badaber near Peshawar. This incident created a rift between the two countries and provided India with an opportunity to exploit the situation. It made angry Soviet Union against Pakistan while India took advantage from the Soviet after this incident.

Meanwhile, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a letter to Mr. Mohammad Ali Bogra, the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 5 March 1954. He claimed that the decision of United States (US) regarding provision of aid to Pakistan had changed the ‘whole context of the Kashmir issue’. It was a threat to Pakistan. Within six months, the same statement was repeated in the next letter on 23 August 1956. These letters were indicating about the referendum referred to the ‘United Nations Security Council’ resolution which was passed in April 1948 for the help of the people of Kashmir. Pakistan did not take any serious action against these letters; however, in future India refused to held referendum in Kashmir and declared that Kashmir issue is the internal matter of India.
5.3. FROM 1955 TO 1971

As we have discussed in above lines that Pakistan joined SEATO in 1954 while CENTO in 1955 and its original name was Baghdad Pact as it was signed in Iraq but it was renamed as CENTO, in 1959 after Iraq pulled out of the Pact. The purpose of Pakistani government for joining the two agreements mentioned above was to get favour from the United States against possible Indian aggression. In this context, Pakistan achieved the military and financial assistance from America at large scale. However, Pakistan had to pay its heavy price to U.S as Ayub government provided the land of Pakistan against Soviet Union.

The period from 1955 to 1971 was also critical for the mutual relations between India and Pakistan. During this phase India attacked on Pakistan twice in 1965 and 1971. Another matter of concern for Pakistan was the blockage of river water. On first day of April, the river water was stopped by India to Pakistan. Although, the flow of water was restored on 19 May 1948; however, it was a serious issue for the newly state. Pakistan was seeking for permanent solution of the issue. The issue was solved to some extent through the ‘Indus Water Treaty’ with the help of World Bank. The Treaty facilitated the moderate water distribution between Pakistan and India. Mr. Eugene R. Black the president of the World Bank took the responsibility to solve this issue. Mr. Eugene R. Black was hopeful that they would be able to resolve the Indus dispute in a short time. In fact the World Bank had the expectations that the both powers will reach to an agreement. However, the World Bank’s idea of the allocation of waters proved premature. None of both states came to compromise regarding this issue. Pakistan and India had the opposite opinion in this context as Pakistan claimed that she had the historical right to waters of the Indus as well as its all tributaries. On the other hand, India had the argument that the prior allocation of waters would not set future distribution. Moreover, the Indian side set up a fresh distribution formula and suggested that the waters of the Western tributaries going to Pakistan and the Eastern tributaries to India. At last the Indian Prime Minister came in Karachi in September 1960 to sign the agreement with President Ayub Khan on 19 September.

The agreement was signed in Karachi while it is known as ‘Indus Water Treaty’. The President of Pakistan, Ayub khan from Pakistan and the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaher Lal Nehru signed the agreement. It was decided in the agreement that the water of three rivers including the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej would be for the India while Pakistan was granted the right on water of the other three rivers including the Indus, the Chenab and the Jehlum. According to the agreement Pakistan lost the water of the three rivers but it was hoped that the issue is being solved forever. It was the time when Pakistan was in real under pressure. Pakistan had to build new dams, canals and the barrages to store the water for famine. In those days, Pakistan neither had the capability to store water nor to construct new dams, canals and the barrages etc.

As the Indus Water Treaty was signed with the cooperation of the World Bank; therefore, it was suggested that Pakistan would be awarded help for the construction of the dams,
barrages and minimum seven link canals. The decision was made that Indian will pay Rs. 200 million of the total cost of the scheme as the remaining amount will be provided by the World bank, United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and other friendly powers of Pakistan. India rejected the idea and argued that, the treaty was signed under the title of Indus Water Treaty and the water flow was equally distributed between India and Pakistan on the bases of lower and upper riparian. In short, after the Indus Water Treaty in 1960, Pakistan was hopeful that the understanding between India and Pakistan will be developed.

In the following year Sino-India relations became sour due to border settlements between both powers. This altercation resultant the start of India-China War. The war although was between the two neighbour countries of Pakistan but Islamabad was highly effected due to its geo-strategic location. Pakistan insured India not to directly involve in the war of two powers but unfortunately India believed that the primary threat to India came from Pakistan but not China. Indian made her position feeble in the South Asia due to her own embarrassing and poor performance in the war against China.

After the defeat in border war with China, the Indian attitude became more aggressive towards Pakistan. India miscalculated the position of Pakistan and decided to take revenge from Pakistan of her defeat in Indo-China war. On the other hand, Pakistan came to the conclusion that India may be defeated by Pakistan in the war like it was defeated by the China. That was why India attacked Pakistan on its western borders on 6 September 1965. The war was started due to two chief factors.

The first of them was the border conflict in the ‘Run of Kutch’ when Indian troops entered into Pakistani side in April 1965 and the situation got worse. The other issue was regarding the ‘Operation Gibraltar’ to support the freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. The operation was launched by the Pakistan army in August 1965. In response to it India did not control the war to Kashmir but opened up the international border near Lahore and Sialkot. This action taken by India resulted in a full scale war between the two powers. The matter is that India attacked Pakistan on 6 September 1965. President Ayub of Pakistan addressed to the nation and announced the war for defence.

A resolution was collectively passed by the ‘United Nations Security Council’ on 20 September 1965 to cessation of the hostilities. The war continued between Pakistan and India for 17 days consecutively; however, both states agreed to a UN mandated the ceasefire by 22 September 1965 and the war ended on 23 September. The following year, on 10 January 1966, President of Pakistan Muhammad Ayub Khan and the Prime Minister of India Mr. Lal Bahdaur Shastri signed an agreement at Tashkent (the present day capital city of Uzbekistan) with the former USDR. According to the Tashkent Pact, both countries agreed to maintain their armies on pre-war positions. India adopted the dual policy with Pakistan; as one side she made agreements with Pakistan in 1960 and 1966 respectively while at the other hand India involved in East Pakistan to destroy the peace. However, during the War of 1965, Pakistan was looking towards America while the American government brought to an end that the involvement of United States in the war.
between India and Pakistan would not be in the national interest of United States. The U.S. President L. B. Johnson stated that the war is a regional crisis and it would be better that Pakistan and India manage it by their own.

With the beginning of next decade, the internal situation of the East and West Pakistan aggravated and India took full advantage of it. On 31 March 1971, the Indian Parliament passed a resolution to support the people of Bengal. A rebel Bengali military force by the name of Mukti Bahini (liberation army) began to take shape. Now the target was East Pakistan instead of West Pakistan. In response to the war of 1971, Pakistan was dismembered and Bangladesh came into existence. In the following year in July, President of Pakistan Mr. Zulfqar Ali Bhutto went India to see Mrs. Indira Gandhi (Prime Minister of India). An agreement was signed by both Prime Ministers on 2 July 1972, called Simla Agreement.

5.4. FROM 1971 TO 1977

After the war of 1971, General Yahya Khan handed over the power to Zulfqar Ali Bhutto. Z. A. Bhutto took the office of the president of Pakistan; he also was the first civilian chief martial law administrator of Pakistan. Bhutto now decided to improve the defensive ability of Pakistan. He determined the liberal foreign policy of Pakistan and called 2nd Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore. He succeeded to gather the Muslim states under the banner of Islam.

On the other side, in India Mrs. Indira Gandhi remained the prime minister from January 1966 till March 1977 while she served again from January 1980 until her assassination in October 1984. It was Zulfqar Ali Bhutto who made an agreement with India called ‘Simla Agreement’. It was signed by the leaders of both powers led by Indira Gandhi and Z. A. Bhutto at Simla in India. According to the agreement it was decided that India will give more that 90,000 Pakistani prisoners to Pakistan. It was also decided that the both states will try to ‘settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations’.

Indira Gandhi and Zulfqar Ali Bhutto were the popular leaders among the inhabitants of India and Pakistan respectively. Both of them had played a leading role in politics and proved themselves as powerful political leaders. Both were the leaders of their countries who used their powers and set aside the democratic values in their countries under democratic political systems. They implemented the state of emergencies and used the authority. Imran Khan and Syed Karim Haider wrote in this context:

“In India Indira Gandhi violating the democratic norms and tradition of the country decreed the state of emergency and ruled the nation for nearly two year from 1975 to 1977. Whereas in Pakistan following the Indira model in Zulfqar Ali Bhutto also handed over three big cities of Pakistan; Hyderabad, Lahore and Karachi to army by enforcing martial law and overthrew two elected governments of Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhaw then N.W.F.P
by enforcing governor rule. In Pakistan that time of 1972 to 1977 is remembered as the brutal use of force and suspension of basic human rights and violation of civil liberties. In India period of 1971 to 1977 and 1980-1984 was associated as suspension of basic human rights and violation of civil liberties and extra use of state force in civil matters. Under the leadership of Indira in India and Bhutto in Pakistan government had committed atrocities at such level that cast a dark shadows over their legacies and tarnished their reputation.”

It is interesting matter that general elections were held in December 1970 and March 1971 in Pakistan and India respectively. Moreover, the policy of nationalization was introduced in India by Indira Gandhi in 1969. The same year 14 private banks were nationalized. The aim of this action was that Indira Gandhi wanted to punish her Political opponents in India. The same policy of revenge was also started by Z. A. Bhutto in Pakistan but the pattern was different. Z. A. Bhutto founded Federal Security Force (FSF). It was the task force to assist the civil administration but was badly used by Z. A. Bhutto to keep down his political enemies. Bhutto also brought the policy of nationalization in Pakistan while Indira Gandhi in India was re-elected by the people due to her policy of nationalization in the 1971 elections.

After the war of 1971, Indira Gandhi nationalized the oil companies in India in 1973. These companies were nationalized by Indira because these had refused to supply the fuel to the Indian air force and Indian navy. It is considered that Zulfqar Ali Bhutto followed the steps taken by Indira Gandhi in India. In 1972, Bhutto introduced the nationalization policy in Pakistan and many industries and services sectors including heavy chemical, mechanical, insurance, cotton, coal and steel industries and oil refineries were nationalized. However, Bhutto argued that this action will be in the favour of laborers and the workers.

Another matter of interest is that Indira nationalized 14 banks in India while Z. A. Bhutto nationalized 13 banks in Pakistan through passing bills by the parliament. Moreover, In India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi introduced the term of ‘Roti, Kapra Aur Makan’ as her party slogan in the 1967 elections. She was connected with the common people of India through this slogan. The same slogan of ‘Roti, Kapra aur Makan’ was adopted by Bhutto in Pakistan for the elections of 1970. He attracted the people of Pakistan through this attractive slogan. Bhutto was impressed by the political policies of Indira Gandhi while she used the term ‘roti, kapra aur makan’ to capture the poorest public of the communities. In fact this slogan had become the biggest catchphrase of the Indian socialism.

Indira Gandhi also adopted the console foreign policy as she tried to maintain the frankly relations with Arab countries including Iran. Indira tried to adopt the policy of separation from both powers USA and Soviet Union during cold war. In the same time Pak-US relations disrupted as Bhutto was pro-communism and was disliked by the United States. When India tested her nuclear weapons in 1974, the action was not appreciated by the
In India, after completion her tenure Indira had to leave the office the Prime Minister in March 1977. She could not get success in the 1977 elections which were held in the month of June; however, in October 1977, she was arrested and imprisoned till the last month of the next year. Meanwhile a similar situation was being seen in Pakistan. In July 1977 Bhutto was arrested by the army and after a court trial was hanged in April 1979. During this period Indo-Pakistan relations remained normal. Both of the governments were busy in their countries to bring change it the society to some extent. When India tested her nuclear weapons, Pakistan also carried on work to on nuclear arms to make the country safe and sound from the Indian aggression in future.

5.5. FROM 1977 TO 1988

After the military coup in Pakistan in 1977, General Zia ul Haq decaled martial law on 5 July 1977 and became the president of Pakistan on 16 September 1978. The Indo-Pak relations during 1977 to 1988 remained the period of challenges for both powers. After the war of 1971, Bhutto tried his best to stable Pakistan in all aspects. He focused on the nuclear programme and made Pakistan as an unbeatable state for future. Bhutto was also threatened by Henry Kissinger for these actions but he rejected his ultimatums. The situation was clear that India was fully supported by United States. However, Bhutto could not rule for a long time and was sent into prison and then was hung in 1979.

When Zia came in rule, he had to face a number of issues to govern the country. He had to keep concentration on the various issues from India and Afghanistan. The Indian Sikhs revolted in the Punjab and tried for their separate state. The situation became worse and India blamed Pakistan while Pakistan declared its internal rebellion of India. In 1982, a new issue developed between Pakistan and India; it was the Siachen conflict. It was the great deal made by Bhutto with Mrs. Indira Gandhi. In the next decade, Indira Gandhi was assassinated on 31 October 1984 by his bodyguard. India blamed Pakistan for her murder and the situation was critical between two neighbours once again. Later on, General Zia-ul-Haq visited India suddenly to see the cricket match. He met Rajeev Gandhi, the son of Indira Gandhi and told him that Pakistan was not involved in the killing of Indira Gandhi. The tension changed into normal atmosphere to some extent. While General Zia-ul-Haq was about to leave India and saying good bye to Rajeev, Zia-ul-Haq addressed him: “Mr. Rajeev you want to attack Pakistan, do it. But keep in mind after this, world will forget Hilaku Khan and Changez Khan and will remember only Zia-ul-Haq and Rajeev Gandhi”.

In 1984, when issue of Siachen glacier developed the Kashmir problem was back on the scene. In the same year, Pakistan was also in danger as there was an open chance that India had plan to attack Pakistan’s nuclear assets in Islamabad (Kahuta). Pakistan came to know that India is going to implement her wicked intends with the help of Israel or Afghanistan, Islamabad had been feeling the uncertainty due to cold relations with Soviet Union. The logical action of Pakistan was looking at USA due to threat from Indian and former USSR. Meanwhile, United States came to save Pakistan and US government
realized Pakistan about the speculations. The United States also informed India that Pakistan will not bear any Indian aggression.

However, during the following years Indian army arranged the tremendous armed exercises (1986-87). How Pakistan could ignore this threat? That was why Pakistan deployed its brigades nearer to the eastern borders. In the second month of 1987, the both powers made an agreement with the major role of the American officials and the troops from both sides called off.

On 23 March 1987, the elections were held in Jammu and Kashmir for the legislative assembly and Mr. Farooq Abdullah was re-appointed its chief Minister. There have been rigged widely during the elections. Kashmir issue became the burning question in those days and the crises appeared once again. Indian government was the responsible of the issues. The Kashmiries recorded their protest at large scale. The Indian government uses its forces to crush the innocent Kashmiries. The Kashmiries were alienated at their homes once again while their struggle for independence carried on.

The fact is that Pakistan could not fulfill the expectations of the Kashmiries due to her involvement in Afghanistan. After Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, Pakistan became the front state of American block. On 17 August 1988, General Zia ul Haq killed in a plane crash with his senior army officers near Bahawalpur.

5.6. FROM 1988 TO 2001

After the death of General Zia-ul-Haq, an era of democracy was developed in Pakistan. Contrary to previous period this phase (1988-2001) remained different regarding the relations between India and Pakistan. Pakistan tried two periods for each of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in this era.

The crisis of Kashmir reached the boiling point as elections of 1987 held on the basis of rigging. The Kashmiri people came to protest against the rigging during elections and the situation converted into uprising. Indi used the armed power which made the situation further complicated and the Kashmiries estranged. India took an action in Siachen and it affected the Kashmir issue once again. There were five rounds of talks between India and Pakistan from January 1986 to June 1989 over the glacier of Siachen. During these 18 months, Pakistan had the argument that the military action of India in the Saltoro range was a straight infringement of the Simla Agreement.

Meanwhile, the situation in Afghanistan was changed as Soviet Union announced her withdrawal from Kabul. It affected the India-Pakistan relations to some extent. India was confused and worried about Afghan Mujahideen that they would now fight in Kashmir after they left Afghanistan. India charged that the intelligence agencies of Pakistan were diverting the freedom fighters of Afghanistan towards Kashmir.

One the other hand, the dead movement of Kashmir was once again came in power because the Mujahideen of Kashmir were now affected by Afghan jihad against the
Soviet Union. In these circumstances Indian army could not organize the situation of law and order in Kashmir and started blaming Pakistan. In the early three months of 1990, both the powers got ready themselves for war once again. Looking at the situation, the United States determined to maintain the situation of peace in the region. In May 1990, Mr. Robert Gates (Assistant to the National Security of US), came in the region and visited India as well as Pakistan. The purpose of his visit was to remove the chances of war between both powers.

On 21 May 1991, the former Prime Minister of India Mr. Rajiv Gandhi assassinated in a suicide bombing attack in Tamil Nadu (Indian state). The decade of 90s was considered the period of allegations. Both countries blamed each other in the perspective of Kashmir. India had been screaming that Pakistan has the responsible of Mujahideen who came to Kashmir. During the same time, Pakistan argued that India is making violations of fundamental human rights in Kashmir. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif took over the office of Premiership but failed to influence India as well as to realize the international world. In the early months of 1998, Indian army prepared herself to attack Pakistan while Pakistan's integrity was in jeopardy. It was the second phase of Nawaz Sharif; the government decided to save Pakistan from Indian aggression. Pakistan had already been carried on the nuclear programme from the reign of Bhutto. President General Zia ul Haq has already decided the area of Balochistan to test the nuclear arm as during Zia's time; as the tunnels were built in the mountains of Chagai. On 28th May 1998, Islamabad tested her nuclear assets despite of global pressure against it. Pakistan celebrated this day as a national day and was declared as Youm-e-Takbir. The children and women came out from their houses and they declared Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan as a national hero of Pakistan. In fact, this action decided by Sharif government increased the moral of Pakistan Army as well as the people of Pakistan. India remained under pressure at large scale.

Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister came to Pakistan to inaugurate the Bus service from Delhi to Lahore; he stayed two days in Pakistan on 20 and 2 February 1999. However, at the end of the decade of 90s, the War of Kargil between India and Pakistan was started which also influenced on the internal politics of Pakistan. The issue on Kargil developed when Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1999. The Kargil War (also known Kargil conflict) was fought between Pakistan and India from May to July 1999. The United States of America played a remarkable role to stop the war when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went to U.S. and met the President Mr. President Bill Clinton. Pakistan succeeded to achieve the target; however, Nawaz Sharif ordered Pakistan army to leave the area, it was due to pressure of the USA.

After the withdrawal of the Pakistani army from Kargil, relations between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the then Army Chief General Pervaiz Musharraf deteriorated. The situation went towards stress between both and General Musharraf acquired the control over the civilian government on 12 October 1999. Nawaz Sharif had to leave the office of Prime Minister due to calling back the army from Kargil.

In short it can be calculated that the next decade brought a new conflict with India. These years Indian had to face difficulties in Kashmir due to Mujahidin’s violence in Kashmir against Indian army. On the other hand, the Kashmiries had been facing the Indian army’s brutalism. The Indian army continued the killing the Kashmiries in bulk and the
situation became worse.

5.7. FROM 2001 TO 2013

Pervaiz Musharraf had to face a number of troubles after taking the control. Despite of it, with the beginning of new century, Pakistan tried to carry on bilateral relations with India. In May 2001, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee invited General Musharraf to visit India for negotiations. On 15 and 16 July 2001, the Agra Summit was held which was joined by General Pervaiz Musharraf at Agra in India. The two days Summit was planned to resolve the issues between India and Pakistan. The summit was failed as the two leaders could not issue a joint statement. The process of talks was collapsed and it ended without any conclusion. No agreement was signed by the both powers as Indian leadership was not willing to discuss the Kashmir issue while General Pervaiz Musharraf wanted to discuss the Kashmir issue on priority basis.

President of Pakistan wanted to maintain relations on bilateral basis. Therefore, he accepted the invitation and went to India on 14 July 2001. In the mean time, the international politics got completely changes once again after the incident of 11 September 2001. Pakistan had no option except that to become the front line state in the war against terrorism decided by the United States of America. As we have discussed in above lines that in the second week of December in the same year, the Indian Parliament was attacked by the terrorist; India alleged that Pakistan was the responsible of this incident.

On 13 December 2001, the Indian parliament was attacked by the terrorists. Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee blamed Pakistan and indicated that the Mujahideen of ‘Jaish-e-Mohammad’ and the ‘Lashkar-e-Tayaba’ came from Pakistan. In response to these attacks on Indian Parliament, the military troops were deployed by the Indian government at the LoC. Pakistan also prepared herself for war once again and the both armies stood ready to attack on one another till October 2002. In December 2002, the deadlock between two powers concluded when India and Pakistan agreed to withdrawal their armies from the boundaries. The Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee raised the hand of friendship towards Pakistan in April 2003 and the situation returned to normal. Pakistan became the host for 12th SAARC Summit conference in January 2004 held in Islamabad. The conference was held from 4 January 4 to 6 January 2004 and doors of expectations were opened once again for the people of India as well as for the citizens of Pakistan. Both countries decided to return to normal situation through dialogues.

April 2005 was considered as important month due to following reasons.

a. Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was started between two powers.

b. On 18th April both states signed the "Delhi joint statement" in the wake of President Pervaiz Musharraf three days visit to India. The leaders of the both powers decided to solve their issues through discussions.

All of the important problems were discussed between the both countries including the Jammu & Kashmir issue. The regular annual Summits were suggested to improve the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. The talks continued and the numbers of various proposals were launched including Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and
opening of the Khokrapar-Munabao railway link. In the very next year on 8th October 2005, severe earthquake occurred in Pakistan. The earthquake was a terrible incident in which thousands of people killed and injured while the houses demolished. It proved a great chance for Indian and Pakistan to get closer each other. The 13th SAARC Summit was held at Dhaka (Bangladesh) in November 2005. Moreover, on 7 November 2005, both powers reached to an agreement in which five points along the LoC were opened. In 2006, the bus and railway travelling services initiated between two states. Later on, some trading and business activities restored for a short period. The relations came to normalization but could not develop for a long time. The dialogues between two neighbors disconnected after the incident of 26 December 2008 when Mumbai was attacked. The maintenance of good relations became a dream once again for the inhabitants of the region.

In the above situation it can be concluded that the Indo-Pakistan relations remained ups and downs in the history. Pakistan was declared responsible of the Mumbai attacks by India and it was assumed that terrorists are belonged to Lashkar-e-Tayaba which entered from Pakistan. India asked Pakistan to handover the alleged mastermind of the Mumbai attack but Pakistan rejected the Indian demands because India failed to provide the sufficient evidences against the alleged.

The process of negotiations between two powers was reversed after the incident of Mumbai attack. The further talks between India and Pakistan remained infertile in future. A relation-building opportunity appeared to some extent when Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh gathered at Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt in 2010. However, the negotiations ended without any decision. Once again a ray of hope appeared when the both leaders gathered in Bhutan during SAARC Summit in Bhutan in April 2010; however, the efforts remained fruitless. From 2011 to 2015, a series of Indo-Pakistan border clashes continued. Specially, the ‘Kupwara’ and ‘Neelam Valley’ in Kashmir remained disturbed while the peace process between two countries suffered. The Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif visited India at New Delhi in 2014. Sharif was invited to join oath-taking ceremony of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Sharif wanted to develop the bilateral relations with India but in vain.

5.8. FROM 2013 AND AFTERMATH

On 3rd March 2015 the Foreign Secretary of India, Subrahmanyan Jaishankar came Islamabad where he negotiated with his Pakistani counterpart Aizaz Chaudhry. Foreign Secretaries of both countries gave the emphasis to work together; however, there was no decision on whether the meeting would result in future negotiations or start dialogue.

In December 2015, India and Pakistan had agreed on restarting the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue (CBD) during the previous Heart of Asia ministerial meeting held in Islamabad. The ‘Indian Minister of External Affairs’ Sushma Swaraj; visited Pakistan in December 2015. There was a hope of negotiations because Narendra Modi also visited Lahore on the birth day of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Unfortunately, the incident of Pathankot attack occurred in the next month in January 2016. Pakistan was
blamed by India as the responsible of the militant attacks. However, Indian could not provide the evidences and in the meanwhile, on 3rd March 2016, an Indian spy ‘Kulbhushan Jadhav’ was arrested in Mashkel near the border area of Chaman (Balochistan).

The 19th SAARC Summit was planned to be held during 15-19 November 2016 in the federal capital city of Pakistan. Unfortunately, it was postponed because of Indian refusal to attend the summit. Later on, the other countries also followed India and boycotted the SAARC Summit.

The next year in 2017, India violated the Indus Water Treaty once again. India designed the hydropower projects including Ratle, Pakal Dul and Lower Kalnai located in the Chenab basin and Kishanganga dam and Wullar Barrage on the Jhelum River. Pakistan had the observations that the designs of these projects have violated the Indus Water Treaty. However, Indian claimed that the projects were designed in line with the Treaty. On 29 March 2017, the two-day meeting of Permanent Indus Commission between India and Pakistan was held in New Delhi. Pakistani was represented by the Indus Water Commissioner, Muhammad Mehar Ali while Indian was led by her Indus Water Commissioner, PK Saxena. The Permanent Indus Commission is a bilateral commission for implementing the goals of the Indus Water Treaty.

The Indo-Pak relations became worse once again after the Pulwama attack in Indian Occupied Kashmir. On 14 February 2019 at least 40 Indian paramilitary soldiers were killed in response to an attack on their convoy. In the last week of February 2019, Indian air fighters attacked Pakistan at Balakot.

The Indian Air Force crossed the Line of Control, entering in Pakistani airspace and dropped missiles into a forest near Balakot. However, no casualties or damage were reported by Pakistan. Pakistan rejected the claims of the Indian Foreign Secretary. Pakistan made it clear that Pakistan had faced no casualties or damages to infrastructure as the Indian aircrafts dropped their payload in an empty area. However, Pakistan firmly made it clear that Indian Air Force had committed an uncalled aggression when it violated Pakistani airspace. The Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed to the nation and took confidence. He said that Pakistan would response it “at the time and place of its choosing”. This address of the Prime Minister was taken as the weakness of Pakistan by the Indian government while it brought up the moral of the Pakistan army as well as the Pakistani citizens.

On 27 February 2019, the Pakistan Air Force shot down two Indian fighter jets. One of the aircrafts fell inside the Azad Kashmir near Muzaffarabad while the other fell inside Indian Occupied Kashmir. One Indian Air Force pilot, Abhi Nandan, was arrested alive by the Pakistani Army on the ground. After a few days on 1st March 2019, the pilot was relieved by Pakistan and handed over to India. This voluntarily stand of Pakistan was highly appreciated by the international community.

Since August 2019, India implemented curfew in Indian Occupied Kashmir for more than three months. During the curfew the Indian army killed a number of innocent people on daily basis. The Prime Minister of Pakistan delivered a remarkable speech in the United
Nations General Assembly on 27 September 2019. He drew the world's attention to Indian atrocities in Kashmir and said:

“100,000 Kashmiris killed, thousands of women raped. UN reported on this. But the world did nothing & sees India as a huge market. Materialism has trumped humanity.

What will happen when the curfew is lifted? Modi says this is done for the prosperity of Kashmir. But what will happen when 8 million Kashmiris come out of a lockdown and face 900,000 troops? I fear there will be a bloodbath. The way Kashmiris are caged like animals in homes. Their political leadership arrested, even pro India ones. 13,000 boys picked up & taken to unknown locations. Youngsters blinded with pellets. This will only lead to further radicalisation.”

The Prime Minister of Pakistan further added:

“How would the Jewish community react if even 8000 Jews were under lockdown? How would the Europeans react? How would any human community react? Are we children of a lesser God? Don't u know this causes us pain. We've been brought up watching films; a good guy doesn't get justice…. he picks up a weapon, and a whole cinema cheers him on. What has been the response of the world community on any atrocities in the Muslim world? I picture myself in Kashmir, locked up for 50 days. Hearing about rapes, the Indian army going around. Would I live with this humiliation? You are forcing people towards radicalisation.”

Under these circumstances, the Indo-Pakistan relations are colder as the borders between two countries have been banned many times for trading. The people from both sides had always faced a lot of trouble regarding their visas as well as the traveling. The terrorist activities in both countries are always blamed by each other. However, once again Mr. Imran Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed his wishes to maintain peaceful bilateral relations with India.

5.9 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Discuss the Indo-Pakistan relations from 1947 to 1954.
2. From 1955 to 1971, the Indo-Pakistan relations could not develop positively? Give your arguments.
3. The relations between India and Pakistan remained warmed to some extent in the reign of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Give your opinion in the light of facts.
4. Highlight the Indo-Pakistan relations in Zia era. Also analyze the affects of Afghan-Soviet war in this context.
5. Elaborate the relations of India and Pakistan from 1988 to 2001 in detail.
6. What was the Kashmir problem and why has it proved impossible to solve Kashmir issue to the satisfaction of all concerned parties?
7. Outline the main events in the dispute between India and Pakistan from 2001-2003.
2. Imran Khan, Syed Karim Haider, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi: A Brief Comparison, in Pakistan Vision Vol. 19 No. 2
5. Muhammad Sajjad Malik, Pakistan-India Relations: An Analytical Perspective of Peace Efforts, in Strategic Studies
8. S.M. Burke, Mainprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, Karachi, 1957
MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND CHINA

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(the above contents are the part of course outlines which have been covered in
section-I and Section-II)
INTRODUCTION

This is the sixth unit of this book which reveals about the relation between Pakistan and China. China is our neighbour country which had good historical relations with Pakistan. Pakistan established good relations with China after its freedom in 1949. Both countries have been connected through historical and trading activities while the new trading relations are being developed between two powers through China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). To provide the authentic information to the students, the editor has selected two articles which fulfill the criteria of the outlines approved by the experts of the subjects.

The first article included in section I shows the Social and Economic relations between Pakistan and China. Socio-economic relation in the era 2000-2012 have been thoroughly discussed in the part I. moreover, the authors has discussed the diplomatic as well as cultural relations during various reigns. China has also helped us after the disasters of earth quakes. In Section II of the unit, the authors has thoroughly discussed about the political, economic and cultural relations between Pakistan and China during Ayub era. Overall, the both articles are very authentic and easy to understand the mutual relations between Pakistan and China.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit you will be able
1. To develop understanding of the mutual relations between Pakistan and China.
2. To understand the same problems faced by the two neighbour states.
3. To learn about the trading relations of both states.
4. To comprehend the multiple aspects of the Pakistan China relations.
Section I:
In this section, a peer review published research paper entitled “Pakistan-China Social and Economic Relations” is included. The same was originally published in the “A Research Journal of South Asian Studies” Vol. 29, No.2, July - December 2014”. The editor /coordinator is adding this article with thanks to the authors Mr. Jafar Riaz Kataria and Anum Naveed who acknowledged the request and permitted to reproduce the article to the students of Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad. Mr. Jafar Riaz Kataria is working as Senior Research Fellow/Lecturer while Anum Naveed was a M.Phil Scholar at the Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.

