

Reporting Violent Insurgencies in Postcolonial Nigeria: An Analysis of Audience Assessment of Nigerian Broadcast Media Reportage of the Boko Haram Insurgence

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Abstract

Postcolonial Nigeria has no doubt witnessed and is still witnessing several forms of insurgencies in both the Northern and the Southern divides of the country, most of which have been very bloody and catastrophic. One of such devastating insurgencies that is currently ravaging peaceful and harmonious living in the country is the Boko Haram terrorism. The Boko Haram sect (which forbids western education) came to limelight in 2009 after the arrest and subsequent murder of the former leader, late Ustaz Muhammed Yusuf. From 2009 till date, they have successfully launched attacks that have claimed lots of lives and properties. In finding lasting solution to this abysmal development, the media have expedient role to play which demands a great deal of caution in their reportage of the insurgency. The critical question here is how the Nigerian broadcast media have fared in this postcolonial era with regard to their reportage of insurgencies, particularly, the current Boko Haram terrorism? This formed the fulcrum on which the study revolved. Survey research method was employed for the study. The residents of six systematically selected cities from the six geo-political zones of the country were surveyed to elicit responses in line with the issue under study. Questionnaire served as the instrument for data collection. The study unveiled amongst others that the broadcast media have been biased in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. Their reports have, to a large extent, glorified the act of terrorism. To this end, it was recommended amongst others that a paradigm shift from biased to objective account of events be embraced by the broadcast media in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Introduction

One fundamental impediment to the advancement of any society is conflict. Conflict engenders stagnation as well as retrogression in all facets of life. It equally engenders acrimony and hatred amongst the inhabitants of a given society. Development communication scholars (Bright 2010, Charles 2009, Kane 2010) have contended that no development agenda (be it political, economical, social etc) can thrive in the midst of crisis. They further contend that crisis enthrones underdevelopment and impoverishes the people.

Several countries of the world have witnessed and are still witnessing one form of crisis or the other. The Liberian war, Somalian crisis, Rwanda's genocide, Sierra Leonean war, Libyan crisis, Bahrain unrest, clampdown on Yemen, and the Syrian conflict are obvious instances of the above assertion. The outcomes of these conflicts, amongst others, have been devastating and painful.

Crisis in Nigeria has been an integral part of her structure. Right from the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates by Lord Lugard in 1914, the country has known no peace. It has been one form of crisis in the North or the other in the South with many of them having ethno-religious undertones.

In Nigeria, religious-related violence and killings to achieve some political or religious ends are certainly not a new phenomenon especially in the Northern part of the country. Right from the pre-colonial days of migration and Jihad by native Africans and Jihadists (from Sudan), to the National Food Shortage Strike Violence in Plateau State between the Igbos and Hausas migrants in 1945, religious and ethno-political crises have remained part of the Nigerian history. These waves of violence which are usually religiously and ethnically motivated continued shortly after independence in 1960s. (Osaghae & Suberu 2005, p.18).

Shortly after that civil war, the factors that underpinned this post-civil war peace had begun to evaporate markedly by the 80s. For instance, the oil boom more or less ended with the collapse of international oil price in 1980/81, while the creative federalism of the 1979 constitution virtually disappeared with the collapse of the Second Republic in 1983 and the subsequent rule of a succession of hyper-centralizing ethno-military administrations during 1984-1999 (Lawal, 2007, p.37).

However, two events in Kano in the early eighties signaled the beginning of the end of the post-civil war peace in Nigeria. The first involved the Maitatsine (or "Yan Talsine") riots of December 1980, which claimed thousands of lives and set the tone for subsequent riots involving the Maitatsine heretical, anti-materialist, Islamic sect in other northern cities like Bullunkutu, Yola, Jimeta and Gombe (Chistelow 1985: Lubeck 1985, 1986). The second event was the destruction of churches and other properties belonging, to Christians, by Muslim mobs protesting the construction of a church in Kano's Muslim heartland in October 1982. But the turning point in Nigeria's collapse into inter-group strife was the 1987 and 1999 Kafanchan-Kaduna ethno-religious riots, which revived age-old tensions between the Muslim Hausa-Fulani and non-Muslim communities throughout the north and beyond. Other major ones include the Zangon-kataf riots of 1992, the Tafawa Balewa clashes in 1991, 1995 and 2000, the Kaduna Riots of 2000 and the Jos Crisis of 2001 in which several hundreds of lives and properties were destroyed

(international IDEA 2000, p.296). It is important to note that Jos Crisis has continued to the present day and it has gone sophisticated.