6.1 Pakistan-China Social and Economic Relations

Jafar Riaz Kataria
Anum Naveed

Abstract:

South Asia and East Asia are two sub regions of Asia. South Asia consists of seven countries India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives. On the other hand, East Asia consists of China, Hong Kong, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. This article throws light on the Social and Economic relations of two countries, one from East Asian Region, China and other from South Asian Region, Pakistan. Pakistan and China has long history of reliable and time tested relationship. Pak-China friendship has been proven to be model of friendship between two neighboring states. Both states have strong political, defence, social and economic relations. This article is an attempt to explore new trends in Pakistan and china relationship.

Keywords: Pakistan, China, Social, Economic, Gawadar, Trade.

Introduction:

There are no permanent friends and enemies in international relations. The permanent thing is National interest which depends upon regional and international situation. It is a Nation’s self interest which makes its foreign policy. South Asia and East Asia are two sub regions of Asia. South Asia consists of seven countries India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives. On the other hand, East Asia consists of China, Hong Kong, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. East Asian economy is one of world’s largest, successful and prosperous economies. In East Asia, China is the most powerful and populous country with population over 1.35 billion. China has second largest economy of world as well as world’s largest exporter and importer of goods. China is a nuclear state and world’s largest army. China has Quality and a potential to become next superpower of world. China and South Asian countries established their
relations since independence of China. China shares common border with four south Asian countries, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and India. South Asia geo-strategically and geopolitically, is very important for the world. There is many events which makes South Asia important for world some of these are (i) Wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971(ii) Unsolved Kashmir issue

Pakistan and India’s Nuclear tests (iv) Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (v) Incident of 9/11 and after 9/11 USA presence in Afghanistan. (Malik, 2012)

It is a fact that China is the only major power of Asia that can maintains balance of power, stability and peace in this region. Influence of superpowers like USA has increased in this region. India and USA relations are becoming stronger. Now there is China which can play its active role for the betterment and economic development of other’s South Asia States. (Sukhanver,n.d.)

China’s foreign policy towards South Asia consists of State to State relations with five principles of co-existences which are mutual trust, noninterference in internal affairs, respect of sovereignty of independent state, confidence and understanding .International Relations always depend upon national interest and in South Asia China’s biggest interest is its economic interest. China has good relations with all small and big countries of this region to get economic and strategic benefits. As China is a permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and work for the peace and stability in the world therefore, China works for the social, economic and political reforms of the world. China is big aid donor to all South Asian countries especially Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Pakistan is the strongest ally of China in this region. Relations between Pakistan and China have remained constant from the very beginning. There are many reasons of good and close friendship between Pakistan and China. Both countries are immediate neighbors. There is no conflict between them. Both countries have cooperated with each other diplomatically. Their friendship is based on sovereign equality, brotherhood and mutual cooperation. Although China is a great power, it has shown no hegemonic designs and has never interfered in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Their strategic partnership always remains as reliable. They are committed to fight against terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, which is necessary for the stability, peace, progress and prosperity of the region. (Malik, 2012)

Pak-China socio-economic relations in the Era 2000-2012:

Pakistan and China has long history of reliable and time tested relationship. Pak-China friendship has been proved to be model of friendship between two neighboring states. Both states have strong political, defence, social and economic relations. The changes took place in government of both states do not affect their relations. Their friendship is based on the principle of equality and mutual interests in all the fields of life. Both states respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other. Both countries are giving much importance to their mutual relations in their foreign policy. Pakistan supported Chinese point of view on one China policy, Tibet and Taiwan issues.
China always gives defence and economic assistance to Pakistan. In Pakistan, there is huge Chinese investment which is likely to invest in the development of infrastructure, roads, highway, ports, and energy and communications sectors. Pakistan welcomed the Chinese investment for social and economic development. China supported Pakistan role against terrorism in this region. (Sabir, n.d.)

Both states are giving much importance to strengthen their economic relations. Chinese investment in Pakistan is gradually increasing which is very important for economic development. In South Asia, Pakistan is first country which has FTA (free trade agreement) with China. Pakistan and China are good trading partners. During first five years of FTA, Pakistan’s exports were increased. So, it is planned to extend FTA for next five years. Both states cooperate each others in the field of trade, economic, agriculture, industry, energy, communication, and technology sectors. Pakistan-China relations are an excellent example of shared perceptions on important issues and dependable friendship based on principles. (Sabir, n.d.)

Historically, Pakistan and China has strong defence relations. China shares close military relations with Pakistan and transfer modern equipments to Pakistan defence forces. China gave material and moral support to Pakistan during Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, wars against India and as a frontline state against terrorism. Both states want to promote diplomatic, defence, economic, and social relations. The relations between two states describe as higher than Himalaya, deeper than Arabian Sea. So, it is important to discuss all major events took place in last twelve years (2000-2012). (Iqbal, 2011)

**Diplomatic Relations:**

In twenty first century, Pakistan-China relations entered in new phase of development and cooperation. When General Pervez Musharraf became new chief executive of Pakistan, he focused to improve relations with China. In January 2000, Chief executive of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf visited China after few months after he came of power. Pervez Musharraf met the Chinese Primer Zhou Rongji and discussed the problems related US sanctions on Pakistan’s nuclear policy and democracy related issues. He also talked to enhance Pak-China economic and trade relations. Premier Zhou Rongji stated military government in Pakistan would not affect Pak-China relations and stated “In our nation-building endeavors, our two countries have supported each other and have carried out fruit full cooperation”. Pervez Musharraf stated that “Pakistan considers China as its most reliable and time tested friend”. (Mahmood, 2000)

In 2001, two countries organized major celebrations on 50th anniversary of Pak-China bilateral relations. In May 2001, Chinese primer Zhou Rongji visited Pakistan to attend 50th anniversary of Pakistan and China bilateral relationship. Zhou Rongji announced that China would start cooperation on the initial development of Gwadar port and coastal highway in Pakistan. Zhou Rongji also stated peace and stability in this region was priority of China. (Tao, 2012)
The terrorists attacked World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The world community reacted with shock. All condemned the attacks and expressed sympathy for American people. The President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf issued a strong statement of condemnation and sympathy. He also affirmed Pakistan’s readiness to join US war in fight against terrorism. On the basis of this terrorist attacks, US entered in Afghanistan and Pakistan became the front line state against War On terror. Pakistan’s alignment with west did not affect the Pak-China friendship. (Sattar, 2010)

After 9/11 event, President Pervez Musharraf immediately visited China after becoming ally of west on War of Terror. In December 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf visited China on the invitation of Chinese President. He met President Jiang Zemin and discussed the Pakistan’s alignment on War On terror and regional situation. Pervez Musharraf stated that "The cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy is its close association and relationship with China". China ensured their support for Pakistan as an ally of US against terrorism. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1720900.stm)

In 2002, China joined US and EU efforts to prevent a possible war between Pakistan and India. Secretary of state Powell later praised China’s very helpful role. (Sattar, 2010) On March 2003, Pakistan’s new Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali visited China. Zafarullah Jamali was first foreign Prime Minister who was invited in China to met new Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Both states signed agreement on peaceful nuclear plant transmission, as well as economic sectors. Both states agreed to establish Pak-China friendship forum. (http://books.google.com.pk)

In November 2003, President Pervez Musharraf went to China. During the visit, leaders of both states signed the Pak-China Joint Declaration for mutual cooperation in all the fields. (http://www.china.org.cn/world/) President Musharraf met President Hu Jintao and discussed the situations of terrorism at regional and world level. Pervez Musharraf attending the second annual conference of Boao Forum for Asia in China province of Hainan. (Umer, 2013)

In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit of Pakistan is marked as a new stage in the burgeoning relations between good friends, good neighbors and good partners whose friendship has withstood the test of time and international vicissitudes. Wen and Shaukat Aziz singed Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations pledging mutual support in defense of sovereignty independent and territorial integration. Meanwhile, Wen and his Pakistani counterpart Shaukat Aziz jointly announced to start the negotiation on a free trade area between China and Pakistan and singed twenty one agreements to promote close trade and economic ties. (Sattar, 2010)

In April 2005, Chinese President and Prime Minister sent sympathy messages to Pakistan on train clash accident in Sind province. (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-07/14/content_460031.htm) In 2005, President Pervez Musharraf visit to China. He said, "We are proud of our ties with China. Our relationship with China is time-tested and broad-based and this visit will be a landmark in further enhancing our political and
economic friendship." (http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t236948.htm)

In February 2006, President Pervez Musharraf asked China for support of Pakistan for becoming full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Pakistan can play an active role in the peace, stability and development of the region. China’s Chairman of National People's Congress, Wu Bangguo ensured their support against terrorism and appreciated Pakistan's role in counter terrorism. (http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t236948.htm)

On Chinese World Affairs, an author launched a book on President General Pervez Musharraf. In this book author described President Pervez Musharraf as universally recognizing leader who had contribution in the peace of region as well as world. Professor Yang Daoin, the author of the book titled "Iron-willed Statesman of the 21st century" presented a copy to President Musharraf who was on a five day state visit to China. (http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t236948.htm)

In November 2006, President Hu Jintao visited Pakistan. He stated that "Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize China. Ever since our diplomatic relations began in 1951, we have enjoyed mutual understanding, respect, trust and support and our friendship and cooperation have flourished. We are truly good neighbors, close friends, trusted partners and dear brothers". (President Hu Jintao, Islamabad, 24 November 2006) Pakistan also gave the highest civil award of Nishan-i-Pakistan to President Hu Jintao for idealist leadership and his great contribution to strength Pakistan and China relations. Both states signed the agreement of Pak-China Free Trade agreement and their mutual cooperation in all fields. (http://www.nihao-salam.com)

On 8 August 2008, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani went to China to attend the Beijing Olympics. During this visit, he met President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and signed several agreements. (http://www.pakbj.org.pk/)

In October 2008, on his first foreign state visit, after he became the president of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari met the Chinese political leadership, entrepreneurs and Chinese media. In this visit, both states signed several agreements in the field of economy, technology, trade, agriculture, and communications. (http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/)

In October 2008, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani reached China. He specially went to attend the Asia Europe Summit Meeting (ASEM). Prime Minister met the group of Chinese corporate leaders. He also invited Chinese businesses men to find business and joint ventures opportunities in Pakistan. He also met with Heads of State and Government during ASEM in which he met with Prime Ministers of Malaysia, Japan, Italy, Poland and India. (http://www.pakbj.org.pk/)

In April 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari visited Hainan Island. He was there to attend Annual meeting of Boao Forum for Asia. This meeting was attended by eleven Heads of
States. The President held a meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao. He also met President of China, Chinese Investment Corporation leaders and China International Offshore Oil Corporation and welcomed them to invest in Pakistan. (http://www.pakbj.org.pk/)

In August 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari visited Chinese provinces Hangzhou and Guangzhou. He met with new leadership of the Communist Party of China in these cities. Pakistan and China signed three MOUs (Memorandum of Understanding) for cooperation in the field of fisheries. President Zardari also invited Chinese cooperation in the field of agriculture, energy sector and construction of dams in Pakistan. This visit of Pakistan’s President covered all aspects of Pakistan and China relations. (http://www.pakbj.org.pk/)

In October 2009, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani went to China to attend the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states. He met with heads of eight countries. He also met with Chinese president Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. (http://www.china.org.cn/world/)

In July 2010, Pakistani President Zardari visited two Chinese cities Shanghai and Beijing. He met with President and Prime Minister of China. President Asif Ali Zardari inaugurated photo exhibition on Mohenjo-Daro in Shanghai. Both states signed six agreements related to agriculture, healthcare, justice, media, economy and technology. (http://www.china.org.cn/world/)

In November 2010, Zardari went to China at the invitation of Chinese President. He reached Guangzhou to attend the opening ceremony of the 16th Asian Games. During this visit, President Asif Ali Zardari stated the importance of Pak-China relations and Pakistan’s support of China as a host in world’s sporting events. (http://www.china.org.cn/world/)

In December 2010, Prime Minister of China Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan. During his visit, he met with Prime Minister and President of Pakistan. Chinese Primer also held talks with Chairman of Senate, Speaker of National Assembly, and leaders of different political parties of Pakistan. He addressed with the Parliament of Pakistan. He met with Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee, and head of Pak Army, Pak Navy and Pak Air forces. He also attended the Pakistan and China business cooperation summit and visited the National Disaster Management Authority. He inaugurated the “Pakistan-China Friendship Centre” in Islamabad. The joint statements emphase on the importance of China-Pakistan and stressed that friendship and cooperation between the two states serve the main interests of them. Pak-China friendship shares peace, stability and development in the region as well as for whole world. (http://www.pakbj.org.pk/)

In 2010, Primer Wen Jiabao announced that next year would be celebrated as Pak-China Friendship Year”. In 2011, Pakistan and China celebrated “Pak-China Friendship Year” at the occasion of 60th anniversary of bilateral Pak-China relations. On May 2011, governments of two sides and common people sent messages to each others on 60th anniversary. In this year, there was remarkable progress in the field of economic, trade, energy, defence, cultural, sports and educational developments. Head of Chinese state
In 2012, there were high level exchanges of visits from both states. There were several times visits of President, Prime Minister, Chairman Senate, Speaker and Deputy Speaker National Assembly, Ministers of different departments and different political parties’ delegations to China. There were also high level visits of leaders and defense ministers of both sides. In January 2012, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kiyani visited China. He met with President of China and Chinese chief of Army staff and discussed the defence matters. After this, Chief of Naval Staff visited China and attends Maritime cooperation ceremony of PNS Aslat. In March 2012, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani visited China to attend Boao forum for Asia Annual Conference. He met with the political leadership of China. In June 2012, President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari ninth times visited China and attended 12th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). During this visit, he met with president of Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. President Asif Ali Zardari met with president of China Hu Jintao and signed three MOUs in the field of trade, economy, science and technology. In 2012, Pakistani parliamentary delegation visited China and met Chinese communist party. (http://www.pakbj.org.pk/publications/Embassay%20News%20Letter2012.pdf)

In September 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao sent messages of condolences to Pakistani President and Prime Minister on the incident of the two major factory fire incidents. (http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/bilateralrelations/t971156.htm)

In May 2013, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Pakistan at the invitation of the government of Pakistan along with Chinese Foreign Minister, Minister of Commerce, and Minister of National Development and Deputy Secretary General of the State Council. During the visit, Premier Li Keqiang met with President Asif Ali Zardari and with the leadership of Pakistan's parliament, political parties and military.

In July 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Visited China on the invitation of Premier Li Keqiang. During the visit, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with President, Premier Li Keqiang, and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China and corporate leaders and business community. (http://www.pakbj.org.pk/)

In June 2013, after Nawaz Sharif was elected he made China his first international official visit as Prime Minister. In October, China’s Ambassador told Pakistan’s National Defense University that “the Chinese government attaches great importance to developing relations with South Asia, and takes South Asia as a key direction of China’s opening up to the west and a prominent position in China’s neighboring diplomacy”. (Pantucci, 2014)
Pak-China cooperation in the disaster of earth quakes:

Pakistan and China had faced earthquake disaster in 2005 and 2008 respectively. Mutual cooperation of both states showed their time test and strong relations at the time of need. Therefore, their friendship is called all weather friends.

In October 2005, a dreadful earthquake hit Pakistan and some areas of neighbor countries. Earthquake was very powerful in its nature and in those areas since last hundred years. According to Pakistan government, about 18000 people were dead and more than 41000 injured in northern areas of Pakistan. There were too much unrecorded deaths in many cities of Pakistan. In Islamabad, huge residential building which was called Margalla hills was completely destroyed killing all its residents.

After earthquake disaster, in the first week China provided $6.2 million aid to Pakistan. This aid included new 150000 blankets, and 3380 tents at the worth of 50 million Yuan. Total aid package from China was reached up to $20.5 million. Pakistan’s Cabinet Secretary Ejaz Rahim stated, "We cannot forget that China is amongst the first countries to leap to the assistance of the people of Pakistan and it has done it every time when Pakistan is in need. We cannot forget the tremendous work the Chinese rescue team has done in Balakot, the most affected area, in those very difficult conditions and we cannot forget China's contribution to the Pakistani President Relief Fund."

On 12 May 2008, a serious earthquake hit the Sichuan province of China. The quake killed 87150 people and more than 374643 were injured. There were 300000 people missing and thousands remained under collapsed buildings. After disaster, Pakistan immediately sent 30000 tents, life saving and other essential good provided by federal as well provincial government. A 28 member’s team of medical officer’s went China from Pakistan. They made the field hospital with latest machinery and medicine to facilitate the effected people. Chinese president Hu Jintao visited this hospital and renamed this hospital as “Pakistan- China friendship hospital”. In 2010, Pakistan faced worst flood disaster of the history causing huge losses in life. This disaster effected eighteen million population of Pakistan. It also destroyed infrastructure, roads, homes, bridges, irrigation system, crops and livestock’s and also spread diseases, environmental and social issues.

China was one of the first countries which provided immediate aid after flood disaster. China sent her medical team to assist the people of affected areas. Total aid package from China was $250 million. It was largest ever aid package to a foreign country. Chinese government, social organization and common people also denoted aid for Pakistani
Economic Relations:

China is world’s second largest economy after United States. It has been largest exporter and second largest importer of goods in the world. In 2011, China’s exports were US$ 1.9 trillion and imports $1.7 trillion. China’s total trade was more than US$ 3.6 trillion and its foreign direct investment was US$ 65 billion. (Hamid & Hayat, 2013)

In November 2006, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Pakistan. Both states signed Free Trade Agreement on 24 November 2006. The FTA has very importance not only in the field of economy but also in strategic relations. It became very significant when signed between two friendly states. Pakistan gave market access to China in cotton, bed linen, marble, sports goods, fruits, vegetables and other raw materials. China also gave access to Pakistan in chemicals, organic, machinery, fishery, plastic, rubber, and leather produce, and industrial machinery etc. (http://masoodaziz.com/downloads/)

In 2006, China eliminated tariff of 767 items on Early Harvest Programs (EHP). Free Trade Agreement was implemented in 2007. Pakistan is the only South Asia state that signed Free Trade Agreement with China. China is second largest trading partner of Pakistan. (Shabir & Kazmi, 2007)

Pakistan and China trade relations (2006-2012):

A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed between Pakistan and China in 2006 and implemented in 2007. The agreement was divided into two phases in which first phase ended in 2012 and phase 2 started in 2013. It is expected that the FTA will reach at $15 billion in second phase.

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<th>Table 7: Pakistan and China trade performance after FTA (2006-2012)</th>
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<tr>
<td>In million dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports from China</td>
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<td>% of total imports from world</td>
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<td>Exports to China</td>
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<td>% of total exports to world</td>
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After FTA, Pakistan’s export rate increased with China which is most important for economic growth. In the last financial year exports witness sixty percent increase in one year. China and Pakistan have enjoying good friendly relations with each other throughout the history. China is supporting Pakistan in the development of infrastructure, technology and defense sectors. (Pakistan business council, 2013)

Pak-China bilateral trade volume was US$ 1 billion in 2001 and reached at US$ 12 billion in last year, which was a great achievement. In 2012, Pakistan’s exports to China
were at the worth of US$ 3.1 billion and imports US$ 9.2 billion. But Trade balance was in favor of China. China’s emergence as an economic giant in the neighbor has opened up several opportunities for Pakistan. It is on Pakistan how it can take advantage from China. (Khan, 2013)

In 2011, both states agreed to extend Pak-China Free Trade Agreement in second phase. The two countries held the first China-Pakistan Entrepreneur Forum. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) opened branches in two cities of Pakistan. The first phase of the China-Pakistan Energy Working Group was also held in China. (http://pakobserver.net/)

Pakistan’s ambassador to China said that both sides were working to fully utilize their free trade agreements on goods, investment and services. He also stated that “We have requested the Chinese government and private sector to help us strengthen our capacity in processing and manufacturing, textiles, leather products, garments, and also in the light engineering sector”. (Khan, 2012)

Pakistani and Chinese banks are working jointly since a long time. On 1951, China opened bank of China in Pakistan. In 2007, Joint Pak-China Investment Company was established. In 2010, China offered to open National Bank of Pakistan in China. In 2011, Chinese Primer visited Pakistan and inaugurated “Pak- China Friendship Center” in Islamabad. Pakistan and China signed thirteen agreements at government and twenty two agreements at private level with the worth of US $ 35 billion. In June 2012, President Asif Ali Zardari went to China to attend Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit. He met with the Chinese president and signed four agreements in the field of trade and economy. In May 2013, Chinese primer Li Keqiang visited Pakistan. During this visit, both countries signed eleven agreements in the field of trade and economic development. (Khan, 2013)

**Chinese Investment in Pakistan:**

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<tr>
<td>Amount (in million $)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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**Private Sector investment:**
- Saigols Qingqi Motors Ltd
- Zhongxing Telecom (Pvt) Ltd
- Sino-Pak Metal Foundry in Nooriabad
- Sehala Chemical Complex
- Pak Glass Ltd Glass Industry
- Saif Nadeem Ltd
- Haier Home Appliances
These are some examples of Chinese private sector investment in Pakistan. In 2006, The President Musharraf visited China which became landmark in Pak-China friendship history. China announced to increase investment in Pakistan from $500 million to $12 billion, which would be used to make Joint Venture Company. (Shabir & Kazmi, 2007)

**Joint Ventures**

Pakistan and China have joint ventures in different fields of life in which heavy engineering, steel mills, and infrastructure development.

- Karakoram Highway
- Pakistan Aeronautical Complex
- Gwadar Deep Sea Port
- Chashma Nuclear Power Plant
- Indus Highway
- THAR Coal Development
- Saindak Metal Project
- Pakistan Cycle and Industrial Cooperative

**Gwadar deep Sea Port:**

Baluchistan is a major province of Pakistan and rich in natural resources. It shares its border with Iran and Afghanistan. Baluchistan has an important district Gwadar. Gwadar is located at the mouth of Persian Gulf near Strait of Hormuz (which is world’s trading route). Gwadar is situated at Arabic sea which is only 72 km from Iran and 32 km from Oman and linked with Persian Gulf. In 1958, Pakistan bought Gwadar port from Oman. Pakistan declared Gwadar as Gwadar port in 1964. In 2001, first phase of Gwadar port construction and development started with the cooperation of China. In 2002, China laid the foundation of Gwadar port. (Anwar, 2012)

**In 22 March 2002**, President Pervez Musharraf said, “If we see this whole region, it is like a funnel. The top of the funnel is this wide area of Central Asia and also China’s western region. And this funnel gets narrowed on through Afghanistan and Pakistan and the end of this funnel is Gwadar port. So this funnel, futuristically, is the economic funnel of this whole region”. (Malik, 2012)

**In 2003 and 2004**, Government of Pakistan declared that Gwadar is special economic zone as a duty free port. A road from Gwadar to Saindak provides shortest route to Central Asian Republics. Gwadar port gave access to landlocked countries of Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics to deep water. Gwadar port transformed consumer goods, oil and gas resources from landlocked countries to global markets. Gwadar port will reduce the distance between Central Asian Republic, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China. Gwadar deep sea port is also called regional hub because it is located in center of Middle East, Persian Gulf, South East Asia, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, and Iran. Gwadar port provides trade links with Central Asian Countries, Persian Gulf, United Arab emirates, east Africa, and North West India.
Gwadar Port Project has become another milestone in Pakistan and China friendship. Pak-China friendship is higher than Himalaya deeper than Indian Ocean and sweeter than honey. On 15 March 2008, Gwadar port was inaugurated. Gwadar port will also increase the job opportunity in Baluchistan and improve their living status. (Anwar, 2012)

China’s contribution in Gwadar sea port is remarkable. In first phase, total cost was US$1.16 billion in which China invested $198 million four times more than Pakistan’s investment. In first phase, construction of three multipurpose ship berths was included. In second phase, China is also contributing in the construction of highway from Gwadar port to Karachi port on Arabian Sea which costs $200 million and will be totally financed by China. In second phase, China will also finance nine ship berths including storage terminals. China is also providing four fifty engineers to provide technical expertise in this project. (http://raafay-awan.blogspot.com/2011/05/introduction-islamic-republic-of.htm) Gwadar is Pakistan’s vision of globalization as a socio economic system dedicated to free trade and free access to global markets. From Gwadar, ships could go over the world. Pakistan recently has handed over operational control of the Gwadar Port to Chinese Overseas Port Holdings Ltd. China will further invest $200 million in the port plans and will be put billion more into railways, roads, and pipelines linking Gwadar to China. Gwadar would serve as a great port for China while it’s western China based industry and even outsourcing franchise in Pakistan would use Gwadar as great export zone. For China the pivotal sequel on global chessboard is named Gwadar. (Mir, 2010)

Makran Coastal Highway:

Makran coastal highway is 653 km long coastal line located on Arabian Sea. This coastal begins from Pakistan as near to Iranian border at Gwadar bay and connects Gwadar to Karachi. For the development of Makran coastal highway China also gave assistance to Pakistan in financial and technical assistance to Pakistan. Makran coastal highway is built by joint cooperation of more than 450 Chinese and 512 Pakistani workers. (Iqbal, 2011)

Cultural Relations:

Pakistan and China have long cultural relations throughout the history. As both states started their diplomatic relations lead to close cultural relations. First Pak-China cultural exchange agreement was signed in March 1965. In 1980’s, Pakistani Cultural Delegation visited China. In May 1983, an important Chinese Cultural Delegation visited Pakistan. In November 1991, another Chinese Cultural Delegation reached Pakistan. These visits help to close people to people relations. In September 1999, Pakistani Government Cultural Delegation visited China. These cultural exchanges were very useful in the field of art, education, health, sports, literature, and information. Chinese art troops visited Pakistan and performed their folk songs, dance, and traditional music. In literature, quite a few writings from two sides have been translated into each other's language. In 1980’s, a special agreement was signed between
two states to promote the cultural interaction in the field of TV and film. China-Pak educational exchanges and cooperation have developing history. China gave 65 scholarships to Pakistani students while Pakistan gave 6 scholarships to Chinese students. In 2003, cooperative education exchanges programs started between Pakistan and China. In Pakistan Higher Education Commission gave scholarship to Pakistani students for study in China. In this agreement, 72 Pakistani students were sent to China and Chinese student came in Pakistan. (http://karachi.chineseconsulate.org/eng/)

Both states gave importance to cultural relations to increase people to people cooperation for strong Pak-China relations. China appreciated Pakistani’s effort to expand Chinese language and Confucius Institutes in Pakistan. (Sabir, n.d.) A delegation of 100 members of China Youth Federation visited National University of Modern Languages (NUML) to increase Pak-China youth friendship exchange. (http://pk.chineseembassy.org/) A teacher Ahmad Ali Shah stated "Our students should go there and learn their language so we can bridge the gap. If we have some understanding with China the whole SAARC countries should be our vision where the youngsters can hold the market. Experts maintain, the construction of Pak-China friendship center is an icon of Pakistan’s deep cultural ties with China”. (http://english.cntv.cn/program/)

To create people to people interaction Pakistani and Chinese governments have made several steps. In 2005, first Confucius Institute was established in National University of Modern Languages Islamabad. In December 2010, Primer Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan and inaugurated Pak-China Friendship Center in Islamabad. Aim of establishing this friendship center is to promote mutual cultural activities of both states. In this center, there are four Pakistan study centers and 8000 Pakistani students studying various discipline of China. Many Private Schools in Pakistan are also teaching Chinese languages. (Khan, 2013)

In 2007, Pakistan Study Centers was established in Peking and Sichuan Universities. In 2008, Pakistan Culture and Communication Centres were established in Tsinghua University. In 2009, Pakistan Study Centre was made at Fudan University. (http://www.pakbj.org.pk/)

In 2008, Pak-China signed MOU to establish permanent campus of Pak-China University in both states. In 2009, Pak-China institute for socio-cultural cooperation was established. In 2011, Sind government announced Chinese language as compulsory subject in school level but its implementation is not easy task. In 2013, Premier Li Keqiang signed agreement to establish another Confucius institute in Karachi University. (Khan, 2013).

Pakistan and China are agreed to establish Digital Television Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcasting (DTMB) in Pakistan. They will lead to exchanges of universities, media, film and TV, youth delegations, entrepreneurs and establishment of cultural centers in Pakistan and China. Two states are agreed to celebrate 2015 as” China-Pakistan Year of Friendly Exchanges”. (Sabir, n.d.)
**Conclusion:**

The relationship between Pakistan and China became closer and stronger with the passage of time. Both states are enjoying deep diplomatic, defence, economic and Cultural ties. So, it can be said that the future of this friendship will be bright and prosperous. Pak-China Socio-economic relations are playing important role to attain their mutual concerns for the economic development. In future, strong Pak-China socio-economic relations will be beneficial to bring regional prosperity and development.

China considers Pakistan as its strong ally in this region. Both states feel threat from India. China economic relations with all South Asian States are very useful to eliminate the influence of Western powers in this region. Pakistan’s geo-graphical location is very important for China.

On the other hand, China has great strategic importance and economic opportunity for Pakistan. Pakistan needs China in the field of defence, nuclear and economic development. China is biggest supporter of Pakistan against India and counter USA influence in this region. Traditionally it was considered that Pakistan needed China more than it needed Pakistan. But now days, rapid changes in global scenario make both states essential for each others.

China has world’s second large economy having great opportunities for Pakistan to take advantage it. Chinese investment is playing important role to uplift Pakistan’s weak economy. Due to FTA, Pak-China trade volume gradually increases.

China is become second largest consumer of oil and energy. Pakistan is a bridge towards oil and energy rich countries. So, China can fulfill its need from Pakistan’s Gwadar port through safe and cheap trading routes linked with rich natural resources countries. It is also planned to connect Gwadar port to China through road and rail links to make strong Pak-China economic ties. China needs Pakistan to control extremist activates in Chinese province Xinjiang and northern areas of Pakistan near its boundary. So, Pakistan and China have great strategic importance for each others.
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Section II:

In this section, a peer review published research paper entitled “Political, Economic and Cultural Relations between Pakistan and China during Ayub Era” is included. This paper was originally published by the HEC approved journal “Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol. XXXVII, No.2 (2016)”. The editor/coordinator is adding this article with thanks to the authors Mr. M. Iqbal and Mr. Falak Sher who acknowledged the request and permitted to reproduce the article to the students of Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad. The first author works in Education Department, Government of the Punjab while the other is Lecturer as Department of Economics, University of Sargodha, Sargodha.

Political, Economic and Cultural Relations between Pakistan and China during Ayub Era

Mr. M. Iqbal
Mr. Falak Sher

Abstract:

This article deals with political, socio-economic and cultural relations between Pakistan and China under Ayub Khan. It highlights all the events and circumstances about Pak-China relationship during this phase (1958-1969). In the beginning, Ayub Khan adopted pro-American policies. His bilateral agreement with America was considered against China. Ayub Khan’s offer of joint defense against India, China felt threatened. Some atmosphere turned in the right direction when Pakistan offered China for border proposal. In drawing up the agreement the two sides relied on the customary boundary line, following the principles of the main watershed. Ayub showed soft corner for China and voted in favour of China’s membership of the United Nations in December 1961. Pakistan aimed at an alliance with Peking (now Beijing) for the treaty of friendship and non-aggression. Relations between China and Pakistan remained on the highest peak from 1963 to 1969. After the Sino-India War, Ayub Khan announced the bilateral policy and as a result Pakistan received military and economic assistance from China. The present study is an effort to analyse Pak-China relations during Ayub era.

Introduction:

President Ayub Khan took over the reign of power in October, 1958. He adopted pro-American policies which were considered as against China, in the early period of 1959. Ayub Khan signed a bilateral agreement with America in March 1959, so China felt threatened. In reaction China criticized that agreement by Ayub Khan which allowed the United States to establish military bases in Pakistan. Ayub Khan also offered India a joint defense agreement in April 1959. That offer meant the joint defense of India and Pakistan against external threats.1 This offer was criticized by China that was against its national integrity.2
The relations between China and Pakistan reached the lowest ebb, when a group of Chinese Muslim pilgrims to Mecca stopped over at Karachi in July, 1959 for a few days. Pakistani Foreign Minister Manzoor Qadir personally received that delegation which also met Pakistani religious leaders. That delegation made statements and speeches. Pakistani press defamed China by covering the negative statements of that group relevant to China.3 The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) therefore lodged a strong protest against Pakistan’s government and its actions.4 Farhat Mahmood, commented on this situation: “in the past few months the Pakistan government has been stepping up its following of the US plot to create two Chinas and has made repeated utterances flagrantly interfering into China’s internal affairs against China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”5

On October 23, 1959 Ayub Khan disclosed at a press conference that the Pakistani foreign office had received a map showing certain areas of Pakistan as part of China. Pakistan wanted to approach China for peaceful settlement of the border. However, he warned that if the Chinese penetrate Pakistani territory, Pakistan would defend itself with every means at its disposal.6 Pakistani Foreign Minister also stated that the maps were being studied by the government of Pakistan, but the Chinese government denied this statement by saying that “this had not made any reference in any official communication to any map or any territory of Pakistan to which they might lay claim.”7

Ayub Khan offered China in November 1959 for a border settlement. China analyzed Ayub’s anti-Chinese policies on the one hand and his proposal on the other hand.8 In 1961, Pakistan’s relation with China improved, when Pakistani Foreign Minister, Manzoor Qadir announced that China has agreed to demarcate borders.9 A host of interrelated developments also contributed to the restructuring of the regional alliance. At the same time, Pakistani newspapers also started advocating closer ties with China as it was in the interest of both the countries to live peacefully being a next door neighbour. Pakistan also voted for China’s membership to the United Nations in December 1961. Pakistan aimed at an alliance with Peking for the treaty of friendship and non-aggression, because China was a greater potential friend of Pakistan and an alliance with a neighbour was more logical.10 Ayub Khan writes in his autobiography:

...on my return from the United States in December 1961, the Chinese ambassador came to see me. He asked for our support for the proposition that the Chinese entry into the United Nations should be decided on the basis of simple majority rather than a two-third majority. I asked him about our suggestions of demarcating the undefined border between China and Pakistan. He said that it was a very complicated matter. I told him that if border demarcation was a very complicated matter, China’s admission to the United Nations was even more complicated. I suggested him that problems of both countries China and Pakistan. He also said that we were supporting China’s case for admission to the United Nation not to please China but we felt genuinely that China had a right to be in the United Nations. I think the Chinese Ambassador was impressed by what I told him.11 Pakistan changed its attitude towards China and also moved quickly to settle the border issue. They could not overlook the fact that having a treaty with Pakistan was quite
beneficial for them. Both countries showed willingness to solve boundary problem and issued joint communiqué on May 3, 1962. According to that Communiqué, “Both the countries agreed to develop good neighbourly relations and also conduct negotiations for the understanding of location and alignment of boundary. The two sides have also agreed to the settlement of dispute over Kashmir, between India and Pakistan.”

Ayub Khan stated on the Sino-Indian War on November 5, 1962, “I have told in lengthy discussions with appropriate experts and advisers over the situation that has arisen through the recent conflict between the two neighbours, China and India and its repercussions on our security and relationships.”

He communicated with the President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of India and replied:

We are seriously disturbed that the differences between India and China have erupted into an armed conflict. However, unfortunately that situation may be, we hope that our two neighbors will be able to settle their dispute peacefully and amicably. Our policy has been based on peace at large, especially peace with our neighbours.

On November 22, 1962 Ayub Khan in the National Assembly session, discussed that Pakistan was facing a critical situation, and disturbed over the outbreak of hostilities between two neighbouring countries. During discussion, it was decided that our sincere desire is that the present border conflict between India and China should be settled peacefully and by the internationally accepted methods of conciliation rather than by resort to brute force. Pakistan and China issued a joint communiqué on December 26, 1962 that two sides reached a complete agreement on the issue of the location and alignment of the boundary.

Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited China with a delegation and final agreement was signed between the two countries on March 2, 1963. According to that agreement Pakistan got 750 square miles of disputed land from which Pakistan got territory beyond the main watershed of the Karakoram Range, comprising the Oprang valley and the Darband-Darwaza including its salt ranges. While 2050 square miles of the same area was given to China. Pakistan surrendered no part of the territory under her control. In drawing up the agreement the two sides relied on the customary boundary line, following the principles of the main watershed. Waters draining into the Indus system remained with Pakistan, while China’s waters draining into the Tarim system. On this occasion, Ayub said, “…we are happy that the people of all circles of our capital are assembled here to attend the celebration”. He assured to Pakistani delegation that Chinese people also fully supported this agreement. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto appealed to India and China to begin negotiations to resolve their border dispute. He also said, “Peaceful negotiations are the only method to civilized nations to pursue in solving their difficulties.” He assured to Chinese leaders that Pakistan wanted to live in peace with its neighbours.

After this agreement a joint communiqué was issued on March 4, 1963. The representatives reviewed the development of friendly relations between China and
Pakistan. Ayub Khan also thanked the Chinese Chairman, Lio Shao-Chi, on the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement by telegram. He said, “The conclusion of this agreement has given deep satisfaction to the people of Pakistan.” Pakistan and China signed an air agreement on August 29, 1963. According to that agreement both countries agreed to provide the permission to airlines to operate across each other’s territories and all necessary facilities to ensure the smooth flow of traffic. It was announced by the Pakistani authorities after signing the agreement that the scheduled flights by Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and the Civil Aviation Administration of China would connect Pakistan with Canton and Shanghai. Subject to Japan’s approval, the PIA flights would be extended to Tokyo. It was expressed with strong hope that the air links between Pakistan and China would strengthen the ties between the two countries.

American official stated in Washington that Pakistan was playing with fire by inviting a militant communist nation to the doorstep. America also stopped Pakistan’s aid. American President Kennedy sent George Ball, Secretary of State to Pakistan to ask Ayub to avoid relations with China but Ayub refused to do so. When America stopped Pakistani Air base aid, Pakistan operated the base with its own funds. China appreciated Pakistan.

Pakistan and China also signed a Barter Trade Agreement on September 30, 1963 covering the import of 100,000 tons of Chinese cement in exchange of raw jute. The total value of commodities to be exchanged on each would be Rs. 75 Lacs. It was decided in the agreement that the supply of cement will start from January next year, and it will be completed before the end of May, 1964. That agreement was signed in Karachi by Ejaz Ahmad Nail, Pakistan’s Joint Secretary in Ministry of Commerce and Liu Shu, Commerce Chancellor.

During September-October 1963, Pakistan continued its efforts to improve relations with Peking. The leader of Pro-China National Awami Party, Maulana Bhashani went to China as the head of a delegation, comprising Industrialists and members of the National Assembly of Pakistan. Maulana condemned the profit-seeking US imperialist policies and other imperialist countries that had done their best since the last world war to destroy Afro-Asian solidarity by establishing the machinery of oppression. He praised the Chinese by saying that the Chinese are standing for equality among nations, sympathized with the oppressed, help them to become strong and had no territorial ambitions at the expense of other countries.

The Chinese premier Chou-En-Lai visited Pakistan as the head of 48-member delegation on February 18, 1964. The delegation was welcomed by the government of Pakistan cordially. Chou En Lai said, “the historic Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement and trade agreement not only mark a new development in the friendly relations between China and Pakistan but also constitute an important contribution of promotion of Asian-African solidarity and the defense with peace in Asia and the world.”
Ayub Khan said on February 20, 1964:

Relations between Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China have happily been always cordial. History and geography have provided our two countries with links, which provide a sound basis for good neighborly relations in the interests of our people of two countries. Not only is there no evidence of any wars or disputes between our two countries but also we have inherited rich traditions of goodwill and friendship on which to lay the foundations of our relationship today.25

Ayub Khan also expressed willingness for Pakistan-China trade policy and other contracts between the two countries. He assured to support in Banding Second Conference of Asian and African countries. 26

Premier Chou En-Lai guaranteed that China would give total support for Pakistan’s position on the issue of Kashmir. The Sino-Pakistan Joint Communiqué issued on February 24, 1964, in which both countries agreed to work together for preserving peace not only in the region but also all over the world. Premier Chou en-Lai supported Pakistan on Kashmir issue for the first time, and invited Ayub Khan to visit China. Ayub accepted that invitation.27

On July 30 1964, China offered Pakistan an interest free loan of US$ 60 Million. It was payable over a period of thirty to forty years.28 On February 19, 1965 an agreement was signed between Pakistan and China. According to this Pakistan would get loan for imports of commodities from China and for financing projects in Pakistan. It would be returned by Pakistan over a period of 20 years, including a grace period of 10 years. Pakistan would also obtain machinery for textile mills and sugar factories, cement plants, railway steel tracks, coaches and wagons.29

Ayub Khan visited China first time in March, 1965. He was warmly welcomed. Both Countries discussed the international situation. The President of Pakistan reaffirmed his support to the immediate restoration of the legitimate rights of China in the United Nations. At the conclusion of his tour, Chinese government reaffirmed that the Kashmir dispute should be settled in accordance with wishes of the people of Kashmir in the light of U.N. Resolution. It was noted with concern in the joint communiqué that the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved and considered its continued existence as a threat to peace and security in the region.30

Ayub Khan on his return, on March 9, 1965 conveyed to the nation that all points of common interests and each other's position on vital issues were discussed and China assured its favour for the solution of Kashmir problem according to the wishes of the People of Kashmir. China considered that the Kashmir dispute should be a matter of concern for the world.31

On March 22, 1965 Pakistani folklore troupe headed by Shamsul Huda Chaudhary visited China. It was first of its kind to visit China. Ting Nsi Nin, Minister for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, inaugurated the performance. On the occasion, the minister said;
“the magnificent image of the life of people in friendly Pakistan would promote greater understanding and friendship between the two nations.”32

On March 26, 1965 Pakistan and China signed a cultural agreement, according to which both countries would facilitate each other by exchanging the educationists, scientists, scholars and experts by awarding them the scholarships to enable students of one country to pursue studies in other country. The agreement further encouraged cooperation between the mass media and contacts of journalists broadcasting, television and the film institutions of the two countries.33

Both countries also agreed on April, 14, 1965 for the operation of monthly shipping service and the first ship was due to leave on the same day.34 On June 16, 1965 Pakistan and China signed a banking agreement for accounting procedures in respect of the transactions of 60 million dollars.35 The Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, passing through Karachi Airport on September 4, 1965 assured Pakistan the support and all sympathy to the people of Kashmir. He also said, “If India attacked on Pakistan China will support Pakistan.”36

The Indian armed forces crossed the international border on September 6, 1965 and extended the war from Kashmir to Pakistan. China extended support to Pakistan by stating, “The Indian Government’s armed attack on Pakistan is an act of naked aggression. It is not only a crude violation of all principles guiding international relations, but also constitutes a grave threat to peace in this part of Asia.”37 During the war, United States did not support Pakistan. Ayub Khan appealed China for help.

Pakistan and India formally ended war and signed a peace agreement at Tashkent in January, 1966. The Chinese had apprehensions of Soviet mediation, however, China did not oppose Ayub’s visit to Tashkent. China supplied military equipment to Pakistan during and after the war of 1965. The agreement to provide arms to Pakistan was negotiated, during Bhutto’s secret visit to China just a week after the end of the war. Pakistan’s Minister of Commerce Ghulam Faruque also visited Peking as the head of a ‘Friendship Mission’ from Pakistan to attend China’s National Day celebrations. China assured that it would not leave Pakistan in difficult situation.38

On March 23, 1966 Pakistan disclosed that its armed forces were equipped with China-made tanks and jets. On the Pakistan Day Parade in Rawalpindi, the Pakistan Army displayed 200 T-59 tanks and a fly-past included MIG-19 fighters also MIG-15 aircraft.39 In May, 1966 China provided Pakistan 3000 assault guns, 100 60mm mortars and T-29 tanks as well as small arms and signal equipment.40 Pakistani poets and writers, during and after the war thanked China for its support and praised it as: “mighty power devoted to the maintenance of peace and justice in Asia”.41

An agreement was signed on June 23, 1966 in which China agreed to supply machinery and technical support for the complex in Taxila. In July 4, 1966 a trade protocol signed for the export of raw cotton and jute, cotton yarn, jute goods and surgical instruments,
chemicals dyes, and steel instruments. Another agreement was signed on August 1, 1966 for the supply of 100,000 tons of rice by China to East Pakistan.42

China and Pakistan relations further improved on January 17, 1967, when China agreed to supply 150,000 tons of rice to Pakistan. On August 2, 1967, 100,000 tons of rice to Pakistan and on August 12, 1967, the Chinese Red Cross donated 50,000 tunas to the Pakistan Red Cross for the relief of Karachi’s flood-stricken people.43 On October 21, 1967 Pakistan and China signed an agreement in this regard to build and restart this route.44

Relations between Pakistan and China were at the highest peak from 1963 to 1969. Ayub Khan after the Sino-Indian war announced the bilateral policy and as a result, Ayub Khan received military and economic assistance from China.” Pakistan and China had made progress in the various fields of science and technology in the field of Industry and agriculture from 1962 to 1969.45 President Ayub Khan lost control of his government when he fell ill with a heart ailment towards the end of 1967 and beginning of 1968. After about six months of demonstrations, he was forced to resign in March 1969.46

Conclusion:

During the early period of Ayub Khan some misunderstanding was found between Pakistan and China. The phase of friendship started in 1963.

During his whole era, Ayub Khan remained successful in getting military and economic aid from China. So under first military ruler Pakistan and China signed many political, cultural and economic pacts. Relations between China and Pakistan remained on the highest peak from the period of 1963 to 1969. Ayub Khan after the Sino-India war announced the bilateral policy and as a result Ayub Khan received much military and economic assistance from China. During this era China proved a great friend of Pakistan.

6.4 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Discuss the Pakistan-China relations in the early days after the establishment of Pakistan.
2. Highlight the phase from 1955 to 1971 in the light of Sino-Pakistan relations.
3. Critically analyse the Pakistan’s foreign policy during the reign of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto with reference to Pakistan-China relations.
5. Discuss the Pakistan’s foreign policy from 1988 to 2001 with reference to diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.
6. Evaluate the Pakistan’s relations with China from 2001 to 2013.
7. Keeping in view the foreign policy of Pakistan, discuss the Pakistan-China relations since 2013 and aftermath.
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INTRODUCTION

This unit of this course book deals with the Pakistan’s relations with its neighbour county Afghanistan. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah wanted to make the peace keeping foreign policy of Pakistan; he wished to maintain good relations with the Muslim states of the world as well as the neighbouring countries. Afghanistan was our neighbour and the Islamic country; therefore, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah ordered to remove all check posts from the Afghan borders. Despite of it, Afghanistan was the sole Muslim state that opposed Pakistan’s membership in the United Nations. The relations between two states remained cool for a long time in the history. Pakistan became an ally of United States in favour of Afghanistan after the invasion of Soviet Union (USSR). After the collapse of the USSR, the Taliban came in power in Afghanistan and Pakistan accepted their government.

However, after the event of 9/11 Pakistan became the opponent of the same Taliban and converted into front line state against the Taliban government. There came the resistance in Pakistan against General Musharraf in favour of Afghanistan. Pakistan supported the US war against terrorism at national level; however, it was considered the war against Taliban at that time. After the crush of Taliban government, the non-stop intervention from Afghanistan has begun. In this regard, Pakistan army started many operations to remove the terrorists from her land while the militants had been entered Pakistan through Afghanistan.

The bilateral relationship between the both countries mainly remained uncertain and fluctuating. The reason behind it was the fragile conditions of security, deficit in trust and cross border infiltration etc.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter you will be able

1. To develop understanding about the Pakistan’s bilateral relations with Afghanistan.
2. To know the major determinants of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.
3. To get knowledge about the role of Pakistan during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.
4. To conclude the role of Pakistan after the incident of 9/11 and the role in war against terrorism.
7.1. INTRODUCTION

The foreign nexus between Pakistan and Afghanistan is often found inconsistent and unpredictable and always remained beyond human perception, hence, can be called as paradoxical in nature. To highlight and present a holistic view of the matter, it is necessary to perceive different aspects of the Pak-Afghan relations since the inception of Pakistan in August 1947. The significance of Pakistan for Afghanistan and vice versa cannot be ignored while dealing with the question of mutual relationship between the two neighbouring states. The landlocked nature of Afghanistan tends it towards Pakistan for its economic development and transit trade access to international markets. Similarly, peaceful Afghanistan is too much important for Pakistan. This strategically important country is the meeting place of four ecological and cultural regions i.e., the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia and even the Far-East as the Pamir Mountains into Chinese Sinkiang. Historically, Afghanistan directly links Indo-Pakistan with Central Asia which in turn extends these contacts further to Eastern Europe. The state of Afghanistan lies in Central Asia and it is surrounded by Iran in the west, Pakistan in the south and east, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the north and China in its easternmost region. Located at the tri-junction of the three strategic regions, Afghanistan is also called a region at the cross road of history because it has been used as a trade route connecting Central, West and South Asia. The dawn of the 21st century has further increased the significance of Afghanistan particularly due to the recent discoveries of natural resources in Central Asia and beyond as it provides a land bridge for these resources such as oil and gas pipelines and trade route as well.

The complexity, stiffness and vicissitude in the relationship of Pakistan and Afghan can be traced in the great game played between Russia and the Great Britain in manifesting their respective desires to expand their empires. Russia’s expansion was motivated by their desire to weaken British power, both in India and its extension into Europe. On the other hand, the British followed a forward policy in order to contain Russia within Central Asia. Although neither power held Afghanistan during this time, Afghanistan’s role as a buffer between them grew throughout this game, leading to repeated clashes on its fringes. When Pakistan came into existence, there was a misconception in the minds of Afghan leaders. They believed that Pakistan would not be able to survive after separation from India. Therefore, immediately after the establishment of Pakistan, the Afghan government raised its voice in favour of Pakhtunistan to reunify the Pakhtun population across the borders. As an independent state when Pakistan tried to become member of the United Nations, Afghanistan was the first Muslim country that opposed its entry into the United Nations. Afghanistan pleaded that the territory of Frontier and some areas in Balochistan were not the rightful possession of the newly born state. The Afghan government said that these were their lands and the British had taken from them on lease for one hundred years. As early as June 1949, Afghan parliament cancelled all the treaties which former Afghan governments had signed with the British-Indian government including the Durand Line agreement and proclaimed that the Afghan authority did not recognize the Durand Line as a legal boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. While making this false base, the Afghan government totally ignored the fact that under
international law, treaties of the extinct state concerning boundary lines remain valid and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct state on the absorbing state. Pakistan was the successor state of British India. So, Durand Line had to be intact as an international border. Besides it, there are certain other factors which determine the nature and direction of this relationship such as ethnic divide, linguistic code-switching, cultural convergence and divergence and the issue of terrorism and rising fundamentalism across the borders.

The regime of General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan and President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan paved the way for new avenues for both the countries but the security problems on the one hand and the issues of fundamental violence in the garb of religion on the other hand hampered the relations between the two countries. The 9/11 incident brought considerable changes in the foreign policies of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The penetration of terrorists in the hinterland of Pakistan was some time reported to have come from Central Asian Republics particularly from Uzbekistan via Afghanistan. Such activities especially in the tribal areas of Pakistan created a considerable gulf in the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Many Uzbek, Afghan and Tajik militants involved in the terrorist activities were arrested in tribal area of Waziristan. The fragile security situation in Afghanistan and tribal areas of Pakistan some time caused tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Indeed, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been largely characterized by mutual mistrust and devised through a narrow security prism. While it will require considerable effort to end deep-seated animosity as both the countries share close ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic ties. However, the prospects for resolving tension, disputes and conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan will largely depend on the nature of the regimes that will be established in both states. After the end of the crisis caused by the summing up of the presidential elections in Afghanistan in 2014, there were reasons to expect a more favorable development of the situation in the country. The same can be said about the situation in Pakistan, where the 2013 parliamentary elections demonstrated the ability of the political system to avoid a crisis after the constitutionally fixed terms of office of the parliament and government. Adoption of democratic regimes can allow Afghanistan and Pakistan to strengthen political, economic and cultural ties between the two countries.

Nevertheless, President Ashraf Ghani, who succeeded Hamid Karzai, tried to find common grounds of cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Unlike his predecessor, President Ghani adopted a policy of rapprochement towards Pakistan. For that purpose, he deferred the execution of the strategic partnership agreement with India. He sought close ties with Pakistan’s security establishment and introduced initiatives to ease Pakistani concerns over cross-border terrorism. Pakistan, in turn, managed to bring the Taliban representatives to the negotiation table in Murree on July 7, 2015. The Heart of Asia Conference was held in Islamabad on December 6, 2015. But, unfortunately, Afghan government-Taliban peace process derailed after the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar, the former Afghan Taliban leader. After a brief period of bonhomie, the
rapprochement process came to a halt; President Ghani started blaming Pakistan for a series of terror acts in Afghanistan which strained the already fragile relations between the two states.

However, in earlier 2018, the formation of Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity brought some positive changes in the relations of the two states. Beside it, a real breakthrough has recently been seen in the form of Taliban-US talks with positive contribution by Pakistan. It is hoped that this will also not prove a mirage like many earlier moves in the past. All sincere efforts should be made for establishing a peaceful and stable environment in Afghanistan which in turn would also be ideal for Pakistan. It is hoped that 2019 would be the year of peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan if such sort of sincere efforts on both sides would be carried on. Indeed, both the countries should be forthcoming in recognizing the bitter fact that the policy of fomenting troubles by interfering in the internal affairs of the other is mutually destructive. Indeed, both of them are engulfed by the specters of radicalism and terrorism. The problem is common and hence can only be remedied by mutual cooperation at the regional level. The unit in hand, however, presents a holistic view of Pak-Afghan relationship since 1947 till the present era in order to understand the dynamics and pros and cons of the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

7.2. MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: 1947 TO 1955

The demographic structure and physical condition of Pakistan cannot be ignored while dealing with the question of Pak-Afghan relations. Pakistan is located in the northwestern part of the South Asian subcontinent, emerged on the world map as a result of the partition on August 14, 1947. The strategic position of Pakistan is very important in South Asia. Bordered countries with Pakistan are Iran on the west, Afghanistan and China on the northwest, India on the eastern border and Arabian Sea on the south. Pakistan’s boundary with Afghanistan is about 2,640 kilometers long. It runs along the ridges of the Hindukush mountains and the Pamirs, where a narrow strip of Afghan territory called the Wakhan Corridor extends between Pakistan and Tajikistan. Pakistan, since its independence, inherited the border with Afghanistan named, Durand Line, one of the major issues in its relations with Afghanistan. The inception of Pakistan, the then Afghan government refused to accept the Durand Line as recognized border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Pak-Afghan border known as the Durand Line came into existence after signing an agreement between Henry Mortimer Durand, who was foreign secretary to the government of India at that time and Amir Abdur Rehman, the then king of Afghanistan on November 12, 1892. The first step for drawing border was taken by Afghan king and he also proposed the name of it after foreign secretary’s name, which later became famous as Durand Line. The reason why British government demarcated the Durand Line was to use the Afghan kingdom as a buffer state between their British Indian colony and
expansionist Russia.

The agreement of Durand Line was ratified by Amir Abdur Rehman’s successor Amir Habib Ullah Khan in 1905. It was further confirmed when Aman Ullah Khan signed two treaties with British Indian government and both the treaties of Rawalpindi in 1919 and the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921 reaffirmed the Durand Line agreement between Afghanistan and British India. After the partition plan of subcontinent, the legal position of the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan was very clearly explained by the secretary of state for Commonwealth relations. According to the British government, Pakistan was the inheritor of the rights and duties of former British Indian government and Durand Line would be considered the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Durand Line was weakly explained in Mohmand area because of the rough geographic nature of the border as was the case with the rest of the border. Later on outsiders exploited it and anti-Pakistani elements in Afghanistan raised problems over border issue.

At the time of Pakistan’s independence, Afghan government apparently thought that the transfer of sovereignty to Pakistan by Britain constituted a fundamental change of circumstances entitling Afghanistan to assert that the Anglo-Afghan treaty of Kabul in 1921 was further invalid. According to article 62 of Vienna Convention on the law of treaties in 1969 on states, a basic change in conditions may not be raised as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty if the treaty establishes the boundary.

The international law did not permit a state to cancel a treaty or an agreement merely because one of the parties did it was a colonial power or a more powerful state. The claim of Afghan authority that the Durand Line agreement was valid for only one hundred years is also not valid point because international law does not lay down the maximum period of one hundred years for a bilaterally concluded border agreement between the two states, when the fixed border validity has not been mentioned in the text. A state to state treaty does not need any revision unless both parties desire to change international agreement, once finally concluded can be accepted only bilaterally and not unilaterally.

Afghanistan exploited the Pakhtunistan issue as a strong tool against Pakistan. Pakhtun nationalism started in the Frontier province in 1930 when British troops killed unarmed protestors in Peshawar, later this place became famous with the name of choke Yadgaar in Peshawar city. Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Bacha Khan) made political organization named, Red Shirts (Khudai Khidmatgars). He was the symbol of Khudai Khidmatgars and later supported Pakhtunistan Movement in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He allied with the Indian National Congress to win the 1937 and 1946 elections in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after his movement formed provincial governments. The Khudai Khidmatgars separated from Congress and did not accept referendum for British partition plan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on joining India or the newly born state of Pakistan. The Khudai Khidmatgars demanded third option for establishing an independent state of Pakhtunistan but Pakistan did not accept their demand. Afghanistan has always contested that the 1947 referendum did not satisfy the requirement for self-determination because many Pakhtuns
boycotted from the vote and the referendum was a unilateral step taken by British government without mutual consultation with Afghanistan. The position of Pakistan remained always the opposite on the issue and has always considered the Durand Line a valid international boundary that has been recognized by the Afghan governments from time to time.

In 1949 Pakistan inadvertently attacked Afghanistan territory by air; as a result the Afghan authority called *loyajirga* (a great council) in Kabul. The *loyajirga* supported the Pakhtunistan cause and repudiated all the treaties of British Indian government. The Afghan authority turned towards the Soviet Union for military aid for Pakhtunistan cause and did not receive help from US because Pakistan became the strong ally of US to encounter the military power of India. The Soviet Union and India did not miss any chance inflaming Pakhtunistan cause for decades to destabilize Pakistan. The Soviet Union wanted to prevent Afghanistan from joining any western military alliance and they also pressurized Pakistan indirectly to not join the western block. The Afghan king Zahir Shah himself was a Pakhtun and he raised the issue of establishing Pakhtunistan comprising the majority Pakhtuns who live outside Afghanistan in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. Sardar Daoud was also the great champion of greater Pakhtunistan and worked for destabilization of Pakistan. This demand was raised among the Pakhtun nationalists of Pakistan but Pakistan firmly rejected the idea insisting the Durand Line must remain and be recognized as the international border between the two states.

In 1955, Pakistan restructured its administrative units on *one unit* basis by incorporating all the areas in Western part of the country as West Pakistan province and eastern areas as East Pakistan province. Afghanistan government vehemently opposed the decision of integrating the Pukhtun dominated North-West Frontier Province (presently named as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and instigated mass rallies and protests inside Afghanistan. Afghan-Pakistani embassy in Kabul was sacked, consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad were attacked and Pakistan flag was molested. Pakistan’s people retaliated by attacking on the Afghan consulate in Peshawar and Pakistan government embargoed Afghan goods. Fearing, Soviet Union may exploit the opportunity by filling vacuum in Afghanistan, Washington’s diplomacy prevailed in subsiding tempers and resumption of normal relations between Kabul and Karachi (the then capital city of Pakistan). In September 1955, Pakistan’s flag was again raised at its embassy and consulates, and the Afghan emblem flew once again over its consulates in Pakistan.

### 7.3. **MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: 1955 TO 1979**

The decision of Pakistan to constitute one unit system comprising all the western provinces in Pakistan including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was strongly opposed by the state and society of neighbouring Afghanistan. This decision invited a fury of mass protest in Afghanistan. But new developments emerged after Pakistan’s joining of SEATO and CENTO. America did not want to lose Afghanistan to Soviet Union. Pakistan, on the
hand, was inclined towards America as it had to fight for its survival in the emerging security situation. When the latter came to assist the former, Pakistan’s neighbors particularly India and Afghanistan started the propaganda of bringing cold war to South Asia against it. It, however, extended the gulf between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The latter started looking towards Soviet Union as a counter weight to improved Pak-U.S relations. It was during this era that Soviet Union softly influenced Afghanistan, initially, by making roads and infrastructure and then physically invaded it. These circumstances convinced Pakistan to pursue reliable friends outside the region. Pakistan during this era started counter weighting Soviet-Afghan nexus by improving its ties with America. On the other hand the economy of landlocked Afghanistan started deteriorating as Afghanistan became totally dependent on Soviet Union for its trade and transportation. The Soviet-Afghan connections were considered with apprehensions in America and it started stressing Pakistan to give Afghanistan a transit route or a railway link. By doing so Pakistan escaped from being exploited by Afghanistan during its war with India in September 1965. This chain of events brought the two neighbours close to each other as Pakistan in 1971 disbanded one unit system and reinstated the autonomous province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (the then N-W.F.P). The dismemberment of East Pakistan made it obvious to the policy makers that Pakistan’s defense cannot be ensured until and unless its relations with Iran and Afghanistan would be molded for greater cooperation. It was felt necessary to secure borders with these two Muslim countries to channelize all the military resources to the eastern border with India. Both Afghanistan and Iran remained neutral during the war of 1971 between India and Pakistan. In order to reciprocate friendly gesture of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s then President Z.A Bhutto chose Afghanistan as the first foreign country to visit. This official tour was followed by the visit of Begum Nusrat Bhutto who visited Kabul and concluded agreements on economic cooperation with Afghanistan. A sudden shift was occurred in 1973 when king Zahir Shah was ousted from power by Sardar Muhammad Daoud Khan, a staunch proponent of the idea of Pakhtunistan. Involvement of USSR, though denied by him, could not be ruled out as USSR was the first state that recognized Daoud’s government. Sardar Daoud’s rise to power was a threatening message to Pakistan owing to his obsession with the idea of Pakhtunistan which he called “lost Lands” of the Pakhtuns. His first broadcast speech confirmed Pakistan’s suspicions wherein he designated Pakistan as the only state with Afghanistan had political disputes.