Of all the ethnic and religious related conflicts painted above, none has threatened the very foundation of the Nigerian State like the current crisis masterminded by the Boko Haram sect. The Sect which is officially known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-jihad (Arabic language) has orchestrated series of deadly attacks which have left hundreds of lives dead and properties destroyed. These attacks which started in July 2009 when the Nigerian Police started investigating the sect following reports that it was arming itself, have gone sophisticated with bombs detonation every now and then (www.wikipedia.com/bokoharm.origin).

The sect which opposes western education, culture, modern science and democracy was formed in 2002 by late Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State. Boko Haram, which literally means western education (Boko) is sinful (Haram), is believed by many as a break-away republic from the deadly Maitatsine Group of 1980s. In fact, the history of Boko Haram is as elusive as the group itself and studies on the group remain inconclusive about its origin. According to some sources, the group has evolved from various efforts by extremists' elements dating back to the 1940s through the end of the 1990s that sought to radicalize various segments of northern Nigeria. To some other sources, Boko Haram started in 1995 as '*Sahaba*' and was initially led by Lawan Abubakar, who later left for the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia for further studies. Late Yusuf Mohammed who was killed in a controversial circumstance in 2009 by men of the Nigerian Police Force was said to have taken over the leadership after the departure of Abubakar and indoctrinated the sect with his own teaching which he claimed were based on purity and Sharia law.

Shortly after his takeover, he commenced what many described as intensive membership mobilization after his first release from police custody in November 2008 in Maiduguri. This intensive mobilization recorded huge success. He allegedly had over 500,000 members before his demise and usually taxed them one naira, which approximated to N500, 000 daily (Madike, June 2011). The Almajiri system in the north made this mobilization easy.

To nip the festering crisis in the bud, the late president Umaru Musa Yar'Adua ordered the deployment of the military to contain those government described as dissidents. After initial resistance, Boko Haram fell to the superior fire power of the military, and Yusuf, its leader, was arrested and handed over to the police. Hours later, police executed Yusuf alongside his alleged sponsor, Alhaji Buji Foi, who was the Commissioner for Religious Affairs during the first term of former Governor Ali Modu Sheriff of Borne State.

Despite the death of the once dreaded Yusuf, the group has continued its attacks. In fact, the insurgency has just gone critical and has indeed assumed a very dangerous dimension. From the time the group was formed to the present day, it has carried out lots of successful attacks most of which were bomb blasts which have left lots of people dead and properties destroyed. Some of these deadly attacks are the August 26, 2011 bombing of the United Nation's Building in Abuja which left over 25 persons dead with several others seriously wounded and the December 25 (Christmas day) bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla, in Suleja

Local Government Area of Niger State which left 43 people dead and several others injured. (Emewu, 2011, Suzan, 2012).

With these attacks, Nigeria was recently ranked 19th “most at risk” country from terrorist attack in the world, according to a survey released on August 2011 by UK-based Global Analysts, Maplecroft. With this ranking, the country is now among countries that are at an “extreme risk” from terrorist attacks. Nigeria’s current status according to Maplecroft is attributed mainly to the uprising by the militia sect (Bakare, August, 2011).

Several attempts made by the government to stop this group from carrying out deadly attacks on the Nigerian nation have not produced any result. The deployment of military personnel and police to flash points of Yobe, Maiduguri, Bauchi, Niger and Abuja, have made situation worst as the group has become so sophisticated. Unarguably, the group has defiled all solutions. Nigerian security community is quite helpless as it has been stretched very thin. The June 16th 2011 bombing of the Police Headquarters in Abuja, is a pointer to this fact. Some have even argued that the political and financial support the group receives from northern politicians and Al Qaeda has made it impossible for the federal government to dislodge it. Several panels set up by the government have not equally helped matters. In the face of all these, the question is, what role can the media play since other institutions seem to be failing Nigerians?

The media whether traditional or modern have over the years, been seen as agents of change. Certainly not always positive or always negative but alternates from one to the other and vice versa. Human beings on the other hand crave for change, preferably, a continuous positive change. But this is quite impossible because the human condition by nature makes this an unattainable goal. In effect, there is a breakdown of order, not only within the self, but also outside the self, stretching towards man’s immediate environment and beyond. When this happens, there is breakdown of the process of smooth flow of information from one source to the other. This bridegroom of the communication process usually arises either because one of the parties sees himself as deliberately disadvantaged or imagines himself disadvantaged irrespective of the true state of affairs (Anyanwa, 2004, p.110). In most cases, one sees his belief system or religion as superior to that of others. Because of human nature in him, he tries to prove this, which usually results to a serious conflict. All these boil down to perception. As Brody (1987, p.73), cited in Nwafor (2011, p.32) puts it; “human beings perceptions are their realities when they believe they are ill-treated, they behave accordingly, even where reality is quite different.”

This perception, whether real or not, usually arises as a result of inadequate information or the absence of an information at all. This is the catalysts to conflict. In other words, the mass media can both generate and solve conflict; the former through inciting coverage, inadequate reporting, none reporting etc, the latter can resolve conflict or crisis through objective and balanced reportage; adequate and non-sensational reportage; and surveillance reportage (Anyanwa, p.110).

In the face of the current security crisis in the country orchestrated by Boko Haram sect, the mass media can play an effective role in resolving the crisis through adequate coverage. The surveillance function of the media (beware surveillance) must be effectively played, to warn people of an impending danger. Through effective reportage, those perpetuating the crisis can

have their perception changed, and peace loving Nigerians can equally step up their security consciousness.

Statement of the Research Problem

Over the years, insecurity resulting from various violent activities of militia groups and ethno-religious unrests has threatened and continues to thwart the craze for socio-economic and political growth of societies the world over. Boko Haram insurgency has only come to worsen matters in the Nigerian socio-economic, religious and political landscape. The sect, through several attacks and bombings with High Improved Explosive (HIE) has brought to question the ability of the country's intelligence community in this regard. This is perhaps the worst in the annals of the nation's security history since the end of the civil war in 1967.

In the search for global peace, the mass media, being the forerunner in promoting development, consequent upon peace, have continued to use their various communication strategies not only to avert violence and strife, but to douse tension when the chips are down. Most times, those aggrieved are provided with alternative platform in the media to air their grievances instead of taking to arms. Studies have shown that through adequate, balance and objective reportage, people who hitherto would have taken to arms to express their displeasure are informed, enlightened and most importantly convinced to seek the option of dialogue or legal redress.

However, how the mass media, especially the broadcast media which are caught between sensationalizing stories to boost patronage and objectively informing the people play this role, is another matter altogether. Many have come to accuse the broadcast media of being biased in the reportage of the Boko Haram crisis. Is this truly the case with the Nigerian broadcast media reportage of the current insurgency?

Since the main goal of the media is to amongst others serve the public with accurate information, the researchers were therefore interested in finding out the perception of Nigerians on how the Nigerian broadcast media have so far reported the Boko Haram insurgency.

Objectives of the Study

To give the study direction, the researchers raised the following research objectives;

- (1) To find out from Nigerians whether the Nigerian broadcast media have so far reported the Boko Haram insurgency adequately (volume of coverage).
- (2) To ascertain from Nigerians whether the broadcast media have been timely in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.
- (3) To determine whether Nigerians perceive the broadcast media to have effectively played the surveillance function of the mass media in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.
- (4) To find out from Nigerians whether the Nigerian broadcast stations have been objective in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.
- (5) Finally, to ascertain whether Nigerians perceive broadcast media reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency as glorifying the act of terrorism.

Research Questions

In line with the research objectives, the following research questions were raised;

- (1) Do Nigerians perceive the broadcast media to have adequately reported the Boko Haram insurgency?
- (2) Do Nigerians see the broadcast media as timely in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency?
- (3) Do Nigerians adjudge the broadcast media to have effectively played the surveillance function of the mass media in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency?
- (4) Do Nigerians perceive the broadcast stations as been biased in the reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency?
- (5) Do Nigerians see broadcast media reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency as glorifying the act of terrorism?

Significance of the Study

Findings of this study will serve as a reference point for broadcast media practitioners on how best to cover insurgencies of this nature in order to better serve their audience(s).

The intelligent community (Police, SSS, Military etc) will equally find the outcome of this study valuable since it will enable them know how best to use the media during security challenges like this.

More so, institutions of learning (universities, polytechnics, colleges of education, etc) shall as well find this work very helpful in conflicts and media studies.

Finally, this work shall be very helpful for further studies in this area

Literature Review

In reporting fundamental events such as insurgencies, adequacy of coverage is no doubt demanded. The media owe the public an expedient responsibility not just to report such development, but to adequately give such account. Adequacy here connotes the volume of coverage.