Hence, the relationships between Pakistan and Afghanistan became hostile and a blame game ensued as the two countries accused each other of supporting dissident groups in their respective countries. To make the situation more complex, Daoud’s government faced three counter coup attempts which he believed were backed by foreign powers implicitly implicating Pakistan. On the other hand Pakistan strongly believed in involvement of Afghan hand in supporting and abetting rebels in Balochistan and Pakhtun belts. Prime Minister Z.A Bhutto in his letter to UN Secretary General stated that, “we have irrefutable evidence that the present Afghan government is systematically organizing the commission of acts of terrorism through hired elements.”
When Pakistan hosted the Islamic Summit Conference in February 1974, the Afghan president refused to attend and sent his representative Abdur Rahman Pazhwak who raised the issue of Pakhtunistan in the conference but could not get enough attention. The relations were so strained that air service between the two countries was suspended in the same year. Afghanistan was blamed to be involved in stirring anti-Pakistan sentiments in the areas what is now the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and supporting and providing training to Baloch rebel groups as well. Nevertheless, both Daoud and Z. A. Bhutto realized the gravity of the situation and preferred to minimize the tensions between the two neighbouring countries. Daoud was trying to distance himself from the soviets and was forging good relations with Iran, Pakistan and India. In 1976 as a token of goodwill a dancing and singing troupe from Pakistan was sent to perform for the afghan national day celebrations. Daoud, on the other hand after receding from the soviet influence, was inclined to settle the Pakhtunistan issue once and for all. But unfortunately this could not be materialized as Z. A. Bhutto’s government was toppled and the negotiations were halted. Negotiations with Pakistan’s new president General Zia ulHaq could not be resumed as Daoud himself was removed from power in April 1977. Hence, Daoud was soon removed in the ‘Saur Revolution’ by the staunch communist factions. After removing Daoud from power, the Soviet backed communist groups reorganized and Afghanistan soon became a Soviet suzerain. This presented a frightening scenario for Pakistan as its fears of encirclement by a disastrous coalition of Afghanistan, India and USSR were being confirmed. Soofia and others in their edited work, *Pakistan: The Contours of State and Society*, wrote, “With the invasion of Afghanistan on December27, 1979, Pakistan was confronted with a direct threat on its western border. Even if an armed invasion was a remote possibility, there was a real concern that Moscow would help separatist movements in Balochistan and NWFP”.

The Soviet advancement in Afghanistan was generally considered as a threat and challenge to the security of Pakistan. The deployment of Soviet troops inevitably dragged the United States of America. Pakistan-US relations before Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had become very strained owing to the former’s clandestine nuclear program. America had pressurized Pakistan to abandon its nuclear program and to this end imposed the Symington Amendment on Pakistan in April 1979 designed to economic aid to Pakistan. But the invasion of USSR in Afghanistan altered the whole equation at once. In December 1979, only a few months after imposition, all sanctions against Pakistan were lifted by Washington and replaced with generous aid. By 1981, America and Pakistan were discussing a $3.2-billion aid package. By 1985, Pakistan was the fourth largest recipient of America’s bilateral military assistance, after Israel, Egypt and Turkey. With the approval of a $ 4.02-billion military and economic aid in 1987, Pakistan became the second largest recipient of American aid, after Israel. Focusing on its enhanced geostrategic importance in the cold war, the US no longer seemed concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear program or lack of democracy, or the human rights violations of its military regime.
7.4. MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: 1979 TO 1988

At the advent of Saur Revolution in Afghanistan in April 1978, the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan was once again put to another test. This development created a wave of apprehension for Pakistan as it was an ominous expansion in a country geographically so abutted with Pakistan that it could not remain insulated from it. The change brought new political and, later on, social realities: Afghanistan was no longer a country governed by conservative nationalist posse of rulers; the new rulers of Afghanistan did not belong to traditional ruling class but they were equally nationalistic in outlook; however, the accentuating point was that they were inspired by revolutionary ideology. Pakistan’s unease on the cataclysmic developments in Afghanistan stemmed primarily from its anxiety that the installation of the new revolutionary regime might stoke Afghanistan’s irredentist claims on Pakistan’s Pashtun territories. And its apprehensions regarding “revival of the Pashtunistan issue were realized when on May 9, 1978 the Afghan President, Nur Muhammad Taraki, referred to the border dispute with Pakistan after meeting the ageing Pashtun leader A.G. Khan in Kabul”.

Besides, the new regime of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) intended to revolutionize the Afghan society and remodel it on socialist pattern. The new government, soon after assumption of power, issued guidelines, in pursuance of its objective, “for the redistribution of land, equality for the ethnic minorities, emancipation for women, and education for all”. Pakistan feared spill-over effects of the Saur Revolution once it stabilized itself inasmuch as the historical direction of political developments in Afghanistan had invariably been towards the subcontinent. The military regime in Pakistan was of the view that “a Soviet-backed Afghanistan had the potential to unleash forces challenging the military dominance over an elitist state run with the connivance of a status quo coalition of semi-feudal rural gentry and the relatively small financial industrial group”.

The newly established regime in Afghanistan under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Tarakai showed keen interest to settle the border dispute with the neighbouring state of Pakistan. This gesture was followed by another positive development when the Afghan President in his address to the nation expressed that his “country would promote friendship and cooperation with the neighboring countries”. President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan paid a visit to Kabul in September 1978 and held discussion with his Afghan counterpart (with Daoud before he was overthrown) on the political differences. But, thereafter, he was unable to bring Tarakai and Amin around to his point of view. However, the initial auspicious beginning did not develop to give specific positive direction to Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and soon dissolved. Notwithstanding the fact that the PDPA was ruling the country but the situation in the country was fluid and uncertain due to growing resistance against the government. Afghanistan believed that Pakistan was not only supporting the resistance but providing training and logistic support to its opponents. Mukherjee in his work, Afghanistan: From Tragedy to Triumph, quotes one of the noteworthy statements of President Taraki in which he declares, “reactionary circles of Pakistan and religious fanatics in Iran together with reactionary imperialist accomplices are interfering to a major extent in Afghanistan’s internal
affairs”. Such grievances were denied by Pakistan.

By April 1979, the one-year-old PDPA regime was under siege from within. An equally contributory factor was the war within the revolutionary leadership. Afghan factionalism proved fatal for the Khalq phase of the revolution. With the passage of time, the resistance against the regime in Kabul became so extensive that no less than three-quarters of the country was engulfed by rebellion. When the situation deteriorated the Parcham faction of PDPA occupied the thrown and installed Babrak Kamal as President on December 27, 1979. It was a phase which began with the inclusion of Soviet forces into Afghanistan in December 1979 and terminated with their departure in 1989. It was the most tumultuous period in the annals of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Pakistan’s refusal to accord diplomatic recognition to the Soviet-installed regime of Babrak Karmal and the presence of Soviet military forces on Afghan soil were the defining factors in the ensuing trajectory of their ties. The cataclysmic development transformed Southwest Asia into a region of international political gravity where the rival superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, strived for the protection of their respective interests. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan were exploited throughout the game.

The involvement of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan surprised the world. The power equation had been changed by the Soviet Union when it sent eighty thousand troops over the Hindu Kush Brezhnev. The advent of such a large number of foreign forces accentuated the existing complexity in Pak-Afghan relations and security considerations came to occupy to be an overriding theme in their relations for nearly a decade. Hence, this situation resulted in the end of the historic buffer state status of Afghanistan between Pakistan and USSR, and thus had a direct bearing on Pakistan’s security. Although, its security was not threatened by the Afghan Army yet the advent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan altered the scenario and Pakistan felt itself vulnerable in the face of Soviet presence. Pakistan’s policy makers were apprehensive that “if allowed to consolidate its hold, the Soviet Union could later leap down the Bolan and Khyber passes to fulfill the historical czarist ambition for access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea”.

In the like manner, Pakistan hesitated to recognize the soviet-backed regime of Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan and this disconnect injected complexity in the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s role in the Afghan jihad also injected complexity in their mutual relationship. As a matter of fact, it was Pakistan’s response to the Soviet military entry into Afghanistan and the niche the country came to occupy in the strategic paradigm of Pakistan vis-a-vis India that were instrumental in defining the trajectory of implications for Pakistan. Stabilized revolutionary regime in Afghanistan under the tutelage of USSR was deemed to pose threats to strategic interests of the United States and its western allies. Besides, the Kremlin move was interpreted as a threat to the stability of the adjacent areas that are vital to the economies of the industrialized states. To safeguard the collective interests of the western world, Washington declared that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means, including military force”. The Soviet military incursion into Afghanistan morphed the area of Southwest Asia into a region of international political gravity and “Afghanistan was, from now on, no less a victim of its geographical factors than of its internal confrontations”.

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America and its allies knitted an alliance to halt the likely Soviet advancement and not allowing the revolutionary regime of Afghanistan to consolidate. Pakistan was coopted in the alliance as a frontline state to achieve America’s prime interests in the region. It became obligatory for the former to assist the latter in materializing its designs. Hence, Pakistan thoroughly supported the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet military forces in Afghanistan. Considering the likely repercussions, America decided to bolster its regional security network in an attempt to contain the communist expansion. The then American President expressed, “we will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the north”. The probable expansion of the soviet forces provided a golden opportunity for Zia-ul-Haq, the military dictator of Pakistan who had ousted the first elected Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in July 1977, and later on, had him hanged to death in 1979 on a trumped charge of engineering the murder of a political opponent. He was an international pariah and his regime was isolated. He utilized the soviet military presence in Afghanistan to consolidate its position internally by marginalizing the democratic opposition.

In fact, America provided massive military and financial assistance to Pakistan due to its active role to prevent Soviet influence in the region. According to the author of *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, “in 1981, the US and Pakistan initialed US $3.2 billion worth of economic and military assistance spread over six years, followed by US$4 billion over the next six”. Under these circumstances, Pakistan and Afghanistan’s mutual relations were not developed in the context of two independent states because both were serving as respective proxies of the two rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union. This status indispensably influenced their independent approach to the crisis unfavorably impacting their mutual relations. For instance, as early as in 1983, the Soviet leadership under Gromyko sounded out the real possibility of the solution of Afghan imbroglio. Since Pakistan had already committed itself whole-hog to the western bloc and thus surrendered its space of pursuing foreign policy independent of the United States, the compromise regarding the withdrawal schedule could not materialize, and morphed the Afghan crisis into a quagmire. According to R.B. Rais, “the domestic political interests of the Zia regime were too tied up with the US economic and military aid package to allow it to act independently on the Afghan issue”.

7.5. MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: 1988 TO 2001

With the mediation of the United Nations, the Geneva Accord was signed which paved the way for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan, instead of exercising disengagement and allowing Afghans to settle their affairs, continued its interventionist policy towards Afghanistan. Pakistan’s endeavor to engineer installation of a favorable regime in Kabul was one of its prime objectives in the beginning of this period. For this purpose, it supported military attacks in the border towns of Jalalabad and clandestinely backed coup plans to get Najibullah out. The Jalalabad campaign was the first major attempt by Mujahideen in the post-withdrawal phase to unseat, militarily, the relatively well-entrenched Najibullah’s government. The campaign which ended in
disaster was severely criticized by some Mujahideen leaders who were critical of its strategic dimensions.

Apparently the decade of 1980s seemed that the Soviet Union was a dominant superpower but behind the mask of the Iron Curtain Russia was simmering. Centralized economy had stagnated and the economic development was faltering. Millions of rubbles had been channelized into Eastern Europe to boost communist allies and what was left drained into a costly armed race with America. Graft on the situation was a disastrous Afghan military adventure which had swallowed millions of dollars. There was perception in the Communist Party leadership and Soviet people that the country had lost its way. It was Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost and perestroika that gave implosive orientation to the simmering discontent which eventually climaxed in the dissolution of USSR in 1992. Hence, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a turning point in international politics inasmuch as it resulted in the dissolution of a world order characterized by its division into two blocs i.e., the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The development further complicated the regional scenario and brought about qualitative change in and around Afghanistan. The Soviet-propped regime of Dr. Najibullah was the first casualty in this regard. Externally, Afghanistan was no more a neighbour of a superpower but three successor Central Asian states. They did not share only border but religious and ethnic similarities with Afghanistan as well, and this transformed the country into an arena of expanded extraneous players.

Pakistan got an opportunity in the wake of changing circumstances in Afghanistan to rectify anomalies in its Afghan policy and retrieve the space it had lost in its relations with Afghanistan. Dr. Najib’s resignation in consequence of a soft palace coup established power vacuum in the country which created the urgency for an interim political framework to guide the affairs of the country. But the factions were not prepared to iron out their differences and remained stuck to their petty self-interests. Pakistan, while realizing the sensitivity of the ground situation in Afghanistan and its impact on its security, exerted all its influence and brought the Peshawar-based leadership of Mujahideen to agree on a provisional political set up which was formalized in the Peshawar Accord on April 24, 1992. The accord provided that Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and Burhan uddin Rabbani would administer the affairs for two and four months respectively, while the cabinet positions were apportioned among the parties with the consensus that the top leaders would not take the positions. Hence, the signing of the Peshawar Accord had engendered a certain optimism that the stalemate persisting since the Soviet withdrawal had ended and that Afghanistan might finally be able to turn a new page for the better.

However, the signing of the Peshawar Accord in 1992 was a significant step in the wake of President Najib’s exit from power. The historic development removed the principal obstacle to the formation of a broad-based government in Afghanistan. The Accord arrested the likely slide, albeit temporarily, of the country to civil war as many feared that the procrastination exhibited by Mujahideen in developing consensus regarding power-sharing could trigger bloodbath that would drown Kabul. The then Prime Minister of
Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, hailed the agreement and termed it “the biggest achievement of the Afghan war and expressed the hope that Mujahideen coalition would smoothly take over power in Afghanistan”

The accord generated much debate both in Pakistan and Afghanistan as majority of the analysts were skeptic regarding its success. They contended that the proposed provisional government comprised parties which had fundamental ideological and policy differences, and critics apprehended that “they can be expected to move towards a vicious power struggle in the political arena. The danger is that in the volatile situation that obtains in Afghanistan today even squabbling and posturing over spoils of power can trigger violence and bloodshed”. Many Afghan nationalists were quite vocal in criticizing the Peshawar Accord. They believed that the Accord contained a roadmap for their country drawn by extraneous powers not in accordance with the aspirations of Afghans but taking into consideration their geostrategic interests. According to M.H. Kakar, “the issue of Afghanistan’s future and the question of Afghan self-determination had been decided at the provincial headquarter of a foreign government and in a meeting where non-Afghans outnumbered Afghans. The Accord was an indication that from now onwards the Afghans would have to deal with more than one Soviet Union”.

The establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the erstwhile Peshawar-based Mujahideen government, started a new phase of relations on a positive note between the two countries. Pakistan was the first country to grant diplomatic recognition to the government of Afghanistan. It was the first government in Afghanistan in twelve years to which Pakistan accorded diplomatic recognition. Nawaz Sharif paid an official visit to Afghanistan on the very next day of Mujaddedi’s arrival in Kabul and presented the new government of Afghanistan a check of US $10 million. The skeptics were not incorrect in their prognosis regarding the success of the Agreement because they soon ran into difficulty due to Hekmatyar’s inflexible attitude. He refused to become part of the signing contending that “the position of prime minister reserved for his party should not be subordinated to that of the president and the position of the defence minister (to which Massoud had been appointed by Mujaddedi) should fall under the control of the prime minister”. His intransigence plunged the country into a civil war. Later on, Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had succeeded Mujaddedi to the office of the president, refused to hold elections for his successor plunged Afghanistan into another phase of fighting in the country. The fresh round of the fighting made the Saudi King, Fahd, issued an appeal for peace. Consequently, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia again joined hands to promote another accord among the Afghan leaders. Thus another accord was signed on March 7, 1993 with the cooperation of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran and came to be known as ‘Islamabad Accord’. The significant aspect of the accord was that it endorsed Rabbani’s continuation as president and elected Hekmatyar as the prime minister.

Although the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan under Mujjadedi period were initially marked by enthusiasm and eagerness yet it began to drift towards estrangement under the Rabbani regime. The underlying causes of alienation between Afghanistan and Pakistan were the latter’s support for Hekmatyar, and Rabbani’s pursuit of independent
foreign policy. Rabbani and his Defense Minister, Ahmad Shah Massud, were not happy
with Pakistan’s support to their rival, Hekmatyar, during and after the war of resistance
against the Soviets. They wanted to use Iran, Russia and India as new levers to counter
Pakistan’s influence in Afghan politics. However, the progressive slide in Pakistan-
Afghanistan relations under the Rabbani regime was ascribed, for one, to Islamabad’s
support to Gulbaddin Hekmatyar of extremist Hizb-i-Islami. He had been chosen by
Pakistan and provided him with military aid more in proportion to his actual influence on
the field. The special favour which was accorded to him by Inter- Services Directorate
was “with the view that he should head the post-communist government in Kabul in order
to further Islamabad’s wider regional interests”. The dicey obtaining situation in
Afghanistan subsequent to the collapse of Dr. Najib’s regime had polarized the Afghan
geographical spectrum along ethnic lines. And Islamabad’s policy further ethnicized the
post-Soviet politics in Afghanistan by its support of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against
Rabbani – a Tajik from Badakhshan province.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was invited to join the government. Later on, he was awarded the
position of the prime minister as a result of the Islamabad Accord but he refused to share
power with Rabbani who became President in June 1992 and Massoud who assumed the
office of the Defense Minister. Instead, he initiated campaign against the government
under the guise of driving out communist militias and launched massive rocket attack on
Kabul. This triggered a devastating civil war in Afghanistan in which rival factions
divided along ethnic lines; Pashtuns in the south, Uzbek and Tajiks in the north, and Shia
Hazara in the center, battled each other. Pakistan continued to provide covert assistance
to Hekmatyar hoping that he would be able to dislodge Rabbani administration and
capture the capital. But, by 1994, Hekmatyar had clearly failed, losing ground militarily
while his extremism divided the Pashtuns, the majority of who loathed him. Hekmatyar’s
failure to wrest power from Rabbani and Massod led Islamabad to make two inseparable
conclusions. One was that Hekmatyar had become a serious liability for Pakistan.
Another was that Pakistan lacked policy to enable it to secure a receptive government in
Kabul in the existing scenario.

Rabbani’s intention to neutralize Pakistan’s influence deteriorated the ties between the
two countries. What irked Pakistan was the fact that President Rabbani was careening
towards New Delhi. His regime’s decision to open a new chapter in Afghanistan’s
relations with India, despite the Indian government’s good relations with the former
Communist regime, was deciphered by Pakistan a step inimical to its strategic interests.
Pakistan was clearly discomfited by Rabbani and Massud’ sinviting Indian technicians
and intelligence operatives in air force and other military installations. The creeping back
of Russian and Indian influence in Afghanistan was the last thing Pakistan could expect
to happen. However, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations became frosty when, on
February 23, 1994, Pakistan’s Embassy in Kabul was attacked and burned by an
officially inspired and directed Kabul mob. An Afghan employee of the embassy was
killed and the ambassador and military attaché were wounded. Pakistan demanded an
official apology and money to rebuild the embassy. The protesters’ main grievance was
the food blockade, which had been imposed by Hekmatyar who controlled the route
leading to Kabul from Pakistan. Later on, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations further soured when four Afghan nationals, who hijacked a school bus in Islamabad, were shot dead by Pakistani commandos.

Burhanuddin Rabbani’s reelection as President in June 1994 gave impetus to existing deterioration in the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan accused the Afghan leader of perpetuating his power illegally. The blunt statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that “anything that happens after June 1994 will have no legitimacy” stoked anti-Pakistan sentiments in Kabul and provoked anti-Pakistan protests in Kabul, including rocket attack on the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul. The Kabul government interpreted the declaration as a pronouncement from Pakistan challenging the legitimacy of the rulers there.

With the arrival of Taliban in Afghanistan, the situation became more vulnerable. Afghanistan believed that the Taliban were the protégé of Pakistan and this further antagonized the two neighbours. However, Pakistan believed that the Taliban phenomenon was the product of popular disgust at the internecine squabbling amongst the warlords. But the Rabbani government continued to accuse Pakistan of supporting and assisting the Taliban with equipment and manpower. Even Mujjadedi, Rabbani’s predecessor, blamed Pakistan for unrest in Afghanistan. He advised Pakistan that “You stop giving Taliban safe sanctuaries inside your borders, and the unrest will disappear overnight. It is only the help and support from Pakistan that see them trying to keep Afghanistan unstable”. Abdul Rahim Ghafurzai, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, alleged Pakistan of supporting the Taliban with arms, military equipment logistics and military intelligence. Not only accusing Pakistan of having had a hand in the Taliban success, Kabul also charged Pakistan of underwriting the Taliban budget of US$ 120 million per month. Pakistan rejected the charges and stated that the root cause of the conflict in Afghanistan arose out of the failure of President Rabbani to quit his office long after the expiration of his legal term in early 1994”

In the aftermath of the Peshawar Accord, the power was transferred to the erstwhile Mujahideen leaders but the transition from a wartime alliance to a legitimate constitutional government was not an easy task. Ordinary Afghans were expecting the new rulers to bring law and order and stability in a country ravaged by a long war but they were deeply disappointed as the new Afghan leaders proved incapable of bringing peace in Afghanistan. Their rule lasted from April 1992 to May 1996 can be described as a period of chaos, destruction, killing and deepening of intra-Afghan differences along ethnic and tribal line. Afghan politics during this period could be characterized by ever-changing loyalties and alliances. It was in the milieu when Afghanistan was in the midst of a devastating and drifting towards virtual disintegration that the Taliban had come out of the blue and bourgeoned into a force which overwhelmed the country and established its government in Kabul. However, a group of the pertinent experts did not subscribe to the above explanation; they did acknowledge the role of the internal conducive ambience in the Taliban’s rise but contended that “the truth has to be that its genesis was altogether more deliberate”. They argued that without the extraneous support, it would not have
been possible for the Taliban to exhibit such swiftness. Pakistan’s role in the creation of
the Taliban and their rise to power has been extensively debated. Pakistan never officially
acknowledged support to the Taliban. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir
Bhutto, denied any Pakistan backing of the Taliban in February 1995 saying that “We
have no favorites in Afghanistan and we do not interfere in Afghanistan”. But despite
Pakistan’s denial, the Taliban’s conduct of military operations and exhibition of entirely
alien tactics on the battlefields of Afghanistan lent credence to the point that they were
foreign sponsored.

A remarkable change occurred in the relationship of the two countries with the
establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). From the beginning of their
(Taliban) rule in 1996 to their abandonment by Pakistan in the wake of 9/11, the era was
described as the highest point of Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan strived for a
friendly and amenable Pashtun-led post-communist regime in Kabul which would pre-empt
the revival of the calls for a Greater Pashtunistan that had so bedeviled Pakistan’s relations
with Afghanistan since August 1947. A day after the Taliban captured Mazar-e-Sharif,
Pakistan accorded general recognition to the Taliban government on May 25, 1997 and
became the first country to do so. The then Foreign Minister of Pakistan expressed, “We
feel that the new government fulfills the criteria for de jure recognition. It is now in
effective control of most of the territory of Afghanistan, including capital Kabul, and is
representative of all country”. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations during the Taliban rule bore
the trappings of patron-client states relations. Pakistan not only guided the Taliban in the
conduct of war but provided manpower also to sustain them in power. Between 1994 and
1999, more than 80,000 trained Pakistanis were sent into Afghanistan who fought along
with Taliban. The patron-client equation between Pakistan and the Taliban-led Afghanistan
was explicit since America had been exerting pressure on Pakistan to persuade Kandahar to
hand over the Osama bin Laden to America. That was the direct hint at what the United
States thought of Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban.

Regarding Pakistan’s subsequent support to the Taliban regime a number of scholars
have pointed out their respective opinions. It had been reported that in 1997/98 Pakistan
provided the Taliban with an estimated US$ 30 million in aid. This included 600,000
tons of wheat, diesel, petroleum and kerosene fuel which was partly paid by Saudi
Arabia. The purpose of this assistance was to run the country’s war machine. Pakistan
assisted the Taliban in infrastructure, telecommunication, airports, public works, water
and power development and technical support to the Radio Shariat. Besides, Pakistan
provided a new communications’ network, refurbished Kandahar airport and supplied
parts and armaments for the approximately 30 warplanes and helicopters the Taliban had
captured. Its extensive support to the Taliban regime was evident when in 1998 the
Pakistan government’s Coordination Committee for Afghan Policy directed the cash
strapped Finance Ministry of Pakistan to earmark 300 million rupees for the Taliban
administration in Kabul. The said amount disbursed over six months at a rate of 50
million rupees a month had to be paid to the Taliban officials and commanders as salary.
However, the incident of 9/11 proved a paradigm shift in the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The former enjoyed complete influence over the Taliban regime in Afghanistan till this tragic incident. The ascendancy of Taliban friendly regime to power materialized Pakistan’s ambitions of securing a strategic depth for her military and her fears of encirclement faded away. The rise of Taliban also brought far reaching consequences for Pakistan in terms of extremism, violence and sectarianism as a natural spill over in its immediate neighbourhood. The country also became a safe sanctuary for religious extremist and terrorist groups operating inside Pakistan which later on transpired as the biggest threat to the survival of Pakistan. The threat of terrorism and violent religious extremism which has been haunting Pakistan embodies the Afghanistan factor as an important cause of its drift into extremism. After the tragic incidents of 9/11 followed by the American led coalition against networks of terrorism, the Taliban regime was overthrown and American led military coalitions assumed a supervisory role in reconstruction and formation of democratic institutions. The American intervention in Afghanistan has far reaching implications on Pakistan and Afghanistan bilateral relations owing to the changing regional political and strategic realities in the post 9/11 world.

7.6. MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: 2001 TO 2013

The event of September 11, transformed the region of Southwest Asia again into an area of international political gravity. President Bush’s describing the attack as ‘Pearl Harbor’ of the 21st century. Osama bin Laden and his organization, Al-Qaeda was declared as the real culprits. Owing to Pakistan’s role in the promotion of the Taliban and, later on, materially helping them sustain in power, it was regarded as the only country to have substantial influence on the Taliban government, therefore, it was certain that Pakistan would have to make some difficult decisions in the days to come. Afghan President Hamid Karzai said Afghanistan could not achieve peace or prosperity without achieving friendly relations with Pakistan. Security maintenance and various development pursuits (political and economic) of both Pakistan and Afghanistan considerably would rely upon cordial and mutually cooperative relations between these two immediate neighbours. This was especially due to their specific geo-strategic location and complexity of regional and global politics. Rather Pakistan and Afghanistan had to fight against terrorism; they started blaming each other for the improvised security and bad economic conditions. Afghanistan urged Pakistan to do more to defeat and stop the alleged extremist infiltrations into Afghan territory while Pakistan repeatedly denied such charges and holds Afghan government itself responsible for its failure to check cross-border incursions and rebuilding of Afghan nation-state. However, the event of 9/11 compelled Pakistan to pursue anti-Taliban policy that Pakistan had been supporting politically and diplomatically during the 1990s. Pakistan committed itself to fight global war against terrorism and to reconstruct war ravaged Afghanistan. It actively participated and mustered support during and after the donor conferences aimed to rebuild Afghanistan. Pakistan deployed more than 80,000 troops to stop alleged infiltrators crossing into Afghan territory.

By virtue of fragile security situation the relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan entered an era of trouble. Key Afghan Officials in Kabul accused Pakistan of turning a blind eye to
cross-border terrorism targeting NATO and ISAF and Afghan central government. Many observers also put forth the idea that much of the former Taliban regime's leadership, along with leaders of Al-Qaeda, were present and operating from the lawless Afghan-Pakistani border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Repeatedly, Afghan officials have also been blaming involvement of Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI in aiding and abetting of extremists and terrorists. When Indian embassy in Kabul was attacked on July 14, 2008 Karzai, without wasting time, accused the Pakistan of being behind the terrorist attacks which rocked Afghanistan and caused heavy casualties and destruction. He continued with the same tune and alleged that the killing, destruction, and insecurity in Afghanistan have been caused by the intelligence institutions of Pakistan. When NATO forces were attacked by the militants killing scores of soldiers earlier on July 13, 2008 Afghanistan government intensified the blame game, and put the entire responsibility on Pakistan.

It goes without saying that a prosperous and developed Afghanistan is in the larger interest of Pakistan and it has no role in any destructive activities of the militants to sabotage the peace of Afghanistan. The PPP government led by Prime Minister Gilani rejected Afghanistan’s allegations and it held the opinion that stable and peaceful Afghanistan was in Pakistan’s interest, and Karzai’s statements might contribute in hampering development work in the region. Pakistan foreign ministry too denied the accusations as baseless, urging the Kabul government to stop playing the blame game.

According to Pakistan, Afghanistan itself and international forces in Afghanistan were responsible for this entire predicament. To detract from their own colossal failure and incompetence, the embattled Afghan officials were blaming the insurgency on Pakistan. Afghan administration and officials were too weak and incompetent to take care of the problems in the country and when they failed to tackle them, they simply put the responsibility of failure on Pakistan. They tried to show the world that Pakistan was responsible for all the failure in Afghanistan.

As a result of NATO forces’ strikes into Pakistani territory, the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan further deteriorated. These strikes significantly alienated Pakistan as it considered it blatant violation of its sovereignty. It was also against the principles and rules of international law. Afghan government’s carte blanche to NATO forces to conduct strikes inside the territorial frontier of Pakistan had brought the relationship between the two countries to the lowest ebb. Indeed, the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan urge the two countries to revert back to the original objectives of war against terrorism which were aimed to cooperate but at the same time to respect each other’s sovereignty and not to allow foreign elements to use any of their territories against each other’s interests. Pakistan, despite Karzai’s provocative accusations, desired cordial relations with Afghanistan.

With the arrival of PPP regime, President Asif Ali Zardari invited his counterpart Hamid Karzai to his oath-taking ceremony. On the eve of 11th SAARC Convention, the Afghan Minister, Dr. Rangin Daftar Spanta and his Pakistani counterpart, Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, reaffirmed their dedication to raise the level of mutual cooperation. Whereas addressing an information convention in Islamabad on August 11, 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai termed Pakistan and Afghanistan as “conjoined twins”. It was because of the presence of numerous Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the lengthy shared
border, and useful setting for Afghan nationals to stay, work and entry to the training and wellbeing services in Pakistan, and shared non-secular, cultural and ethnic ethos, which prompted and realized Afghan President Hamid Karzai to declare Pakistan and Afghanistan the conjoined twins. Due to the re-election of President Hamid Karzai, constructive developments occurred on each the edges and an affirmative shift occurred for bilateral insurance policies and regional views. Though sure blame recreation and political statements prompted acute irritation however bilateral visits and interplay significantly overshadowed these statements. Yousef Raza Gilani, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan paid an official visit to Kabul in December 2010, exchanged views with members of Afghanistan’s Chambers of Commerce and Trade and mentioned the newly signed Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). Moreover, the signing of APTTA during which Pakistan agreed to supply transit facility to India for commerce with Afghanistan would additionally increase commerce relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The settlement might even show a good supply of regional connectivity. Likewise, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) fuel pipeline mission might be a fantastic supply of boosting regional integration and financial cooperation.