Insurgencies, terrorism and other forms of conflicts are very devastating developments that easily attract adequate media coverage globally. In postcolonial Nigeria, we have witnessed war and other forms of ethno-religious conflicts which research findings have unveiled that these conflicts received adequate media attention. Bola (2010, p.83) affirmed the above when he revealed in his study that conflicts in Nigeria have consistently received maximum media coverage. Timiebi (2010, p.45) agreed with the finding of Bola when he revealed in his study that the Niger Delta Militancy crisis was adequately covered by the Nigerian mass media, particularly, the broadcast media. Remi (2010, p.31) also agreed with Bola and Timiebi when he also found out from his study that the media gave adequate coverage to Jos crisis.

Apart from adequacy of coverage, the criterion of timeliness is very important. It is a fundamental and an expedient criterion for newsworthiness. For news (especially hard news) to make the desired impact, timeliness is a core demand. It is a yardstick amongst others, which is always employed to assess the worthiness of an event. Laying credence to the above assertion, Okunna (1999, p.46), affirmed that “the quality of newness is the most fundamental of the criteria for determining what should qualify as news”. Supporting Okunna’s assertion, Uwakwe, (2005, p.50), affirmed that;

The more recent an event is at the time of going to air or publication, the more timely and interesting it becomes. The closer the event, the more interesting it is; currency gives news life. Remember, “Nothing is as dead as yesterday’s news”. This “latest development” gives news its last minute effect.

Obviously, the factor of timeliness is no doubt very necessary when reporting events, including the emergence of crisis. Code 1.4.3 of the Nigerian Broadcasting Code asserts that;

In calling attention to crisis, timely basic information shall be provided to assist the public and to facilitate rescue and other forms of amelioration. In so doing, the practitioners shall be protected by the commission.

The above assertion is no doubt, an obvious attestation to the necessity of timeliness in conflict reportage. In fact, it is very correct to state here that timeliness is a social responsibility which places a demand on the media to give timely account of events. Here, it goes far beyond just giving account of events. Rather, timely account is seriously expected of the media. This is very fundamental. Ozoh, (2000, p.2), opined;

News is often regarded as a perishable commodity. Therefore, it must be timely if it is to have value. This is in the sense that if an account of an event is not rendered as soon as it happened, such an account may become stale later on. In essence, therefore, one of the principle consideration in deciding on the newsworthiness or not of an event is whether an account of such an event at the given time is timely.... Television and radio excel in this regard.

Furthermore, Okunna, (p.46), in agreement with the assertion of Ozoh, affirmed that;

Timeliness is the newness of news. A newsworthy event should be reported after the shortest possible time interval following its occurrence. Otherwise, it ceases to be news.

More so, Ngwu, (2000, p.38), opined that;

We regard news as a perishable commodity. As such, it must be timely in order to have value. This is in the sense that you render an account of an event as soon as it happened. In other words, the account must have recency. If the account is not timely, the news becomes stale.

Ngwu, (p.52) further contends that “because news has always been regarded as a perishable commodity, which is capable of getting sour, and coupled with competition from other mass media organizations, the reporter always find himself faced with deadlines for filling news reports”.

In Nigeria, scholars have contended that the media have not been timely in their reportage of conflicts. Afolabi (2010, p.63) lends credence to the above assertion when he unveiled in his study that the Nigerian media have not fared well in timely reportage of insurgencies, particularly the Niger Delta crisis. Yusuf (2010, p.92) agreed with Afolabi when he equally found in his study that the media have failed in giving timely account of Jos crisis. Ikenna (2009, p.101) further lends credence to the above findings when he unveiled in his study that the Nigerian media have not been very timely in their account of events, especially insurgencies.

Another core responsibility of the media is the surveillance function. Here, the media are expected to bring to the consciousness of the public impending dangers. This function places a demand on the media to cover, analyze and report significant developments within and outside a given society. Lasswell (1984) in Odigbo (2003, p.178), opines that “they (mass media) watch over, guard and alert society of impending problems and often proffer the way forward”.

Studies have revealed that the Nigerian media have not fared well in this regard. Okpara (2010, p.31) unveiled in his study that the Nigerian media are yet to effectively play the surveillance function of the media in their reportage of conflicts. He contended that this has led to the unabated conflicts in Nigeria. Okali (2011, p.75) lends support to the above finding when he unveiled in his study that the Nigerian media have not done well in discharging their surveillance role, particularly in the Boko Haram crisis.

In reporting daily occurrences, including the outbreak of conflicts, the media, despite the ownership pattern are generally expected to display a real sense of objectivity. They must ensure balance and fairness in their reports. This implies that their reports must be free from bias. To guarantee this, all parties involved must be given equal attention. Stories must not be one sided. Facts must be separated from opinions. All over the world, virtually the entire broadcasting codes and journalism ethics emphasize objectivity in news reportage. In Nigeria for instance, code 3.3.3 of the broadcasting code states that “all sides to any issue of public interest shall be equitably presented to ensure fairness”.

Also, code 2 (i) of the code of ethics for Nigerian journalists affirmed the above when it states that;

The public has a right to know. Factual, accurate, balance and fair reporting is the ultimate objective of good journalism and the basis of earning public trust and confidence.

Unfair and unbalanced journalism is capable of eroding away public confidence in the reporter or the media organization. (Udoudo and Basse, 2001, p.43).

In Nigeria, it is very expedient to ask how the media have fared in upholding objectivity, particularly during conflicts. Ademola and Okeke (2011, p.14) confirmed in their study that the Nigerian media have been biased in reporting crisis in Nigeria. Oputa, (2011, p.67) also unveiled in his study that objectivity was not observed in media coverage of the Niger Delta crisis.

Lawrence (2011, p.99) equally revealed in his study that the Nigerian media, particularly the broadcast media have been biased in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. He further contended that their reportage of the insurgency have most often glorified the act of terrorism.

As affirmed earlier, the Boko Haram sect has carried out several deadly attacks which have claimed lots of lives and properties. Within January 2010 to January 2012, Vanguard Newspaper of December 10, 2011 and January 23, 2012, x-rayed major attacks that were orchestrated by Boko Haram sect. They are hereunder x-rayed;

- January 2010, four persons killed in an attack at Dala Alemderi Ward in Maiduguri metropolis, Borno State.
- September 7, 2010, group freed over 700 inmates from a prison in Bauchi State.
- Friday January 28, 2011, group killed Borno State candidate of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP), Mr. Modu Fannami Gubio, his brother, four police officers and a 12 year old boy.
- March 3, 2011: Three people are killed and 21 injured by an explosive device thrown from a car at an election rally near Nigeria's capital, Abuja.
- April 1, 2011: Sect attacked a police station in Bauchi.
- April 7 2011: An explosion hits a polling booth at Unguwar Doki, Maiduguri, Borno State, injuring more than 10 people.
- April 8 2011: Bomb explosion at the Independent Electoral Commission office in Suleja, kills 11.
- April 9, 2011: A polling center in Maiduguri was bombed.
- April 15, 2011: The Maiduguri office of the Independent National Electoral Commission was bombed, and several people were shot in a separate incident on the same day.
- April 20, 2011: Boko Haram killed a Muslim cleric and ambushed several police officers in Maiduguri.
- April 21, 2011: Two suspected bomb makers die in a blast in Kaduna.
- April 22, 2011: Boko Haram freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State.
- April 25, 2011: Three mob blasts rip through a hotel and a motor park in Maiduguri killing at least two persons.
- May 29, 2011: Boko Haram blamed for a series of bombings in northern Nigeria that killed 15 persons.
- June 17, 2011: The group's suicide bomber bombed the Police Force Headquarters in Abuja killing many people.
- June 26, 2011: The sect bombed a beer garden in Maidguri, killing about 25 people.
- June 27, 2011: Another bombing in Maiduguri attributed to the group killed at least two girls and wounded three customs officials.
- July 03, 2011: Another bombing in a beer garden in Maiduguri killed about 20 people.
- July 10, 2011: A bombing at the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State. (38).
- August 12, 2011: A prominent Muslim Cleric, Liman Bana was shot dead by Boko Haram.
- August 26, 2011: The UN headquarters in Abuja was blown up by a suicide car bomber, leaving at least 21 dead and dozens injured.
- October 16,2011: Boko Haram shot and killed politician Modu Bintube outside of his home in Maiduguri.

- October 22, 2011: Boko Haram slew Alhaji Zakariya Isa, a Nigerian Television Authority journalist, claiming that he was a government informant.
- November 5, 2011: A series of coordinated attacks in Borno and Yobe States, primarily around Damaturu, killed at least 67 people, leaving a new police headquarters in ruins, and government offices burned.
- November 11 2011: Explosion in Bauchi left five people injured.
- December 8, 2011: Bomb least at a market in Kaduna claim 15.
- December 25, 2011: Bomb explosion at St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla, Sulaja, Niger State. 43 persons died.
- January 20, 2012: Multiple bomb explosions in Kano State metropolis left 186 persons dead.
- January 22, 2012: Bomb explosions in Bauchi left 11 dead.
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Theoretical Underpinning

Theories are maps of realities. This implies that they help to give explanations as to why things occur the way they do. They serve as clarifiers of events. This indicates that theories are relevant tools to ensure clarity of events.

Consequent on the above, this research is anchored on the framing, individual differences and social responsibility theories.