Consequently, President Burhanuddin Rabbani of Afghanistan led an Excessive Peace Council to Islamabad in 2011. The primary goal of their go to was to forecast for Pakistan’s position within the settlement course with the Afghan Taliban. The delegation went again with the concept Pakistan actually desired to be a part of the Afghan resolution and if Pakistan’s real issues in Afghanistan have been addressed, Islamabad could be able to play the position of a peacemaker additionally. The go to of delegation of Afghan Peace Council to Islamabad was pursued by a go to by International Secretary of Pakistan Salman Bashir to Kabul for coverage discussions and exploring new methods and horizons of strengthening bilateral ties.

The victory of PM L-N in the wake of 2013 general elections once again enthroned Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister of Pakistan. He desired a secure and peaceable Afghanistan. He continuously urged on the connotation of pursuing financial diplomacy and cooperation with all neighbouring countries particularly Afghanistan to advance Pakistan’s pursuits within the wake of secure Afghanistan. Though the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan during this period have been dominated by belief deficit and blame recreation but these have been primarily because of the regional and international political designs and targets. Nonetheless, regardless of these constraints one can see many constructive developments and interactions between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

7.7. MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: 2013 AND AFTERWARDS

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan during this period mainly remained uncertain/ fluctuating due to fragile conditions of security, trust deficit, cross border infiltration etc. In September, 2014 the new government in Afghanistan under the leadership Ashraf Ghani took the charge of the country. He tried to address some of Pakistan’s main concerns, including those linked to Indian influence in Afghanistan. Firstly, he delayed the implementation of the strategic partnership agreement with India and
also decided against the purchase of heavy weapons from India, which was requested by former president Hamid Karzai during his final months in office. Many in Afghanistan saw this as part of Ghani’s efforts to improve relations with Pakistan. Secondly, he sought close ties with Pakistan’s security establishment, unlike his predecessor, who preferred to establish warm military and defence ties with India. As a first step, a high-level Afghan delegation led by Ghani visited the general headquarters of the Pakistan army in Rawalpindi in November 2014. His gesture showed that he understood the Pakistan military’s paramountcy in the oversight of its country’s foreign policy with Afghanistan and wanted it to help Afghanistan achieve political reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban. In January 2015 he also sent six Afghan army cadets to study for 18 months at the military academy in Abbottabad. Similarly, amid strong resistance in Afghanistan, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) for cooperation in intelligence sharing and coordinated intelligence operations on both sides of the border. These measures triggered a strong outcry in Afghanistan that entailed severe criticism of the Ghani government from parliamentarians, civil society groups, and Hamid Karzai as well, who publicly accused the Ghani administration of treason for signing the intelligence-sharing agreement with Pakistan. Thirdly, Ghani took some specific initiatives to alleviate Pakistani concerns over cross-border terrorism that included increasing pressure on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants sheltering in Afghanistan, providing access to ISI officials to investigate anti-Pakistan elements in Afghan jails, and coordinating border patrols. Afghan security forces also conducted some operations in Pakistani-Afghan border areas where reportedly Pakistani Taliban militants allegedly involved in the Peshawar army public school attack were hiding.

Indeed, bilateral pledges made by the two countries, including of non-interference in each other’s affairs, and improving border security and counter-terrorism coordination, could not be fully realized. There were two main reasons for this: firstly, Ghani’s high-level decisions vis-à-vis Pakistan did not enjoy across-the-board and top-down acceptance in Afghanistan; and, secondly, increasing Taliban attacks after the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death increased political and security opposition to Ghani’s pro-Pakistan overtures. Presently, there appears to be a growing consensus in Afghanistan that Pakistan is largely responsible for the growing insecurity and Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and that Ghani’s policy of reconciliation with Pakistan and the Taliban has failed. Ghani’s political popularity and influence have also declined particularly after the talks with the Taliban stalled and terrorist attacks increased in the country.

The announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in July 2015 had been followed by some negative developments. The Afghan government might have released the news of Omar’s death to obtain a form of leverage over the Taliban in the negotiations, but this proved to be counterproductive. Firstly, it derailed the fledgling peace process, exposed and increased internal rifts among the Taliban leaders, and prompted the new Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, to take a hard-line stance to appease the dissident Taliban commanders who did not want to engage in talks with the Afghan government. Consequently, the Taliban reverted to their traditional stance – that they would not hold
talks with the government until international forces are completely withdrawn from the country and the Afghan government’s agreements in this regard are abrogated – and increased their attacks inside Afghanistan.

The Fifth Heart of Asia Conference increased the prospects of the resumption of Afghan talks with the Taliban, as well as of a long-stalled comprehensive dialogue between Pakistan and India, which could also support a constructive engagement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the discussions at the conference, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and China all called for a renewed effort to open talks with the Afghan Taliban groups willing to reconcile with the government. During his stay in Islamabad for the conference President Ghani also had a meeting with the Pakistani chief of army staff, General Raheel Sharif, who reportedly assured Ghani of Pakistani support for reconciliation with the Taliban. Afghan foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani expressed the hope after the conference that the peace process would start as soon as possible. However, Rahmatullah Nabil, the NDS chief, strongly criticized Pakistan, describing it as an enemy of Afghanistan and also President Ghani for his rapprochement towards Pakistan. He resigned on the next day, citing policy disagreements. Nabil’s resignation came after a Taliban raid on Kandahar airport that claimed fifty lives. A few days later Ghani denied that the NDS chief had been removed from office at Pakistan’s request and suggested that peace negotiations with the Taliban might begin within a few weeks. This hope was based on the fact that the US and China had committed to facilitating and supporting an Afghan-led and -owned peace process through the Quadrilateral Monitoring Committee comprising representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and America. The first meeting of the committee was held in Islamabad on 11th January 2016. While acknowledging the roles of their respective countries in the Afghan peace process, the members of the committee emphasized the immediate need for direct talks between representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban groups in the peace process. Sartaj Aziz, the adviser on foreign affairs to the Pakistani prime minister of Pakistan, underscored the significance of not attaching any preconditions to the peace talks. He also warned that differentiating between reconcilable and irreconcilable Taliban groups at a time when the talks had not even started could be counterproductive.

In order to prevent cross-border flow of militants and drugs, Pakistan initiated construction of border fencing in 2018 along the Durand Line—the roughly 2,611 kilometer long border shared with Afghanistan. Pakistan believes the barrier would improve the security environment in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is generally believed that the fence would greatly help to stop cross-border movements of militants. However, Afghanistan resolutely opposes the fence’s construction along the Durand Line.

After Pakistan’s seriousness in facilitating the Afghanistan peace process, the perception in Kabul’s policy circles appears to be changing. The Afghan president’s special envoy and the chief of High Peace Council (HPC) Umar Daudzai visited Pakistan in January 2019 and appreciated the current government’s efforts for Afghanistan. He also highlighted the potential of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) in increasing bilateral trade and enhancing cultural exchange visits.
and people-to-people contacts. Under that framework, in June 2018, both the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments also agreed to establish liaison offices in each other’s military headquarters, ground coordination centers for better military coordination and intelligence-sharing on cross-border flow of terrorists and drug-traffickers. Indeed, Pakistan and Afghanistan have unquestionable significance for each other. Geostrategic, political, economic and other reasons make it imperative for both the countries to have cordial relations. Establishing cordial relations between these two countries can contribute a lot in making this strategically important region prosperous and wealthy. Beside it, they can easily defeat and remove many ills being faced by the two important neighbouring countries. But such a prospect would be neutralized by foreign powers if leadership of both the countries remains unable to tackle all outstanding issues in bilateral relationship. Role of any such external elements have to be coped with in order to avoid jeopardizing of their short and long term interests.

7.8 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Discuss the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan in a historical perspective?
2. What are the major hurdles in the way of mutual relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan?
3. Discuss Pak-Afghan relations during the Taliban regime in Afghanistan?
4. What are the implications of the tragic incident of 9/11 on the mutual relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan?
5. How can the issue of Terrorism be dealt by Pakistan and Afghanistan mutually?
6. Discuss Pakistan and Afghanistan relations during Musharraf period?
7. Give recommendations for establishing good relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan?
8. Critically evaluate the present state of affairs between Pakistan and Afghanistan?
REFERENCES


MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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INTRODUCTION

This unit highlights the relations between the United States of America and Pakistan. Pakistan had been facing a number of difficulties since its establishment; however, the government tried to maintain good foreign relations with the other countries. During the initial days, the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan established the foreign relations with the United States through his visit in America instead of the USSR. Although the Prime Minister of Pakistan announced on 18 August 1947 that Pakistan would adopt the non-alignment policy regarding the foreign policy. However, in the following days, his visit of the United States was criticized as it was the attachment of Pakistan with the Capitalist block against the Communism followed by the USSR.

This unit reveals the overall mutual relations between the US and Pakistan. Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO in the decade of 1950s; however, its impact remained till a long time on the foreign policy of Pakistan and its relations with the other world. Pakistan had to lose her Eastern wing due to various reasons but one of these was the enmity of the former Soviet Union. Pakistan came to know that neither U.S nor China came to help Pakistan. That is why Pakistan separated from SEATO and CENTO after the war of 1971.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able:

1. to get knowledge about the history of mutual relations between Pakistan and the United States.
2. to comprehend the major defence agreements between the United States and Pakistan.
3. to develop understanding about the US role on the Kashmir issue and India-Pakistan relations.
8.1 INTRODUCTION

Nature:

Relations between the United States and Pakistan are characterized by American Opportunism and Pakistan’s vulnerability. There is no direct clash of interests between the United States and Pakistan, but relations deteriorate because of third party interests such as India or Israel. The long term foreign policy of the United States is to gain the friendship and guard the interests of India, to present India as the Asian counterpoise of China. Except in the early years of the Cold War or during the 1971 War when Sino-American interests had converged when a short term policy came into play, the overriding aim of the United States has been to side with India. Larry Pressler, author of the Pressler Amendment which denied U.S support to Pakistan in the 1980’s and the 1990’s has stated this clearly: “We as a nation must not look upon India and Pakistan as equals. India is our ally and has our values. Pakistan is not our ally except when it wants money and military weapons from us or when we want its help with a geo-political goal.”

External Disadvantage:

Pakistan emerged as an independent state, when the Cold War had already begun. The west led by the United States represented Price Economy or capitalism. The East, led by the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR) represented Planned Economy or Communism. One element was common to both camps. None of their nations were based on religion. Pakistan may not have had a religious ideology, but it had a religious identity. Thus when Pakistan emerged on the map of the world, it was disadvantaged, being considered a medieval relic in a modern world. Pakistan through Yusuf Haroon had approached the USSR’s Politburo Member and Future President, Anastas Mikoyan, but was rebuffed. This led to M .A. Jinnah saying that Communism could not flourish on the soil of Pakistan, and Russia being the only country not to congratulate Pakistan on its Independence. The British had acted partially towards India leaving Pakistan with only the choice of America. The U.S through their diplomats Joseph Sparks and Raymond Hare had tried to dissuade the Muslim League leadership from opting for partition, but they sent an official delegate to the Independence ceremony.

Internal Disadvantage:

The parting post-colonial master, Britain, withheld Pakistan’s military assets most of her financial assets, and publicly hoped that India would soon be re-united. The Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General made one mistake. They had earlier met at Singapore and established a rapport and both decided to sideline Mahatma Gandhi the leader of India’s Independence struggle. When India withheld Pakistan’s financial assets on 13 January 1948, Gandhi underwent a fast of 72 days forcing India to give Pakistan Rs.500 million to Pakistan although India still kept Rs.50 Million back.
There was no corresponding relief regarding the military assets F.M Sir Claude Auchinleck had delayed dividing the armed forces, but he too had to concede that the Cabinet of India was doing everything within its power to prevent the establishment of Pakistan. Indeed Pakistan did not have even the proper infrastructure to govern a state. It should be understood that even then, bribery, corruption and black marketeering were so rampant that Quaid-i-Azam in his 11 August 1947 speech had to warn against these evils. Such a warning was not necessary. “The American diplomats admired the small band of over worked, highly motivated and idealistic civil servants who struggled to establish their new country. It was hard for the embassy staff not to empathize with the Pakistanis and their view of the troubles with India over Kashmir and other issues.”

8.2 FROM 1947 TO 1955

It were only the diplomats and a minority of journalists who saw the justice of the Muslim League’s choice, but overall the sentiment was favorable to India and hostile to Pakistan. India was an ancient land of myths with tigers, maharajas, magic carpets and fakirs performing the rope trick. As against this romantic notion the new state of Pakistan was considered an interloper in the United States. After prolonged deliberations, and aided by India’s own reluctance, the United States decided to reach out to Pakistan. The Secretary of State George C. Marshall pointed out that in terms of population Pakistan would be the largest Muslim state as well as occupying one of the most strategic locations in the world.

The might of the United States and the vulnerability of Pakistan caused them to pursue divergent goals. At first, on 18 August 1947, the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan has stated that Pakistan would pursue a policy of non-alignment. However, on 2 September Ghulam Mohammad the Finance Minister was telling Charles W. Lewis the American Charge d’Affairs that “he and his colleagues felt that Pakistan must be ready defensively to bar the progress of Russia”. The next step was that Mir Laiq Ali as the emissary of the Governor-General solicited on 17 October from America a loan of $2 billion “to enable Pakistan to block the progress of Communism in Pakistan.”

This was an unrealistic demand, but this was the time that India had still not restored to Pakistan her share of financial assets, and Pakistan’s desperation was understandable. The United States came through with only $10 million, a fraction of the sum asked for, but which nevertheless was a source of relief in the dire straits Pakistan found itself. Still such extravagant demands served only to weaken Pakistan’s position in American eyes.

The United States also unduly delayed formal recognition of the Durand Line 1893 as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which weakened Pakistan in the eyes of the USSR also. Had a formal recognition not ultimately come about, the United States would have found itself in an equivocal position when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The United States was also unresponsive to requests for military aid there matters stood till the visit of Liaquat Ali Khan to the United States in 1950.
It was during Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit that some of the standing was restored. Liaquat Ali Khan had been preceded by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who because of his austere demeanor and policy of non-alignment had proved somewhat disappointing to his hosts. Nehru in his impetuosity also irritated the State Department by asking them the purpose behind Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit. Noting that no such inquiry had emanated from Pakistan when Jawaharlal Nehru was visiting the United States they described Nehru’s attitude as “undignified and petty”.12

Liaquat Ali Khan provided a contrast. He said that he had not come for aid but for trade. “Some may have thought that I was asking for charity, I only ask for the help of the more experienced countries to put our own men to work and make our own resources yield their wealth” Liaquat Ali Khan in his address to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: “Whenever I have talked of international co-operation, I have always asked that it be scrutinized very closely both as a joint moral undertaking and as a mutually profitable concern.”13

As for non-alignment, Liaquat did not adopt a softer attitude. He reminded his American audience on 4 May that Pakistan had recognized the People’s Republic of China. On 25 May he said in Boston that he would be going to Russia as soon as that country fixed a date. In one matter he presented a contrast to Nehru, which affected non-alignment deeply. In March 1948, Nehru had banned the Communist Party of India.14 When the same proposal was put before Liaquat Ali Khan one month later (12 April), he refused to ban the Communist Party of Pakistan. The War in Korea broke out before Liaquat returned home, and he delayed issuing any statement.

Back at home he supported the United States in the Korea War. In reply to Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy he said in the Constituent Assembly that he had to side with UNSC Resolution on Korea, otherwise Pakistan would be unable to press for the implementation of the UNSC resolutions on Kashmir.15 Liaquat sent wheat as a support. Inside his cabinet, however, he had to overcome considerable opposition from members who wanted him to commit troops.16

Liaquat Ali Khan’s condition for sending Pakistani troops was that the United States equip Pakistan’s Armed Forces. This caveat was understood as resulting from inaction in Kashmir. Liaquat was careful to refer to the UNSC, for back in Pakistan, on 8 March 1951 addressing a public meeting at Gujranwala the Prime Minister had forcefully reiterated Pakistan’s non-aligned status.

Liaquat Ali Khan clearly understood that only the obduracy of Jawaharlal Nehru was obstructing any solution to the Kashmir dispute. He also understood that Kashmir was the issue which was preventing Pakistan from pursuing normal foreign policy goals.

Even suggestions emanating from India could not be carried to a conclusion. Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai the Foreign Secretary-General of India, suggested to Sir Owen Dixon that both India and Pakistan keep the portions of Kashmir they had in their possession
and limit the plebiscite to the Valley of Kashmir. Liaquat Ali Khan told Dixon to get Nehru’s approval first. This Dixon failed to do, and his mission failed.

The next Plebiscite Administrator was Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who remained in Washington. Dr Frank Graham, a member of the American Senate, sent to mediate the dispute, after his meeting with Nehru, reported the futility of his mission to his State Department. This was on 16 October 1951, the same day that Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated.

Earlier in October Liaquat Ali Khan asked his Ambassador to Iran to probe the possibility of a Pakistan-Iran-Egypt joint policy on the Middle East. Egypt had barred Israeli ships from crossing the Suez Canal, Iran had nationalized its oil. On 12 October 1951, just four days before the Prime Minister was assassinated, the U.S. Ambassador Avra Warren had found Liaquat Ali Khan “cagey” over a contribution to Middle East defense and insistent on a Kashmir solution first.

8.3 FROM 1951 TO 1955

For all his disappointment, Liaquat Ali Khan retained a posture of neutrality. His reaction to the Korean War was measured. He would follow UN Security Council resolutions, but would not commit troops unless the U.S equipped Pakistan Armed Forces. The USSR which till then neutral on Kashmir, but in January 1952, Jacov Malik the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union, objected to Dr. Frank Graham’s findings saying that they were designed against his country Pakistan and Kashmir, he added would be made to encircle it.

The American side was also discouraging. Wasting no time M. Ikramullah visited the State Department on 18 October, he was bluntly told that since Pakistan had refused to commit troops to the Korean War, it could not expect Military Supplies, as aid, as a loan or even by outright purchase. Ikramullah replied that in view of the Indian threat, Pakistan could not have done that.

With the removal of both Harry Truman and Liaquat Ali Khan from the scene a thaw occurred on both sides. Previously, Pakistan was not willing to consider any alliance with the United States until it included a military guarantee against Indian aggression. After Liaquat, this condition was dropped. The new American administration under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was considering a system of military alliances and Pakistan did enjoy a strategic location. Throughout, however, the Americans were fearful of an adverse Indian reaction. When the new Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad arrived in Washington, the American envoy Horace Hildreth had conveyed his opinion that Pakistan’s contribution to Middle East defense would outweigh adverse Indian reaction. This was bolstered by Vice-President Richard M. Nixon’s visit to South Asia when he found Nehru frigid and Ghulam Mohammad effusive. The U.S.-Pakistan Mutual Defense agreement ultimately resulted.
These reports were not sufficient to alleviate American misgivings, and while agreeing to consider an alliance with Pakistan, Eisenhower gave an undertaking to India that if Pakistan misused American arms to commit aggression the United States would take “appropriate action”. However the mere fact that Pakistan was to receive arms was so abhorrent to Nehru (who knew the value of such undertakings) that on 24 February 1955, he went back on his repeated public promises of holding an impartial plebiscite in Kashmir.

Pakistan joined SEATO, even though it had a special provision limiting the alliance only to Communist aggression, leaving it exposed before India. The Pakistani Cabinet ratified South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in January 1955, while the US Senate passed it with one dissenting vote on 1 February 2019. MEDO gave way to the Baghdad Pact, signed there on 20 November 1955, and after Iraq withdrew after its 1958 revolution, to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). With Iraq’s withdrawal, the only Muslim countries represented were Pakistan, Iran and Turkey all non-Arabs. Added to the hostility of Arab states was that of India, Russia and (then) China..

Nevertheless these pacts gave Pakistan an opening to US resources and in March 1956 during a SEATO meeting the US recognized the Durand line as the international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The fact that the US itself did not become a member of CENTO, it was able to oppose the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. All in all it was not a satisfying situation for Pakistan. Pakistan’s support for The Western bloc against a Muslim country infuriated the populace of Pakistan. On the other side, there were regrets even in the US. On 3 January 1957, President Eisenhower called making Pakistan an ally a “terrible error”.

On 10 July 1957, Prime Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy told John Foster Dulles that Pakistan would give the US an Intelligence facility, and a base to fly their U2 Airplanes from. Kux admits that he had not seen the relevant records, but it seems that during Suhrawardy’s visit some American feelings of regret were reversed.

Later in 1957 Pakistan would have a new Prime Minister Sir Feroz Khan Noon and America had a new Ambassador, James Langley. The new envoy was less sympathetic to the country of his accreditation and plainly wrote back hope that American aid was not geared to combating Communist states but to Indo-Pakistan Arms race. Pakistan on its side observed that US aid to India was enabling her to purchase arms from British Commonwealth, while the U.S was not willing to advance the date of delivering B-57 bombers. Noon threatened, on 8 March 1958 to break ties with the U.S. for its financing Indian arms build-up. Dr Frank Graham had made his second trip to India and was unable to move it, therefore slow progress was also one of the issues raised by Noon.

President Iskander Mirza rushed a delegation to the US in a bid to mollify it. The resulting talks did not have the desired results with the United States reaffirming that their arms were for use only against Communist countries while Pakistani delegates General Ayub and Air Marshal Asghar Khan frankly stated that they needed the arms against India. Within the US administration there were individuals having either pro India
or pro-Pakistan leanings and they presented to President Eisenhower that all the disputes Kashmir, Indus Waters and Arms be put together and resolved, by using large scale American aid as a leverage. Both countries to cap their military capacities. As usual Pakistan agreed, India refused.

Soon after on 7 October 1958 the first military coup d'etat brought General M. Ayub Khan as the President of Pakistan. In all the reasons given for the proclamation of Martial Law, the role of the incumbent Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon has found no mention, but in view of his outburst against the US, it cannot be ruled out as a factor. Although the military rule brought about no immediate dislocation in US-Pakistan relations, in the coming era the lack of democracy would prove to be a security impediment.

On 5 March 1959 a US-Pakistan Security agreement was signed. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir, who had been reluctant to sign stated that the new treaty did not pose an advance over SEATO since it did not commit the United States to support Pakistan against Indian aggression. Nevertheless, President Ayub Khan on 24 April 1959 made the fantastic proposal of joint defense with India against China. Most fortunately for Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru turned down his proposal on 4 May. This was the point from when on Pakistan became more accommodative towards American interests while downplaying its own security.

One year later, on 7 May 1960 the USSR shot down a U2 Spy plane which had taken off from Badaber, the enclave Suhrawardy had reportedly offered. The pilot Gary Powers was captured. The United States in order to protect Pakistan from the retaliation threatened by the Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev, stated that the U2 had taken off without Pakistan’s knowledge, thus exposing Pakistan to the charge of negligence.

The base was kept secret from both the American and the Pakistan public; that was the reason for a shock on both sides. On another issue, however, there was some gratification. Under US influence, the World Bank was able to bring about an Indo-Pakistan Agreement on Indus Water Basin. President Eisenhower announced it on 7 September 1960 while the Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani President actually signed the agreement on 19 September. For all their complaints Pakistan was to look back upon US-Pakistan relations under President Eisenhower as more sympathetic than the incoming US Administration.

### 8.4 FROM 1955 TO 1970

Geoffrey Barraclough marked the line separating the Modern Age from the Contemporary Era, with the election, in 1960, of John F. Kennedy as the President of the United States. While it was true generally, it was truer for South Asia. The Eisenhower Era ended comparatively satisfactorily for Pakistan, as Pakistan did not suffer much Russian damage from the U2 incident. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had concluded on 31 December 1961 an Oil and Gas Exploration Treaty with the USSR, and Nikita Khrushchev’s demeanor was visibly softer.
Before becoming President, John Kennedy had favored Pakistan over India. On 25 March 1958 he had said: “Our special and valued relationships and military pacts with Pakistan do not make possible such international effort for India”. However, when Sino-Indian conflict had their first round, his tune began to change. On 1 November 1959, Kennedy said: “We want India to win that race with Red China.”

The concern of Pakistan heightened when John F. Kennedy in his first State of the Union message on 31 January 1961 spoke of the “soaring idealism of Nehru.”. On the other hand Pakistan’s decision to seat the People’s Republic of China in place of Nationalist China (Taiwan) in the UN Security Council upset Kennedy.

Still, on the surface, relations were not at a low pitch, as demonstrated by Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson’s visit to Pakistan in May 1961 and President Ayub’s trip to the United States in July of the same year. Addressing a joint session of the American Congress President Ayub said: “If there is real trouble, there is no country in Asia where you will be able to even put your foot in. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan.”

In fairness to Kennedy, he tried to solve the Kashmir dispute, but when he tried to tackle Nehru on the subject, he found Nehru obdurate. Nehru’s state visit was the “worst state visit Kennedy ever had.” Ireland, on the personal prompting of President Kennedy moved a Resolution calling for Plebiscite in Kashmir. On 22 June 1962, USSR vetoed the Resolution, but the US has proved its good faith by voting for Pakistan.

Some months later when Jawaharlal Nehru ordered Indian troops to throw out Chinese troops from the areas India claimed, Indian troops suffered a resounding defeat. In panic, Nehru wrote an urgent letter to Kennedy asking for air cover and other arms. This was kept from the Indian public and there was an uproar when Sudhir Ghosh revealed this, which was considered a movement away from Non-Alignment. Once the Chinese announced a unilateral cease-fire from 21 November 1962 and a withdrawal to 20 km. behind the line of actual control from 1 December, Nehru reverted to form. When Sudhir Ghosh suggested a military alliance with the United States, Nehru wrote him on 5 January 1963:

“If unfortunately the likely contingency of their (China) attacking us with great force arises, and air power is used, an entirely new situation will arise not only in India but in the whole world.” When Ghosh showed Nehru’s letter to Kennedy, the American President was amused. He then told Ghosh how Nehru had made a desperate appeal to him for air protection at the outset of the Sino-Indian war, and “non-alignment or no non-alignment, the President had to respond”.

Nehru was unwilling to shed his Non Alignment status, or even to solve the Kashmir problem, because he knew that however derogatory his behavior, or how ever outrageous his conduct in annexing tiny Goa after suffering humiliation at the hand of a giant like China, the U.S would have to stand by him. Kennedy’s biting comment not-
withstanding, it was Nehru who had stated the correct position in his letter to Ghosh, because he knew for ideological reasons America would rush arms to India without bothering about letting Ayub know beforehand, as they had earlier promised.

Meanwhile on 2 March 1963, China and Pakistan signed a Border Agreement. Although the Chinese President Li Shao-Qui and Prime Minister Zhou En-lai were also present. The Agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministers Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Chen-Yi. Ayub had not gone, in deference to American sentiments. Z. A. Bhutto set aside the official low key draft of his speech and spoke extempore, the result being that his speech was very loudly applauded in the crowded Hall of the People in Beijing.28

Regardless of this development, five rounds of Indo-Pakistan talks on Kashmir went on, and regardless of the new sponsors, without results. This time the United States was urging Pakistan to compromise in areas where their complete position in Kashmir would be compromised. As Nehru had expected, America withdrew the solution of the Kashmir dispute as a condition for military aid.

In what would prove the last year of the Kennedy presidency, Under-Secretary George Ball travelled to Pakistan from 3 to 6 September 1963. He was told by Ayub, that in view of the Luke-warm attitude of the U.S. to Pakistan, they had to normalize relations with all their neighbours China and Russia included. Ayub dismissed George Ball’s proposal to enhance American military presence, since it would not be directed to the right direction (towards India) George Ball then said that :”The United States had given Pakistan straight forward assurances on coming to its aid should it be attacked from any direction.”29

This assurance, since it was not written into the earlier pacts, was not taken seriously. George Ball had to be content with the decision that the Badaber Base, even after the U2 incident would be expanded. This remained the position till the assassination of President Kennedy.

The Lyndon B. Johnson era would begin ominously for Pakistan. At Kennedy’s funeral Johnson told Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to: “get Kashmir out of your system”. Emboldened, Nehru set in motion a series of steps abridging the special status of Kashmir. The Prime Minister of Kashmir would now be called Chief Minister. The head of the principality would be called Governor in line with other provinces of India. It is not clear why, but at this stage Nehru had his “old friend” Sheikh Abdullah released and sent to Pakistan on a peace mission. On 26 May 1964, Sheikh Abdullah held discussions with Ayub in which Kashmir was to part of a package deal between the two countries. These discussions were more promising than the 5 rounds of discussions held in 1963, but the very next day( 27 May) Jawaharlal Nehru died, and Abdulla rushed back to India. Bhutto attended Nehru’s funeral as he had Kennedy’s but no unpleasantness occurred, but the hopes that had been raised for a solution to Kashmir was dashed to the ground. Sheikh Abdullah was free and he made foreign trips but when he came back from Cairo where he had met Zhou En-lai along with Ayub and Gamal Abdul Nasser, he was again arrested.
The next year 1965 would see two wars between India and Pakistan. The first on the Rann of Kutch was the minor one. When Pakistan gained the upper hand, Britain called for Arbitration. Ayub agreed. The results of the Arbitration were announced after the next war, the Kashmir war was over. This war as President Ayub re-iterated in his speech began on 15 May when Indian troops occupied Kargil. The UN Secretary-General U Thant, forced India to vacate Kargil, but unfortunately, the Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Musa did not send troops to re-occupy it. Rather he downplayed Kargil’s importance in his book *My Version*.  

The upshot was that Pakistan sent infiltrators into Occupied Kashmir on 6 August. On 15 August Indian troops re-occupied Kargil without resistance. From 1 September the war theatre remained confined to Kashmir. When on 6 September India crossed the International border, President Johnson ordered an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan. He knew that since India had an alternative source of supply in USSR, the embargo would hurt only Pakistan.  

The United States refused to honor the 1959 Mutual Defense Treaty on the ground that Pakistan had sent infiltrators to Kashmir. Ayub pointed out to Walter McConaughy, the U.S Ambassador that the war had begun in May with the Indian occupation of Kargil. He also stressed that Pakistan had sent in infiltrators (as the U.S had done during the Bay of Pigs Crisis) to the disputed territory of Kashmir and not into India itself. Whether this convinced McConaughy or not, we do not know, but he wrote back home that the destruction of Pakistan’s military capacity would not be in the interest of the U.S.  

Under-Secretary George Ball and Assistant Secretary William Bundy expressed the opinion that: “were the Chinese to indulge in some mild harassing action, it would give the United States some leverage over India.” In the midst of recrimination emerged the Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s statement, upholding the principle of self-determination. In fact Dean Rusk told the Indian Ambassador that “in the unlikely event of sizeable Chinese intervention, the US would first ask India to stop the fighting, moreover, there was little chance of the United States committing troops to the conflict.”  

On balance, while the American posture was terribly disappointing, in essence, it was laced with the desire that the Kashmir conflict, over hanging only because of Indian intransigence, be solved once and for all. It was Britain whose Prime Minister Harold Wilson had proclaimed India’s crossing of the international border on 6 September an act of aggression who actually set out to neutralize Pakistan’s valor on the field. In his memoirs Sir Morrice James claims credit for getting President Ayub Khan to accept cease-fire, before the Chinese Ultimatum given to India expired.  