Framing Theory

This is a fundamental and unique theory which lots of media houses have adopted and utilized in their day to day operations. The theory opines that the way media frame words in their reportage impacts on public understanding of the issue and consequently determine their responses. Fairhurst and Star (1996, p.2), assert that “a frame refers to the way media and media gatekeepers organize and present the events and issues they cover, and the way audience interpret what they are provided”. This theory is similar to the agenda-setting theory. Frames influence the perception of news by the audience, this form of agenda setting not only tells what to think about, but also how to think about it. (fairhurst et al, 1996, p.3).

Accordingly, the way and manner the Nigerian broadcast media frame words in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgencies impacts seriously on the perception of the public on the issue. It determines to some extent, how the public perceive the Boko Haram insurgency.

Individual Differences Theory

This theory seeks to explain the differences amongst human beings in terms of their reactions or responses to issues. Wogu, (2008,p.119) asserts that “this approach holds that each and every member of the audiences possesses unique qualities, which accounts for the differences in behaviour”. One strong reason mass media messages cannot have the same effect on all members of a mass media audience is because there are individual differences in personality characteristics among such members. (Bittner, 1989).

In line with this study, the differences in the psychological trait of Nigerians largely affected their responses on how the broadcast media reported the Boko Haram insurgency.

Social Responsibility Theory

This theory according to Ndolo, (2005, p.35) “owes its origin to an American initiative – the 1947 Hutchins Commission on the freedom of the press”. The theory emerged as a result of the fact that the unlimited freedom advocated by the libertarian theory can be abused. Ndolo, (p.35) asserts that “the idea arose from fears expressed that free market of ideas was been threatened by ownership restrictions to rich individuals or large corporations”.

This theory opines that the media must discharge their duties responsibly. In their bid to report events, they must display high sense of responsibility by reporting accurately. Theodore Peterson, in sandman et al (1972, p.170) as cited in Ukonu (2007, p.32), gave credence to the above assertion when he stated that “the press is obliged to be responsible to society for carrying out certain essential functions of mass communication in contemporary society to the extent that the press recognizes its responsibility and makes it the basis of operational policies”. Also affirming the above assertion, code 2 (ii) of the code of ethics for Nigerian journalists, asserts that “a journalist should refrain from publishing inaccurate and misleading information....” The implication of this code is to enforce responsibility in the practice of journalism in Nigeria.

Accordingly, in the emergence of a critical and very disturbing situation like the Boko Haram insurgency, the media (broadcast media) owe the public a responsibility to come up with prompt, balanced, accurate, objective and well verified reports. They must acknowledge the fact that they exist to serve the public and as such, they have a duty of not just serving the public, but serving them responsibly. This is the thrust of the social responsibility theory.

Consequent on the above, it can be stated here that the extent to which the Nigerian broadcast media observed this responsibility in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency went a long way to determine the kind of responses that were elicited in this study.

Methodology

The researchers employed Survey research methodological approach to prosecute this study. Residents of six randomly selected cities from the six geo-political zones of Nigeria were surveyed. Simple random sampling technique was used to administer copies of the questionnaire to the respondents. Also, tables and percentages were used to present and analyze the collected data. Below is a table of the six selected cities, their states, geo-political zones, population and percentages, as released by the National Population Commission of Nigeria.

Selected Cities	States	Geo-Political Zones	Populations	Percentages
Bauchi	Bauchi	North-East	493,730	18.6%
Kano Municipal	Kano	North-West	371,243	14%
Suleja	Niger	North-Central	215,075	8.1%
Ikeja	Lagos	South-West	317,614	12%
Enugu	Enugu	South-East	717,291	27%
Port-Harcourt	Rivers	South-South	538,558	20.3%
Total			2653511	100%

From the total population of 2653511, a sample of 625 was drawn using Taro Yamane formular (0.04 error margin). Proportional representation and systematic random sampling were used to distribute the designed copies of the questionnaire in such a manner that all the respondents in the selected cities had equal chances of been selected. Below is a table showing the proportional representation for each of the selected cities.

Selected Cities	States	Geo-Political Zones	Populations	Proportional Rep.
Bauchi	Bauchi	North-East	493,730	116
Kano Municipal	Kano	North-West	371,243	87
Suleja	Niger	North-Central	215,075	51
Ikeja	Lagos	South-West	317,614	75
Enugu	Enugu	South-East	717,291	169
Port-Harcourt	Rivers	South-South	538,558	127
Total			2653511	625

Analysis and Results

Simple percentage was used to analyze the collected data. It is however very expedient to state here that out of the 625 copies of the questionnaire administered, 9 were wrongly filled while 14 lost in transit, making a total of 23 representing 3.6% mortality rate. To this end, the researchers worked with the remaining 601 copies of the questionnaire.