How, he achieved this, James withholds from his memoirs but can be seen from the documents. James had told Ayub: “The world will not repeat not, in the foreseeable future revert to the position that the future of Kashmir was a closed issue.” The British had ensured since one year before partition that Kashmir should not go to Pakistan, and now when Kashmir was in Pakistan’s grasp James cornered Ayub saying: “with reference
to Chamb area, High Commissioner (James) warned Ayub of critical importance of singling unmistakably the limits of Pak military responses in order reduce risk of provoking overactions.” Thus we see the real reason why General Akhtar Husain Malik was replaced with General Yahya Khan to pre-empt the fall of Akhnur to Pakistan. Then pressure came on Pakistan to obtain a cease-fire, which would render Pakistan’s efforts futile. Aziz Ahmed, then Foreign Secretary told James in no uncertain terms that ‘any attempt to impose a cease-fire on Pakistan would have serious consequences’ James told Ayub in Aziz Ahmed’s presence that: “Otherwise Mr. President, the nuclear powers would take over.” We know that the nuclear powers to whom James referred could be Britain and perhaps Russia, but certainly not America.

The GHQ, the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Secretary all pleaded with Ayub to delay the cease-fire by at least three days, but the President disregarded them all. Throughout Ayub had been sending China private messages, not to intervene. First the Cease-fire and then the Tashkent Declaration was a disappointment. That Pakistan chose to succumb to Soviet Union’s pressure was an outright anomaly, because it was India and not Pakistan that was dependent on Russian aid. No harm would have come to Pakistan had Ayub left Tashkent without signing an agreement.

The Tashkent Declaration, however had one angle, mentioned by the American Consul-General in India: “the key to the imposition of the cease-fire, and the key to more lasting settlement, if one is reached, lies in one factor only—the existence of overlapping national security interests of the U.S and the U.S.S.R.” That was the factor which proved detrimental to Pakistan. In spite of all the bitterness. President Johnson wrote to President Ayub Khan complaining of Pakistan’s decision to close down the Badaber Base.

8.5 FROM 1965 TO 1971

As long as the Democratic Administration was there, there was in the words Ayub Khan: “I said that by a peculiar coincidence the policies of the U.S.S.R. and the United States seemed to have coincided in India. This did not please Mr. Kosygin. He said with some emotion, ‘Only some enemy of ours could have told you that’. I maintained that we did not have to be told by anybody; we had come to this conclusion ourselves.”

This position changed when Ayub Khan resigned handing over to General Yahya Khan, and in the United States, a Republican Administration headed first by Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974) and the Gerald Ford (1974-1977) came in. Beyond the ravages of the Vietnam War, which he tried to end, Richard Nixon clearly saw that there was no real conflict of interests with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and he changed the equation from US+USSR vs. PRC into US+PRC vs. USSR, which was a step by which Pakistan sought to benefit and from which India feared to lose.

The first step in this direction was taken when Nixon made a stop-over at Lahore on 1 August 1969. There he asked President Yahya Khan to act as his intermediary with China. Richard Nixon had told the Soviet ambassador: “China and the United States
cannot tolerate having a situation develop in which we are enemies, any more than we want to be permanent enemies of the Soviet Union.”

As a consequence of this policy, the National Security Advisor Dr Henry Kissinger made, through the good offices of President Yahya Khan a secret trip to China on 11 July 1971. On Kissinger’s return to the United States, it was announced on 1 August 1971 that President Nixon had accepted an invitation to visit China. India lost no time in reacting and on 9 August a Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed. Quite unlike 1965 both the U.S and China were to support Pakistan, however the United States told China that it could not aid Pakistan militarily. Sultan Mohammad Khan then Foreign Secretary was received late night on 9 April 1971 by Zhou En-lai himself. The talks were urgent and cordial but Sultan Mohammad Khan notes: “It is also relevant to point out that China never, during these or subsequent talks held out any possibility of coming to Pakistan’s aid with her armed forces.”

This meant that though diplomatically, Pakistan was well-placed, she had received no military guarantee. Both America and China during the last phase of the Indo-Pakistan had tried, nevertheless to intervene militarily but were thwarted by the Soviet Union. The arms embargo imposed by President Johnson in 1965, were undermining Pakistan’s defense. When the invasion was underway, President Nixon wrote to First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev: “The objective fact now is that Indian military forces are being used in an effort to impose political demands and to dismember the sovereign state of Pakistan. It is also a fact that your government has aligned itself with this policy.”

One complication was the American political system. Henry Kissinger has confided that the Secretary of State William Rogers was pro-India. When Benjamin Oehlert a former US Ambassador to Pakistan, spoke out in the middle of the 1971 crisis that US had obligations towards Pakistan, the State Department chose to contradict him.

In the US Congress there were many members supporting India, led by Senator Edward Kennedy. The reason being that a one-sided story was being played up in the press to the effect that the Pakistan Army was committing atrocities on an unarmed Bengali population to prevent transfer of power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League. Years after the conflict the first Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, among many other writers wrote:

“When Yahya announced the indefinite postponement of the National Assembly, Bengalis in Dhaka began venting their wrath on non-Bengalis. Violence soon spread to other towns of East Pakistan…..The subcontinent had a history of communal riots and it was not altogether surprising that bad feelings against Biharis should set off communal violence. There were massacres of Biharis in Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna by mobs”

Since many historians in Pakistan do not know of this reason for the Army Action, to prevent the complete decimation of the non-Bengali population, or choose to ignore the fact that the Pakistan Army was only responding, we cannot in fairness, blame opinion-
leaders in the United States for believing such one-sided stories. Then the United States faced another complication as spelled out by Henry Kissinger to Huang Hua the Chinese Representative to the UN:

“We are barred by law from giving equipment to Pakistan in this situation. And we are also barred by law from permitting friendly countries which have American equipment to give their equipment to Pakistan.” 

Kissinger explained that he had it conveyed to Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey that “If they decide that their national security requires shipment of American arms to Pakistan, We are obliged to protest, but we will understand.”

On 9 December, the State Department told President Nixon that the fall of Dacca was both “inevitable and desirable”. It was after this development that on the same day, President Nixon ordered the 7th Fleet with Enterprise towards India. The USSR countered by “deploying nuclear armed submarines off the east coast of the United States, where they could hit Washington in just 8 minutes.”

On 11 December, Kissinger received the news that Chinese troops were moving towards India’s North-East Frontier area. He commented: “While this decision was clearly taken before Chou [written Zhou now] could have known of our New York meeting.”

Thus it was not that despite their disclaimers, the US and China did not try to help militarily, but they were pre-empted by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had in the meantime vetoed every resolution calling for a cease-fire. Before returning to Pakistan Bhutto called on Nixon who complimented him on his UNSC speech, especially where Bhutto had mentioned that his son had asked him not come back with a document of surrender.

8.6 FROM 1971 TO 1979

Thus, despite their best and sincere intentions, neither the U.S. nor China could intervene militarily on time. Later when Z.A. Bhutto visited the United States on 19 September 1973 President Nixon said: “The independence and integrity of Pakistan is a cornerstone of American foreign policy.”

Despite legal hitches, Pakistan was able to receive humanitarian aid from the US after a massive flood but in 1974 three events took place. Pakistan’s recognition of Bangladesh during the Islamic Summit at Lahore, the resignation of President Nixon and the Indian nuclear explosion (8 May 1974). The Indian nuclear tests changed the whole tenor of US-Pakistan relations. All American efforts were directed at preventing Pakistan from being able to respond. Z.A. Bhutto had been negotiating with France for a Nuclear Reprocessing Plant, and the United States objected to this development.

The United States knew that what they were doing was totally unfair. In a State Department meeting held on 9 July 1976, Dr. Henry Kissinger now Secretary of State,
and continuing as such under President Gerald Ford; replied to Philip Habib the Under Secretary’s accusation that Z.A. Bhutto wanted to build an atom bomb:

“If you were in his place, you would do the same thing. I must say I have some sympathy for Bhutto on this. We are doing nothing to help him on conventional arms, we are going ahead and selling nuclear fuel to India even after they exploded a bomb and then for this little project (French Reprocessing Plant) we are coming down on him like a ton of bricks….An imbalance is being created in which Pakistan is totally dependent on India. There is no question we can break Pakistan’s back, they have made the mistake of allying themselves with us.”

These words of Dr. Henry Kissinger need no explanation. In 1977 President Jimmy Carter had been elected as President on a democratic ticket. This can be characterized as the Era of sanctions against Pakistan. The Stuart Symington Amendment 1976 forbidding aid to Pakistan for its efforts to go nuclear. This was followed by the John Glenn Amendment in 1977. For three years Pakistan faced American hostilities, much as described by Dr. Kissinger, which however was declassified only at the end of 2007. In 1979, three events took place. The Irani Revolution, the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On 6 April 1979, two days after Z. A. Bhutto’s execution, President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions against Pakistan.

8.7 FROM 1980 TO 1990

The Zia Era at first faced Democracy Sanctions, but two years into his term, because of the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Pakistan became a front line state. Since Pakistan had access to Afghanistan, and India did not, President Ronald Reagan had to listen to the advice of his National Security Advisor that Non-proliferation would have to take second place to combating the USSR.

In the first place General M. Ziaul Haq had bargained hard for the amount of aid Pakistan would get. Then because Pakistan was being sent in against the two Nuclear Armed states that had dismembered it in 1971 Ziaul Haq assured that Pakistan would continue its Nuclear program. Zbignew Brezezinski was the only National Security Advisor to weigh in Hindu fanaticism against Muslim Fundamentalism. “Irrationality might overwhelm the strategic restraint inherent in the nuclear calculus.” On 3 May 2007 it was revealed by former C.I.A analyst Richard Barlow that President Ronald Reagan deliberately let Pakistan develop nuclear weapons because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 2009 Andrew Cockburn according to reports said that the US was helping Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons. He quotes Ronald Reagan regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program: “I just don’t think that it is any of our business.” Andrew Cockburn further claimed that Dr Abdul Qadir Khan, (the Father of the Pakistani Bomb) had a C.I.A. agent as his shipping manager.

There is enough evidence to corroborate what Andrew Cockburn said. Ruud Lubber, the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands claimed that when in 1975 and then again in
1979 he had tried to have Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan arrested, the American C.I.A. had intervened. The next day a State Department Spokesperson refused to comment on Lubber’s statement on the ground that his statement was about past events and involved security issues.

The other concern apart from nuclear proliferation, that is terrorism, was not merely acceded to by the United States, it was authored by them: Terror. To counter the atheistic Communist ideology, the United States indoctrinated, trained and funded what are now called Islamic Terrorist. Kathy Gannon, explaining the title of her book *I is for Infidel, K is for Kalashnikov*, the text books given to Jihadis were printed by the University of Nebraska. Hillary Clinton when Secretary of State admitted: “the problems we face now, to some extent we have to take the responsibility for having contributed to it...the people we are fighting today, we funded them 25 years ago”. Larry Pressler states: President Carter and later President Reagan put their concerns about Pakistan’s development of a nuclear weapon on the back-burner. They now needed Pakistan to bolster the resistance fighters trying to oust the Soviets in Afghanistan. These resistance fighters were Islamic Fundamentalists, the same we are fighting all over the world today.

After the Geneva Accord on 14 April 1988, The Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan. The Cold War was over, won by the United States and the end of Pakistan as a frontline state. In April 1984, Indian troops had marched onto the Siachen Glacier in Kashmir, effectively ending the Simla Agreement of 1972. The next year 1985 the Pressler Amendment came in requiring a certificate from the President of the United States that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. Originally meant to circumvent the Symington and Glenn Amendments, it came into force in 1990, the first time that the President refused certification. Since the Geneva Accord did not settle the issue of rulership in Afghanistan, the country was left in chaos. In August President M. Ziaul Haq died in a plane crash over Bahawalpur, and along with him died the US Ambassador Arnold Raphael.

### 8.8 FROM 1988 TO 1999

This era saw a restoration of democratic rule, with the Pakistan People’s Party led by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) led by Nawaz Sharif alternating. Neither party completed its full term either time, because of Amendment 58 (4-B) to the Eighth Amendment the constitutional device to give cover to the Martial Law decisions in the Zia era and grant indemnity. It was first used by Ziaul Haq to dismiss Mohammad Khan Junejo, his handpicked Prime Minister, in 1988. Elections to a new assembly had already been scheduled before Ziaul Haq had died. Twice Benazir Bhutto and twice M. Nawaz Sharif with the National Assemblies were dismissed.

Benazir Bhutto took office in December 1988 and George Bush in January 1989. On 5 June the Pakistani Prime Minister arrived in Washington. The next day, President Bush assured Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto of continued US assistance to Pakistan’s Defense and Development objectives, but the nuclear issue kept hovering in the background. On both
issues Nuclearization and Terror, the US knew that their acquiescence to the Indian test in 1974 had made it imperative for Pakistan’s survival to develop a credible deterrence, as well as Terrorists were their creations not Pakistan’s yet, Congress expectations continued to be unrealistic, especially since the Soviets had departed barely a year before leaving Afghanistan to turmoil. In her 7 June address to the Congress Benazir Bhutto offered to throw open Pakistan’s Nuclear installation provided “other countries in the region” did the same. 67

On 16 August 1989, Munir Ahmed Khan the CEO of Pakistan Atomic Commission disclosed that Pakistan had attained the capability of designing and making nuclear reactors.” 68 A fortnight later on 26 August Benazir Bhutto basically confirmed to AFP Munir Ahmed Khan’s statement adding that Pakistan could deal with any threat, but had no intention of pursuing it. 69 On 15 December the United Nations adopted a Pakistani proposal that South Asia be made a nuclear free zone. This however was not binding and Pakistan had little expectation that India would roll back. Still, diplomatically Pakistan’s move was sound.

As a consequence of her visit, Pakistan was assured of the sale of sixty F-16 Bombers and continue the annual $ 600 million aid program. Soon, however, the Kashmir problem erupted. Dennis Kux wrote what was in the mind of most Americans: “Although Pakistan did not start the uprising in Kashmir, the temptation to fan the flames was too great for Islamabad to resist. Using guerilla- warfare expertise gained during the Afghan War (1979-1988) Pakistan’s ISI began to provide active backing for Kashmiri Muslim insurgents.” 70 The word “insurgent” defines the whole American attitude. What had the US done in Afghanistan except guerilla warfare to expel the USSR soldiers? U.N Security Council resolutions on Kashmir were in Pakistan’s favor, and India was in defiance. Even if we agree that the Kashmiris started a struggle to remove occupation Indian forces, how was it different from the Afghan struggle to remove occupation Russian forces? Another gaffe by Kux is to call General Mirza Aslam Beg a Shia Muslim. 71

This development takes us back to US-Pakistan alliance era when Pakistan was given aid provided it did not use it against India! With India being the only power to have invaded Pakistan and had even dismembered it in 1971, despite US support, it was not rational that having the means that Pakistan would not struggle in Kashmir for what amounted to the realization of UNSC resolutions. In 1990, in the months before the PPP government of Benazir Bhutto was dismissed, US Assistant Secretary of Defense signed three memoranda of understanding to improve mutual defense co-operation. However relations were defined by the warning delivered by Robert Gates Under Secretary to Pakistan (in the Prime Minister’s absence from the capital) to stop nuclearization and cease support for Kashmiri “insurgents” It was clear that Gates was carrying not the American, but the Indian brief. The Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub-Khan was told by the Secretary of State James Baker in October 1990, that mere freezing of Pakistan’s nuclear capacity was not enough, it had to destroy its existing nuclear equipment as well as roll back of its capacity. 72
By the time a Pakistan Muslim League under Prime Minister M. Nawaz Sharif took office, related developments favorable to Pakistan took place. On 7 June, India rejected a Pakistan proposal for a 5 nation conference to make South Asia a nuclear free zone. 31 January saw President Bush urging Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to accept Pakistan’s proposal for making South Asia a nuclear free zone. On 14 April the Secretary of State James Baker tells Congress that outright purchase is not covered by the Pressler Amendment. In the meanwhile, on 10 May the US imposed sanctions on India and Russia for signing a $250 million rocket development agreement. On 9 June, Narasimha Rao rejected the US proposal. On 14 June, the US House of Representatives voted by an overwhelming majority to extend the Pressler amendment to India. This probably was the extent that Pakistan could gain Congressional support. Pakistan made another gain when on 23 October US officials visited Kashmir for an on the spot appraisal. However what set the tone of the relationship was set by the behavior of the Under Secretary Reginald Bartholomew told President Ghulam Is’hak Khan in Islamabad: “We can’t change our policies you change yours” and then walked out. Later when Syeda Abida Hussain became Ambassador, she saw Bartholomew, who as being posted out to Japan. When she presented her credentials she told President George H. Bush: “Mr. President, if you meant what you said about Pakistan having rendered assistance to your country in achieving victory in the Cold War, then you owe us, not merely financial assistance, but a strategic return for the strategic support we provided. You owe us a referendum on Kashmir.”

1993 saw a border confrontation between India and Pakistan under cover of what were called War Games. On 15 April the United States let it be known that it had worked behind the scene to avert war between the neighbors. But this year a related development detrimental to Pakistan took place. July and August saw the US sanction China for missile sale to Pakistan. In response China warns that if shall in the face of sanctions, it shall stop abiding by global arms control agreements. Come December Pakistan could do no more than ask US to lift the sanctions. The tone was set however

Benazir Bhutto was voted back to power on 6 October 1993. On 28 October the United States re-iterated its position that Kashmir was disputed territory; but by winter relations again froze when Pakistan was pressed on the nuclear issue. In November Assistant Secretary Robin Raphael was clearly told Pakistan would not sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, at least not unilaterally. In response, on 19 November US threatened to close its Aid offices in Pakistan. This did not make much of an impression and when in December a group of American senators including Larry Pressler were told plainly that Pakistan would not unilaterally sign the NPT. Unable to persuade India to agree making South Asia a nuclear free zone, these American senators were apparently in a bid to impose a discriminatory regime on Pakistan.

Visiting the US again in April 1995, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto when Bill Clinton had become President, pressed for the delivery of the F-16’s Pakistan had paid for. Publicly, President Clinton agreed: “I don’t think it is right for us to keep both the money and the equipment”. The US Senate approved of the Brown Amendment on 21 September
1995. This did not alter the core provisions of the Pressler Amendment, but it allowed resumption of financial aid, training of Pakistani military personnel, and except for the F-16’s, Pakistan would be able to take possession of other military equipment frozen in the United States. In 1996, drug trafficking concerns re-surfaced, but Clinton refused to take action on the ground that “punishing Pakistan was not in the national interest.”

The second term of Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister is noted for only two events in the present context. The Nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan in 1998 and the Kargil Operation in 1999. India, having already tested in 1974, launched a series of 5 explosions at Pokhran on 11 May 1998. The US did take some steps. President Clinton did threaten India with sanctions. In June, finally looking beyond, it also asked Russia to scrap its nuclear program with India, but essentially, the US ran true to form. The Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was sent to Pakistan to dissuade her from responding to the Indian provocation. Both Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad Khan proved intrepid, telling Talbot that the CTBT was dead, and so was the NPT. After facing diplomatic indifference Nawaz Sharif ordered Pakistan to respond and on 28 May, five explosions were carried out at Chaghai followed by another the next day to equal the Indian count.

Although India had been busy trying to corner Pakistan diplomatically, so that it could not respond, from the reaction of the Indian Parliament the next day, it seemed that India was not actually convinced that Pakistan had the expertise to respond. A nuclear stand-off held promise of peace, but the next year took place the Kargil conflict. The stand-off on Kashmir had been frustrating and General Pervez Musharraf says that he filled in the unoccupied gaps along Kargil and Dras had been filled by 100 new posts of 10 to 20 Pakistani troops.

The Indians suffered heavy casualties in three rounds in May bringing their Air Force into operation General Musharraf’s assessment about the Indian Army was: “It had bottled up major formations inside Kashmir, leaving itself no capability to attack us elsewhere, and, most seriously, had left the field open for a counter offensive with which we could choke the Kashmir valley”. 74

Although Nawaz Sharif yielded to US pressure, Pervez Musharraf’s assessment though it may have been credible as far as the Indian army and Air force was concerned, overlooked the Indian Navy which threatened to blockade Pakistan. 75 Although Pervez Musharraf did close the gaps in 1999, something General M. Musa had not done in 1965, the basic question is that Kargil been had been on the side of Pakistan till 1971. If it could be used to liberate Kashmir, it could have happened before 1971. After all even after the 1971 War Pakistan had been successful in taking the Leepa valley. The morale of the Pakistani soldiers was not in question, the strategic aspect was. Then if Pakistan had volunteered to exchange Kargil for Siachen, it would have been acceptable to the world powers, but Kargil proved not a military, but a diplomatic set back.
Yielding to pressure on Kargil made Nawaz Sharif loose that level of popularity he had gained after the Nuclear response to India. Pervez Musharraf took over late in 1999 and was at the helm of affairs when 9/11 took place. Although the terrorist attacks had been perpetrated by Saudis and Yemenis, the United States chose to punish Afghanistan and Pakistan. Secretary of State Colin Powell phoned Musharraf saying that you are either with us or against us. The Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage followed through by threatening to bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age.  

The whole term of General Musharraf was spent in listening to US homilies “Do More” to control Terror. Having committed cross-border terrorism for a decade against the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, the United States expected Pakistan to control terrorism, which Pakistan was unable to do, with 3 Million Afghan refugees on its soil. They were not prepared to go back because they had irredentist claims against Pakistan. Pakistan at American behest humiliated Dr Abdul Qadir Khan, although at the time of the actual tests, he was sought to be sidelined. This incensed the Pakistani public and Musharraf was forced to extend him a pardon. Two influential columnists rushed to cite the US precedent of issuing a pardon to J. Robert Oppenheimer Jr., the father of the American bomb who was later deprived of security clearance.

In this whole decade Pakistan suffered accusations. As Munir Akram explained in the presence of the Indian representative Pakistan’s action was neither cross, nor border nor terrorism. He said that the movement in Kashmir was indigenous, therefore not cross, it was a Line of Control, not a border and it was not terrorism, it was a struggle against state terrorism. Even with American troops in Afghanistan they were unable to control acts of terrorism like the killings in the Army Public School, Peshawar and a hospital in Quetta. The terrorists escaped either across the border to Afghanistan or mingled with inmates in the Afghan refugee camps.

8.9 FROM 1999 TO DATE

General Pervez Musharraf was the only military ruler of Pakistan not to impose Martial Law, and was the only military ruler forced to resign, due to lawyers movement protesting the removal of Pakistan’s Chief Justice. After elections were held the Pakistan People’s Party was returned to power, but after the tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 In her last speech, she had challenged the terrorists: “Should the Pakistani flag not be hoisted in Swat?” But during this term three incidents took place. The Raymond Davis affair, the killing of Osama bin Laden and in the following year the Salala incident. The United States had employed a new instrument unmanned Drone aircraft ostensibly to combat terrorists but many civilians and non-combatants suffered in what was called collateral damage! 2010 saw an upsurge in Drone attacks especially in Waziristan. The US knew their targets; they had been collaborators before.

On 27 January 2011, Raymond Davis an American who later claimed diplomatic privilege killed a man in Lahore, and an American security vehicle come to rescue him, ran over another Pakistani. The Pakistani law of Diyat or blood money was applied and
the assassin went free. Former presidential candidate Senator John Kerry arrived to take
charge of Davis. Davis was later arrested in the United States for a minor crime and
released and he actually published a book on his misadventure.

Osama bin Laden was discovered to hiding in the garrison town of Abbotabad, near the
capital Islamabad. It is a wonder that Pakistani intelligence did not know of his presence
in Abbotabad. Since he was America’s most wanted criminal, it is a wonder that
American also did not know. President Barack Obama has repeatedly said that Pakistani
authorities were unaware of his presence, but the nature of his residence, in a well- built
house with a courtyard, raises the question of how they did not. Conspiracies theories
abound, but it seems that the United States, so prone to blaming Pakistan, as can be seen
from the incidence that follows just below, gave the country a clean chit in this high
profile case, because his location was a secret both countries shared.

The Drone strikes however continued unabated. On 26 November 2011, 25 Pakistani
soldiers were killed in Mohmand Agency. The United States did not apologize for what
was called the Salala incident, but on 22 December, issued a statement that the incident was
caused “by mistakes on both sides.” The Government of Pakistan considered it too blithe an
explanation and shut down the NATO supply line that ran from Pakistan to landlocked
Afghanistan. At first the US explored other routes, but found them both more expensive
and more hazardous. Finally on 3 July 2012, Hilary Clinton, Secretary of State apologized
to Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, that the supply route was re-opened.

The PPP had only one term, but the Democrats under Barack Obama had two. When
Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, relations plunged again. His
policy statement on Pakistan was “We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe
havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups. We must prevent
nuclear weapons and material from coming into the hands of the terrorists” Rex
Tillerson, then Secretary of State said: “There are areas where perhaps even India can
take some steps of rapprochement on issues with Pakistan, to improve stability in
Pakistan and remove some of the reasons why they deal with these unstable elements
inside their own country.”

When asked the next day to elaborate whether a Kashmir solution was being linked to the
Af-Pak issues the State Department spokesperson, Ms. Nauert replied :“I think going up
to 30,000 feet, we view the whole strategy and handling Afghanistan as being a regional
strategy, and that, incorporates India as well as Pakistan. In terms of Kashmir, our policy
on that has not changed. We continue to encourage the sides to sit down and talk together
about that.”

The American stance started being just a little more understanding after 21 July when
President Donald Trump offered to mediate the Kashmir issue, since Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi had asked him to. Although India denied ever asking him to do
so, President Trump re-iterated his stance on 2 August. On 5 August 2019, India
revoked Article 370, giving Kashmir a special status, and when to put down the resulting
protests clamped down a curfew, which at the end of October has still not been lifted. The
next day Morgan Ortagus, State Department spokesperson, urged India to engage in
discussion with those affected by its decision to revoke Kashmir’s special status, but
added: “We note that the Indian Government has described these actions as strictly an
internal matter. We call for peace and stability along the Line of Control”.

On 16 August Imran Khan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister contacted President Trump, who in
turn contacted Prime Minister Modi. The Indian media noted that during Trump’s
meeting with Imran Khan, the Indian External Affairs Minister had noted that no request
for mediation was made, but a senior Trump aide said that “the U.S President does not
make up things”

A more reassuring stage was reached when a US State Department official stated that
“stripping Kashmir of its special status has implications that go beyond the Indian
borders.” A week later at the G7 Summit at Biarritz (France) saw the American
President and the Indian Prime Minister sitting side by side. President Trump repeated his
offer of mediation to which Prime Minister Modi said that he would not accept any
mediation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir or other issues.

When The UNSEC meeting on Kashmir held on 16 August ended without a joint
communique, American media became active asking how long should Kashmir wait for
peace? CNN reported that two of the five permanent members and a major Western
power prevented the United Nations Security Council from issuing a joint statement
(which could be actionable) condemning Indian unilateral action on Kashmir.

However, President Donald Trump having earlier (on 3 August 2019) expressed his
feelings about Imran Khan: “We have a good friendship, a good feeling, good chemistry.
I think Pakistan will help us” Such words were not spoken of any other Prime Minister of
Pakistan since Mochtarma Benazir Bhutto, who by the way was at Oxford at the same
time as Imran Khan. Late August, American legislators joined the protest. They reminded
India that “transparency and political participation were the corner stones of
representative democracies.” Thus questioning India’s democratic credentials Yvette
Clarke of New York said “Modi has no right to do what he is doing to the people of
Kashmir.”

Four days later, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services
Committee, Adam Smith told the Indian envoy: ”There are legitimate concerns about the
ongoing communications blackout, militarization of the region and the enforcement of
curfews” Pramila Jaypal, an Indian born member said that she was “deeply troubled by
reports of Indian Government’s arrest of two thousand in Kashmir”. Amnesty
International, on the same day, deprecated the use of metal pellets. “Their use has
blinded hundreds and killed at least 14 people since July 2016”,

Four US Senators wrote to President Trump expressing alarm over the situation in
Kashmir. On 20 September Alice Wells Under Secretary applauded Prime Minister
Imran Khan’s “unambiguous and important statement that militants from Pakistan who
would carry out violence in Kashmir are enemies of both Kashmiris and Pakistan. We
agree” Next Prime Minister Imran Khan could address US legislators. Lindsey Graham
one of the four legislators who had written to President Trump was present. Imran Khan held the United States “partly responsible” for Pakistani society’s radicalization. He recalled that President Ronald Reagan had glorified these fighters—“Then we joined the US war on terror and lost 70,000 soldiers.” One week later the United States urged India to quickly ease restrictions in occupied Kashmir.

All these efforts by Pakistan are having a cumulative effect. The UN and US legislators are commenting on the nature of US-Indian ties. Newspaper reports of October show a rising trend as the miseries of Kashmiris are prolonged. UN Human Rights chief Michelle Bachelet has expressed her concern while the United States has called for rapid lifting of restrictions.

On 5 September while Prime Minister Imran Khan renewed his warning to people against crossing the LoC, a US Senate panel has added an amendment to a finance bill requiring India to end its lock down and curfew in held Kashmir. Specifically they asked for 1. Full restoration of telecommunications and Internet services. 2. Lift its lock down and curfew. 3. Release of individuals detained pursuant to the Government of India’s revocation of Article 370. It was revealed that two days earlier (on 4 October) Senator Christopher Van Hollen was denied entry into IH Kashmir. Senator Bob Menendez was also in India and both made public statements decrying Indian repression of Kashmir. Sandeep Pandey an Indian activist was similarly denied access.

Two Senators meanwhile met Azad Jammu and Kashmir President Sardar Masood Khan. Senator Van Hollen being joined by Margaret C. Hasan. On the same day Senator Elizabeth Warren tweeted that US-India partnership has always been rooted in our shared democratic values. I’m concerned about the recent events in Kashmir. The next day Kamal Harris was reported as saying “We have to remind the Kashmiris that they are not alone in the world” Senator Elizabeth Warren reminded India that the rights of the Kashmiri people must be respected. Senator Bernie Sanders that India’s action of 5 August is unacceptable. Sanders called on President Trump to support a UN backed peaceful resolution that respects the will of the Kashmiri people.

On 10 October Dr Maleeha Lodhi, Permanent Representative of Pakistan said that for Kashmiri people life under India’s brutal occupation is to live in an armed cage in the silence of the graveyard. India restored SMS services but blocked them again within hours.

On 22 October, 23 diplomats visited the LoC areas affected by Indian shelling. The areas claimed by India to be Terror units were proved to be ordinary dwellings. The same day Alice Well informed a Congressional panel: “America’s position on held Kashmir is that it continues to consider it a disputed territory. We consider the LoC a de facto line separating two parts of Kashmir. We recognize de facto administrations on both sides of Kashmir. We have urged India to respect Human Rights and restore SMS and internet services.

The following day three US legislators spoke out Ilhan Omar, Tom Melinowski, and David Cicilline terming the Kashmir situation a disaster. Alice Wells responded to Sheila Jackson Lee that: “we are not taking a position on Article 370. We are taking a position on whether Kashmiris can live in dignity and have a full economic and political life.” Congressman David Torne asked: “How is the State Department accepting that at this
time, India, a close strategic partner for the US on every-thing from trade to military co-
operation, is telling us that we cannot allow US diplomats to enter Kashmir?"  

On 27 October Un and Us officials called for Indo-Pakistan dialogue to reduce tension. The stand of UN Secretary-General Guter ces was that any solution to the 70 years old dispute must be rooted in respect for Human Rights of Kashmiri people. The same day it was revealed that a million tweets on Kashmir were blocked at the request of the Indian Government. 

At the time writing, it was stated that the US was looking for a fresh start in ties with Pakistan. They desired an increase in trade. Commenting on some low-level elections held in IH Kashmir, a US official said “These very local set of elections could not be an alternative to restoring normalcy”. 

There are still two issues that still inhibit mutual relations. One is holding on to bilateralism as necessary for the solution of the Kashmir issue as claimed under the Simla Agreement and the second is cross-border terrorism claimed by India. For this, we can heed the words of two Indians: 1 On 1 January 1994, Indian Foreign Minister J. N. Dixit admitted that Kashmir is an outstanding issue under Article 6 of the Simla Agreement. 

The Indian historian on Kashmir Prem Shankar Jha writing in the Wire about the execution of Burhanuddin Wani: “But no amount of money or exhortation could have made 1.5 lakh people from all over South Kashmir to catch a last glimpse of him and offer no less than 40 prayers for his soul. And Pakistan did not even learn of Wani’ death let alone instigate it, before the people of South Kashmir”.

8.10 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Keeping in view the initial issues of Pakistan’ foreign policy, discuss the Pakistan-US relations from 1947 to 1955.
2. How do you understand the Pakistan America foreign relations partnership from 1951 to 1955.
3. ‘From 1955 to 1970, Pakistan adopted the policy of affiliation with the United States’. Discuss your arguments.
4. ‘Pakistan remained strange towards America during 1971 to 1979’, discuss the statement.
5. Discuss the role of Pakistan in the war of Afghanistan against Soviet Union and Pakistan-US relations from the period 1980 to 1990.
7. Keeping in view the peace-making efforts of Pakistan, discuss the relation of Pakistan with the Unites States from 1999 to date.
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MUTUAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND USSR

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INTRODUCTION

This is the last unit of this book which reveals about the relation between Pakistan and USSR. To provide the authentic information to the students, the editor selected two articles which fulfill the criteria of the approved outlines. The first article entitled “Pakistan’s Growing Relations with Russia: Factoring in the Role of the US” was written by Mr. Muhammad Taimour Fahad Khan and was originally published by “Strategic Studies”.

The second article entitled “Russia and Pakistan: Shared Challenges and Common Opportunities” is written by Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov which was originally published by the Carnegie Moscow Center. © 2014 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Unfortunately, the mutual relations between Pakistan and USSR could not be developed in a better way since the early days of establishment of Pakistan. The first article shows the history of mutual relations between Pakistan and USSR in detail. One of the main reasons of the cold relations between Pakistan and USSR was the Pakistan’s inclined towards United States. It is the reality that Pakistan was dependent on military assistance attained from US. In following years Pakistan provided its land to United States against the USSR and the U-2 incident occurred. Moreover, the USSR carried on to provide help India against Pakistan which reluctant the fall of East Pakistan. At last, Pakistan became the front line state during Soviet-Afghan war and the logical end was collapse of USSR.

The second article reveals that after the collapse of USSR, Russia and Pakistan both understand the needs of maintaining peace in Asia and in this regard, Pakistan has great importance now a days. The authors also discussed the US role between the both states.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit you will be able

1. Understanding of the mutual relations between Pakistan and USSR.
2. To comprehend about the role of United States in Pakistan US relations.
3. To know the collapse of Soviet Union and Pakistan’s relations with Russia.
4. To comprehend the multiple aspects of the foreign Policy of Pakistan
Section I:

In this section, a peer review published research paper entitled “Pakistan’s Growing Relations with Russia: Factoring in the Role of the US” is included. The same was originally published by the journal “Strategic Studies”. The editor is adding this article with thanks to the author Mr. Muhammad Taimur Fahad Khan who acknowledged the request and permitted to reproduce the article to the students of Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad. The author is Media Officer/Research Associate at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.

9.1. Pakistan’s Growing Relations with Russia: Factoring in the Role of the US

Muhammad Taimur Fahad Khan

Abstract:

It is argued that there are no permanent friends or foes in the realm of international relations, only interests are primary and supreme. Every nation-state in the world adheres to this rule and Pakistan is no different. Given the roller-coaster nature of Pak-US relations, the former’s foreign policy orientation has always remained buoyant with and peripheral to that of the latter. However, with the world shifting from unipolarity to multi-polarity, Pakistan needs to modify its foreign policy orientation according to the changing international and regional circumstances. Significant global player such as Russia has emerged, who has a revisionist stance towards the contemporary state of affairs. Recently, Russia has managed to reassert its significance globally as well as regionally. It is also rethinking its policy towards South Asia. Therefore, being a strategically important country in this region, it becomes imperative for Pakistan to forget the Cold War baggage and look towards a different relationship with the regional power based on cooperation and mutual trust while maintaining stability in its bilateral relations with the US. This research aims to surmise the bilateral relationships of Pakistan with both, the US and Russia, the recent emerging trends in these relationships and what options does Pakistan have for balanced and stable relations with Russia and the US to achieve and secure its foreign policy objectives.

Keywords: Pakistan, Russia, US, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Balance.

Introduction

Pakistan is a country with a significant regional stature, which is now also increasing internationally. Its geographical location and contiguity with important land and sea routes makes it all the more relevant in the bigger scheme of contemporary global politics. Resultantly, Pakistan’s foreign policy orientations and actions also have an impact on the regional and global state of affairs. Its economic policies, political
preferences, security strategies and foreign policy decisions are pivotal in terms of shaping the environment of the entire region. Pakistan’s relations with Russia, if compared with those of the US, have remained insignificant in magnitude due to several underlying and overarching factors. Although the two countries never indulged in any bilateral dispute with each other, their alliances, geopolitical interests and respective world views have always remained poles apart. Pakistan’s rivalry with India and friendly ties with the US always cast a shadow on its already lukewarm relations with Russia.¹

Historically, Pakistan’s choice of the US as an ally inadvertently harmed its potential chances of forging mutual ties with Russia. The other limiting factor stunting the growth of Pakistan-Russia relations was Russia’s Indo-centric South Asia policy.² However, major shift in the Russian policy vis-à-vis South Asia has now begun to emerge, which does not diminish Russia’s bonhomie with India but simultaneously, it forges better ties with other countries in the region like Pakistan, China, Afghanistan and Iran.³ It entails a careful balancing act that keeps both Russia and India at peace with each other and it also provides Russia with an opportunity to eye other potential markets for its massive defense exports.⁴ Overall, the recent trends indicate that Russia’s monochrome South Asia policy is now changing, which paves the way for Islamabad to improve its existent cordiality with the Kremlin.

An objective analysis of the existing literature reveals that the global constructs, which were largely shaped after the end of the Cold War, are in disarray. The world, at present, seems to be slipping into a transition. The world is no longer lead by a single power bloc. It is moving from unipolarity to multi-polarity. In light of the current changing circumstances, it is extremely important for Pakistan to be cognisant of these changes and shape its foreign policy actions and objectives according to international environment. This study will attempt to highlight the current nature of Pakistan’s relations with Russia and the US. It will explore how the long-standing patterns of interaction changed in these relationships over the recent past? It traces the changes which have occurred in the attitudes of each state vis-à-vis Pakistan and vice versa. It highlights the options, which present times and circumstances offer to Pakistan to maximise the benefits of maintaining good and balanced relations with Russia as well as the US without compromising on its own national interests and image.

The underlying interests of Russia and the US in South Asia, especially after the initiation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), have made Pakistan an attractive partner for any power interested in the South Asian region. The policy-makers in Pakistan must realise its political, economic, strategic and geographic significance and make the best of this opportunity. More importantly, however, the significant shift in Russia’s policy in South Asia particularly with reference to the US presence in this part of the world, also builds a persuasive case for warming up of relations between Pakistan and Russia. This research attempts to add a new perspective to the existing literature in terms of how Pakistan should determine its future foreign policy course while dealing with Russia and the US. Pakistan’s relations with the US, since its inception in 1947, have remained quite friendly, thus, by default setting Pakistan against Russia all through
the Soviet era and afterwards. Pakistan’s inclination towards the US was driven due to the economic and security compulsions as well as the ideological differences with Russia. Indian presence on the eastern border was a constant threat to Pakistan which compelled it to forge an alliance with a major power like the US. However, lately, with the rise of regionalism, interconnectivity, economic development in the Asian countries, particularly China’s rise and the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan has brought to light some fissures between Pakistan and the US. The US President, Donald Trump, in his strategy announcement regarding South Asia, criticised Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and used a harsh tone for its peace-building efforts, which has strained relations between the two. Financial aid to Pakistan from the US was also blocked while its relations with India were better than ever. All these factors played a major role in bringing Russia and Pakistan together. Presently, Russia has been looking to expand its forays into South Asia by forging better ties with Pakistan and by playing a major role in peace-building efforts in Afghanistan.

Thus, it is imperative to analyse how necessary it is for Pakistan to balance the US factor when improving bilateral relationship with Russia and what options are on the table for the country to maintain stable relationship with both the states (Russia and the US) without compromising on its own national security and political interests.

9.1.1. PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND THE US: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Pak-US Relations during the Cold War

Pakistan’s relation with the US have always been described as ‘a tale of exaggerated expectations, broken promises and disastrous misunderstandings.’ Nevertheless, the two countries have a relationship so entwined that one’s survival is dependent on the other. Pakistan has always been disappointed in the US for not giving much weight to Pakistan’s fear regarding hegemony, while on the same time; the US continuously expected Pakistan’s assistance in fighting the war against Communism. During the post-partition era in South Asia, Truman’s administration wanted to maintain strong bilateral relations with both the newborn states and expected them to maintain regional stability. However, Nehru’s non-alignment policy directed the US interests more towards Pakistan. Pakistan, being an inborn insecure state, with the unending fear of sub-continental re-unity, reached out to the US for a “Strategic Alliance.” The two countries during the extended period of the Cold War had a purely counter-balance strategy, while Pakistan tried to contain the Indian influence over the region, the US reciprocated such behaviour in terms of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

Soon enough, Pakistan’s status vis-à-vis the US, emerged as ‘the Eastern bastion against Communism,’ with Turkey the Western bastion. These strategic modifications in Pakistan’s foreign policy, however, turned out to be counter-productive for the country as the US military assistance brought with it the propagation of anti-state/undemocratic tendencies within the country. In the years that immediately followed the independence,
Pakistan under the rule of Liaquat Ali Khan, a strong supporter of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), practiced a fairly neutral foreign policy towards both the superpowers. However, as the USSR’s inclination became clear with the vetoing of Kashmir issue resolutions in the UN in India’s favour, Pakistan was now convinced as to which side to pick for the years to come.

In 1950, after a formal invitation from Washington, Liaquat Ali Khan visited the US to help gain support over voicing the Kashmir issue in the UN. The US, however, found the issue insignificant and pressed for using the Karachi-Lahore area of Pakistan as a base for air operations against the USSR and a staging area for the forces engaged in the defence or recapture of the Middle Eastern oil areas. Geopolitical considerations allowed Pakistan to receive aid from the US, free from obligation such as joining the US-led security pacts to encumber China. In the 1950s, Pakistan became America’s ‘most allied ally’ when it came to containing the Soviet expansion. The signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement followed by the US sponsorship for Pakistan to become a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) were seen as clear initiatives to curb and contain Communism. In 1959, a cooperation agreement was signed between the two states, which stated that the US would be required to assist Pakistan if it became the victim of aggression from any other country (and particularly countries in the region mostly hinting towards India). This initiative put Pakistan’s reservations against US interest centric policies on a hold. With the US intelligence base in Badaber (Pakistan), the US could now easily look upon the activities of the USSR and China simultaneously.

The assistance Pakistan provided to the US did not, of course, come easy. The Muslim nations such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia had their reservations with the new western ally. At the same time, Pakistan had disturbed the two communist giants, the USSR and China. During the wars of 1965 and 1971, the US maintained a neutral position between India and Pakistan while providing military aid to both the countries. With the USSR’s undivided loyalty lying with India followed by the new Indo-US military alliances, got Pakistan to rethink its strategic alliances. This led to improved relations with China, which soon led to extensive military and developmental support. In 1976, Pak-US relations, once again, faced turmoil as the Ford administration severely opposed the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant to be purchased by Pakistan from France. In 1979, the Carter administration cut-off the US aid to Pakistan causing the withdrawal of France’s support to Pakistan. The limited US interests in Pakistan were ephemeral as the Russian involvement in Afghanistan became a reality.

The US tested Pakistan as a frontline ally during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Like many Cold War-era partners, Pakistan was able to successfully bargain for significant assistance from Washington in exchange for its help in containing the USSR. Both sides avoided deeper alignment of interests’ vis-à-vis Afghanistan. However, as the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, the US interest in Afghanistan evaporated very quickly.
This provided impetus to brewing confrontation between the US and Pakistan over the issue of nuclear proliferation. By the end of the Cold War, both states had developed a huge underlying trust deficit and considered each other as “unreliable ally.” In the US, Pakistan was considered as an ally, which was no longer of any use to the greater US interests and propagation of its foreign policy in the region. The aid to Pakistan was considered a liability on the US economy. While in Pakistan, the same sentiments existed regarding the US. A strong sense of bitterness and mistrust towards the US pervaded in the Pakistani society. It was believed that Pakistan was treated very unfairly by the US despite being a close ally in the South Asian region. This abrupt end of Pak-US cooperation left a bad taste in the mouth of the Pakistani establishment and decision-makers, which led them to believe that the US always wanted to subordinate Pakistan rather than adopt a foreign policy that would engender mutual gains and foster understanding between the two countries.

**Pak-US Relations in the Post-Cold War Era**

As the USSR fell apart, the geostrategic importance of Pakistan to the US greatly fell. After the rollback of the Soviet Red army from Afghanistan, Pakistan was left to bear the costs of the Afghan conflict alone, while the US carried the day by reaping most of the benefits. The Afghan war left thousands of Afghanis on the right side of the Pak-Afghan border, along with the sentiments of hatred that had generated among the militant groups and split regime bearers of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, a nuclear Pakistan was against the US interests in the region and, so, in 1990, came the Pressler Amendment. According to the document, the sanctions were to be placed on Pakistan in terms of military and economic assistance, if Pakistan would continue to pursue the dream of becoming a nuclear power. In light of the amendment, the US withheld the F-16 fighter jet supply to Pakistan, which Pakistan had already paid for. After Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests, President Bill Clinton imposed additional sanctions on Pakistan, invoking the 1994 Glenn Amendment, which authorises sanctions on Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that detonate nuclear explosions and the Symington Amendment, which prohibits military and economic assistance to any country that delivers and/or receives nuclear assistance. In 1999, as Pakistan faced a military coup bringing Pervez Musharraf to power, the US prohibited all forms of military and economic help to Pakistan in light of its Foreign Assistance Act.

The whole decade in the post-Cold War era showcased severely deteriorated relations between the US and Pakistan. The US left Pakistan severely dismantled against the Afghanistan’s post-Russian invasion, while Pakistan had soured relations with communist powers as well as regional allies. The good that came out of the century for Pakistan was its declaration as a nuclear power, which helped balance the tension with the neighbouring India using deterrence.
Pak-US Relations post-9/11 and War on Terror

Exactly 9 days after the 9/11 incident when the US President, George Bush, addressed the congress regarding his plans for War on Terror, it was made very clear to every country (especially countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan) to pick a side, for they will either be fighting ‘with the US or against the US.’ Pakistan’s international isolation throughout the 1990s now allowed the country, to once again build some strong western alliances. In the light of this, Pervez Musharraf pledged alliance with the US. In the months that followed 9/11, four airports were provided to the US forces by Pakistan for logistic assistance along with Dalbadin, Pasni, Jacobabad and Shamsi (Kharan). Likewise, the US also got help from Pakistan to engage in spying activities that included employing of planes for spying activity in North and South Waziristan, Hindu Kush, Zhob, Chitral and hilly zone between Afghanistan and Baluchistan. The devices used to track were also employed on various locations to perform the monitoring of activities in the border regions. The US did not expect Pakistan to just be a staging ground for troops and intelligence activities, but also help the West (NATO and ISAF) eradicate the influence and network of al-Qaeda from the world.

Pak-Russia Relations during the Cold War

The relationship of the two countries has always depended on Russia’s relations with India and the US. Soon after independence, Pakistan did not stand on solid foundations and suffered from inconsistencies and imbalance. Owing to some historical, geographical and ideological idiosyncrasies, Pakistan did not succeed in establishing closer, good neighbourly ties with the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, Pakistan being an insecure nation fearing the re-unity of the subcontinent and the Indian dominance did not take long before grabbing on to the strategic economic and military alliance a super power like the US had to offer. So, Pakistan sided with the US block.

The US and the Soviet Union extended an invitation to Pakistan in 1941 for a visit. The Pakistani Prime Minister at the time, Liaqat Ali Khan declined the Soviet invitation and paid an official visit to the US. Moreover, holding of two sessions of the International Economic Conference at Karachi and Tehran, in 1949, was interpreted by many observers in the USSR as Pakistan’s active participation in the Western efforts to create an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist block. The participation of Pakistan in the US-sponsored military alliances, SEATO and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), further deteriorated any possibilities of Pakistan-Soviet bilateral relations warming up. According to many analysts, the unfriendly position of the Soviet Union on the issues of Kashmir and Pashtunistan was a result of Pakistan’s position on Communism and its siding with the US. The Soviets got further alienated from Pakistan after the Soviet’s downed a US U2 spy plane, which was operating from an airbase in Badaber in Pakistan. The bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan showed signs of improvement after the exchange of envoys in 1949-51. In 1956, the Soviet Union also took the initiative of constructing Steel Mills in Pakistan. The Soviet Deputy Premier’s visit to Pakistan and declaring the resolution of the Kashmir dispute according to will of
the Kashmiri people reflected the softening of Soviet policy towards Pakistan as well. In 1961, Pakistan was granted a loan worth US$3 million for technical support in oil exploration. Some bye-agreements were also signed: covering operation of air services; exchange of cultural delegations; assistance for mechanism of agriculture; building power projects and promotion of technological and scientific knowledge, were inked. The Russian assistance to Pakistan to develop oil, gas and mineral resources was renewed in the 1960s with enhanced cooperation between the two countries. In the same year, the Soviet Union provided US$519 million for the purchase of heavy machinery. In 1966, the Soviet Union also played the role of a mediator between Pakistan and India to sign the Tashkent Agreement. Then President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, also paid a visit to the Soviet Union in 1967 in order to strengthen the bilateral relations between the two countries. During this visit, Pakistan and the Soviet Union agreed to increase bilateral trade up to US$7 million. The USSR also promised US$200 million for Pakistan’s fourth 5-year Plan. Agreements regarding 30 developmental projects in Pakistan funded by the USSR were also signed during President Ayub’s visit to the Soviet Union as well. Further impetus to better Pakistan-Soviet relations was provided by Prime Minister Bhutto’s visit to the USSR twice in five years (1972-77). During Premier Bhutto’s visits, both the countries agreed to restore Pakistan-Soviet trade, enhance cooperation in geological prospecting, building a metallurgical works in Karachi and help in power generation. They expressed unanimity of the views on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, withdrawal of foreign troops from Indo-China, termination of the arms race and keeping nuclear disarmament under effective control. They also called for a rational approach to solve contentious issues. The identity of views ensured Pakistan’s vote in UN in the USSR’s favour. This assistance by the USSR to Pakistan held a lot of significance as it came with no political strings attached. 1973 saw the great improvement in Pak-Soviet relations in the fields of science and economy. Relations between Pakistan and Soviet Union soured after the ousting of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto from power by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. After the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan, the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan, in December 1979. During 1979-1989, the relation between the countries was severely harmed, as Pakistan once again sided with the US troops to fight the growing Russian dominance in Afghanistan. At the time, Pakistan was the principal base for the Afghan resistance to Soviet forces. Seen from Moscow, Pakistan was the enemy’s backer, resource base and sanctuary. During the Cold War, Pakistan played a pivotal role in training the Mujahedeen against the USSR forces in Afghanistan, which shattered any hopes for Pak-Russia relations in the times to come.

Pak-Russia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era

In the last decade of the 20th century as the USSR disintegrated, the relationship between Pakistan and Russia did not revive overnight. The grievances Russia held against Pakistan revolved around the Pak-US alliance during the Cold War, while Pakistan had reservations with Russia’s unwavering support to India on the Kashmir Issue.

Russia has always had trust issues with Pakistan and as Pakistan emerged as a nuclear power, Russia’s insecurities grew. Russia was also worried about the presence of the
Chechen separatists and the Central Asian militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nevertheless, with the changing world order, the alliances changed too. As the US backstabbed Pakistan in the case of the Afghan War, severely damaging the international image of Pakistan and leaving the country now insecure on its eastern as well as western border. As the Washington-Delhi alliance got stronger, Moscow now wanted to look past its reservations against Islamabad. Meanwhile, Pakistan tried to juggle both the US and Russia at the same time. The US still happened to be one of the biggest contributors to Pakistan’s instable economy and also a strong military aid provider. However, with the declaration of Pakistan as a nuclear power, the aid went on halt. The Pak-US relation has always been directly dependent on the strained Pakistan-Russia relation, and vice versa. Then came the 9/11, and Musharraf’s pledge of alliance to the US on the War on Terror yet again put Pakistan-Russia relations on the backseat. Russia hopes that improving ties with Pakistan gives it leverage at two levels. Firstly, it will obtain an advantage on issues of terrorism and on Afghanistan by building better relations with Islamabad. It also wished to capitalise on the differences between the US and Pakistan to carve out a role for itself in the region. Secondly, Russia is also of the view that building better relations with Pakistan will partially counter any alignment between India and the US and could help impede India from getting too close to the US.

9.1.2.RECENT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE US FACTOR

Revival of Pakistan’s Regional Significance

The recent Afghan tilt towards India, GCC-India alliance and Delhi’s attempts to sabotage the SAARC summit have come to make Pakistan realise that it is high time for the nation to play its geo-strategic card and gain the influence it has had long coming. The country’s foreign policy has faced certain impediments in recent years and they must be overcome without compromising the sovereignty and national interests of the country. The growing US-India relations along with the shrinking of the coalition support fund and the recent US-India-Afghanistan alliance against Taliban has made Pakistan realise the US isolation tactics. However, the new Trump administration can turn out to revive the strained relationships and restore benefits to both the nations. In this time of need, Russia can turn out to be a beneficial ally for Pakistan, while of course simultaneously balancing neutrality with the US. Pakistan is expecting to set ties of military aid with Russia and suspects that the Russian products will be of much more high quality as compared to what have Ukraine, Turkey and others been providing. Russia’s natural resources and technology can also serve to be an added advantage of the fruitful Pak-Russian relations.

Pakistan has become a recent eye-turner with the establishment initiative of the CPEC. Given the geostrategic significance of the Gwadar port, the completion of the CPEC will change the face of world trade. Keeping in mind the flow of wealth from Europe to Asia forecasted in light of multi-polar order, the completion of the CPEC will almost half the trade costs for China, which happens to be one of the biggest mass providers of technology and low-cost goods around the world. Pakistan will simultaneously benefit from the high-quality influx of
goods, the boost in available jobs for the locals and not to mention, the upcoming mutual alliances with countries interested in benefiting from the CPEC. The revival of Pakistan as a significant geostrategic player is already paving way for better Pak-Russia relations. Meanwhile, the US is trying to balance and limit the influence of rising Russia on the region. With the Crimean referendum in place, China’s growing influence on South China Sea, soured relations with North Korea and the Indian duplication of the US policies, the US needs to take a long look at the repercussions of relations with Pakistan, which happens to have undeniable strategic significance for the US as of now.

Shift in US and Russian Foreign Policy towards Pakistan

Russia’s foreign policy, in general, is undergoing a transformation as Moscow transitions to a new paradigm of conducting its international relations, which according to its leadership, is to balance relationships with everyone and maintaining peace and stability across the globe with all states. This feat is impossible without Russia’s display of impartiality towards all states. Due to this, Russia has been diversifying its relations in South Asia all across the board and with every single actor. Therefore, it seems that Russia does not have a comprehensive policy for Pakistan or South Asia in general but it does seem to be in the process of formulating one for the near future.

Moscow’s relations with Islamabad have experienced a notable change over the past couple of years. Russia’s balancing strategy is not directed against anyone, nor is it meant to be for anyone’s benefit either. Rather, it attempts to be just that – balancing, or finding equilibrium – in order to put Russia in the position to ensure stability in the various regions of Eurasia, in this case, South Asia.

Comparison of the Russian policy to India’s heralded one of “multi-alignment” is pertinent. Though unlike how the latter hides behind this slogan to overtly side with the US against China, Moscow has no such intentions whatsoever and is actually practicing the said policy as it is supposed to be. The same also goes for Pakistan, which has a history of seeking diverse relationships in order to balance between multiple actors and especially Great Powers. Russia, however, is showing restraint in boosting the bilateral relations with Pakistan in a full-fledged manner, as evident from the recent statements by the Russian President Putin about India, being one of the oldest and most reliable partners of Russia and the current Russian stance on Kashmir. Nevertheless, the things are looking up for the improvement of bilateral relations between the two Cold War adversaries. More fields of cooperation are being identified and worked upon by the leadership of both countries now, which is a good sign as it will not only help both countries to benefit from each other but it would be highly fruitful for the entire region as well.

The US relationship with Pakistan has always been a political rollercoaster ride. There have been times of extreme highs (such as in the mid-1950s and throughout the Afghan War in the 1980s) and at times they have experienced severe turbulence (like in the 1990s and Post 9/11). In the contemporary times, the Pakistan-US relationship is at its lowest, to put it mildly. Both countries have a serious trust deficit. The interests of both the countries vary a great deal: interests clash on the peace-process in Afghanistan, on the issue of terrorism and Pakistan’s ever increasing friendship with China. After the assumption of power by the new administration in the US, it is very difficult to
predict exactly what Trump’s policy will be towards Pakistan, but considering this decision maker’s personal biases, it’s likely that he views the country in the simplistic and stereotyped sense of being a “Muslim terrorist-exporting Chinese ally,” which hits all the “red flags” in his mind concerning Muslims, terrorism, and China. If that’s the case, then Trump’s approach to Pakistan will probably be negative, such as recommencing drone strikes against it and applying concerted international pressure to pin the blame for regional terrorism squarely on its doorstep.

It is highly imperative for the US administration to keep their personal prejudices aside and understand the crucial role that Islamabad must play in bringing peace to the region in general and Afghanistan in particular. The US policy-makers will have to disown their country’s previous decades-long policy of using Afghanistan as a springboard for exporting regional chaos (and blaming Pakistan for it) and find a way to pragmatically engage Pakistan in a productive manner that can serve the national interests of both the countries in the region without compromising that of other stakeholders.

There is a strong chance that President Trump, under the guise of his sincere or disingenuous outreaches towards Pakistan uses this strategy in order to reap even more strategic dividends from India. In this scenario, Pakistan will be used by the US once again only to be abandoned later by the US, after it had squeezed as much it could from India. The economic and environmental disagreements between the US and India hint that there is some trouble after all on some fronts, though not large enough to offset their military-strategic partnership. Under such pretext, the US might try engaging more with Pakistan in order to make India insecure and get it to enter into unilateral concessions in order to ‘win’ the US back. All these are still speculations at best, and the US policy for Pakistan is still waited upon but the signs being shown by the US administration as of late vis-a-vis Pakistan paint an overall grim picture with regards to the bilateral relationship.

Is Pakistan’s Balanced Relationship with Russia and the US, a Possibility

It is going to be challenging for Pakistan to strike any sort of “balance” in its relations with the US because of the fact that Washington now regards Islamabad as an “accomplice” to what it perceives to be Beijing’s “bid for global power,” so there is almost no way that the US will look past this game-changing geostrategic fact in order to narrowly cultivate positive relations with Pakistan at the expense of trying to impede the CPEC. Imbalance, not balance, will come to define the relations that Pakistan has with the US and the Eurasian partners. There is no way to compare Pakistan-China strategic partnership with the sham of an “anti-terrorist” “alliance” that the US-Pakistani one was supposed to be, especially considering the American support for Afghanistan’s state-to-state aggression against Pakistan in recent years and its clandestine backing of RAW terrorists waging war in Balochistan and beyond.

Even bearing in mind that the forthcoming Russian-Pakistani strategic partnership is still in its early stages, it cannot be compared to Islamabad’s relationship with Washington. Russia and Pakistan faced-off in Afghanistan during the 1980s, while the US and Pakistan cooperated there to an extent in the 2000s. Islamabad “won” the first war but “lost” the second, and remaining in a high-level “partnership” with the US is not going to change that. In fact, it is the whole reason for Pakistan’s present “defeat” (if it can be
looked at in such a way) and why the Afghan state apparatus has turned against its neighbour and is even welcoming the Indian military-terrorist influence into its eastern borderlands for this purpose. Faced with this ever-growing predicament, the best course of action for Pakistan is to expand its relations with Russia, China and Iran in order to counter the strategic disaster that Afghanistan is becoming for all of them and the developing Moscow peace process attempts to do just that through encouraging tighter multi-polar Eurasian coordination in tackling the country’s conflict.

The consequences of this imbalance between Pakistan’s “traditional” relations with the US and its “new” ones with the Eurasian countries will reverberate throughout South Asia because it will make the country ground zero in the hybrid war on China (as waged against the CPEC), though there’s really no practical way to get around this eventuality. Pakistan will not abandon CPEC, so it will, therefore, remain the prime target of the joint US-Indian destabilisation operations. Accordingly, Pakistan should work with its Eurasian partners in order to strengthen its anti-terrorist capacities even further and publicly shed light on what’s going on in order to instructively inform the masses about the new strategic state of affairs in their country, region, hemisphere and the world more generally. The combined capabilities of the Russian, Chinese, Iranian and Pakistani information apparatuses should be more than enough to make a convincing case to those in the world who care to listen that South Asia is becoming the central battleground in the new Cold War between the multi-polar and unipolar forces.

It is uncomfortable to think about and will probably trigger accusatory remarks of “fear mongering,” but the sooner that Pakistani strategists, decision makers and the political leadership accept this inevitability, the less behind the curve they will be in defending against this eventuality and the more collective of a response they will be able to harness in protecting their country. It’s largely ‘outdated’ to think in terms of a “bloc mentality,” but as a simplified (operative word) explanation for what’s taking place in Eurasia nowadays, it is essentially the multi-polar bloc of Russia-China-Pakistan vs. the uni-polar one of the US-India-Afghanistan, with Iran throwing its weight behind the multi-polar forces but with the potential of playing a double game against Pakistan if India is successful in convincing it that India-backed cross-border attacks are some sort of “conspiracy” hatched by Islamabad. This is the reality of the present-day geopolitical situation surrounding Afghanistan and it’s the guiding dynamic, which will determine Pakistan’s relations with the US going forward.