On whether Nigerians Perceive the Broadcast Media to have so far reported the Boko Haram Insurgence Adequately

Selected Cities	Yes	No	Can't Say	Total
Bauchi	103 (17.1)	3 (0.4)	1 (0.1)	107 (17.6)
Kano Municipal	78 (13)	5 (0.8)	3 (0.4)	86 (14.2)
Suleja	47 (8)	2 (0.3)	2 (0.3)	51 (8.6)
Ikeja	61 (10.1)	7 (1.1)	6 (1)	74 (12.2)
Enugu	152 (25.2)	4 (0.6)	2 (0.3)	158 (26.1)
Port-Harcourt	106 (18)	11 (2)	8 (1.3)	125 (21.3)
Total	547 (91.4)	32 (5.2)	22 (3.4)	601 (100)

The table above shows that 547 respondents representing 91.4% affirmed that broadcast media in Nigeria have so far reported the Boko Haram insurgence adequately. 32 respondents representing 5.2% said that the broadcast stations in Nigeria have not adequately reported the Boko Haram insurgency, while 22 respondents representing 3.4% indicated that they can't say anything in that regard. From the above analysis, it is very obvious that Nigerians perceived the broadcast stations to have so far reported the Boko Haram insurgence adequately. Bola 2010, Timiebi 2010, and Remi, 2010 all gave credence to this finding.

On whether Nigerians see the Broadcast Media as Timely in their Reportage of the Boko Haram Insurgence

Selected Cities	Yes	No	Can't Say	Total
Bauchi	14 (2.2)	91 (15.1)	2 (0.3)	107 (17.6)
Kano Municipal	9 (1.4)	71 (11.8)	6 (1)	86 (14.2)
Suleja	7 (1.2)	41 (7)	3 (0.4)	51 (8.6)
Ikeja	4 (0.6)	69 (11.5)	1(0.1)	74 (12.2)
Enugu	21 (3.4)	132 (21.9)	5 (0.8)	158 (26.1)
Port-Harcourt	16 (3)	107 (18)	2 (0.3)	125 (21.3)

Total	71 (11.8)	511 (85.3)	19 (2.9)	601 (100)

From the above table, 71 respondents, representing 11.8% agreed that broadcast media in Nigeria have been timely in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency, while 511 respondents, representing 85.3% of the total respondents indicated that broadcast stations in Nigeria have not been timely in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. 19 respondents representing 2.9% of the total respondents indicated that they can't say anything in this regard. It is very clear from the above analysis that Nigerians see broadcast stations in Nigeria as not been timely in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. The findings of Afolabi, 2010, Yusuf, 2010, and Ikenna, 2009, upheld this finding.

On whether Nigerians adjudge the Broadcast Media to have effectively played the Surveillance function of the Media in their Reportage of the Boko Haram Insurgency

Selected Cities	Yes	No	Can't Say	Total
Bauchi	11 (1.8)	92 (15.2)	4 (0.6)	107 (17.6)
Kano Municipal	6 (1)	79 (13.1)	1 (0.1)	86 (14.2)
Suleja	4 (0.6)	41 (7)	6 (1)	51 (8.6)
Ikeja	3 (0.4)	66 (11)	5 (0.8)	74 (12.2)
Enugu	7 (1.1)	150 (24.9)	1 (0.1)	158 (26.1)
Port-Harcourt	20 (3.3)	101 (17)	4 (1)	125 (21.3)
Total	51 (8.2)	529 (88.7)	21 (3.6)	601 (100)

The above table shows that 51 respondents representing 8.2% of the total respondents affirmed that broadcast stations in Nigeria have effectively played the surveillance function of the media, while 529 respondents representing 88.7% of the total respondents said that the Nigerian broadcast media have not effectively played the surveillance function of the media in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. 21 respondents representing 36% of the total population indicated that they can't say anything with regard to this question. From the analysis above, it is very obvious that broadcast stations in Nigeria have not effectively played the surveillance function of the media in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. Okpara (2010, p.31) upheld this finding when he unveiled in his study that the Nigerian media are yet to effectively play the surveillance function of the media in their reportage of conflicts. He contended that this has led to the unabated conflicts in Nigeria. Okali (2011, p.75) lend support to the above finding when he unveiled in his study that the Nigerian media have not done well in discharging their surveillance role, particularly in the Boko Haram crisis.