9.1.3. Conclusion

Pakistan should confidently embrace its geopolitical destiny in serving as the spine/zipper of the emerging pan-Eurasian cooperation due to the CPEC and must enhance its relations with its regional partners. As mentioned earlier, achieving a perfect balance between the two powers (the US and Russia) seems to be a farfetched dream. Nevertheless, Pakistan should try to adopt a carefully balanced foreign policy in approaching Russia and the US. Pakistan should learn from its past experiences and construct a foreign policy that will help in achieving a balance between the two global powers. It will also help accelerate Pakistan’s economic development, which would consequentially stabilise its position in the region as a balanced state striving to bring about equilibrium to a highly misbalanced situation. Greater connectivity ushers in deeper cooperation, which Pakistan has the potential to achieve if it makes the right choices.
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In this section, a peer review published research paper entitled “Russia and Pakistan: Shared Challenges and Common Opportunities” is included. This paper was originally published by the Carnegie Moscow Center. © 2014 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The editor/coordinator is adding this article with thanks to the authors Mr. Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov who acknowledged the request and permitted to reproduce the article to the students of Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad. Vladimir Moskalenko is chief research associate at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, and a professor at the Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University. Petr Topychkanov is an associate in the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program. Previously, he taught courses on the modern history of the South Asian countries at Moscow State University’s Institute of Asian and African Studies, the Institute of Practical Oriental Studies, and St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University of the Humanities.

9.2. RUSSIA AND PAKISTAN: SHARED CHALLENGES AND COMMON OPPORTUNITIES:

Mr. Vladimir Moskalenko and Mr. Petr Topychkanov

In recent years, Russia has begun to take a more pronounced political interest in Pakistan than ever before. Instability in South Asia reverberates in Moscow, and Russia and Pakistan in particular face a number of common challenges, especially on security issues. Developing closer Russian-Pakistani relations will help Moscow counter some of these shared threats. In order to accomplish this, however, the two countries will have to overcome existing difficulties—including their long and conflict-ridden history and potential objections from neighboring countries—and forge a new Russian-Pakistani relationship. Historically, Moscow’s interest in Pakistan seems to have been primarily academic. Despite the geographic distance, Soviet researchers began analyzing what would become Pakistan over half a century ago—the first Soviet work on Pakistan appeared in 1943, before the state was actually created. But Moscow’s political interest in Islamabad has been less consistent. Several years ago, the view that Pakistan belongs to the American and Chinese spheres of influence was quite common in Russian political circles. Many in Moscow believed that even serious threats to Pakistan’s security would affect Islamabad’s close partners and neighbors but would not impact Russia. Moscow seemed largely uninterested in developing its relations with Pakistan, especially as these ties did not promise to yield quick and large dividends for Russian state corporations. It also feared that moving closer to Islamabad could harm Russia’s more lucrative relations with India, whose relationship with Pakistan has long been fraught. Today, Russia’s views on Pakistan seem to have shifted. Despite the absence of a common border, Russia and Pakistan face a number of similar problems, from terrorism to organized crime to nuclear security. Moscow also has interests in South Asia that have forced it to develop its ties with Islamabad and other regional actors in recent years. And while Russia approaches Pakistan as part of its larger strategy in South Asia, Moscow and Islamabad
have their own agenda that is not dependent on other countries. Further developing the relations between these two nations can be an important instrument of economic growth and security in both South and Central Asia.

9.2.1. RUSSIA’S FRAGMENTED SOUTH ASIA POLICY

Russia has adopted several doctrinal documents that devote a great deal of attention to the South Asian countries—primarily Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. These foundational documents reveal that Russia’s relations with the various South Asian countries constitute independent and occasionally interconnected strands of the country’s overall foreign policy, but they do not form a cohesive regional strategy. For instance, according to the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, an overview of the principles guiding Moscow’s foreign policy that President Vladimir Putin approved in 2013, Russia intends to continue developing a “privileged strategic partnership” with India. As for Afghanistan, the document indicates that Russia’s aim is to “achieve a post-conflict recovery of Afghanistan as a peace-loving sovereign neutral state with a stable economy” by working with other concerned countries and various multilateral institutions, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Together, these partners will “make consistent efforts to find a just and lasting political solution to the problems faced by . . . [Afghanistan] with due respect for the rights and interests of all its ethnic groups”.2 A similar document outlining Russia’s foreign policy that was adopted in 2008 referred to developing relations with “Pakistan and other leading regional states.” In the 2013 document, however, Pakistan is not mentioned at all.3 It is impossible to say whether the omission of Pakistan from the more recent document signals a shift in policy on the part of Moscow. Neither of these documents is legally binding. Rather, as the 2013 document states, each constitutes “a systemic description of basic principles, priorities, goals and objectives of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.” Therefore, the mention of Pakistan in 2008 but not in 2013 can serve as the basis for assumptions about a possible correction in Russia’s policy toward Islamabad but not for the conclusion that a change of course indeed occurred. Russia’s approaches to South Asia and nearby regions are also outlined in two documents on military strategy, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 and the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020. The national security strategy notes the negative impacts that the situations in Afghanistan and a number of South Asian countries have had on the international climate.4 The maritime doctrine states that Russia is interested in “a course focused on the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, stability and good neighborly relations”.5 In February 2012, Putin published an article in the Moscow News, a daily English-language Russian newspaper, called “Russia and the Changing World.” This article also contributes to an understanding of Russian policy in South Asia. In it, Putin states that Russia is “an inalienable and organic part of Greater Europe” that is trying to take advantage of Asia-Pacific growth, particularly the growth of China and India. The article describes Russia’s policy on China in great detail, but there are only two sentences on India and no mention of Pakistan. Putin names terrorism and “heroin-related aggression” as the main threats coming from Afghanistan, but when he writes of Russian interests in this country, he does not refer to the war on terror at all. Instead, he
identifies Afghanistan’s stable and peaceful development and the fight against drug trafficking as Russia’s major interests. Putin’s article, particularly when read in combination with Russia’s other policy and strategy declarations, makes it clear that Moscow expects South Asia to have a place in Russian foreign policy for the foreseeable future. It sees the region’s integration as important to Russia and its economy and considers India to be the main engine of growth in South Asia. In addition, for at least the next ten years, Moscow predicts that the region will pose numerous threats to Russia’s security, including those stemming from political instability, interstate conflicts, terrorism, and drug trafficking. To address these issues, Russia intends to develop bilateral relations with South Asian countries and will actively participate in various multilateral political forums. It has also prepared for a potential military response to these security threats. Russia intends to maintain a military presence in the areas closest to South Asia. According to the maritime doctrine, the Russian Navy will have a periodic presence in the Indian Ocean. In addition, Moscow will work closely with the other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance of post-Soviet states, to address cross-border challenges. According to the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which was approved in 2010, “the Russian Federation assigns troop contingents to the CSTO Collective Rapid-Response forces for the purpose of responding promptly to military threats to CSTO member countries”. The overall impression from these official documents, statements, and strategies is that Russia’s priorities in South Asia are clearly delineated. India is its privileged strategic partner; Afghanistan is a close neighbor; and Pakistan is a leading regional state whose place in Russia’s foreign policy is similar to that of Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey. According to the 2008 document outlining its foreign policy concept, Russia intends to deepen relations with these and other important regional players in bilateral and multilateral formats.

9.2.2. PAKISTAN: ALIVE AND IMPORTANT

Russia has good reason to view Pakistan as a leading regional state, especially because Islamabad has been in the global spotlight for the last few decades. It is not as large a regional player as India, nor does it boast as many energy resources as Iran. But Pakistan’s “natural resource” is its advantageous strategic location, which makes it an important link between the Middle East and Central and South Asia. Nevertheless, experts have questioned Pakistan’s viability throughout its history. In the first few years after the creation of India and Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan was often treated as a nonviable state. Few believed the partition of the British Indian territories would last. In the words of one of Pakistan’s early settlers, an employee of the colonial state given the chance to help form the Pakistani bureaucracy, “partition happened all of a sudden, and people were not well informed. Many thought that it was a temporary thing and that one day the two countries would be one again”. But a close look at history, culture, politics, and life in Pakistan reveals what journalist and Pakistan expert Anatol Lieven has referred to as the “idiocy of portraying Pakistan as a ‘failed state’”. In addition to being inaccurate, this “idiocy” is also quite harmful—it hinders the understanding of Pakistan’s political processes, since an outsider might consider the whole sociopolitical system ineffective

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based on the perceived lack of conventional political institutions. Today, experts are once again making dire predictions about Pakistan’s fate. The country’s current domestic situation is characterized by political and economic instability, serious security threats, and complicated relations with neighboring states. Yet, an analysis of the political and socioeconomic situation in Pakistan indicates that despite these numerous problems, the country is unlikely to face the sort of catastrophic scenarios that have been discussed in recent years. For example, there have been predictions that ethnic strife could lead to the disintegration of the country, but these fears appear groundless—neither Islamabad nor the neighboring countries are interested in Pakistan’s breakup. Along the same lines, it would be virtually impossible for radical elements, although they exist, to come to power. For the first time in the country’s history, Pakistan’s political system has endured a full electoral cycle, from the general elections in 2008 to those in 2013, and it seems relatively stable. Forecasts of another military coup also seem quite improbable. Pakistan’s armed forces display an unwillingness to take power at this time (although they claim to be ready to come to the aid of the country’s political leadership). Still, Pakistan will face difficulties. In the coming years, it is quite possible that the weakness of the political regime will lead to the buildup of military, political, and religious forces. And the country may be in for a host of other foreign and domestic exigencies, including political and economic crises, natural calamities, terrorist incidents, ethnic conflicts, temporary loss of control over certain areas of the country, and conflicts with India and Afghanistan. It is nearly impossible to guess which, if any, of these challenges Pakistan will face. In addition, uncertainty about the plans of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan complicates any attempts to predict possible developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the entire region. But one thing is certain: any of these developments would affect more than just Pakistan’s immediate neighbors and have ramifications in Moscow as well.

9.2.3. RUSSIA’S SECURITY AND PAKISTAN

Russian and Pakistani interests are increasingly intertwined, especially with regard to security concerns. In particular, the issues of terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and nuclear security make Pakistan important to Russia in the long term. Russia cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in Pakistan, a fact that was made abundantly clear when Pakistani police and military servicemen shot and killed four Russian citizens and one Tajik national on the basis of reports that they were suicide bombers. The incident took place at a checkpoint in Kharotabad, in Pakistan’s eastern province of Balochistan, on May 17, 2011. As became known in the course of a subsequent investigation, Pakistani law enforcement agents used excessive force. The victims were unarmed and posed no threat. The investigation also revealed that the victims had entered Pakistan’s territory illegally by way of Iran, possibly for terrorist training. While this group was not implicated in acts of terrorism in Pakistan, there is evidence that citizens of Russia or other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—a regional association of several post Soviet nations—including minors, may belong to terrorist organizations with Pakistani ties and receive instruction in training camps or religious schools, known as Madrassas, on Pakistani territory. The exact number of foreign

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terrorists in Pakistan is unknown, although there are some estimates. Tariq Hayat, secretary of law and order in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, claims that in 2009 there were 1,500 foreign militants, including Arabs, Chechens, Sudanese, and Uzbeks, in the region of South Waziristan alone. The situation has hardly changed for the better in recent years. In March 2013, when the Pakistani Taliban took over most of the Tirah Valley in North Waziristan, up to 3,000 foreigners, predominantly Chechens and Uzbeks, fought for the Talibs. There is also official data on the number of foreigners in religious schools. According to the Ministry of Interior, 2,673 students were enrolled in these schools as of September 2012, and 43 percent of the students were from Afghanistan. The rest were from China, the Netherlands, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uganda, and other countries. However, this information may be incomplete. It only includes data on registered madrassas, which number from 24,000 to almost 30,000, but thousands of unregistered madrassas also operate in Pakistan. Unofficial estimates of their numbers range from 15,000 to 25,000, with some as high as 40,000. Given the extreme variance, it is hard to guess how many citizens of Russia and other CIS countries study at these schools. Unlike foreigners who underwent terrorist training and therefore certainly pose a potential threat, foreign graduates of Pakistan’s religious schools may or may not be dangerous. But given the links between some madrassas and extremist groups in Pakistan, national security services should closely monitor foreign graduates of Pakistani madrassas once they return home. Both terrorist training camps and madrassas have given rise to a network of contacts between Russian and Pakistani extremists, although these contacts do not yet look like a large-scale phenomenon. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Russia, in addition to having endured terrorist attacks itself, also functions as a transit point for terrorists migrating from South Asia to Western Europe. Thus, a vast territory from Pakistan and other Asian countries to Russia and Western nations is linked by a network of illegal migration. Former Russian Federal Security Service spokesman Alexander Murashov notes that most illegal migrants who crossed Russia’s borders ten years ago came from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. He estimates that law enforcement agencies were able to stop 80 percent of this migration flow. While most were labor migrants, there may also have been some terrorists among the 20 percent who crossed into Russia. In addition, there is a distinct connection between terrorism, illegal migration, and organized crime that complicates efforts to combat national security threats to both Pakistan and Russia. Smuggling or drug trafficking, for example, can provide terrorists with new options for mobility and additional resources. It can even transform the terrorist threat by allowing potential terrorists to use smuggling schemes to transport nuclear material and technology that can be used in attacks of catastrophic proportions. Judging by the significant volume of narcotics smuggled into Russia from Afghanistan, Russian and Central Asian law enforcement agencies are not capable of entirely ruining smuggling schemes. This might make such schemes appealing to terrorists, a possibility that should make Russian authorities concerned about nuclear security in Pakistan. If nuclear material were to be stolen, it might make its way to Russia through these smuggling networks, raising the risk of nuclear terrorism on Russian territory. In the middle of the last decade, Pakistan took serious steps toward improving national nuclear security. In addition to enacting comprehensive organizational and technological changes that affected the entire nuclear
complex, Pakistan instituted mandatory personnel monitoring. It seemed, for a time, that these measures effectively ensured the state’s control over its nuclear arsenal, including nuclear material and technologies. But this sense of security was short-lived. The high-profile murder of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer shocked Islamabad on January 4, 2011, and demonstrated that these reforms had not eliminated the threats to Pakistani nuclear security. Taseer was shot by his own bodyguard, who, as a member of an elite unit, had to undergo regular security checks in accordance with the state’s regulations. As a result of one such check, the bodyguard was deemed a security threat—and yet he continued to serve until he committed the crime. It is impossible to say whether the bodyguard’s commanders were criminally negligent in ignoring the security threat or whether they made a conscious choice to allow the known threat to materialize. Either way, the incident proved that Pakistan’s efforts to increase its nuclear security were insufficient. This shortcoming will have a direct bearing on Russia—and the world—should it facilitate the rise of nuclear terrorism.

9.2.4. MOSCOW’S RELATIONS WITH ISLAMABAD

Russia is aware of the security threats coming from Pakistan. These concerns have led officials from Moscow and Islamabad to regularly participate in joint working groups on international terrorism and strategic stability since 2002. Similar issues have also been discussed at summits of the Dushanbe Four, a grouping that includes the Afghan, Pakistani, Russian, and Tajik presidents. These summits have taken place in Dushanbe (2009 and 2011) and Sochi (2010) and at higher levels in New York (2010) and Trieste (2009, without Tajikistan). The four presidents adopted a joint declaration at the conclusion of the Dushanbe Four summit in Sochi on August 18, 2010. The declaration stressed the importance of cooperation for maintaining stability in the region and advised that collaboration on such issues as terrorism and drug trafficking was to be carried out through international and regional structures. They also called for a more active use of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, a permanent body of the SCO designed to enhance collaboration in fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism. And all sides expressed their commitment to implementing the recommendations set forth in a statement by the SCO member states and Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, and organized crime that had been adopted at the Special Conference on Afghanistan under the aegis of the SCO in Moscow on March 27, 2009. Pakistan is not a member of the SCO, but it has been able to actively participate in SCO initiatives designed to strengthen regional security thanks to frequent meetings of the Dushanbe Four. Pakistan has been an observer state at the SCO for nine years, but it has had rather limited success developing relations with the organization. An observer state has the right to be present at open meetings of the SCO’s Council of Foreign Ministers as well as at the meetings of heads of ministries or departments. It can also take part in discussions without the right to vote and has access to unrestricted SCO documents. However, an observer state cannot prepare or sign the organization’s documents, and it cannot participate in decision making. Developing Pakistani-Russian relations will benefit the two countries on both bilateral and multilateral levels. Russia can use its relations with Pakistan to improve its position in the SCO. For instance, the Dushanbe Four, which includes two SCO members (Russia and Tajikistan)
and two observer states (Afghanistan and Pakistan), allows Russia to strengthen its position in the SCO by establishing an internal club to discuss issues of mutual interest. To encourage further cooperation, Moscow can also enter organizations in which Pakistan is a member. In the past, Russia supported Pakistan’s bid to join the SCO as an observer state. Pakistan, in turn, supported Russia’s intention to join the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference before 2011). Indeed, Russia now has observer status in this organization. There are also no obstacles to Russia’s seeking observer status in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, an economic and geopolitical union of eight South Asian nations, including Pakistan. However, there are three factors that may limit the further development of Pakistani-Russian relations. The first has to do with fears of offending India. Some in Moscow are concerned that a deal between Pakistan and any other state, including Russia, could cause New Delhi to suspend its cooperation with that state. India is likely to balk at any agreement it perceives to be upsetting the balance of power in South Asia. As a result, New Delhi would likely be extremely irked by military cooperation between Pakistan and other states, especially on the issues of missile technology, strike aircraft, missile defense, or submarine technology. Russia has no intention of working with Pakistan on the military issues that might upset India, barring a few exceptions. In 2007, Pakistan received the first shipment of JF-17 Thunder jet fighters, jointly developed by China and Pakistan (as of now, the Pakistan Air Force has 40 such jet fighters). They are being fitted with Russian RD-93 engines under a contract between China and Russia that provides for the shipment of 100 engines and possibly 400 more. Some Indian analysts strongly believe that these jet fighters can carry nuclear weapons. Moreover, some Russian experts believe that Russia could sell MiG-35 jet fighters to Pakistan without upsetting India. They point to the United States and France, which have established extensive ties with both India and Pakistan in the field of military technology. Russia itself is a good example that military cooperation in diplomatically sensitive situations is possible—it exports modern weapons to both India and China, whose relations have been tarnished by a border dispute and deep mutual mistrust.

These exceptions notwithstanding, the fear of damaging Indo-Russian relations remains a significant factor in relations between Moscow and Islamabad. This fear essentially derailed the Dushanbe Four summit in Pakistan in October 2012. Putin, who was scheduled to attend the summit, decided not to visit Islamabad until he had first visited India. He canceled his trip to Pakistan and sent Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Islamabad in his place. At the time, Lavrov explained that Putin’s decision did not contain any messages. The president’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, went so far as to claim that Putin never had plans to visit Pakistan at that particular time. But Pakistan, which had expected this visit until the last minute, interpreted Putin’s decision as a clear signal of Moscow’s reluctance to deepen cooperation between members of the Dushanbe Four. In addition to fears of offending India, a history of conflict between Moscow and Islamabad that dates back to the Soviet era could hamper the development of closer relations. First there was the U-2 crisis of 1960, when an American reconnaissance plane that had taken off from Pakistani territory was shot down in Soviet airspace. Then came the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, which lasted from 1979 to 1989, during which
Pakistan and other states aided the military resistance against the Soviet Union. Since many of Russia’s current mid- and high-ranking officials were either directly or indirectly involved in the Afghan conflict, they are unsurprisingly reluctant to work toward closer cooperation with Pakistan. Enhancing existing contacts between representatives of the power structures in both countries would contribute to building greater mutual trust. In this context, work on locating the grave sites of Soviet soldiers buried in Pakistan and searches for soldiers who went missing during the conflict may help build a better foundation for future relations. The perennially underfunded Warriors-Internationalists Affairs Committee, a Moscow based nonprofit organization, is currently conducting this sort of work. In addition, a greater exchange of information between Russia and Pakistan on the events of 1979–1989, which could be conducted as a jointly sponsored research project, would help close this painful chapter in the history of what was effectively an undeclared war between the two countries. Lastly, it will be difficult to improve relations between Moscow and Islamabad until Russian investors become more confident doing business in Pakistan. This will not happen until Pakistan addresses Moscow’s concerns about the security of its personnel and investments. Pakistan’s strategic location means it has the potential to be an important center of cooperation and regional development, but it will require massive investments in building a complex infrastructure. Since achieving stability in Pakistan and improving regional security to the south of its borders are important to Russia, Moscow is certainly interested in developing infrastructure projects that will help promote South Asian stability, such as work in the fields of transportation and energy. But these projects can be successfully developed only if the long-term security of Russian personnel and investments is guaranteed. At present, Russian companies are reluctant to send their employees even on business trips to Pakistan for fear of possible terrorist attacks, and any further deterioration of the security situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan could entirely prevent Russia from implementing long-term projects there. Russian investors also question whether the Pakistani authorities can protect their investments. In 2006, for example, the full support of the Pakistani prime minister was not enough to save a deal in which a Russian steel company, Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, was attempting to privatize a Pakistani company, Pakistan Steel Mills. In addition, there is the possibility that Russian investments in Pakistan could upset some of Moscow’s other partners, particularly India. On the whole, Pakistani-Russian infrastructure projects should not concern other states. But if Russia, for example, were to take part in projects to modernize and develop Pakistan’s railroad network, India might interpret it as Moscow’s helping to increase the mobility of the Pakistani armed forces. To alleviate Indian concerns, such projects should be as transparent as possible without compromising Pakistan’s interests.

9.2.5. DIALOGUE ON CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

The prospect of potential cooperation between Russia and Pakistan in the field of nuclear energy may seem far-fetched. Indeed, the chances for such cooperation are almost nonexistent at this time. But this may not always be the case, and discussing the possibility of Russian-Pakistani civil nuclear cooperation is productive for a number of reasons. First,
evaluating the prospects of nuclear cooperation will provide a clear idea of the level of trust between the two countries. It will also make it possible to assess the real limits and possible goals of such cooperation. Second, looking into this cooperation reveals a great deal about Pakistan’s domestic energy challenges and about the potential of nuclear energy to alleviate the country’s current energy crisis. Extreme electric energy shortages have prompted Pakistan to contact a number of countries, including Russia, on the issue of nuclear cooperation. Only 20 percent of Pakistan’s energy resources are produced on the country’s territory. The use of the Tarbela Hydroelectric Power Plant in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, the largest plant in the country, is complicated by a long-standing dispute with India on sharing the Indus River water resources. Decreases in precipitation also affect the plant’s capacity, forcing the authorities to impose strict limits on energy consumption during droughts. Some authors believe that flaws in the Pakistani government’s energy policy rather than economic and climate factors are primarily responsible for electric energy shortages. Either way, developing the country’s nuclear energy program could be part of a long-term comprehensive program to improve Pakistan’s energy sector. Third, the issue of Russian-Pakistani civil nuclear cooperation is important because it is related to larger problems of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The question of whether Pakistan should be permitted to cooperate with other countries to develop its nuclear energy program has received a great deal of attention since India was granted a waiver that allowed it to engage in civil nuclear trade in 2008. The waiver, proposed by the United States, lifted restrictions on India’s cooperation with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multinational body that sets global rules for nuclear trade. The NSG was created as a response to the peaceful nuclear test that India conducted in 1974 with the help of technologies obtained as a result of its cooperation with the United States and Canada. India was granted this waiver despite never having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pakistan—which also refuses to sign the NPT—believes it should be granted the same waiver. Russia, which consistently supported both the nonproliferation regime and the Indian waiver, cannot ignore the problem of how to answer Pakistan’s demand. The solution will affect both Moscow’s nuclear cooperation with India and the nuclear nonproliferation regime more broadly. Unlike India, Pakistan will probably not receive U.S. support as it seeks a nuclear waiver. An article published in the Russian Yadernyy Klub (Nuclear Club) journal concludes that broad cooperation between Pakistan and the United States on nuclear energy, even though it could have certain benefits, is ultimately impossible because it would not contribute to greater global security. According to the author, nuclear cooperation would allow Pakistan and the United States to overcome mutual suspicion, which would, in turn, help solve other problems in South Asia, such as stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. It would also strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime if Washington required Pakistan to commit to nonproliferation as a precondition for civil nuclear cooperation. However, the author concludes that arguments against U.S. nuclear cooperation with Pakistan outweigh the possible benefits. Pakistan is not committed to transparency regarding its past violations of the nonproliferation regime, such as the transfers of nuclear technologies to other countries that were organized by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. It also does not demonstrate a readiness to consistently combat terrorism on its territory, and it is hard to expect Pakistan’s unstable government to reliably adhere to any agreements in the long term.
Thus, a U.S.-Pakistani deal on peaceful nuclear cooperation is not likely to be supported by American lawmakers, and other nonproliferation regime members would probably be unhappy with such an agreement as well. It stands to reason that if the United States, Pakistan’s closest strategic partner, is not interested in broad nuclear cooperation with Islamabad, then Russia—whose relations with Pakistan have long been complicated—would be even less interested. However, there are some indications that nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and other countries is possible. Although Washington officially declares that there is no nuclear cooperation between the United States and Pakistan,28 some unofficial contacts do take place. In private conversations with one of this work’s authors that took place between 2008 and 2012, representatives of the White House, the U.S. State Department, and U.S. military agencies confirmed these occurrences. The contacts intensified after 2001, when Pakistan became a principal non-NATO ally of the United States. Most conversations seem to primarily concern securing nuclear facilities. According to the New York Times, the United States has spent almost $100 million to assist Pakistan with nuclear security. 29 In addition, not all American experts share the view that U.S.-Pakistani civil nuclear cooperation would do more harm than good. For instance, in a policy brief published in February 2011, Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution recommends offering Pakistan a nuclear deal allowing for this sort of cooperation. The deal would be similar to the 2008 U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement that permits nuclear cooperation between Washington and New Delhi. In O’Hanlon’s view, Pakistan has successfully improved nuclear security and export control, so greater cooperation between Washington and Islamabad on nuclear energy would not compromise the nonproliferation regime. He believes that cooperation is possible if Pakistan agrees to comply with any future treaty that cuts off the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.30 Other experts seem to agree. In an article published in Time magazine in April 2013, another expert on Pakistan, Christine Fair, stresses that the last chance for the United States to salvage its relations with Pakistan is to offer Islamabad a deal on peaceful nuclear energy.31 Nuclear cooperation already takes place between China and Pakistan, and it testifies to the opportunities that collaboration in this field offers, regardless of Pakistan’s being outside the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In 1986, Beijing and Islamabad reached an agreement to cooperate on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Since it began working with Pakistan on nuclear energy projects before it signed the NPT and joined the NSG (in 1992 and 2004, respectively), China does not believe it is breaching its nonproliferation obligations. As a result of the Chinese-Pakistani cooperation agreement, contracts for shipping a total of four light-water reactors, which are used in generating nuclear electricity, to Pakistan’s Chashma Nuclear Power Plant were signed in 1991, 2004, and 2010. The first two reactors, which have an aggregate capacity of 600 megawatts (MW) were launched in 2000 and 2011. Two more reactors with a total capacity of 680 MW are slated for launch in 2018. And the cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad goes beyond the Chashma projects. For example, in 1998 Pakistan acknowledged the existence of a 50 MW heavy-water reactor in the Khushab Nuclear Complex, which might have been put into operation ten years earlier with China’s scientific and technological input.32 This reactor is probably related to Pakistan’s military program; in fact, it is not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, which can be interpreted as indirect evidence of its military
purposes. So Pakistan has not been completely denied a chance to cooperate with other countries on nuclear issues, and it is trying to take advantage of the opportunities it has. But if Islamabad were to approach Moscow on nuclear cooperation, the answer would probably be no. This response would be dictated by the non-NPT status of Pakistan, Russia’s ties to India, and uncertainty as to Pakistan’s ability to protect Russian investments and citizens from instability and terrorism. In addition, Beijing would not be happy to see a competitor in a market on which it probably believes it has a monopoly. While it is theoretically possible that Russia and Pakistan could engage in nuclear cooperation and use China as an intermediary, this scenario also appears unlikely. It would require greater transparency on Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation, but since that collaboration probably includes both civil and military components, neither Beijing nor Islamabad is likely to agree to that condition. Therefore, those Russian analysts who write about possible and productive Russian-Pakistani nuclear cooperation are probably incorrect. However, opportunities for productive and useful dialogue still exist. As Andrey Alekseyev correctly pointed out in 2006, “one may find ways to establish contacts” on peaceful nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Russia. Such contacts, which are already taking place both officially and unofficially, help share Russian concerns on nuclear security with Pakistan. They also afford Moscow an understanding of the current state of and prospects for Pakistan’s energy sector. In addition, they provide a forum for the two states to discuss each other’s positions on the issues of nonproliferation in light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which Pakistan has yet to ratify, and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. As long as the dialogue between Russia and Pakistan continues, there are prospects for eventual nuclear cooperation. But the future mostly depends on Pakistan, which must create favorable conditions for its long-term cooperation with Russia.

9.2.6.A NEW APPROACH TO PAKISTAN AND SOUTH ASIA

The Afghan conflict ensures long-term engagement between Russia and Pakistan. Terrorism, organized crime, drugs, nuclear safety, nonproliferation, and various other issues will also call for closer cooperation between the two states. Indeed, Moscow is paying greater attention to Pakistan than ever before on doctrinal, expert, and practical levels. Russia’s priorities in South Asia are clearly delineated, even if its approach to the region remains piecemeal. In the future, Russia would benefit from a balanced and stable development of Russian-Pakistani relations. In order to do so, Moscow should replace its separate approaches to the countries of South Asia with a unified concept of Russian policy in the region, which would include its policy on Pakistan. This Pakistan policy should support intensive dialogue between the civil, military, and economic institutions of Moscow and Islamabad on issues involving bilateral and multilateral relations. Regular exchange visits by the countries’ highest officials would be helpful in facilitating these conversations. Establishing a continuous informal and semiformal dialogue between Russian and Pakistani representatives would increase transparency and confidence in the burgeoning relationship. Moscow should actively use regional organizations and initiatives to promote these various levels and forms of dialogue. In addition, Russia should support Pakistan’s efforts to respond to security threats on its territory politically,
economically, and militarily. This support can include cooperation on military technology as long as Moscow is careful to take into account India’s concerns and respect the delicate balance of power in the region.

9.3 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Discuss the mutual relations of Pakistan and ‘the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ (USSR) in a historical perspective?
2. What are the major hurdles in the way of mutual relationship between Pakistan and USSR?
3. Discuss Pak-Soviet relations during the 1947 to 1965?
4. Discuss the Pakistan’s relations with the USSR from 1965 to 1971.
5. How do you understand the mutual relation of Pakistan with the Soviet Union during 1971 to 1988?
6. Discuss Pakistan and Russia Relations from 1992 to 2013.
7. Highlight the mutual relations of Pakistan and Russia from 2013 and aftermath.
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