On whether Nigerians see the Broadcast Media as been Biased in their Reportage of the Boko Haram Insurgency

Selected Cities	Yes	No	Can't Say	Total
Bauchi	101 (16.8)	5 (0.7)	1 (0.1)	107 (17.6)
Kano Municipal	81 (13.4)	2 (0.3)	3 (0.5)	86 (14.2)
Suleja	38 (6.3)	8 (1.3)	5 (1)	51 (8.6)
Ikeja	72 (12)	1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	74 (12.2)
Enugu	141 (23.4)	12 (1.9)	5 (0.8)	158 (26.1)
Port-Harcourt	107 (18)	16 (3)	2 (0.3)	125 (21.3)

Total	540 (89.8)	44 (7.4)	17 (2.8)	601 (100)
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The above table reveals that 540 respondents representing 89.8% of the total population affirmed that the broadcast stations in Nigeria have been biased in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency, while 44 respondents representing 7.4% of the total respondents indicated that broadcast stations in Nigeria have not been biased in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. 17 respondents representing 2.8% of the total population indicated that they cannot respond to the question. The above analysis implies that Nigerians see broadcast stations in Nigeria as been biased in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. Ademola and Okeke (2011, p.14) gave credence to the above finding when they revealed in their study that the Nigerian media have been biased in reporting crisis in Nigeria. Also, Oputa (2011, p.67) affirmed the above when he found in his study that objectivity was not observed in media coverage of the Niger Delta crisis. Lawrence (2011, p.99) equally revealed in his study that the Nigerian media, particularly the broadcast media have been biased in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.

On whether Nigerians Perceive the Broadcast Media Reportage of the Boko Haram Insurgence as Glorifying of the act of Terrorism

Selected Cities	Yes	No	Can't Say	Total
Bauchi	102 (16.9)	4 (0.6)	1 (0.1)	107 (17.6)
Kano Municipal	74 (12.3)	9 (1.5)	3 (0.4)	86 (14.2)
Suleja	41 (7)	4 (0.6)	6(1)	51 (8.6)
Ikeja	65 (10.8)	6 (1)	3 (0.4)	74 (12.2)
Enugu	123 (20.4)	31 (5.1)	4 (0.6)	158 (26.1)
Port-Harcourt	101 (17)	22 (4)	2 (0.3)	125 (21.3)
Total	506 (84.4)	76 (12.8)	19 (2.8)	601 (100)

The above table shows that 506 respondents representing 84.4% of the total respondents indicated that broadcast media reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency is glorifying of the act of terrorism, while 76 respondents representing 12.8% of the total respondents said that the broadcast media reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency is not glorifying of the act of terrorism. 19 respondents representing 2.8% of the total respondents indicated that they can't comment in that direction. The implication of the above analysis is that Nigerians see the broadcast media reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency as glorifying of the act of terrorism. Lawrence (2011, p.99) upheld the above finding when he found out that broadcast media reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency have most often glorified the act of terrorism.

Summary of Findings

At the end of the presentation of results and analysis, the following findings were made;

- (1) The broadcast media have so far reported the Boko Haram insurgency adequately.
- (2) The broadcast media have not been timely in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.
- (3) The broadcast media have not effectively played the surveillance function of the media in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.

- (4) The broadcast media have been biased in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.
- (5) Broadcast media reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency have glorified the act terrorism.

Recommendations

In line with the findings of this study, the following recommendations were made;

- (1) The broadcast media must understand that timeliness is a very expedient criterion of news worthiness. To this end, they should (as a matter of necessity) give timely account of the Boko Haram insurgency.
- (2) A very fundamental function of the media is the surveillance function. The Nigerian broadcast media must endeavour to effectively play this role in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.
- (3) Virtually all the laws establishing and regulating the media strongly emphasize objectivity, accuracy and balanced reportage. These laws vehemently frown at biased reporting of events. In this regard, broadcast stations in Nigeria must shun bias and embrace objectivity in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency.
- (4) As earlier recommended, broadcast stations in Nigeria should embrace objectivity in their account of events. This, amongst others implies that they must carefully report the Boko Haram insurgency in such a manner that will not glorify the act of terrorism.

Conclusion

The fact that the media is central to the restoration of peace in postcolonial Nigeria is not a subject of debate. But the way and manner they report conflicts such as the Boko Haram insurgency is a serious concern. As earlier recommended, the Nigerian media, particularly the broadcast stations must uphold objectivity in their reportage of not just violent insurgencies but news generally. There should be a paradigm shift from biased to objective reporting. This is a core demand for news dissemination.

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